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Fourth edition . . *January*, 1930

To MY WIFE

PREFACE TO THE FOURTH EDITION

Owing to the wide use of this manual for examination purposes in England and America, it has not been thought advisable to introduce any fundamental changes of treatment into the present edition. The work, however, has been made more comprehensive, and brought thoroughly up to date, by the incorporation of new sections dealing, not only with recent theological developments, but also with the religious and ethical implications of the chief movements of thought in the scientific world, particularly those connected with Emergent Evolution and Relativity.

Much more attention has been devoted to Psychology, the influence of which upon theology and ethics has been steadily increasing since the issue of the last edition. In particular, an attempt has been made to supply a discriminating criticism of Freudianism and the allied schools. The author hopes that this may assist the student in the far from easy task of separating the valuable and well-established results of " the New Psychology " from its more questionable elements.

In response to requests from Transatlantic readers, a section has been added on " the New Psychology of America "—Behaviourism. Although this system

of aggressive Materialism has not secured the adhesion of a single serious American thinker, and has lately lost caste even among specialists in experimental psychology, the fatal fascination which it still exerts over the minds of American undergraduates renders it necessary to accord it a somewhat fuller treatment than its intrinsic importance deserves.

The discussion of the problem of "the Two Natures," which formed the leading feature of the last edition, has now been relegated to a supplement. Defenders of the Chalcedonian Definition have lately been active and persuasive,[1] and the controversy has to some extent died down. That it is not dead, however, is clearly shown by the recent appearance of the volume, *The Lord of Life*, most of the contributors to which are decidedly critical of the Chalcedonian formulation.

Few things are easier than to criticize the two-nature formula of Chalcedon; few more difficult than to find an adequate substitute. When all has been said, it remains a simple fact, that of all the incarnational formulas hitherto suggested, the Chalcedonian is the only one which, on the one hand safeguards the complete and perfect humanity of the Redeemer, and on the other erects an impassable barrier against the loose semi-pantheistic identification of Godhead with manhood, which characterized ancient Pagan thought, and has its advocates even to-day.

[1] See especially Fr. L. S. Thornton's able book, *The Incarnate Lord*, 1928.

CHARLES HARRIS.

January, 1930.

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SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER, 1930

SEEING that Dr. Gore's *New Commentary on Holy Scripture* (S.P.C.K. 1928, 2nd edit. 1929) is by this time in the hands of most theological students, it seems unnecessary to increase the bulk of this work by including in it any such survey of the most recent results of biblical criticism as that volume contains. Dr. Gore's Commentary also contains much important apologetic matter which it seems unnecessary to duplicate. The student of Apologetics is referred particularly to the following articles: "The Bible in the Church"; "The Function of Literary and Historical Criticism"; "The Teaching of our Lord Jesus Christ"; "The Knowledge of Christ Incarnate"; "The Evidence of the Resurrection"; "The Virgin Birth of our Lord"; "The New Testament and the Catholic Creeds"; and "The Theology of St. Paul."

The present writer has expressed his views on the difficult and highly controversial question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel in an appendix to this Gospel in the New Commentary. It may be added that the opinion there expressed, which is favourable to the Johannine authorship, is

shared, not only by Dr. Gore, but also by the two other editors of the Commentary, Prof. Goudge and Prof. Guillaume.

For a convincing defence of the institution of at least the major sacraments by the Historical Jesus, the student is referred to Prof. F. Gavin's important book, *The Jewish Antecedents of the Christian Sacraments* (S.P.C.K., 5*s*.), which deals mainly with Jewish Sacramentalism ; and to his briefer treatment of the same subject in *The New Commentary ;* also to Prof. N. P. Williams's brilliant essay, " The Origin of the Sacraments," in *Essays Catholic and Critical.* If this convincing piece of apologetics has a fault, it is that it makes more concessions than seem really necessary to negative criticism.

Considerable help towards meeting the difficulties raised by modern anthropology and the science of comparative religion will be found in Dr. E. O. James's contributions to *The New Commentary* and to *Essays Catholic and Critical.*

The student who wishes to keep up to date in his study of Apologetics will find it useful to consult *Theology* (1*s*. monthly), which contains frequent apologetic articles by theologians of the first rank, written for the most part from the Liberal-Orthodox standpoint, which is that of this manual.

Recent Tendencies in Theology

At the time of the issue of the last edition of this work (1923), the subject of Modernism was

prominently before the public mind; and it seemed to many that future theological development would be mainly in the direction of extreme Modernism and Liberalism.

This has not proved to be the case. The outstanding theological feature of the last few years has been the appearance of a succession of able and influential works representing the Liberal-Orthodox—and, for the most part, the Liberal-Catholic—position. Most members of the new Liberal-Catholic school stand in succession to the contributors to *Lux Mundi*, and look for leadership and inspiration to its veteran editor, Dr. Gore. His widely read trilogy, *The Reconstruction of Belief* (1927, 7*s.* 6*d.*), its sequel, *Can we then Believe?* (6*s.*); his "magnum opus," *The New Commentary;* his brief but impressive contribution and the "Home University Library," *Jesus of Nazareth* (2*s.* 6*d.*); and his defence of Christian moral principles in *Christ and Society* (4*s.* 6*d.*), constitute a series of apologetic works which are indispensable to the student.

The outstanding characteristic of the new school is its attempt to revive the spirit and methods of the greatest of the early theologians and apologists, Origen, whose originality and audacity of speculation were out of harmony with prevailing temper of post-Nicene Christianity, and prevented him from winning that recognition to which his merits justly entitle him. Convinced, like him, that the acceptance of new truth, and the development of old to its logical consequences, are not inconsistent

with faithful adherence to apostolic tradition,[1] the apologists of the new school attempt to achieve such a synthesis of revealed truth and modern knowledge as the modern mind can accept without doing violence to its fundamental presuppositions.

The present-day representatives of the *Lux Mundi* school of theology are more closely in touch with modern progressive thought than were even the contributors to that famous volume. Their attitude towards New Testament criticism is distinctly more "liberal"; in dealing with theological problems they make freer and bolder use of speculation and hypothesis; and, while showing due deference to the ecclesiastical authority of the past and of the present, they consider themselves at liberty to restate boldly in terms of contemporary thought doctrines which, in their purely traditional form, are liable to be misunderstood or present difficulties to modern minds. While adhering to the affirmations of the Catholic Creeds and Ecumenical Councils, and seeking to preserve all that is of value in the Church's theological tradition, the modern school insists that theology, not less than the other sciences, is progressive; and that accordingly theologians ought to adopt a sympathetic and welcoming attitude towards new truth. Confident that in the religion of the Incarnation it possesses (in principle at least) the key to universal knowledge, it looks modern difficulties in the face,

[1] See, for example, his valuable remarks on development and its relation to apostolic tradition in his *De Principiis* (i. 3).

and attempts to find solutions to them which the modern mind can accept.

Of course, original and constructive thinking of this order involves certain risks, and doubtless recent apologists have made mistakes—mistakes which further reflection and research will correct. But beyond all question it is the writings of this rather than of the more strictly conservative school of apologists which have arrested the drift towards extreme Modernism which was becoming dangerous, and have caused the theological tide to set—at least in this country—in the direction of a theological position which, while definitely modern and liberal, is at the same time essentially Catholic and orthodox.

It is difficult to speak with confidence as to the dominant theological tendency of an age marked by such widespread religious unsettlement as the present; but if the theological thought of the last few years is to be judged by the quantity and quality of the output of literature, it is hardly rash to surmise that the bulk of the liberal thought of this country favours rather the Liberal-Orthodox than the definitely Modernist position—a state of things which apparently prevails in very few Christian countries, certainly not in Germany or America.

Among the numerous recent productions of the Liberal-Catholic School may be mentioned (besides Dr. Gore's works, and *Essays Catholic and Critical*) R. H. Thouless, *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (*7s. 6d.*); O. Hardman (ed.), *Psychology*

and the Church (10*s.* 6*d.*); H. Slesser, *Religio Laici* (4*s.* 6*d.*); P. N. Waggett, *Knowledge and Virtue* (10*s.* 6*d.*); E. J. Bicknell, *In Defence of Christian Prayer* (3*s.* 6*d.*); A. H. McNeile, *The Problem of the Future Life* (3*s.* 6*d.*); J. A. Lacey, *The One Body and the One Spirit* (6*s.*), *Authority in the Church* (3*s.* 6*d.*), and *The Reformation and the People* (4*s.*); H. Maynard Smith, *Atonement* (12*s.* 6*d.*); W. Lockton, *The Resurrection and Other Gospel Narratives and the Narratives of the Virgin Birth* (5*s.*); H. M. Relton, *Some Postulates of a Christian Philosophy* (7*s.* 6*d.*); A. B. Whitham, *The Mystery of Belief* (3*s.* 6*d.*); F. H. Brabant and P. Hartill, *Faith and Truth* (philosophical, 3*s.* 6*d.*); A. E. J. Rawlinson, *St. Mark* (16*s.*), *The New Testament Doctrine of the Christ* (12*s.* 6*d.*), and (ed.) *Essays on the Trinity and the Incarnation* (21*s.*); K. D. Mackenzie, *The Confusion of the Churches* (10*s.* 6*d.*), and *The Case for Episcopacy* (on Reunion, 3*s.* 6*d.*); E. G. Selwyn, *The Approach to Christianity* (10*s.* 6*d.*); J. Paterson-Smith, *Myself and Other Problems* (6*s.*); K. Ingram, *Why I Believe* (criticizes Bertrand Russell, 6*s.*); J. K. Mozley, *The Impassibility of God* (7*s.* 6*d.*), and *The Doctrine of God* (4*s.*); N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and Original Sin* (very important, 21*s.*); F. H. Brabant, *Prayer, Some Facts and Fallacies* (2*s.*); A. E. Taylor, *David Hume and the Miraculous* (2*s.* 6*d.*); C. Harris, *First Steps in the Philosophy of Religion* (4*s.* and 2*s.* 6*d.*); J. H. Beibitz, *What I Believe and Why I Believe It* (2*s.* 6*d.*), and *Rationalism and Orthodoxy of To-day* (5*s.*); O. C. Quick, *The*

Christian Sacraments (10*s.* 6*d.*) ; P. Hartill, *The Necessity of Redemption* (on the Atonement, 7*s.* 6*d.*) ; K. E. Kirk, *Ignorance, Faith, and Conformity* (8*s.* 6*d.*), and *Conscience and its Problems* (16*s.*) ; F. Gavin, *The Jewish Antecedents of the Christian Sacraments* (5*s.*) ; C. H. Valentine, *Modern Psychology and the Validity of Christian Experience* (7*s.* 6*d.*), and *What do we Mean by God?* (7*s.* 6*d.*) ; B. R. Brasnett, *The Sufferings of the Impassible God* (7*s.* 6*d.*) ; A. E. Burn, *The Council of Nicæa* (3*s.* 6*d.*) ; L. Hodgson, *The Place of Reason in Christian Apologetics* (4*s.*), and *And Was Made Man* (9*s.*) ; A. Chandler, *Christian Religious Experience* (4*s.*) ; L. S. Thornton, *The Incarnate Lord* (important, 21*s.*).

Nearly all these works are directly or indirectly apologetic, and most of them are critical of the extreme Modernist position. Something of a novelty in apologetic literature is the piquant combination which not a few of them exhibit of essential orthodoxy with free—sometimes even rash—speculation. For example, Fr. Thornton restates the doctrine of the Incarnation in terms of " emergent evolution," with constant reference to the biological views of C. Lloyd Morgan and the metaphysics of S. Alexander. E. G. Selwyn appeals to the new psychology and the phenomena of mystical experience to explain—at least on the subjective side—the manifestations of the Risen Jesus. W. Spens restates the Church's eucharistic doctrine in terms of an ultra-modern metaphysical system at present in vogue at Cambridge. F.

Gavin vindicates the Judæo-Christian origin of the Church's sacraments by means of an original investigation of rabbinical sacramentalism, which tends to reverse many current assumptions. N. P. Williams attempts to supplant St. Augustine's theory of original sin by an audacious and improbable—but not actually unorthodox—theory of his own. Beyond doubt the present age has witnessed a revival of bold speculation and original constructive thinking in theology, which has been rare—perhaps unexampled—among orthodox writers since the days of Origen and his school.

Among works which, though not of this school, approach more or less to the Liberal-Orthodox (and in certain cases even the Liberal-Catholic) position, the following are worthy of note: W. Temple, *Christus Veritas* (an important apologetic work, 5*s.*); D. S. Cairns, *The Reasonableness of the Christian Faith* (3*s.* 6*d.*); W. B. Selbie, *The Psychology of Religion* (10*s.* 6*d.*); W. R. Matthews, *The Psychological Approach to Religion* (3*s.*); H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ* (2*s.*), and *The Christian Apprehension of God* (6*s.*); V. F. Storr, *The Problem of the Cross* (4*s.*); T. W. Pym, *More Psychology and the Christian Life* (4*s.*); A. C. Bouquet, *The Christian Religion and its Competitors To-day* (6*s.*); S. Angus, *The Mystery Religions and Christianity* (15*s.*); A. E. Garvie, *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* (16*s.*); W. R. Matthews, *God and Evolution* (3*s.*); J. E. Turner, *Personality and Reality, A Proof of the Real Existence of a Supreme Self in the*

Universe (7*s.* 6*d.*) ; A. C. Baird, *Christian Fundamentals, A Modern Apology for the Apostles' Creed* (7*s.* 6*d.*) ; D. C. Mackintosh, *The Reasonableness of Christianity* (6*s.*) ; F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* (2nd series, 16*s.*) ; H. D. Anthony, *Relativity and Religion* (6*s.*) ; G. Galloway, *Faith and Reason in Religion* (7*s.* 6*d.*) ; W. P. Paterson, *The Nature of Religion* (a sound apologetic work, 15*s.*) ; S. A. McDowall, *Creative Personality and Evolution* (5*s.*) ; D. S. Cairns, *The Faith that Rebels* (on miracles, 8*s.* 6*d.*) ; H. J. Wotherspoon, *Religious Values in the Sacraments* (7*s.*) ; H. Balmforth, *Is Christian Experience an Illusion?* ; C. J. Shebbeare, *The Problem of Providence* (4*s.*).

Recent Modernist and Liberal theological literature has shown a welcome tendency towards a more balanced outlook—indeed, in not a few cases a distinct approximation to the orthodox standpoint. Nearly all the contributors to *Foundations* now adopt almost or entirely the orthodox position. The Bishop of Durham has become an antagonist of Modernism, and in several recent utterances has defended with energy the Catholic doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, and of the Church. Dr. Streeter, who, though definitely a Modernist, has always stressed the positive aspect of the school to which he belongs, has produced two valuable apologetic works, *Reality* (8*s.* 6*d.*), and *Adventure* (7*s.* 6*d.*), which (on the subjects with which they deal) approximate very closely to traditional views. Even Dr. Major's *English*

Modernism (10*s.* 6*d.*), in spite of its somewhat polemical and aggressive tone, shows a considerable appreciation of—and even approximation to—the Liberal-Catholic standpoint. In a similar way his *Reminiscences of Jesus by an Eyewitness* (3*s.* 6*d.*) shows reaction towards conservatism in criticism. It treats St. Mark's narrative, even when it records physical miracles, as historical and trustworthy. For example, speaking of the Feeding of the Five Thousand, Dr. Major remarks : " We have no adequate explanation of it on non-miraculous lines : there have been many attempts of this sort, but the narrative does not lend itself to rationalization at present. We seem compelled to accept the historical fact, and to wait for its explanation " (p. 84).

In America the same reaction towards tradition is well illustrated by Dr. B. W. Bacon's *The Story of Jesus and the Beginnings of the Church* (8*s.* 6*d.*), which (considering the writer's advanced views on biblical criticism) is surprisingly orthodox in tone. This stimulating course of lectures, although adopting an unduly negative attitude towards well-attested New Testament documents (*e.g.* 1 Peter), yet rejects with decision the unsatisfying Liberalism of Harnack, which reduces Christianity to ethics. In Christology, Bacon approximates to the Catholic doctrine of the Incarnation, defends with energy the Resurrection—apparently the Bodily Resurrection—of Jesus, stresses the objective efficacy of His Atonement for human sin, and maintains that St. Paul was right in

regarding Christianity as a religion primarily of redemption.

The following Modernist and Liberal productions also deserve attention: B. H. Streeter, *The Four Gospels* (21*s.*); Shailer Matthews, *The Faith of Modernism* (6*s.*); A. Clutton-Brock, *Essays on Religion* (6*s.*); D. S. Robinson, *The God of the Liberal Christian* (7*s.* 6*d.*); F. Heiler (tr.), *The Spirit of Worship*; W. R. Inge, *The Church in the World* (6*s.*); H. E. Fordick, *Adventurous Religion* (6*s.*); C. E. Raven, *The Creator Spirit* (8*s.* 6*d.*).

The new school of Liberal Evangelicalism, the rise of which was noticed in our last edition, has not been active to any considerable extent in the literary field. However, its principles have been briefly stated and defended in V. F. Storr's *My Faith* (2*s.*); and a volume of essays on the Atonement has appeared under the editorship of L. W. Grensted. The devotional principles and methods of the school find worthy expression in *The Inner Life* (6*s.*), a sequel to *Liberal Evangelicalism.*

Pantheism and Semi-Pantheism

Thoroughgoing Pantheism, which reduces all that is to a single universal substance or real being, thereby extinguishing human free-will, and making God directly and solely responsible for sin, is a theory so repugnant to the developed moral consciousness, that at present it finds few supporters in the Western World, least of all in England.

No form of full Pantheism yet devised, or likely to be devised, is capable of satisfactory defence

from the ethical standpoint. It is simply not true that the pantheistic affirmation that God is the author of sin is in any way neutralized, or rendered morally innocuous, by the corresponding pantheistic affirmation that He is the author of virtue. A being who *ex hypothesi* combines the practice of virtue with addiction to vice and the commission of crime cannot fairly be called morally good, and certainly cannot be an object of worship—at least for Europeans.

Accordingly, in recent years Pantheism has given place—in this country at least—to a modified form of Monism,[1] which may conveniently be designated "Semi-Pantheism." As this view is presupposed by, and forms the philosophical basis of, most of the theological and Christological theories of advanced Modernism and Liberalism, some description and criticism of it in this place seems to be called for.

Semi-Pantheism aims at modifying Pantheism in such a way as to render it consistent (1) with the Christian doctrine of Creation; (2) with the moral perfection of God; and (3) with such a distinction between the being of God and that of creatures as to render human free-will and moral responsibility possible. Semi-Pantheism on the one hand distinguishes God from the universe, and on the other does not regard Him as independent of it.

[1] Monism is the doctrine that there exists only a single universal "substance." If this substance is conceived as spiritual, the result is Pantheism; if as matter or physical energy, the result is Materialism.

While admitting that the universe is in some sense the work of God, and that He may not unfittingly be described as its "Creator," it is quite explicit in its teaching that He is *dependent* upon created things in such a way that apart from them He neither is nor can become perfect. We are told, for instance, that "Creation is the complement of God"; that "creatures are as necessary to the existence of God as He is to theirs: neither is complete without the other"; and that "the relation of God to the world is organic." Prof. Pringle-Pattison goes as far as to write: "As soon as we begin to treat God and man as two independent facts, we lose our hold upon the experienced fact, which is *the existence of the one in the other and through the other.* Most people would probably be willing to admit this *mediated existence* in the case of man, but they might feel it akin to sacrilege to make the same assertion of God. And yet, if our metaphysic is, as it professes to be, an analysis of experience, the implication is strictly reciprocal" (*The Idea of God*, p. 308).

The statements here made, that the existence of God is a *mediated* existence, and that God and man exist each *in* the other and *through* the other, can only mean, if taken seriously, that God depends upon man for His existence, and consequently is not *self*-existent, as orthodox Theism postulates.

The following considerations seem to be conclusive against Semi-Pantheism.

(1) The theory that God is dependent upon creatures, either for existence or for perfection,

contradicts the plain testimony of the religious consciousness, as Prof. Pringle-Pattison himself goes far towards recognizing, when he admits to many such a view is " likely to appear akin to sacrilege." The most characteristic ingredient of genuine religious worship is what Rudolf Otto calls " creature-consciousness "—" the emotion of a creature abased and overwhelmed by its own nothingness in contrast to that which is supreme above all creatures." In the act of worship, which is the essential " moment " of religion, the worshipper knows with intuitive certainty that the " dependence " of which he is so acutely conscious is on the side of the creature alone, and is not in any sense reciprocal. It is a psychological impossibility to worship a being whom one regards as dependent upon oneself either for perfection or for being.

(2) Semi-Pantheism involves belief in the evolution, not only of the universe, but also of *God*—a view which, when thought out, is found to involve a contradiction of the law of causation, one of the root principles of rational thinking.

The evolution of the *universe* from a less to a more perfect condition does not contradict the causal principle, because (on the theistic supposition) God, who is antecedently perfect, is the cause of every advance which the universe makes towards a more excellent condition.

But the evolution of *God* involves an absolute contradiction of the law of causation, because, if He gradually becomes more perfect than He was

originally, every increment of perfection which He successively realizes is *an effect without due cause*—a " due cause " being one which is at least equal to its effect in magnitude and excellence. Of course, human beings are able to advance in excellence, because they are assisted in so doing by the grace of God. There exists, however, no superior being able to give grace to God ; from which it obviously follows that, unless God possesses perfection necessarily and from eternity, He never can achieve it.

(3) As a necessary condition of anything existing at all, *there must exist from eternity at least one being possessed of ultimate causal or creative power, whose existence does not depend upon anything else, or upon any condition, but is unconditional and absolute.* Such a " Root of Existence," or " First Cause of Being," we are bound by the law of causation to postulate ; whether, with Theism, we regard it as personal spirit ; or, with Pantheism, as impersonal spirit ; or, with Materialism, as matter or physical energy or some combination of both.

Full Pantheism (*e.g.* that of Hegel) recognizes this necessity, and provides for it by postulating the existence of a self-subsistent and eternal " Absolute."

Semi-Pantheism ignores it, recognizing only dependent being. According to its teaching, not only does the universe depend upon God, but God is equally dependent upon the universe (particularly upon man), and that, not only for perfection, but also for being.

This is entirely impossible. Every kind of "dependent" or "mediated" or "caused" being must ultimately be derived from and find support in *absolute* being, *i.e.* being which is independent, unmediated, and uncaused. If we accept Prof. Pringle-Pattison's theory of the mutual dependence of God and man, we are compelled logically to postulate the existence of some unknown and unrevealed "Super-God" (something like the "Veiled Being" of Mr. Wells) to account for the existence of both.

It is hardly necessary to point out that a "dependent" or "finite" god is not God at all in the Christian sense. He is nothing but a "demiurge," similar in nature to those inferior and often evil creators who played so prominent a part in the fantastic cosmogonies of the ancient Gnostics.

The student will find a fuller discussion of Pantheism and Semi-Pantheism in my recent book, *First Steps in the Philosophy of Religion* (S.C.M., 4*s.* and 2*s.* 6*d.*).

Science and Religion

Owing to the almost universal acceptance by orthodox theologians of the Darwinian doctrine of Evolution, the relations between religion and science in this country have been steadily improving for many years past, and are at present more harmonious than they have ever been within living memory. Significant evidence of this welcome change is afforded by the able and representative

volume, *Science, Religion, and Reality* (1925, 12*s.* 6*d.*), edited by an eminent biochemist, Joseph Needham, and supervised by an influential committee of scientists. Among books of similar outlook and tendency may be mentioned J. A. Thomson's *Science and Religion* (1925, 7*s.* 6*d.*); A. S. Eddington's *The Nature of the Physical World* (1928, 12*s.* 6*d.*); A. N. Whitehead's *Religion in the Making* (1926, 6*s.*), and *Science in the Modern World* (1926) and *Symbolism* (1928, 4*s.* 6*d.*).

Prof. Whitehead's treatment of religious questions, though suggestive and valuable, is somewhat handicapped by his imperfect acquaintance with modern philosophical theology.

The situation in America is quite different. There the so-called "Conflict between Religion and Science," which to the majority of the younger generation in this country is a dim tradition of the past, rages with unabated intensity—at least that is the impression produced by the recent volume of essays, *Creation by Evolution* (1928, 21*s.*), most of the contributors to which seem to regard orthodox Christianity as committed to Fundamentalism.

So far as this country is concerned, it seems now to be agreed by the majority of authorities that the scientific and the religious views of the universe, so far from being in conflict, are harmonious and complementary; and further, that even the distinctive doctrines of Christianity—at least as expounded by representative English theologians—are in principle reconcilable with the laws of nature

and the ascertained facts of science. Prof. Eddington, for example, speaking as a physicist, assures us that the acceptance of Einstein's doctrine of Relativity (see below) has considerably weakened the scientific objections to the doctrine of Free Will; and Dr. Wm. Brown declares: "Psychology cannot either prove or disprove Determinism" (*Science, Religion, and Reality*, pp. 214-6, 318). The contributors to this volume fully recognize the power of the human will to produce physical effects in the realm of nature, and they draw from this fact the correct inference that there can be no really "scientific" objection to the possibility of occasional "miracles": "If anything can be proved by direct experiment, it is that we can, in however small a measure, vary the 'natural' distribution of matter and energy. We can certainly act on our environment . . . [This] constitutes a spiritual invasion of the physical world:—it is a miracle" (p. 14). One of the most remarkable statements in this volume is that the maintenance of health—especially mental health—depends largely upon religious faith and prayer: "Religion is the most important thing in life . . . it is *essential to mental health*" (p. 312, italics mine).

If this theory of the dependence of physical and mental health upon religion be accepted, two important inferences seem to follow:

(1) That the religious view of the world—at least in its broad outlines—is objectively true; and

(2) That there ought to be close co-operation

between the ministers of religion and the practitioners of medicine on the treatment of disease.[1]

To maintain that the medical treatment of disease is efficacious in proportion to the truth of the theories in which it is based (which is the usual assumption), and at the same time to maintain that the religious treatment of disease is efficacious in spite of the entire falsity of the theology which underlies it, is not a position likely to commend itself to logical minds.

Emergent Evolution

In the materialistic atmosphere of the scientific world of the last century, Evolution—even Organic Evolution—was usually conceived as a process essentially physical, involving problems of mechanics and chemistry alone. "Teleology" (*i.e.* explanation in terms of "end" or "purpose") was at a discount. It was assumed that the only important factors to be considered were "atoms," "molecules," and physical (including chemical) forces, the nature of which was supposed to be thoroughly understood. Entirely typical of the narrow materialism of the period was Herbert Spencer's famous definition of Evolution: "Evolution is . . . a change from an incoherent homogeneity to a coherent heterogeneity, accompanying the dissipation of motion and integration of matter" (*First Principles*, c. xv, *ad fin.*). "Quality" and "value" were usually ignored, as of little or

[1] On such co-operation see the Report of the Archbishops' Committee on *The Ministry of Healing* (1924, 6*d.*).

no scientific importance, and perhaps in the last resort "unreal." Materialistic biology treated life, consciousness, and animal intelligence as elaborated products of organic chemistry. Even the human mind, in spite of the undeniable fact that it had created the very "science" which proclaimed its negligibility, was widely regarded as a useless by-product of Evolution, a mere "phosphorescence," or "epiphenomenon"—a kind of haunting "shadow" which accompanied (for no ascertainable or useful reason) the physical functioning of the human brain-cells, but exercised no influence of any kind upon the behaviour, conduct, or bodily movements of human beings (see below, pp. 185 f.).

The last fifteen years, however, have witnessed something approaching a revolution in the scientific outlook. The attention of Evolutionists is now focused much less upon "matter and motion" than upon "emergence," by which is meant the unexplained appearance—generally in ascending series—of new qualities and values. Evolution is now usually acknowledged to be, not the endless reproduction of similar situations and objects—not the mere reshuffling of essentially unchanging elements, but rather a *free creative* process, in which the level of perfection already attained is continually transcended, and ever higher values, biological, psychical, mental, and ethical, are successively realized. Whereas nineteenth-century science regarded the future as virtually contained in the past, and in principle predictable on the basis of it, not a few representative scientists of to-

day believe that the future has in store elements of *absolute novelty*, and that for this reason it is unpredictable, not only in fact, but also in principle.

To some slight extent the " emergent " point of view was anticipated in the last century by J. S. Mill, who in his *Logic* distinguished ordinary causation, in which the effect is merely the " arithmetical sum " of its causes, from " heteropathic " causation, in which the effect differs markedly in *quality* from its causal antecedents. For example, when the gases oxygen and hydrogen combine chemically to form the liquid water, the result is a compound which possesses hardly any of the distinguishing features of its constituents[1] (*Logic*, bk. iii, c. 10). G. H. Lewis (1875) used the actual word " emergent," contrasting it with " arithmetical resultant." W. M. Wundt also, at about the same date, declared the conception of " creative resultants " to be basic for psychology: " In all psychical combinations the product is not a mere sum of the separate elements, but . . . represents *a new creation.*"

It was, however, Bergson's influential work, *L'Évolution Creatrice* (1906, E.T. 1911), which first gave wide currency and popularity to the modern theory of " Emergence." At the present time, the view that Evolution is an " emergent " or " creative " process is widely accepted not only by philosophers, but also by biologists, both in England and America. Creative Emergence is the principal theme of the

[1] Mill also recognized " heteropathic " causation in psychology, speaking of it metaphorically as " mental chemistry."

recent volume *Creation by Evolution* (1928), to which twenty-six leading scientists (mostly American) contribute. The philosophical basis of Emergence has been elaborately worked out by C. D. Broad in *The Mind and its Place in Nature* (1925), and other writings; and still more fully by S. Alexander in his Gifford Lectures. A somewhat individual version of the theory is presented by J. S. Smuts in his *Holism and Evolution* (1926). From the psychological point of view, Emergence has recently been subjected to drastic (but not unsympathetic) criticism by W. McDougall in his *Modern Materialism and Emergent Evolution* (1928, *7s. 6d.*).

The literature of the subject is large and increasing, but all that the ordinary theological student need concern himself with is contained in Bergson's *Creative Evolution*; C. Lloyd Morgan's *Emergent Evolution* (1923), with its sequel *Life, Mind, and Spirit* (1926); and S. Alexander's *Space Time and Deity* (1927). Along with these should be studied McDougall's penetrating criticism, mentioned above.

According to Morgan and Alexander, who base their metaphysics mainly upon Einstein's Theory of Relativity, the universe has evolved gradually from a hypothetical potentiality, denominated "Space-Time." This, though it is denied the status of a "substance," is yet declared with some inconsistency to be "the stuff of things," and is by Alexander definitely equated with the primordial "hyle" of ancient Greek philosophy.

From " Space-Time " are evolved, through the creative activity of an ever upward-tending *nisus* (which in this system fulfils a function similar to that of Bergson's Élan Vital), first " matter," then living organisms, then intelligent organisms possessed of " mind." " Spirit " is treated as an emergent, distinct from and higher than mind. All these " emergents " (" matter," " life," " mind," " spirit ") exhibit absolutely new qualities, not to be found in earlier stages of the evolutionary process. Hence they are not predictable, even in principle, before their actual production.

Both writers postulate the existence of " Deity " —actual or potential—but their theological systems are as wide as the poles asunder.

According to Morgan, God exists *ab initio* as the active immanent principle of the entire process of development. The upward creative *nisus*, he declares, must be attributed ultimately to God. Alexander, on the other hand, denies the past and present existence of God, but looks forward to His probable production in the future. According to his view, " Deity " or " God " will emerge as the next stage of being, succeeding " mind " and " spirit." Certain premonitory indications of what God will be like are afforded by the highest and most sublime spiritual activities of religious men. But the actual and complete production of " God " (whom Mr. Alexander defines in the traditional manner as " the Perfect Being ") belongs to the future. He is not the " Creator," as orthodox theology postulates, but a *creature*—a product of

the absolutely lifeless and unintelligent "Space-Time." To avoid doing injustice to Mr. Alexander's highly individual theological position, his summing up is given below in his own words: "God is . . . the universe flowering into deity." "God, then, like all things in the universe, is in the strictest sense not a creator but a creature." "It is, properly speaking, 'Space-Time' itself, which is the creator, and not God" (*o.c.*, bk. iv., *passim*).

It seems also to be involved in Mr. Alexander's theory (though his statements on the subject are not very full and explicit), that not even in the production of God will the evolutionary process culminate. God will probably be succeeded and superseded by yet other "Emergents" of a character altogether beyond human conception and imagination.

Mr. Alexander's inverted theology has received so little support from either philosophers or theologians, that detailed criticism of it hardly seems necessary. It is indeed difficult to treat seriously a theory which not merely violates but actually *reverses* the Law of Causation, making the less the cause of the greater, and the worse of the better.

The arguments employed on pp. xxiv ff. against the position of Prof. Pringle-Pattison are equally available against that of Mr. Alexander.

Dr. Lloyd Morgan's version of the Emergence theory is much more satisfactory than Mr. Alexander's, though (as will be seen) it labours under serious defects. It provides the universe with a much more satisfactory First Cause than the totally

inadequate (and entirely hypothetical) " Space-Time." It postulates the existence of God *ab initio*, and regards Him as the cause, not the product, of the evolutionary process. It explains the universe in terms of " Divine Purpose." " The rational order [of the cosmos] is, in spiritual regard, not other than Divine Purpose. For us, Divine Purpose is inclusive of *all advance*—physical, vital, mental, social, and in spiritual regard." God is objective fact, and not simply mental " projection." He may be defined, in accordance with Christian tradition, as " Spiritual Substance," and " Ultimate Substance." Even the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation of the Logos in a particular human individual is not alien from Lloyd Morgan's system of thought : " Divine Personality shines through the Unique Individuality of the Christ " (*Life, Mind, and Spirit*, pp. 306 ff.).

The defect of Prof. Morgan's theory is that it does not adequately realize (1) the *transcendence* of God (of which he confesses that he can form no clear idea), and (2) the consequent *supernatural* character of the evolutionary process.

Prof. Morgan regards God as entirely " immanent " in the cosmos, and cosmic evolution as an entirely " natural " process. The idea of any supernatural influx into the realm of nature is definitely excluded.

But if God is *entirely* immanent in the cosmos, He can possess no qualities which are not actually existent in the cosmos at any given stage. For example, at the stage of " Space-Time," He can

possess only spatio-temporal qualities, and at the stage of " matter " only material qualities. But unless at each given stage He also possesses the equivalent of the qualities of the stage next above it, *He cannot produce it.* To suppose otherwise is to suppose that it is possible for superior orders of being to be produced by inferior ones—a manifest contradiction of the Law of Causation.

The truth is that the evolutionary process cannot be made to " work," unless God is assumed to possess *ab initio* the equivalent of every " emergent" that will ever be evolved, including the highest. No assumption less than this will enable a rational explanation of the process to be given. But such a God is, of course, " transcendent " as well as " immanent."

There are times when Prof. Morgan comes near to recognizing this. In several passages he speaks of the " Divine Purpose " as manifesting itself at *every* stage of evolution, and not merely at the highest. " Purpose " is, of course, a psychical, not a physical term. " Purpose " can only be affirmed of a *mind.* If therefore purpose is manifested at the stages of " Space-Time " and of " Matter " (as Prof. Morgan in some passages affirms or implies), then clearly God must possess " mind " at these stages, and thus be " transcendent," and not merely immanent.

The truth is that it is impossible to explain evolution without assuming some kind of divine " intervention " of a continuous kind, which becomes specially noticeable in the production of

" emergents." " Intervention " is not less truly " intervention " when (as in this case) it is continuous and usually so gradual as to be imperceptible to ordinary observation.

The Emergence theory (supposed true) harmonizes with and yields a certain amount of support to the following theological doctrines :

(1) The transcendence of God (not merely His Immanence, as Lloyd Morgan assumes).

(2) The consequent existence of a supernatural order, distinct from the natural.

(3) Creation by the free and unpredictable operation of the Divine Will.

(4) The freedom (within reasonable limits) of the human will.

(5) The intervention of the supernatural order in the natural, and the consequent possibility of miracles (physical and psychical), and of objective answers to prayer.

The Theory of Relativity

Einstein's Theory of Relativity is undoubtedly the most important contribution to physics and mathematics since the age of Newton, but what (if any) is its philosophic and religious significance still remains a matter of debate. The theory at present is immature, and important features of it are undergoing rapid and bewildering changes. Prof. Eddington almost fears to put pen to paper to describe the " Quantum " theory, lest by the time his statement is printed it should be out of

date. When such leading authorities as Prof. Whitehead and Prof. Eddington differ on such vital questions that one can speak of the other's position as " unorthodox," the mere layman may be excused if he adopts an attitude of reserve and suspension of judgment.

The main difficulty of the inquirer is to understand whether the Relativity Theory, with its accompanying " Tensor Calculus," is presented as only a mathematical device to secure more refined and accurate practical results than can be obtained from the physics and mathematics of Newton, or whether, besides this, it is intended to be taken seriously as a philosophical theory of the actual objective structure of the physical world. On this fundamental point our authorities use ambiguous and inconsistent language. On the one hand, Prof. Eddington, in his standard work, *The Nature of the Physical World* (1929), insists on the " symbolical " character of physical science as a whole, and in particular of the various " ethers," " sub-ethers," " quanta," and so forth, that it postulates. In this spirit he writes : " Something unknown is doing we don't know what—that is what our theory amounts to " ; He also insists on " the essential unknowableness of the fundamental entities of physics " (p. 291). In places his language even seems to suggest that not only Einstein's theory, but also the whole of the physical world to which it relates, is nothing but a mental substance or mental construction. For example, he writes : " The substratum of everything is of a mental

character " (p. 281). Such passages set the inquirer wondering whether the Relativity Theory is at bottom anything more than a highly ingenious calculating device or " dodge," as some portions of it are frankly acknowledged to be. For example, we read : " Schrödinger's wave-mechanics is not a physical theory but a dodge—and a very good dodge too " (p. 219). If we take this view of the subject, we are not compelled to regard as objectively true the paradoxes to which the theory leads. We are not, for instance, required to attach more than " mathematical " truth to the statements, that a body can possess position but not definite position ; shape but not definite shape ; velocity but not definite velocity : further, that the distance between two given points is not a fixed quantity ; that absolute position and motion cannot really exist, because we cannot detect them ; that space is curved ; that two bodies travelling a sufficiently long distance in opposite directions will ultimately approach and meet ; that time might cease to move, or might move in some other direction than towards the future ; finally, that time is a dimension of space, in spite of its fundamentally different " quality," which Eddington (unlike many relativists) frankly acknowledges. Considering that human " thoughts," which are not in space, succeed one another (like physical events) in time, the last statement is particularly difficult to credit.

On the other hand, there are passages in which Eddington insists on the philosophical and even

religious significance of the Relativity Theory. Such significance it could not, of course, possess, unless objective reality were claimed for its fundamental conceptions.

Upon the mathematical value of the Relativity Theory, no one but a mathematician has a right to express an opinion ; but a metaphysician has a perfect right to consider the claim to " objectivity " put forward on its behalf by many of its adherents. Moreover, both the logician and the plain man are entitled to criticize the non-mathematical arguments which are so much in evidence in Prof. Eddington's recent book, *The Nature of the Physical World*. These arguments have lately been subjected to devastating criticism by a very competent metaphysician, Mr. H. W. B. Joseph, who pronounces them a tissue of fallacies. With this judgment the present writer is inclined to agree ; but he desires to remind the reader that a theory supported by arguments as unconvincing as those of Prof. Eddington may nevertheless prove to be true.

Even supposing the theory to be true, Prof. Eddington considers that religion—including the Christian religion—has nothing to fear from it.

In his opinion, the theory affords support to (or harmonizes with) the following religious and philosophical beliefs :

(1) *The Objective Existence of God.* " The idea of a universal Mind or Logos would, I think, be a fairly plausible inference from the present state of scientific theory ; at least it is in harmony with it " (p. 338).

(2) *God's Creative Activity.* "Evolution is to be regarded not as a materialistic process, mechanically and necessarily determined, but rather as a continuous exercise of free and intelligent creative activity" (p. 306, and *passim*; see above on "Emergent Evolution").

(3) *The Reality and Unity of the Human Soul or Ego* (p. 315).

(4) *The Reality of Religious* (*especially mystical*) *Communion with God* (p. 333).

(5) *Absolute Values.* "Science permits to believe in the objective existence of moral, æsthetic, and other fundamental 'values.' We may trust optimistically that our values are some pale reflection of those of the Absolute Valuer" (p. 331).

(6) *The Supremacy of Mind* (*human and divine*) *in the Universe.* Mind alone gives "actuality" to the abstract and shadowy physical world. Thus "we restore consciousness [mind] to its fundamental position, instead of representing it as an unessential complication occasionally found in the midst of inorganic nature at a late stage of evolutionary history" (p. 332).

(7) *A Return* (*with certain modifications*) *to the Anthropocentric and Geocentric View of the Universe.* The human mind possesses an *absolute* value, which is in no way affected by the vastness of the inferior physical universe. "The rival earths are in general places where conscious life has already vanished, or is not yet come." "I feel inclined to claim that *at the present time* our race is supreme, and not one of the profusion of stars in their

myriad clusters looks down on scenes comparable with those which are passing beneath the rays of the sun " (p. 178).

(8) *The Freedom of the Human Will.* As a result of the rejection of the principle of strict (*i.e.* necessary) causality, and the adoption in its place of the " Quantum " Theory and its associated " Principle of Indeterminacy," " science withdraws its moral opposition to free will."

(9) *The Interaction of Mind and Matter is affirmed and Psychophysical Parallelism is rejected.* " A mental decision to turn right or left starts one or [of] two alternative sets of impulses along the nerves of the feet. . . . The course of behaviour . . . is directly determined by the mental decision " (p. 313).

The student will find all needful information about the Relativity Theory in Prof. Eddington's standard work above referred to, and Prof. Whitehead's *Science and the Modern World.* Among simpler treatments may be mentioned Bertrand Russell's *ABC of Relativity*, L. Bolton's *Introduction to Relativity*, and J. Rice's brief but valuable pamphlet, *Relativity.*

The religious implications of the theory may be studied at length in H. D. Anthony's *Relativity and Religion*—a very thorough piece of work.

The New Psychology and Religion

At the present moment, the chief danger to religion and to Christian standards of morality proceeds, not so much from the dogmatism of

physical science, which (as we have seen) now shows a laudable desire to acknowledge its limited, "relative," and "symbolic" character, as from the extravagant claims to universal authority put forward by certain representatives of "The New Psychology." "Many things," observes Prof. W. R. Matthews, "when they sever themselves from parental tutelage [in this case, that of philosophy and theology], frequently manifest a melancholy tendency to arrogant self-assertion. . . . How often one hears the phrase 'Psychology teaches us' spoken in a tone which suggests that the infallible authority has been found at last" (*Psychology and the Church*, p. 4). Fortunately this arrogant attitude is unusual in England, where the majority of leading psychologists (including prominent Freudian practitioners) are friendly to religion, supporters of Christian ideals of conduct, and by no means inclined to claim that their science has the right to lay down the law in matters of metaphysics and theology. As Dr. Wm. Brown puts the matter: "Just as psychology cannot do justice to the validity of knowledge, psychology cannot do justice to the validity of religion. . . . Directly we assume that the individual [man] is in touch with an existence outside him, we are passing beyond psychology. All that psychology does is to describe as accurately and as fully as possible what goes on in his mind" (*Science, Religion, and Reality*, pp. 308, 310).

The New Psychology, unlike the old, aims at being an entirely "natural" or experimental

science, like chemistry and physics. The "Old Psychology," which originated in the writings of Plato and Aristotle, was regarded as, in a wide sense, the science of the soul and its activities—including its religious activities. It was, in fact, a theological and philosophical as well as a natural science, and accordingly concerned itself, not only with the facts of consciousness, but also with such questions as the soul's ultimate nature, origin, and destiny, its relation to God and the universe, and such problems as free-will and immortality.

The New Psychology concerns itself entirely with *mental states as such*, not with the metaphysical nature of the soul or mind, nor with the objects about which the thinker thinks. Its point of view is "subjective," not objective. For example, it is concerned, not with God, but with human ideas and beliefs about God; not with the objective moral law, regarded as authoritative and binding, but with man's moral ideas and sentiments. It is content with describing, as fully and accurately as possible, the empirical processes and activities of a man's mind, leaving it to other sciences to investigate what happens outside his mind, also his mind's metaphysical nature. A clear understanding of this point suffices to remove many of the religious perplexities and difficulties which the peculiar technical phraseology of the New Psychology is apt to engender. For example, modern psychologists are accustomed to speak of God as "a mental projection"—in particular as a projection of the "father-idea." This sounds like

atheism, but the whole sting of the apparent negativity is removed, when we reflect that for modern psychology, not only God, but also matter, and other human minds, are in the same sense mental " projections." Adopting, as it does, the purely " subjective " standpoint, it is precluded by its very nature from affirming the objective existence, not only of God, but of anything else. As Dr. Brown points out, the existence of the external universe, and the existence of God, are problems, not of psychology at all, but of metaphysics and theology.

Those psychologists are probably right who contend that a child constructs his idea of God upon the basis of his idea of his earthly father, and that it is in this sense a " projection." But a child also constructs his ideas of other persons upon the basis of his knowledge of his own personality. He " projects " his own personality outwards, and attributes its leading characteristics to those human beings with whom he comes in contact. Both God and other human minds are " projections," but they are very far from being *mere* projections. Satisfactory reasons can be produced for believing in the objective existence of both of them. For example, it is far more easy to account for the existence of parental love and tenderness on earth, if we believe God to be in some sense our " Father in heaven," than if we believe Him to be an impersonal energy or abstract First Cause. The child's " projection " of the idea of his earthly father into the supernatural realm is probably

" instinctive " ; but like many other instinctive activities, it has a rational basis, as will become increasingly evident to him as his intelligence develops.

The Psychology of Purpose

The leading conception of the New Psychology is that of mental activity directed towards a biological " end " or " purpose."

During the nineteenth century scientific psychology was unduly dominated by conceptions derived from physics, and the prevailing views of psychologists were apt to be purely mechanistic and materialistic—very similar, in fact, to those of the present-day American " Behaviourists " (see pp. lviii ff.).

This materialistic psychology was *static*, not dynamic. It denied to the soul the possession of any activity, initiative, or directive power of its own. Above all, it utterly rejected the conception of " end " or " purpose " as a principle of explanation in biology. Instead of regarding an animal's behaviour as the expression of active inherited " instincts " directed towards important biological " ends " (*e.g.* self-preservation, or the propagation of the race), it insisted that every kind of behaviour, both animal and human, is a complex of strictly mechanical movements, entirely determined by other mechanical movements which have taken place in the past. It denied, or explained away, even the most obvious instances of end or purpose. It denied, for example, that the hen's instinct to

sit on her eggs has, as its end or purpose, the hatching out of chicks. It similarly denied that her maternal instinct is directed towards the protection and preservation of her young. " The future," these theorists argued, " does not yet exist ; consequently it cannot possibly influence the present activities of either men or animals."

Materialistic theories of this kind did not usually in express terms deny the existence of the soul, but they deprived it of all its energy, initiative, and usefulness, and subordinated it in every respect to the body. The entire activity and directive power of the organism was assigned to the material body, the soul or mind being reduced to the status of an idle spectator. Mind was frequently spoken of as an ineffectual " phosphorescence " or mysterious " shadow," which occasionally, for no explainable or useful reason, accompanies the mechanical functioning of the brain and nervous system.

The New Psychology challenges and reverses this materialistic standpoint. It assigns to the soul a native energy of its own (technically called " libido " or " hormé "), which is different in kind from physical energy, and capable of directing and controlling it. It reverts—at any rate in very many of its representatives—to the ancient idea that the soul, not the body, is the principle of life, and is the ultimate productive cause of the vital activities and behaviour of the living organism.

According to the New Psychology, all mental

and vital activity is " telic " or " purposive " in a broad sense. " Subconscious " (or " unconscious ") as well as " conscious " purpose is recognized as playing an important part in the order of nature. It is supposed that an animal's activities are sustained by powerful inherited instincts, which are directed towards such clearly defined biological ends as the preservation and well-being of the individual, and the perpetuation of the race. It is acknowledged that man alone is fully conscious of his purposes. For example, he alone takes a mate with the deliberate intention of begetting and rearing a family ; he alone forms states, establishes governments, and organizes industries for the sake of the many advantages that result from a stable social order and from the division of labour. But the mating and parental and social instincts of beasts and birds, also the political and industrial instincts of such insects as bees, wasps, and ants, are in reality directed towards identical or cognate ends, though the animals themselves are unaware of the fact. Indeed, it is not too much to say that the conception of " end " or " purpose " (conscious, subconscious, or unconscious) is the principal key employed by the New Psychology to unlock the secrets alike of human and animal mentality. In this important respect, psychologists of the New School revert to the standpoint of the oldest of all scientific psychologies, that of Aristotle. In his famous treatise, *On the Soul* (which deals not only with the soul of man, but also with the inferior souls of animals and

plants), Aristotle lays down the following fundamental principle: " It is manifest that the soul is *a purposive cause.* For nature, like intelligence, acts for a purpose, and this purpose is for it an end " (ch. iv). This dictum of Aristotle would be endorsed by practically every adherent of the New Psychology.

Psychology and the Design Argument

It requires but little reflection to show that a psychology like this, based, not upon the idea of blind mechanism, but upon the purely spiritual conception of " end," " purpose," or " design," is inconsistent with atheism, and involves, when thought out to its logical conclusion, some form of theism as its philosophic basis.

" End " or " purpose " is a purely mental or psychological term. It cannot be expressed in terms of movements of matter, or chemical changes, or transformations of energy. A " purpose " is simply an end proposed to itself by some mind. Apart from a mind there cannot be a purpose. Apart from a designer there cannot be a design. If there is purpose in nature—above all, if purpose pervades the whole of animate and perhaps also of inanimate nature—then clearly there must be some *mind* which is conscious of it. And since this mind cannot be the mind of any animal, or even of any man (for man's knowledge of nature's purposes is very limited), it follows that there must exist some Supreme Designing Mind which knows all nature's purposes.

Moreover, since the universe is one, and the same laws pervade the whole of it, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that all the various purposes of nature are summed up in a single comprehensive purpose, which we may describe as the Goal of Cosmic Evolution—God's final purpose for the universe as a whole, and for every constituent part of it, including each individual human soul.

This is, of course, precisely the Christian theory of the universe, and if we cannot go so far as to affirm that the New Psychology positively requires us to accept it, yet it is undeniable that a system of thought which employs the conception of " end " or " purpose " as its leading principle of explanation in biology, establishes a foundation within the territory of science itself, upon which the labours of philosophers and theologians may successfully erect the edifice of Christian theism.

Freudianism

Of the various European schools of the New Psychology, that founded by the Viennese physician, Sigmund Freud (undoubtedly one of the greatest creative personalities of our age), is usually supposed to be the most antagonistic to Christian faith and morals.

It is not to be denied that there is real weight in the objections urged (on moral and other grounds) against certain theories and practices of the extreme Freudian school, not only by the leaders of the Christian Church, but also by very many—probably the majority—of English physicians and

psychologists. But inasmuch as Freudianism, together with much that is false or exaggerated, contains a large element of valuable new truth, and suggests more hopeful methods of treating neurotic and mental disorders than those at present prevailing, a policy of undiscriminating condemnation is not advisable.

It must be admitted that Dr. Freud's personal attitude towards the Christian religion is mainly negative, and that he sometimes permits himself, in his published writings, to speak contemptuously of "the received" (*i.e.* the Christian) morality, especially in the matter of sex. On the other hand, a certain number of Freudian practitioners, both on the Continent and in England, are orthodox practising Christians, and maintain that Freudianism, properly understood, is entirely reconcilable with Christianity, and that its therapeutic method (Psychoanalysis) may be as useful to pastors and teachers as it is to physicians. This point of view is adopted by Dr. O. Pfister, who is a Swiss pastor and educationalist; by Dr. A. Carver, the medical superintendent of the C.E.T.S. inebriate home at Nuneaton; and apparently by Freud himself, who has written a laudatory preface to Pfister's book, *The Psychoanalytic Method* (E.T., 1915).

The three points in the Freudian psychology which are most frequently challenged as negating the Christian standpoint are the following: (1) Pansexualism; (2) Determinism; (3) Depreciation of Reason.

Pansexualism, strictly interpreted, is the theory

that every human desire, volition, and activity is sexually determined—is, in fact, a manifestation, overt or disguised, of the sexual instinct. Pansexualism, in this extreme form, has never been advocated by Freud. From the first he has recognized that there are other instincts than the sexual—for example, the ego-instincts and those connected with nutrition and self-defence. Nevertheless, it is true to say that Freud, especially in the pre-War period, laid such exclusive stress upon the sexual instinct, and explained so many apparently non-sexual human impulses as disguised forms of it, that his system really amounted in practice, if not in theory, to something very like Pansexualism.

Since the Great War, however, which produced a profusion of fear-neuroses, not a few even of the strict Freudian school have come to recognize that there exist neuroses which are in no way sexual, and that the abnormal functioning of any powerful instinct may lead to nervous illness.

At the present time, the "Œdipus" (or "Electra") complex plays a much less prominent part in Freudian teaching than was formerly the case. The original theory was that incestuous attachment (usually unconscious) of sons for their mothers and of daughters for their fathers is a normal and usual phenomenon; and that its forcible "repression" is a frequent cause of nervous disease. Recent research has not yielded support to this theory, and not a few Freudians are now ready to admit that the Œdipus complex is neither

universal nor normal. That it actually occurs in certain instances, and that its consequences may be as grave as Freud indicates, is not, of course, denied.

In the actual circumstances of to-day, little serious difficulty need be found in reconciling Christian principles of morality with the somewhat attenuated form of sexual theory which is now widely current in Freudian circles.

To this it is only fair to add that Freud, by his theory of the " sublimation " of the sexual instinct (*i.e.* its transformation into various forms of worthy and unselfish moral energy), has not only shown that chastity in the Christian sense is possible, but has also suggested practical means of attaining and preserving it, which are worthy of the attention of parish priests and spiritual advisers.

That Freud is a thorough-going determinist, and that he denies that the reason of man possesses any of that power of directing and controlling his animal impulses which theologians and philosophers have hitherto attributed to it, is unfortunately true. " [Your] deeply rooted belief in psychic freedom and choice," he writes, " is quite unscientific, and it must give ground before the claims of a determinism which governs even mental life " (*Introductory Lectures*, p. 87).

In practice, however, Freud does not adhere to this standpoint. So far from encouraging a neurotic patient to believe that his future is irrevocably fixed by his unsatisfactory heredity or unfortunate past, he strives to inspire him with the conviction that, aided by his physician,

he may hope to break the psychic chains that bind him, to unlock the door of his dungeon of despair, and to come forth a *free man*, master of his life and destiny. Freud explicitly states that the object of psychoanalysis is to render the nervous patient " independent by the effect of the treatment " (*o.c.* p. 363). The truth is that every system of mental therapy which aims at success in curing patients, finds itself compelled in practice to work on the principle of Libertarianism, however much its theories may commit it to the opposite principle of Determinism.

In a similar way, Freud by no means adheres in practice to his theory of the powerlessness and ineffectiveness of reason. On the contrary, an essential part of the psychoanalytic treatment consists in imparting to the patient a rational view of the origin and nature of his malady. As soon as the patient by exercising his *reason* upon his symptoms " sees through them," recognizing them for what they are, their hold upon him is at once weakened and his cure has begun. In reality " reason " plays almost as important a part in the practical therapy of Freud as it does in that of the school of Dubois and Dejerine, who explicitly recognize " Autognosis," or Self-knowledge, as a therapeutic agency of primary importance.

The Eclectic School

Strict Freudianism has only a small following in England, but its influence upon other schools has been great. The predominant school in

England is a kind of modified Freudianism, which may conveniently be styled " Eclectic," because it borrows, not only from Freud, but also from nearly all the leading psychological systems of the day. Among its prominent exponents are (the late) W. H. R. Rivers, Morton Prince, McDougall, B. Hart, T. W. Mitchell, W. Healy, Yellowlees, Hadfield, Wm. Brown, and Crichton Miller.

With Freud, the Eclectic school accepts the fundamental conception of " telism," " hormism," or " dynamism " (already explained). It also accepts his general theory of the " unconscious " (or " subconscious "), of mental " conflict," and of " repression " (resulting in pathological " complexes " and neurotic symptoms) ; also certain elements in his theory of infantile sexuality, and his general teaching concerning " sublimation."

But it rejects with decision other important elements of Freud's system, *e.g.* his belief that the sexual instinct dominates the whole of human life and is the sole cause of neurotic disorders, his theory of the universality of " the Œdipus complex," his purely sexual interpretation of dreams, his theory of sexual " transference " of the patient's " libido " to the physician as a necessary condition of cure, and (of course) his rigid Determinism, which excludes free-will.

As the representatives of the Eclectic school are for the most part friendly in their attitude towards the Christian religion and Christian morality, a detailed exposition of their views in this place seems to be unnecessary.

Behaviourism

The only influential system of modern psychology which conflicts *inherently and necessarily* both with all forms of religion and with all accepted moral standards is the so-called " new " but really antiquated psychology of America—" Behaviourism."

Professing to be an entirely new, original, and up-to-date system of thought, dating only from the year 1912, it is in reality nothing but a slightly Americanized version of the " Automatonism " or " Epiphenomenalism " of Clifford, Huxley, and Tyndall, which had a considerable vogue in England and Germany in the latter half of the nineteenth century, but has been entirely obsolete in the Old World for more than a generation (see the discussion on pp. 38–42, and 185 ff.).

Behaviourism is a system of pure materialism based upon the fundamental assumption that man is a mindless and soulless automatic machine, actuated and directed entirely by physical forces. In virtue of its narrowly practical and utilitarian outlook, it is akin to (but not identical with) the Pragmatism of William James, which has a better claim than it to be regarded as a characteristic product of American thought.

Extreme Behaviourism absolutely denies the existence of subjective or mental states altogether ; and, if it uses the term " consciousness " at all, does so only in an esoteric sense, meaning thereby merely the physical functioning of the brain-cells

in response to physical stimuli proceeding from the organs of external and internal sensation.

The classical statement of the extreme position is generally considered to be E. B. Holt's *The Concept of Consciousness*, the only attempt at a philosophic exposition and defence of Behaviourism. Mr. Holt's statements about consciousness, however, are so extremely involved and conflicting, that even the careful reader is often in doubt as to what his real position is.

Moderate Behaviourism leaves the question of the existence of mental states undetermined, contenting itself with asserting that, supposing them to exist (which is highly doubtful), at any rate they exert no influence of any kind upon the " behaviour " of that entirely automatic machine, the human body, and are, both from the scientific and the practical point of view, entirely negligible.

Behaviourists have made important contributions to practical psychology, and have opened up new avenues of psychological research. Especially illuminating and informing (though marred by materialistic bias) is their experimental work upon the behaviour of the primates (notably the great apes) and of the human infant. A useful résumé of the light thrown upon human psychology (normal and abnormal) by recent observations of the behaviour of wild and captive apes is given in the valuable treatise, *Objective Psychopathology* (1925) of Dr. G. V. Hamilton, a moderate and by no means dogmatic behaviourist. This book possesses value and interest, not only for the professional

psychiatrist and psychotherapist, but also for those parish priests who desire to give spiritual help to those suffering from nervous and moral diseases.

The leader of the behaviouristic school, Dr. J. B. Watson, in his earlier work, *Psychology from the Standpoint of a Behaviorist* (1924, 3rd ed. 1929), while using extremely contradictory language, seemed on the whole to incline towards the more moderate behaviouristic view. But in his more recent manifesto, *Behaviorism* (1928), as also in his article in the 1929 edition of the *E.B.*, he seems to have gone over entirely to the extreme position, though even here the careful reader will detect passages which, to say the least, are *patient* of the interpretation that the author's aim is to affirm rather the complete unimportance than the non-existence of mental processes. For instance, he writes thus in the *E.B.*: " So far in his *objective* study of man [italics mine], no behaviourist has observed anything that he can call consciousness, sensation, perception, imagery, or will." *Prima facie* the very existence of mental states is here denied, but Dr. Watson has left himself a possible loophole for retreat by his use of the word *objective*, which *may* imply that a *subjective* study of man might yield a different result.

According to Watson, " consciousness " is the " false god " or " idol " of every psychological system except his own. All other systems are infected by a false " dualism " of soul and body, even that of Wundt, who professed to establish a " psychology without a soul," and that of William

James, who definitely rejected the " substantial " soul of tradition. Freudianism fares even worse than other modern psychologies. It is stigmatized as a mixture of religion and " Voodooism " (the superstitious witchcraft of the raw negro). The primary psychological method of all other systems, *viz.* mental " introspection," is rejected as impossible—there is nothing mental to introspect. Psychology is defined as the science, not of the mind or soul, but of the physical " behaviour " of the organism. Whereas for other psychologists " behaviour " (except, perhaps, in the case of purely reflex action) is a psycho-physical process, for Watson it consists of purely physical movements, either of the entire body or of certain of its organs or parts.

Human " behaviour," even of the most rational and purposive kind, is reduced to " reflex " action. Reflex action may be either " unconditioned " (or innate) or " conditioned " (or acquired). In most cases it is the latter, the " unconditioned " reflexes, present at birth, being very few in number.

Human speech or conversation has no intellectual basis, and is entirely destitute of " meaning "—a term which Watson banishes from psychology. Speech consists entirely of physical movements of the tongue, teeth, and larynx, which produce physical vibrations of the air.

" Thinking " is merely a bad name for " whispered speech," i.e. *minimal* movements of the speech-organs, or, in certain cases, of the entire body (Watson teaches that the entire body,

as well as the speech-organs, is capable of what is wrongly called " thought ").

Behaviourism wages a war of extermination against all forms of religion, also against every existing school of metaphysics and ethics. It stigmatizes all ministers of religion as idle, useless, self-seeking medicine men (" A good medicine man has the best of everything, and, best of all, he doesn't have to work.") Their influence is rooted, not in love, but in superstitious terror—" if the fear element were dropped out of any religion, [it] could not long survive."

Behaviourism expects an early triumph. " Religion [is] being replaced among the educated by experimental ethics." " Philosophy [is] becoming the history of science." Traditional ethics is becoming " experimental ethics, based entirely on behaviouristic ethics." And so forth.

Although Behaviourism has not secured the support of any leading thinker of America, and is not regarded seriously by any European psychologist, it has had a considerable vogue among American experimental psychologists. Moreover, it has been inordinately boomed by the sensational press, and has gained great prestige among American students. Already in 1923 Dr. McDougall spoke of the school as " flourishing," and four years later had to deplore its triumphant progress through the student world of America. When in 1927 he debated the subject of Behaviourism with Dr. Watson before a university gathering, he managed to secure a small majority for his own point of view, but the under-

graduates acclaimed Dr. Watson, and the women students voted almost unanimously for Behaviourism.

The reason of the fascination which Behaviourism still exercises over the mind of the American undergraduate is not far to seek. Many of the American colleges and universities base their educational system, not upon the humanities, as is the custom in Europe, but upon the " exact " sciences—mathematics, physics, chemistry, and mechanistic biology of the type popularized by the late Dr. Loeb. American science students thus come to regard as real and important only those things which are apprehensible by the five physical senses, and can accordingly be weighed, measured, and otherwise experimented with. When, therefore, Dr. Watson issues his challenge to believers in the soul to produce a soul that he may place it in a test-tube[1] and subject it to the action of chemical reagents, he seems to not a few of the less discerning students of natural science to be talking, not arrant nonsense, but the quintessence of modern scientific wisdom.

During the past year, however, Behaviourism has lost prestige and status, even among the experimental psychologists of America. The " behaviour," even of the great apes, has been found by recent experimentalists to be incapable of purely mechanical explanation. Some of these apes are capable of realizing in imagination

[1] " No one has ever touched a soul, or seen one in a test-tube " (*Behaviorism*, p. 4).

certain desirable " ends," and of thinking out and executing appropriate means of attaining them (see especially W. Köhler, *The Mentality of Apes*, 1924; and R. M. Yerkes, *Almost Human*, 1926, and *The Great Apes*, 1929). At the ninth International Psychological Congress, held at Yale, Sept. 1–7, 1929, out of about a hundred American papers not one supported the full Watsonian position, and the president summed up strongly against it. Prof. E. G. Boring even goes so far as to say (*American Journal of Psychology*, Oct. 1929): " The day of behaviorism in America is over. It has accomplished its purpose, and American psychology now takes of physiological or behavioral data whatever its problems need."

Since Behaviourism has no philosophical basis, it is best in criticizing it to deal with concrete facts—the more familiar the better.

Toothache, for instance, consists, according to Behaviourism, entirely of physical and objective facts, *e.g.* bodily (including neural) movements, and chemical changes. It is made up of inflamed tissues and nerves, abnormal vibrations of the neurones of the brain, cries, grimaces, contortions of the limbs, and so forth.

But this behaviouristic description of toothache leaves out the most important element in it, *viz. the pain*. Toothache *minus* pain is not toothache at all, and would not be called so even by a behaviourist, unless he happened to be writing a defence of the behaviouristic dogma of the non-existence or negligibility of mental states.

Pain is obviously not a physical existent, but *a state of mind*. It has no physical qualities of any kind. It can neither be seen, heard, handled, tasted, nor smelt. It is not green or pink, heavy or light, round or square. It cannot be placed in a test-tube and subjected to the action of chemical reagents, or weighed on the physicist's balance. No imaginable physical test of any kind can directly reveal its presence. Nevertheless, it is unmistakably and aggressively real. It refuses to be ignored, and insists upon occupying the very focus of attention. Even Mrs. Eddy herself, who in theory denied the existence of pain, found herself compelled, when suffering from a severe fit of toothache, to sacrifice her principles and avail herself of the useful services of the dentist.

In proving that pain (which is a mental state) is real, we have *ipso facto* disproved the assertion, both of the extreme behaviourists who assert the non-existence of mental states, and of the moderate behaviourists who assert their negligibility. No sufferer from severe toothache or neuralgia—not to mention cancer, gout, stone, and arthritis—will yield assent to the dogma that pain is negligible.

There are many other mental states of the utmost importance, *e.g.* memory, desire, anticipation, hope, imagination, reverie, cheerfulness, joy, exhilaration, depression of spirits, anxiety, worry, fear, despair, love, hatred, jealousy, pride, humility, awe, æsthetic appreciation, sense of moral obligation, a guilty conscience, remorse, disgust, which cannot possibly be reduced to physical movements

or chemical changes, but which yet are undeniably real. Happiness and misery themselves, the importance of which no rational person denies, are mental not physical states. Bodily states (*e.g.* health and disease) are chiefly important, not so much in themselves as in virtue of the mental states (*e.g.* pleasure and pain, happiness and misery) which they tend to produce.

The behaviourist's account of "memory" (the existence of which as a psychical fact he usually denies) is especially unconvincing. He defines it as *the mechanical repetition of the same physical movements*, adducing as typical instances the repetition of a poem by rote, and the riding of a bicycle. It is quite true that both these may be and usually are automatic or mechanical processes. *But in so far as they are these, they do not involve true memory.* True memory is not motion, but *knowledge*—knowledge of the rememberer's past experience. The reciter, as such, does not remember—he only repeats. Memory, however, would arise if he happened, while reciting, to recall the circumstances under which he first learnt the poem. Similarly the bicycle-rider, as such, does not remember—he only automatically pedals. But if, while pedalling, he happens to remember some of his unfortunate experiences when learning to ride, then true memory is involved.

Further, it is worth noting that the act of memory involves knowledge, not only of past facts, but also of the rememberer's *soul* or *mind*, the existence of which the behaviourist denies. What I remember

is not past experiences in general, but *my own* experiences. I who am riding a bicycle now am identically the same person who learnt bicycle-riding with painful effort many years ago. Explicit memory always involves knowledge of *the enduring psychical self* which owns the experiences remembered. This *enduring psychical self*, however, is precisely the substantial " soul " of traditional psychology and common sense. Beyond doubt, experience in every case involves *an experiencer*, and this experiencer is, of course, the substantial mind or " soul," which, as everyone knows, retains its identity through life. It cannot possibly be the physical body, for this is in a state of continual flux.

Even more palpably false is the behaviourist's denial that human speech possesses " meaning." The very purpose of speech is to convey meaning—teeth, tongue, and larynx are moved in speech for this purpose alone. The essence of a spoken statement is its meaning. A statement may be translated into a hundred different languages, or written in fifty different alphabets, or expressed by signs alone. Its physical expression may be infinitely varied; but provided that the *meaning* is not altered, it remains the same statement, and produces the same effect upon every hearer who understands it. No explanation of this acknowledged fact is offered by Dr. Watson, nor is any possible on his principles. He requires us to believe that the reading of a closely reasoned treatise on some difficult subject (*e.g.* logic or metaphysics) is nothing but a complex of physical brain-vibrations

occurring in response to the purely physical stimuli of rows of meaningless black marks. As a matter of fact, the attention of the reader is focused, not on the black marks, but on the meaning they are intended to convey. If the meaning of a difficult sentence is not obvious, he pauses to reflect upon its probable meaning before passing on.

Since "knowledge" is a mental state, it follows from Dr. Watson's principles that knowledge—even of Behaviourism—is entirely useless. Enough, however, has been said in criticism of a system which requires us to believe, in addition to other absurdities, that advance in civilization has no connection with advance in knowledge; that, for instance, Pasteur's discovery of the nature of *sepsis* has not influenced the development of modern surgery; that the discovery that malaria is caused by mosquito-bite has not assisted sanatarians to render tropical countries more healthy; and that the enormous advances made during the nineteenth century in the knowledge of electricity have no causal connection with such outstanding features of modern civilization as electric lighting and wireless telephony.

Knowledge is Power. The universal experience of the human race confirms it. The mere fact that Behaviourism logically involves its denial is sufficient to condemn it.

Literature.—The literature of modern psychology is so vast, that the student will welcome a very brief list of the most necessary books: W. McDougall, *Outline of Psychology*, 1923, and *Outline*

of Abnormal Psychology, 1926 (15*s.* each; these works together cover the whole ground: they contain full descriptions and criticisms of the chief modern schools); also *Body and Mind* (1911, a defence of the real existence of the soul, and of interactionism); S. Freud, *Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis* (E.T. 1922, 10*s.* 6*d.*); A. Adler, *Understanding Human Nature* (E.T. 1928, 12*s.* 6*d.*); C. G. Jung, *Two Essays on Analytical Psychology* (E.T. 1928, 10*s.* 6*d.*); W. Brown, *Mind and Personality* (1926).

Christian Science

The American therapeutic cult of Christian Science, though actually founded by the late Mrs. Baker Eddy (1821–1910), owes both its name and most of its doctrines and practical methods to an uninstructed but able and successful mental healer, "Dr." Phineas Quimby (1802–1866), whose patient and whole-hearted disciple Mrs. Eddy became shortly before his death. Starting as an enthusiastic advocate of pure Quimbyism, she gradually began, as her own movement gathered strength, first to belittle and ultimately entirely to deny her vast debt to Quimby, the evidence for which is demonstrative.

Christian Science has already passed its zenith in America, but since it is at present active and aggressive in England, a brief account and criticism of it in this place seems desirable.

Christian Science continually uses Christian

phraseology (usually in a distorted sense), but its actual doctrines are doubtfully Christian. Its view of God is definitely pantheistic. God is regarded as the only ultimate reality, and human souls as merely parts of His Infinite Substance. Mrs. Eddy leaves the question of God's personality in obscurity. The fact that she attributes both male and female attributes to Him, and speaks of Him as " Father-Mother," suggests His personality. On the other hand, she habitually describes Him as " principle " rather than person, and discourages prayer to Him in the ordinary Christian sense.

Mrs. Eddy rejects the belief entertained by all Christians, except certain early gnostic heretics, that Jesus of Nazareth was truly the Christ. Jesus, she teaches, was only an imperfect earthly representation of the true heavenly Christ, who, being impassible, could not demean Himself by becoming incarnate and suffering death upon the Cross. She considers, however, that the death of Jesus possessed a certain atoning efficacy ; although, had He been greater than He was, He need not and would not have suffered. The Holy Ghost is frequently mentioned in her writings, but is identified with her revelation of Christian Science. The followers of Mrs. Eddy claim for her, either equality with Jesus of Nazareth, or (more usually) superiority, on the ground that she has mediated a more perfect revelation than His. It was she who completed the revelation of Christian Science, which the prophet of Nazareth only partly understood, and therefore could not adequately teach.

The practical control which Mrs. Eddy exercised over her denomination during her life-time was absolute, and her spiritual claims far exceeded those of the Pope. Not only did she declare herself to be the one and only infallible interpreter of Holy Scripture, but she even asserted that she had been authorized by God to add to it an inspired appendix (*Science and Health, with a Key to the Scriptures*, 1st edition 1875), without which it is incomplete, and cannot be correctly interpreted.

The real importance and power of popular appeal of Christian Science lies, however, neither in its crude Pantheism, nor in its Gnostic Christology, nor in its fantastic metaphysics (it denies the existence, not only of matter, but also of sin, pain, disease, and death, accounting for them as delusions or illusions of a " non-existent " entity known as " mortal mind "), but in its *cures*, which are effected by purely mental means. It is Mrs. Eddy's numerous professional " healers," and their occasional striking successes in curing patients, which advertise the movement and win adherents.

Successes, however, are less numerous in Christian Science practice than failures. Moreover, after failure, attempts are not infrequently made to prevent an orthodox medical man being called in to treat the patient. Thousands of valuable lives that might have been saved have been sacrificed through this cruel procedure. Mr. Fisher hardly exaggerates when he says : " An American republic directed by rigid Christian Scientists would

in a very short time be a vast cemetery. There would be no laws enforcing vaccination, or prohibiting adulteration in food or drink. Since the purity of milk would be undefended by law, babies would die in their thousands. The deaths of mothers in childbed . . . would be multiplied to an incalculable extent by the substitution of 'metaphysical' for surgical obstetrics. The cities would be undrained, the doctors, surgeons, and nurses would be driven out of practice. There would be no provision for the isolation of infectious diseases. Typhoid, cholera, and small-pox would rage unchecked. A strict execution of Mrs. Eddy's doctrines throughout the world would in a very few years extinguish human life upon this planet" (*Our New Religion*, p. 163).

The successes of Christian Science are to be found for the most part (though not quite exclusively) in the realm of "functional" nervous disorders. Purely organic diseases are seldom cured by it. This circumstance, however, does not detract in any way from the importance and significance of its cures. Many "functional" nervous disorders are of the gravest character, and are much more difficult to cure than ordinary organic diseases. A system which—in some cases at least—has succeeded in curing such disorders as neurasthenia, psychasthenia, hysteria, compulsion neurosis, alcoholism, and drug addiction (as Pierre Janet, a competent and far from friendly witness, acknowledges) cannot be quackery pure and simple, but must contain a certain element of truth.

This element may be summed up in two words : (1) Optimism ; (2) Suggestion.

Christian Science is a radical optimism. More than half a century ago it grasped the important truth, which medical psychotherapy is only just beginning sufficiently to appreciate, that half the task of curing a patient—particularly a nervous patient—consists in persuading him to take up an optimistic attitude towards life in general, and towards his own case in particular. Christian Science regards the good in the universe as alone real, and the evil as non-existent. God is represented as the giver, not of pain, sorrow, disease, and death, but of pleasure, happiness, and health. Convinced that nothing is real but the good, the true Christian Scientist strives to banish from his mind all thought of such things ; he tries even to *deny their existence altogether*, regarding them as mere illusions of " mortal mind."

This treatment of sickness by negation is not infrequently effective in curing functional nervous disorders ; also in relieving the pain of physical disease. But it seldom effects a serious physical cure. A cancer, or a calculus, or a boil, is not usually removed by denying its existence, though that is what Christian Science affirms ought to happen. (Certain of its more intelligent adherents speak more doubtfully now, and in extreme need avail themselves of the services of the dentist, the surgeon, and the obstetrician.)

The Christian Science Gospel of Healthy-mindedness, though exaggerated and in some ways

dangerous, has produced certain beneficial results. Beyond doubt, thoughts and feelings of a painful, depressing, or vindictive kind (*e.g.* fear, anxiety, worry, regret, discontent, jealousy, anger, hatred, despair) depress the general vitality, impair the due functioning of the bodily organs, and weaken resistance to disease. They also retard recovery from sickness. Conversely, joyful, elative, hopeful, courageous, and affectionate frames of mind augment vitality, conduce to bodily health, and promote rapid recovery from disease.

Christian Science being right upon these important points, it is obvious that the correct method of combating it is, not merely to refute its errors, but also (and still more) to assimilate the valuable truth which it contains, viz. *the importance of mental, moral, and spiritual factors in the causation and treatment of disease.*

Such assimilation involves: (1) *On the medical side*, the further development and wider use of *psychotherapy* (*i.e.* healing by mental means), which at present does not form part of the ordinary medical curriculum, but is studied by a few specialists only; (2) *On the side of the Church*, the general revival of the Ministry of Spiritual Healing, and its exercise in close co-operation with the art of medicine, which is now prepared to recognize, far more fully than in the last century, the profound influence which the mind exercises over the bodily functions.

Literature.—Mrs. Eddy, *Science and Health*, and other works; H. A. L. Fisher, *Our New Religion*

(1929); L. Pullan, *Mrs. Eddy's Christian Science* (1928, pamphlet); A. M. Bellwald, *Christian Science and the Catholic Faith* (R.C., 1922); W. Barrett, *The Religion of Health* (1925); Mark Twain, *Christian Science* (1907, amusing, but quite serious); S. Paget, *The Faith and Works of Christian Science* (1907, a scathing indictment). Excessive admiration for the character of the founder of Christian Science is not likely to survive perusal of Georgine Milmine's critical and candid *Life*, to which, and not to the idealizing official *Life* by Sibyl Wilbur, the student is referred for really reliable information.

The reader will find trustworthy information concerning the Healing Ministry of the Church, and its relation to the art of medicine, in *The Report of the Archbishops' Committee on Spiritual Healing* (S.P.C.K., 6*d.*); also in the literature issued or recommended by *The Guild of St. Raphael* (Anglican) and *The Guild of Health* (inter-denominational). The moral basis of disease and the moral methods of cure are authoritatively and lucidly expounded by J. A. Hadfield, in his small but important *Psychology and Morals* (1923), a book which every parish priest should possess.

Spiritualism, Spiritism, or Psychism has (for obvious reasons) attracted renewed interest since the Great War. It may be studied critically in A. B. Bateman, *Christianity and Spiritualism* (2*s.*); F. Podmore, *Modern Spiritualism* (2 vols., 1902); and *The Newer Spiritualism* (1910); also in the

Proceedings of the Psychical Research Society *passim*. The best recent pro-spiritist books are O. Lodge, *Raymond* (1916) and *Raymond Revised* (1922); W. J. Crawford, *Experiments in Psychical Science* (1919).

THEOSOPHY (which, for apologetic purposes, means the system of Eastern Occultism taught by "The Theosophical Society" founded in 1875 by Madame Blavatsky) may be sufficiently studied in Mrs. Besant's article in Hastings' E.R.E. For criticism, see W. S. Urquhart, *Theosophy and Christian Thought* (critical but sympathetic, 1922); E. R. McNeile, *From Theosophy to Christian Faith* (1919); M. C. Sturge, *Theosophy and Christianity* (1917); C. C. Martindale, *Theosophy* (1928).

CHRISTIAN ETHICS.—Since Christian morality is almost as much subject to attack in these days as Christian doctrine, a considerable acquaintance with Ethics, Christian and non-Christian, is necessary to the Apologist. The following selected list of books will be found useful by students: J. Rickarby (E.T.), *Aquinas Ethicus*[2] (1896); J. Butler, *Sermons* (modern editions by Gladstone and J. H. Bernard); C. E. Luthardt, *History of Christian Ethics*; T. C. Hall, *History of Ethics within Organized Christianity* (1910); E. Tröltsch, *Soziallehren d. Christl. Kirchen* (1912); C. F. D'Arcy, *Short Study of Ethics* (1912); E. F. Scott, *The Ethical Teaching of Jesus* (1925); L. S. Thornton, *Conduct and the Supernatural*[2] (1916); D. S. Adams, *A Handbook of Christian Ethics* (1926); T. Slater, *Back to Morality* (1926); H. Martin, *Christ and*

Money (1926); K. E. Kirk, *Conscience and its Problems* (1927) and *Some Principles of Moral Theology* (1920); H. H. Scullard, *The Ethics of the Gospel and the Ethics of Nature* (1927); C. Gore, *The Sermon on the Mount* (1897) and *Christian Moral Principles* (1922); *Christianity and Industrial Problems* (Report of Archbishops' Commission, 1923); R. H. Tawney, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism* (1926); A. E. Taylor, *Problems of Conduct* (1901); R. L. Ottley, *Christian Ideas and Ideals* (1909); E. Lyttelton, *Character and Religion* (1912); Spinoza, *Ethics* (tr. W. H. White, 1883); Kant, *Theory of Ethics* (tr. T. K. Abbott, 1873); *The Ethics of Hegel* (*tr.* J. M. Sterrett); H. Spencer, *The Principles of Ethics* (1893); T. H. Green, *Prolegomera to Ethics*[3] (1892); H. Sidgwick, *The Methods of Ethics*[6] (1901) and *Practical Ethics* (1898); F. H. Bradley, *Ethical Studies* (1876); F. W. Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil* (tr. 1909); L. T. Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution* (1915) and *Rational Good* (1921); J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory* (1885); E. A. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas* (1906); W. R. Sorley, *On the Ethics of Naturalism* (1885), *The Moral Life* (1911), *Moral Values and the Idea of God* (1921); McDougall, *Ethics and some Modern World Problems* (1924); Joad, *Thrasymachus.*

In view of present-day attacks upon the Christian law and ideal of Marriage, a careful study of the two following standard books is recommended: O. D. Watkins, *Holy Matrimony*; and F. W. Foester, *Marriage and the Sex Problem.* Reference may also

be made to Mary Scharlieb (ed.), *Sexual Problems Today* (1924); C. W. Margold, *Sex Freedom and Social Control* (full discussion, 1927); *The Ethics of Birth Control* (Report edited by the Bishop of Winchester, 1925).

Miscellaneous

For popular religious difficulties see the publications of the Rationalist Press Association, which caters mainly for the half-educated public. Its most notable recent publication is B. Russell's lecture, *Why I am not a Christian* (1928, 6*d.*), in which this able thinker descends to the level of his audience, and uses arguments unworthy of his reputation. In *Sceptical Essays* Mr. Russell expounds his philosophic and scientific scepticism, and in *What I Believe* his ethical scepticism. For replies, see H. G. Wood's *Why Mr. Bertrand Russell is not a Christian* (1928), and K. Ingrams, *The Unreasonableness of Anti-Christianity* (1928). Useful guidance for dealing with the R.P.A.'s propaganda, and with such popular works as H. G. Wells's *God, the Invisible King*, will be found in C. F. Rogers's *The Case for Christianity* (1928), and *Question Time in Hyde Park* (1925). The historicity of Jesus is adequately defended in T. J. Thorburn's *The Historical Jesus* (9*d.* and 2*s.* 6*d.*). *The Moral Argument for Theism* is popularly stated by V. F. Storr in a work of that name (1921, 2*s.*). On the problem of evil, see B. H. Streeter's *God and the Struggle for Existence* (1919, 2*s.* 6*d.*). On *Immortality*, see Streeter's work of that name

(1925, 10*s.*). On prayer, see C. Gore's *Prayer and the Lord's Prayer* (13th ed., 1*s.* 3*d.* and 2*s.* 6*d.*). Simply written evidential tracts and leaflets (mostly good) are supplied by the Christian Evidence Society. Extreme Modernism (Continental and English) is fully discussed in the present writer's *Creeds or No Creeds*, which contains an extensive bibliography.

PRO FIDE

CHAPTER I

THE ARGUMENT FOR A FIRST CAUSE

SUMMARY.—(1) All contingent things have causes; the Universe is contingent; therefore the Universe has at least one Cause, and that an uncaused or First Cause. (2) The existence of eternal and necessary truths implies the existence of an Eternal and Necessary Mind, distinct from and independent of the Universe. (3) The existence of possible, as well as of actual things, points in the same direction. (4) The Unity of the First Cause may be inferred from the Principle of Parsimony, which forbids us to assume more causes than are necessary to account for things; and from its infinite and absolute character, which excludes plurality; also from the Harmony of the Universe, and of the Laws of Reason.

I.—PROOF FROM THE CONTINGENCY OF THE UNIVERSE

THERE must be at least one permanent uncaused Cause, eternal, necessary, unconditioned, immutable in its real nature (though not necessarily in all its manifestations), and absolutely self-existing and self-sufficing, *i.e.* dependent upon nothing else and no condition whatever, either for its being or for its perfection.

This we intend to prove, not by evidence, which

from the nature of the case is obviously excluded, but by showing that it cannot be denied, without contradicting reason itself.

The human mind, by its very constitution, is bound to assume that every contingent thing, *i.e.* everything which does not exist of absolute and immutable necessity, has an efficient or productive cause. This necessary assumption is called the Law of Universal Causation. No experimental proof of it is possible, or even conceivable. All that we can say in support of it comes to this, that the very nature of our rational faculties compels us to assume it, and that unless we are allowed to do so, we cannot reason at all.

Many other absolutely certain truths, besides the Law of Universal Causation, are incapable of proof by evidence. The axioms of geometry, the fundamental principles of arithmetic and algebra, and the laws of thought, are in this predicament, and yet their certainty is so absolute, that we cannot, even in imagination, regard them as false. We speak of truths of this kind as *self-evident*, and these alone are absolutely certain. Truths which are not self-evident, or not necessary deductions from self-evident truths, are never certain. They require to be proved by evidence, and are always liable to be modified, or even disproved, by further evidence. But truths which are not based upon evidence, but are certain in their own right, can never be modified by the progress of discovery. They are eternal and immutable.

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It is not difficult to show that the Law of Universal Causation belongs to the category of eternal and immutable truth. Let us imagine, for example, the present universe annihilated, and its place taken by a complete vacuum. We are altogether incapacitated, by the nature of our reasoning faculty, from believing that anything could come into existence to fill that vacuum, unless there already existed a Cause adequate to produce it. To any one who asserted the contrary, we should simply retort, *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* We cannot of course *prove* this; but there is no need to do so, because it is self-evident. We may regard it, then, as an absolutely certain truth that, if the Universe had a beginning, it had a productive Cause.

We must now raise a more difficult question. What if the Universe had no beginning, but is eternal, as a few Theists and all Materialists believe? We have given reasons in chapter xi. for holding that the idea of an Eternal Universe—at least of such a universe as ours—involves a contradiction, and therefore cannot be rationally entertained. But for the purposes of this chapter we will assume that the idea is rational and possible, and will conduct the argument on the assumption of its truth.

Assuming, then, the universe to have no beginning, are we compelled to assign a Cause to it? This depends upon whether an eternal universe is to be regarded as contingent or not. A thing can be eternal in two ways. It can be eternal in its own

right, *i.e. necessarily* eternal; or it can be eternal because of its dependence upon something else that is eternal, and *causes* its eternity. In the first case its being is *necessary*, and requires no cause. In the second case it is *contingent*, and requires a cause. The second is obviously the case of the universe. Though it can be imagined to be eternal, and on the hypothesis we are considering actually is eternal, it can equally well be imagined not to be eternal. Moreover, it can be imagined not to exist at all, and to be replaced, either by a vacuum, or by an indefinite number of quite different universes. Its laws also, the so-called laws of nature, are all mutable. We can imagine even the law of gravitation changed, and replaced by a different law of attraction, or by a law of repulsion. The finite souls, also, that exist in the universe, are all contingent. Even if we follow Mr. McTaggart and other Pluralists in regarding them as eternal, we cannot by any stretch of the imagination regard them as *necessarily* eternal.

We conclude, then, that the universe, both in whole and in part, is *contingent*, and, consequently, whether it is eternal or not, requires an Originating Cause to account for its existence.

II.—Proof from the Nature of Necessary Truth

There are such things as eternal, immutable, and necessary truths. We may mention as examples —*in Logic*, "Two contradictory propositions cannot both be true"; *in Mathematics*, "Things which are

equal to the same thing are equal to one another"; *in Ethics*, "Justice is better than Injustice," or "Benevolence is better than Cruelty."

Propositions of this kind are so obviously and necessarily true, that we cannot, even in thought, imagine them false. They belong altogether to the eternal order. Time and the vicissitudes of things make no difference to them. They were true a million ages ago, and they will be true a million ages hence. In no way are they dependent upon the existence of the human mind. They existed before the human mind, and if all human minds perished, would still exist. Nor are they dependent upon the universe. If the universe ceased to exist, they would still remain true. They are true eternally and unconditionally—true not only for this, but for all possible universes.

Now, of course for truths like this, which are absolutely necessary and eternal, we cannot seek a *cause*, but we can seek an *explanation*, or at least we can seek to discover what light they throw upon the nature of Ultimate Reality, with which they are obviously closely connected, and to which they must, in some sort, belong.

These eternal principles are not material things, nor are they persons. They are *propositions*—logical propositions or judgments; and a logical proposition or judgment can only exist and have meaning for an *Intelligence*. Only if an Intelligence exists, can a proposition or truth exist. If the universal system of things were altogether desti-

tute of Mind, such things as Truths could not exist in it. But since in the system of things known to us, there exists an indefinite number of eternal, necessary, and immutable truths, truths, moreover, which are absolutely independent of the human mind and of the universe, the only possible inference seems to be that there exists an Eternal Self-Existing Mind, in and for which these eternal truths are eternally true.

III.—Proof from the Nature of Possibility

Besides the finite number of *actual* things, there exists an infinite number of *possible* things.

Possibility is not a mere figment of the imagination. It has as real an objective existence (though of course of a different kind) as actuality. It is as true that certain things, which do not actually exist, are *possible* as distinguished from *impossible*, as that certain other things do exist *actually*.

Possibility, therefore, exists both as an idea and a fact, and it is necessary to seek, if not a cause, at least an *explanation* of it. Its explanation is not to be found in the human mind, because the existence or non-existence of the human mind makes no difference to the number of things that are possible. Nor is it to be found in the universe, which might be annihilated, without the number of possible things being either increased or diminished.

Possible things have evidently a transcendental and supra-mundane existence, analogous to that of

eternal and necessary truths. A little reflection will show that Possibility, as distinguished from Actuality, can exist only for Mind, and that, therefore, the existence from eternity of an infinite number of possible things, guarantees the existence of an Eternal, Necessary, and Infinite Mind.

IV.—The Unity of the First Cause

(1) *Proof from the Principle of Parsimony of Causes.*[1]—In proving the existence of a First Cause, we have proved *eo ipso* that the First Cause is *one at least.* It cannot be regarded as more than one, unless definite arguments or evidences are forthcoming in favour of its plurality. There are no such arguments or evidences of a purely metaphysical kind. The moral argument for two First Causes, based on the existence of Evil, is discussed in chapter xiv.

(2) *Proof from the Nature of the Infinite and Absolute.*—The First Cause, being absolute and infinite, must necessarily be *one*, for a plurality of absolute and infinite beings would limit one another.

(3) *Proof from the Unity of the Universe.*—The Universe and its Laws form a system so harmonious and mutually coherent, that a single Cause is strongly suggested, if not actually necessitated.

(4) *Proof from the Laws of Reason and from*

[1] This principle is often called "Occam's Razor." William of Occam (died 1349) expressed it thus: "Entia non sunt multiplicanda praeter necessitatem." Other scholastic statements of it are: "Principia non sunt cumulanda," and "Frustra sit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora."

Necessary Truth.—The Laws of Reason, and the World of Knowledge based upon Eternal and Necessary Truth, form a system so absolutely coherent, that it is necessary to assume that the Eternal Mind, in and for which these Laws and Truths are true, is *one.*

(5) *Proof from the Moral Law.*—The Moral Law is universal in its scope, and binds with an absolute obligation all rational natures. This strongly suggests that Ultimate Reality is *one.*

Objections

Objection 1.—If everything has a cause, then the First Cause has a cause, and that again another cause, and so on to infinity. (So H. Spencer, and others.)

Reply 1.—It is not assumed by the argument, and is not true, that everything whatsoever has a cause. Only *contingent* things have causes. To seek for the cause of an absolutely Necessary Being, such as the First Cause, is absurd.

Reply 2.—The idea of an infinite regress of causes involves a contradiction. A cause which owes its existence to another cause, is not (so far as its own *existence* is concerned) a cause at all, but an effect. Hence to account for the existence of things by a series of caused causes, is to account for it by a series of effects, which is absurd. Unless there existed from eternity at least one really productive Uncaused Cause, nothing would ever have existed at all.

Objection 2.—Science detects no such thing as true efficient causation in nature. Since, therefore, there are no such things as causes, there cannot be a First Cause. (So Hume, J. S. Mill, K. Pearson, and others; and in part even Kant.)

Reply.—It is not to be expected that efficient causation could by any scientific means be detected in nature. If it exists, it is an impalpable and immaterial bond uniting phenomena, not anything sensible that can be measured or weighed.

But efficient causation, though not to be detected in nature, can be detected in the human mind. The human mind, in the act of *willing*, perceives itself to be the efficient cause of its own thoughts and actions. Efficient causation, therefore, exists, and if it exists in the human mind, there can be no scientific objection to it existing also in the universe at large.

We may put the matter thus: Science admits that efficient causation *may* exist in nature; Metaphysics proves that it *must*.

Objection 3.—Though the human mind is irresistibly impelled to believe the Law of Universal Causation, it may not, for all that, be objectively true. (So Kant[1] and others.)

Reply.—This objection, if admitted, opens the way to universal scepticism. The primary assumption of all thinking is that the universe forms a rational system. This implies that the inward world of

[1] Kant held this as a purely speculative, not as a practical opinion.

mind corresponds in a rational way with the objective world about which mind thinks. This, again, implies that the main categories of human thought (the category of causation, for example) correspond to something objectively real in the external world. It is not possible to *prove* this, but if it is denied, the alternative is an irrational universe.

LITERATURE

(*a*) Theistic

Plato, *Dialogues*, especially the *Timæus*; Aristotle, *Metaphysics*; Cicero, *De Natura Deorum*; A. Caldecott and R. R. MacKintosh, *Selections from the Literature of Theism*; R. Flint, *Theism*; G. P. Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*; J. Martineau, *A Study of Religion*; G. Frémont, *Démonstration Scientifique de l'Existence de Dieu*; G. Michelet, *Dieu et l'Agnosticisme Contemporain*, 1909; F. J. Hall, *The Being and Attributes of God*, 1909; Piat, *De la Croyance en Dieu*; Franzelin, *De Deo Uno*, 1883; J. Iverach, *Theism*; A. Whately, *Christian Theism*; H. Wrixon, *The Religion of the Common Man* (popular work defending Theism); H. Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, 1909; W. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*; Paley, *Natural Theology*; Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*; Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*; Descartes, *Metaphysical Meditations* (tr.); J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* and *The Realm of Ends*; F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*; W. S. Jevons, *Principles of Science*, xxxi.; J. R. Illingworth, *Personality*, and *Divine Immanence*, and *Divine Transcendence*; Boedder, *Natural Theology*; Lotze, *Microcosmus*; J. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*. (See also chap. ii., and the works on the philosophy of religion mentioned on pp. xxv. and xxvi.)

(*b*) Agnostic

Hume, *Human Understanding*, sect. vii.; J. S. Mill, *Three Essays on Religion*, p. 142 ff.; H. Spencer, *First Principles*, pt. i.; K. Pearson, *Grammar of Science*[2]; Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*; McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*. (See also chap. ii.)

CHAPTER II

THE NATURE OF THE FIRST CAUSE

SUMMARY.—It is proved against Pantheism that the First Cause is not identical with the universe. If it were, it could not be the cause of the universe. Also it would have contradictory and impossible attributes. The personality of the First Cause is demonstrated (*a*) from the fact that perfect causality can only be affirmed of a free personal intelligence, (*b*) from the fact that infinity in the strict sense can only be affirmed of perfect mind, and (*c*) from the existence of human personality. If the First Cause is not personal, it is inferior to its creature, man. Personality, being a pure perfection, implies no limitation or imperfection of the nature of the First Cause.

IT was demonstrated in the last chapter that a First Cause of the universe exists. The object of the present chapter is to investigate its nature.

I.—THE TRANSCENDENCE OF THE FIRST CAUSE

The first question that requires discussion is whether the First Cause is distinct from the universe, or identical with it. According to Pantheism, God and Nature are identical. Nothing exists except God, and therefore the universe is its own First Cause.

The pantheistic view has already been incidentally refuted in proving the existence of a First Cause. In the first chapter it was shown that the existing

universe is not the only universe conceivable, and that therefore there must be some cause why this particular universe out of the infinite number of possible universes actually exists. But such a cause cannot be the universe itself, nor can it be a limited being greater than the universe. It must be a cause capable of producing all possible universes: in other words, it must be transcendental, infinite, and absolute. It must be infinite not only in certain limited respects (as in the opinion of some the present universe is infinite in time and extension), but infinite in all possible respects, and the absolute cause of all inferior infinities.

The error of Pantheism may also be shown by a consideration of its consequences.

(1) If the First Cause is identical with the universe, then the First Cause is liable to change. The universe, if not as a whole, at least in its parts, is subject to evolution or development. The First Cause, therefore, must evolve or develop, and be sometimes more perfect and sometimes less perfect. This is fully admitted by many Pantheists. Hegel, for example, teaches that the First Cause begins by being unconscious and destitute of all qualities, that it gradually perfects itself as the world develops, and finally attains self-consciousness in man. Analogous statements are made by Schelling, Fichte, Schopenhauer, von Hartmann, and Spinoza.

But the First Cause must, as has been already shown, be absolutely complete and perfect in all respects. If it changes, it must thereby become

either more complete or less complete. If more complete, it was not complete before it changed; if less complete, it ceases, after the change, to be the First Cause. Therefore it cannot change at all.

(2) If God is identical with the universe, contradictions and absurdities must be affirmed of Him. He must be conscious and unconscious, rational and irrational, material and immaterial, hot and cold, round and square, moving and at rest. He must be identical with the Theist who believes in a God distinct from the world, with the Pantheist who believes that the universe is God, and with the Atheist who denies that there is a God at all. Moreover, since the universe consists of parts and is extended, God must consist of parts and be extended.

(3) But this is not the worst. If God is identical with the actual world, moral distinctions disappear altogether. Since evil exists as well as good, God must be sinful as well as holy, cruel as well as merciful, unjust as well as just. He must be the coward as well as the hero, the murderer as well as his victim, the criminal as well as his judge. The more thorough-going Pantheists admit this. Hegel for example, says: "What kind of an absolute being is that which does not contain in itself all that is actual, even evil included?" And an Indian Pantheist only develops the moral consequences of his creed when he says: "Though the soul plunge itself in sin, like a sword in water, it shall in no wise cling to it."

But a creed which denies the distinction between right and wrong, a distinction grounded on the direct testimony of consciousness, must be false.[1]

II.—The Personality of the First Cause

(1) It has been shown that God is a perfect cause. But the conception of perfect cause involves the idea of perfect personality. Cause is a conception derived, not from observation of external nature, but from observation of the operations of the mind itself. The mind is able to choose freely certain ends, and to bring them about, either by willing them directly or by willing their appropriate means. A being, therefore, which is a cause in the full sense of the word, must possess intelligence and volition. It is true that inanimate objects and forces are sometimes spoken of as causes, but always in a lower and inferior sense. A cause, strictly so called, must be a person, and a perfect and infinite cause must be a perfect and infinite person.

(2) The personality of God may also be proved from His infinity. It has been shown that God is infinite in the sense that He contains within Himself the equivalent of all possible things. But *possible* as distinguished from actual things can exist only for a mind. Matter is entirely actual. It is precisely what it is, and cannot contain within itself what is not, as a mind can when it conceives the possible. God therefore, as containing within Himself all possibility, is infinite mind.

[1] See chap. iii.

But impersonal mind is an absurdity. Therefore God must be an infinite person.

(3) The personality of God may also be proved from the existence of human personality, as follows. No effect can transcend its cause. Now, personality, as it exists in man, is the highest known fact in the universe: therefore God is at least personal.

This argument is based on the self-evident truth, confirmed also by experience, that the cause of an effect must always be *adequate*, that is, it must contain within itself a power and excellence at least equal to the effect to be produced. Within the sphere of human activity (which is the only form of efficient causality directly known to us) this law invariably holds. For instance, a great picture can only be produced by a great painter, and a great poem by a great poet. Never under any circumstances is this principle violated. An inferior artist never produces a great work of art; an idiot never accomplishes a task which would naturally require an intelligent man to accomplish it.

Nevertheless, plausible objections have been made to the principle of *adequate cause* considered as of universal applicability. John Stuart Mill, for example, says: "The notion seems to be that no causes can give rise to products of a more precious or elevated kind than themselves. But this is at variance with the known analogies of Nature. How vastly nobler and more precious, for instance, are the higher vegetables and animals than the soil and manure out of which and by

the properties of which they are raised up! The tendency of all recent speculation is toward the opinion that the development of inferior orders of existence into superior, the substitution of greater elaboration and higher organization for lower, is the general rule of Nature. Whether it is so or not, there are at least in Nature a multitude of facts bearing that character, and that is sufficient for the argument."[1]

Mill here confuses *succession* with *efficient causality*. He argues that because a less excellent state of things precedes a more excellent state of things, therefore it causes it. This is the old fallacy of *post hoc ergo propter hoc*. It is perfectly true that for the purposes of natural science, which does not profess to deal with efficient causation, the idea of cause as "invariable antecedent" may suffice, but it does not suffice for philosophy. Philosophy asks not only what things follow what things, but why they do so, and by no means assumes that, because one thing follows another, it causes it. In the order of nature, matter precedes life, and life precedes mind; but it would be rash indeed to conclude from this that matter causes life and life causes mind. It may be that all three are effects of some other cause, or that if they cause one another, the order of causation may be precisely the reverse of what is assumed. It is perfectly conceivable, and indeed is held by good authorities, that the order of causation is the reverse of the

[1] *Three Essays*, p. 152.

order of time, and that what appears later in order of evolution is really the cause of what appears earlier. In this case, instead of matter being the cause of mind, mind is the cause of matter; and instead of Darwin's arboreal animal being the cause of man, man is the cause of the arboreal animal; and instead of the original nebula being the cause of the universe, the universe is the cause of the original nebula. Either of these suppositions is preferable to the absurdity of supposing that a cause can produce anything superior to itself.

It may be added that Mill's examples of effects transcending their causes are singularly ill chosen. The "higher vegetables and animals" of which he speaks, are certainly never produced entirely from soil and manure, but always from other vegetables and animals of the same kind.

There is nothing, therefore, in the facts of natural science to hinder the argument from the personality of man to the personality of God. Moral personality, as we know it in man, is the highest fact in Nature, and therefore the Author of Nature must be at least moral or personal, otherwise He would be inferior to His own creatures. Theists admit that "moral" and "personal" are inadequate terms to apply to God; but they represent the highest qualities that we can conceive, and are therefore the nearest to the truth. If any one prefers to speak of God as hyper-personal, no Theist who understands his position will object.

III.—Objections

It is now necessary to consider certain difficulties and objections which are frequently urged against the ascription of personality to the First Cause.

First Objection.—It is said that if it is logical to argue that because man is personal, God is so, it must be logical to argue that because man has a brain, God has a brain, and that because man is imperfect, therefore God is imperfect; in fact, on the principle that whatever is true of the effect, is true of the cause, it is necessary to argue that God, being the cause of the material world, must Himself be material, extended, heavy, and so forth.[1]

The reply is that it is not true, and is not assumed by the argument, that whatever is true of the effect is true of the cause. *In a certain sense*, of course, the effect is contained in the cause, but only in the sense that the cause is able to produce it. Thus a painter is the cause of the picture he produces, but he is not the picture, nor does he possess the attributes of the picture. For instance, he is not rectangular, nor made of paint and canvas.

Yet, although the cause need not actually possess any of the attributes of the effect, it is possible, by examining the effect, to obtain important information about it. For instance, by examining a picture, it is possible to infer that it was produced by a

[1] This is argued by Mr. G. J. Holyoake, Prof. Clifford, Prof Du Bois-Reymond, and others.

painter, and if it is a good picture, that the painter possessed considerable artistic skill. Similarly, it is possible from an examination of Nature to infer an Author of Nature, and to conclude, not indeed that He is material, or extended, or anything of the kind, but that He possesses great skill and wisdom. Now it has been already proved that He possesses infinite power, and it will be proved more fully in the next chapter that He possesses infinite moral perfection. God, therefore, is pure perfection without any admixture of limitation or imperfection. But to possess a brain, or to be material, or to be extended, are qualities denoting limitation and imperfection; therefore they cannot in any sense be affirmed of God. But personality, provided that it can be shown to express a pure perfection, is predicable of Him.

Second Objection.—It is objected that personality implies some measure of limitation or imperfection, and that therefore it cannot be predicated of the infinite and absolute God.

In order to examine this objection, it is necessary to analyse the idea of personality. Whenever God is affirmed to be personal, it is meant among other things less important: (1) that He is intelligent; (2) that He is self-conscious; (3) that He possesses will.

(1) That intelligence is the name of a perfection is clear. Even the limited intelligence of man is a noble attribute, exalting him to be the king and high-priest of nature. Moreover, intelligence is not

an attribute implying in itself limitation or imperfection. It is as easy to conceive a perfect intelligence, knowing all actual and possible things, as to conceive a limited intelligence like man's. Intelligence, therefore, in a perfect and infinite degree, can be legitimately predicated of God.

(2) Self-consciousness, again, is implied in perfect intelligence. For if a perfectly intelligent Being did not know Himself, His intelligence would be limited.

(3) Will, in like manner, is a real perfection. Without an active will, man, in spite of the gift of intelligence, would never have attained the mastery of the world. Even God, if He were pure intelligence without will, could neither create nor govern the world. If therefore God is really perfect, He must possess will. Will implies, of itself, no limitation or imperfection of nature. It is as easy to conceive of a will absolutely free and infinitely powerful, as to conceive of a limited will like man's. God therefore possesses a will adequate to His intelligence—that is to say, He is able to achieve all that is possible.

Third Objection.—It is objected by certain philosophers of the "absolute" school, that God cannot be personal, because that would contradict His being "absolute." By "absolute" is meant *not related in any way to anything.* But if God, they argue, is personal and conscious, and knows Himself and other things, He must be related to Himself, and therefore imperfect, and not absolute.

We reply: Not every relation implies imperfection or limitation. Certainly the relation of an Infinite Being to Himself does not. Such a relation must from the nature of the case be an infinite and perfect one. Similarly, the relation of a perfect cause to its effect implies no imperfection in the cause, though it may in the effect. We may go further, and say that if God were really absolute in the sense of being unable to enter into relations with anything, He would be unable to create or rule the world, which is absurd.

Another objection of a similar kind is that if God is "absolute," He must have absolutely all attributes. Thus He must not only be absolutely personal, but also absolutely impersonal; not only absolutely holy, but absolutely sinful, and so forth. But this is absurd. One and the same being cannot have at the same time a number of contradictory attributes. God is a rational, not an irrational absolute. He possesses every possible perfection in an absolute degree, but no contradictory attributes or imperfections of any kind.

APPENDIX

IS GOD FINITE OR INFINITE?

THERE has been much discussion in recent Philosophy as to whether God is finite or infinite. God is certainly not finite in the sense of Mr. J. S. Mill and Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, who argue that the world being finite, its cause is finite, and that

God accordingly is only a kind of *Primus inter pares*—a Being greater than other beings, but of the same order.

All *actual* existence is finite, and if a cause for actual existence alone had to be sought, God, perhaps, might be regarded as finite. But we have to seek a cause for *all possible and conceivable existence*, and since the categories of the possible and the conceivable are, to our faculties at least, infinite, God must, by creatures like us, be regarded as infinite.

It is, however, possible that, *from the point of view of perfect intelligence*, the number of possibilities and conceivabilities is finite, and that therefore God appears *to Himself* as a finite, complete, and perfect whole. Thus God is finite to Himself, but infinite to us, and to all creatures. This, perhaps, is the true solution of the difficulty. Many good metaphysicians hold that *absolute* infinity is an irrational and impossible conception, and that therefore *absolute* infinity cannot be predicated of God.

LITERATURE

(*a*) Defending God's Personality

Add to the literature of chap. i., Uhlmann, *Die Persönlichkeit Gottes*, 1906; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*, 1907; Paulsen, *Der Moderne Pantheismus*, 1906; R. Flint, *Anti-theistic Theories*; C. Gore, *The New Theology*; Momerie, *Personality*; Lotze, *Microcosmus*, ii. p. 659 ff.; H. Rashdall in *Personal Idealism*; C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man.*

(*b*) Pantheistic or Agnostic

Spinoza, *Ethics*; Hegel, *Philosophy of Religion*; M. Arnold, *God and the Bible*: H. Spencer, *First Principles*; J. A. Picton, *Pantheism* and *The Religion of the Universe*; R. J. Campbell, *The New Theology*; works of the English Hegelian School, F. H. Bradley, A. E. Taylor, B. Bosanquet, J. Royce, etc.

(*c*) Atheistic

G. J. Romanes, *Candid Examination of Theism*; C. Bradlaugh, *Plea for Atheism*; P. B. Shelley, *Necessity of Atheism*; Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*; McCabe, *Existence of God.*

CHAPTER III

THE MORAL ARGUMENT FOR THE EXISTENCE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

SUMMARY.—Only the general goodness, and not the moral perfection, of the Deity can be proved by arguments taken from external nature. But the inward voice of conscience testifies that a perfect standard of righteousness exists independent of the human mind. Whatever, therefore, may be the explanation of moral evil, God is good, and hates evil. The evidence of conscience is vindicated against the misrepresentations of Hedonism and Utilitarianism; also against certain illegitimate deductions from the theory of Evolution.

IT is impossible to prove by observation of the world alone the moral perfection of the First Cause. Neither the justice, nor the benevolence, nor even the veracity of the Deity are so plainly manifested in the present order of things that doubt concerning them is impossible. Upon the whole, no doubt, nature gives us the impression that God is good. His justice is daily vindicated in the general prosperity of virtue and the general misery of vice. His benevolence is shown in the delight which all creatures feel in the mere exercise of their bodily and mental functions. His veracity may be inferred from the fact that He gives His creatures faculties for the attainment of truth, and therefore

presumably loves truth. But, on the other hand, the existence of so much unrewarded virtue and unpunished wrong, of so much seeming cruelty, and above all of so much sin and error in the world, seems to cast a doubt upon the absolute perfection of His moral character. So much are these difficulties felt even by thoroughly religious men, that some have supposed that there exists besides the good God an eternal principle of evil, which He is unable, with all His efforts, entirely to control. Others have supposed that the moral character of God is, like that of men, partly good and partly evil. It is necessary, therefore, to turn to an argument of a more decisive character, and this is to be found in what is known as the *Moral Argument.*

Man is a moral being. No nation of men is known who have not some idea of the distinction between right and wrong. As to the particular actions which are right or wrong, there is some diversity of opinion, though less than is often represented; but as to the reality of moral distinctions, and the duty of men to do the right so far as they understand it, there is complete agreement.

Since, however, the existence of moral distinctions is, as will be shown, one of the strongest proofs of the existence of a moral Creator, many attempts have been made by philosophers of sceptical tendencies to show that these distinctions are illusory, and that right conduct is, at bottom, nothing but enlightened self-interest.

Hedonism.—According to one form of this teaching, known as Hedonism, the chief end of life is Pleasure. That form of conduct which yields to the individual the maximum of pleasure or the minimum of pain is right, and other standard of right there is none.

The reply to Hedonism is threefold. In the first place, conscience testifies that duty and pleasure, even when they coincide, as they sometimes do, are not the same thing; and experience further testifies that they often collide. The Hedonist answers that the collision is only apparent, for if what is called duty ever summons a man to sacrifice a present pleasure, it is always in order to secure a greater pleasure in the future. But the plain man remains convinced, all the same, that there are some cases of virtuous self-sacrifice in which there is no adequate return in terms of pleasure. Especially is this the case when a man at the call of duty sacrifices his life for his country, or for some noble cause. In this case, there being, on sceptical principles, no future life, a future compensation is impossible.

In the second place, Hedonism fails to account for the feeling of moral obligation as distinguished from prudence. It is doubtless prudent to follow the course of conduct which yields an overplus of pleasure, but it can never be a duty to do so, in the sense that to act otherwise would be a sin. But the sense of duty and the sense of sin are inexpugnable facts in human nature. It is simply playing with the subject to assert that the sense of *duty* is

only a conviction that a certain course of conduct will be pleasurable, or that *remorse*, say, for a mean or cowardly action, is only a conviction that a more pleasurable course of conduct might have been chosen. Hedonism, therefore, failing to account for the sense of duty, or for shame, or repentance, or remorse, or for any of the strictly moral feelings, is an inadequate theory of morals.

In the third place, Hedonism affords no secure basis for social morality. Its basis is the greatest pleasure of the individual, and it is impossible to show that this always coincides with the interests of society. The best authorities say that it does not; and even if it does, the proof is so doubtful, that it would never be able to hold in check the narrow self-interest which the general adoption of Hedonistic principles would inevitably foster To take a concrete example, it is impossible to show by conclusive arguments that the pleasure of having children is not outweighed by the great pain, self-denial, and anxiety which the bearing and nurture of children entails; and therefore it is probable that if Hedonistic opinions ever prevailed universally, men and women would refuse to rear children, and the human race would dwindle or come to an end.

Utilitarianism. — The general inadequacy and moral repulsiveness of pure Hedonism have led to its restatement in the modified form of *Utilitarianism.* Utilitarianism differs from simple

Hedonism in having regard to the happiness of others as well as of self. According to its teaching, right conduct is that which conduces to the greatest happiness or greatest pleasure of the greatest number. Every one, in acting, is to consider not only his own pleasure, but the pleasure of all other persons whom his action will affect, according to the principle, "Every one to count for one, and nobody for more than one." In the system of Utilitarianism expounded by John Stuart Mill there is a further element. Account is taken not only of the intensity or quantity of pleasures, but also of their quality. A distinction is drawn between pleasures that are noble and elevated, and pleasures that are ignoble and base. This distinction, true and important as it is, is an illegitimate addition to the theory in question. No pleasure, considered simply as pleasure, can differ from another pleasure otherwise than in quantity or intensity. If it differs in any other way, it must be from the presence in it of something which is not pleasure. Every course of conduct or action has various qualities or aspects. It may, for example, be pleasurable, and dignified, and unusual, and beautiful, and noble, and virtuous, and many other things. But its pleasureableness is not its dignity, or its unusualness, or its beauty, or its nobleness, or its virtuousness. All these qualities, though conjoined in the same course of action, are distinct. Mill therefore, in recognizing grades of nobility in pleasures, has

passed beyond mere pleasure, and introduced æsthetic and moral distinctions for which his theory has no place.

In general criticism of Utilitarianism it may be remarked that it is as incapable as Hedonism of finding room for, or of explaining, the fundamental moral facts. It does not explain the sense of duty—the sense, that is, that a course of conduct is not only prudent as conducing to pleasure, but binding on the conscience in a far higher sense. Nor can it either justify or logically urge real self-sacrifice. When the interests of society require that an individual should sacrifice his interests or his life for its sake, what argument can the Utilitarian bring to bear on him? He can say, "You should consider the interests of others more than your own." But the man can retort, "Why should I?" and to this there is, on Utilitarian principles, no answer. Utilitarianism, then, is simply a very illogical form of Hedonism. As Dr. Martineau epigrammatically expresses it, "From 'Each for himself' to 'Each for all'—no road."

Evolutionary Ethics.—The last sceptical theory of morality which it is necessary to examine is that of the existing school of Evolutionary Ethics. Following a hint of Darwin in his *Descent of Man*, Mr. Herbert Spencer, Mr. Leslie Stephen, Prof. Clifford, and others, have sought to explain conscience as an inherited faculty derived partly from the "tribal conscience"—*i.e.* the gregarious instincts of primitive man—and partly

from the accumulated experiences of the race that certain actions conduce on the whole to pleasure, and others to pain. As Mr. Spencer expresses it, "Experiences of utility, organized and consolidated during all past generations of the human race, have been producing nervous modifications, which, by continued transmission and accumulation, have become in us certain faculties of moral intuition, certain emotions responding to right and wrong conduct, which have no apparent basis in the individual experience of utility."

Mr. Spencer's theory is, in its main features, credible enough. It is credible, though it is not demonstrated, that ancestral experiences as to what things are beneficial and noxious, may be transmitted to posterity as instincts to seek and avoid those things. It is also clear that tribes of unselfish men would, owing to their unusual powers of co-operation, have a great advantage in warfare and in other respects over tribes of selfish men, and so would tend to survive and to propagate unselfishness. Nor need it be denied that conscience has been *evolved*—perhaps, even, evolved out of non-moral elements. What must, in the interests of truth, be denied, is the illegitimate assumption that because conscience has been evolved out of non-moral elements, therefore it is still identical with those non-moral elements. Such an assumption is contrary to experience. A chicken is evolved out of an egg, but there is more in a chicken than there is in an egg. Man has been

evolved, according to Darwin, out of an ape, but there is more in man than there is in an ape. The perception of colour has been evolved out of the perception of light, but the perception of colour is more than the perception of light. The fact is that the history of Evolution is the history of real additions to the knowledge and capacities of creatures. It is not the mere reshuffling of old elements, but the gradual appearance of entirely new ones. It is nothing to the point, therefore, to prove that the ideas of right and wrong have been evolved out of the ideas of pleasure and pain, or out of tribal instincts. What is necessary is to prove that they contain no new element, and this the evolutionist moralists have not seriously attempted to do. There is nothing, therefore, in the theory of evolution, to lead us to distrust the validity of our moral intuitions, or to require us to resolve them, contrary to the plain testimony of consciousness, into non-moral elements such as pleasure and pain. Conscience, then, is trustworthy, and hence, to account for conscience, there must be a God, and a God with moral attributes, as will now be shown.

The Argument from Conscience.—(1) The moral law is felt to be not a mere human convention, but objectively true. Deceit, cowardice, selfishness, cruelty, injustice, envy, ingratitude, and the like are felt to be in themselves, and apart from all consequences, morally base and vile; while truthfulness, courage, unselfishness, benevolence,

justice, generosity, and gratitude are felt to be in themselves morally excellent. It is as certain that they are so, as that feathers are light, and lead heavy. But these moral distinctions must have an efficient cause. The cause cannot be man himself, because moral distinctions are discerned to be objectively true, and to be independent of human will and legislation. The cause cannot be anything non-moral or physical, otherwise the effect would transcend the cause; besides, moral distinctions can only exist for a moral and personal being. It follows, therefore, that the cause must lie in some transcendent Personal Being to whom moral distinctions are real, and who is altogether holy.

(2) The same result is reached from a consideration of the sense of duty, or moral obligation. Whenever one course of conduct is discerned to be morally right, and the alternative courses of conduct morally wrong, there arises in the mind a sense of moral obligation. This is a feeling altogether peculiar in its nature. It is not a sense of compulsion: the person under a sense of moral obligation is perfectly free to resist it. Nor is it a feeling that it would be imprudent to refuse to perform the act. It is more like an earnest command or exhortation, founded on such just and evident reasons, that it cannot be neglected without a sense of shame and sin. Now this exhortation, or command, or "categorical imperative," as Kant called it, clearly comes from outside ourselves. Being moral in its nature, it cannot come from the non-moral or

physical universe. It must come, therefore, from some personal Being superior to man, who since He commands always what is right, and sets before man a standard of sinless perfection, must be morally perfect. This argument was never better expressed than by Cicero, who says:[1] "It has always been the persuasion of all truly wise men that the moral law was not devised by men or introduced by nations, but is an eternal law to which the whole world must conform. Its ultimate basis is God, who commands and forbids. And this law is as old as the mind of God Himself. Hence the law upon which all moral obligation is founded is truly and pre-eminently the mind of the Supreme Divinity."

Difficulties undoubtedly occur, when an attempt is made to account for the existence of evil in a world ruled by a perfect Being; but since the Author of the universe reveals Himself in conscience as irreconcilably opposed to evil, He cannot possibly be its cause. But this subject will be more fully discussed later.

LITERATURE

(*a*) The Moral Argument

The moral argument is dealt with in most of the treatises on Theism mentioned in chapter i.; *e.g.* Flint, *Theism*, lect. vii.; Fraser, *Philosophy of Theism*, vol. ii. lect. i.; Martineau, *A Study of Religion*, vol ii., p. 39 ff.; Boedder, *Natural Theology*, p. 62 ff.; Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, c. xii.; Rashdall, *Philosophy and Religion*, lect. iii. See also Butler, *Sermons*;

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Newman, *Grammar of Assent*, c.v.; F. P. Cobbe, *A Faithless World*; A. Fouillée, *Le Moralisme de Kant*; C. B. Renouvier, *Le Personnalisme*, and the works mentioned below under (*b*).

(*b*) Hedonism, Utilitarianism, and Evolutionary Ethics

J. S. Mill, *Utilitarianism*; J. Martineau, *Types of Ethical Theory*, ii. pp. 304–422; Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*, pp. 1–146; W. K. Clifford, *Lectures*, ii. p. 74 ff.; K. Pearson, *Ethic of Free Thought*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Sociology*, and *Principles of Ethics*; F. W. Nietzsche, *Also sprach Zarathustra*, and *Jenseits von Gut und Böse*, and *Zur Genealogie der Moral*; A. Fouillée, *Nietzsche et l' "Immoralisme,"* and *La Morale des Idées-Forces*; Hobhouse, *Morals in Evolution*; C. M. Williams, *Systems of Ethics founded on the Theory of Evolution*; F. P. Cobbe, *Darwinism in Morals*; W. Wundt, *Ethical Systems* (tr.); E. Westermarck, *Origin and Development of Moral Ideas*; W. R. Sorley, *Ethics of Naturalism*; Gutberlet, *Ethik und Naturrecht*; Castelein, *Droit Naturel*; J. Rickaby, *Moral Philosophy*; Calderwood, *Handbook of Moral Philosophy*.

CHAPTER IV

DESIGN IN NATURE[1]

SUMMARY.—The general harmony of Nature is attributed by philosophers either (1) to unknown or unknowable causes, or (2) to the natural properties of matter and energy, or (3) to a Designing Mind. But as against (1), it is illegitimate to postulate unknown or unknowable causes, when known ones suffice, and as against (2), it is impossible to explain from the known properties of matter and energy either the origin of these properties, or the reason why matter was originally arranged as it was, or the origin of consciousness and intelligence. There remains, therefore, the third hypothesis, a Designing Mind, which is proved to be the true and adequate cause both of the order of physical nature and of consciousness and intelligence.

MOST serious thinkers admit that the universe is neither a fortuitous concourse of atoms nor an incoherent medley of partial uniformities, but a unity of the most thoroughgoing kind. All the forces of Nature, even those which are most diverse, co-operate for common ends, and result in harmonious combinations which cannot possibly be accidental. For instance, the body of a living animal is a most wonderful and complex harmony of diverse forces, mechanical, chemical, vital, and

[1] The argument of this chapter is popularly called "The Argument from Design." Strictly speaking it should be called "The Argument *for* Design."

psychical, all supplementing one another, and tending jointly to promote the proper good of the animal. Moreover, organisms in general are adjusted to the environment, and the environment to organisms in such way as to make it evident to all observing minds that a principle of harmony and order runs through the whole of Nature.

Attempts to explain this harmony may be divided into three classes. Some philosophers attribute it to unknown or unknowable causes, others to the natural properties of matter and energy, and others to design. Besides these three suppositions there are no others.

(1) *Theories of the Unknowable.*—With regard to the first supposition, that the harmony of Nature is due to unknown or unknowable causes, it might suffice to say that it is illegitimate to appeal to unknown or unknowable causes, until it has been plainly proved that known causes are inadequate to account for things. It is, nevertheless, advisable to consider what these alleged causes are, and what they are worth.

(*a*) Mr. Spencer attributes the origin of things to "the Unknowable." But this hypothesis is objectionable because there is no evidence that anything unknowable exists. Unknown things exist in plenty, but there is no evidence that any of them are unknowable. The First Cause may, of course, be unknowable, but there is at any rate no proof that it is. There are two alternatives—one that it is knowable, and the other that it is

unknowable. Which of these alternatives is true can only be decided by a person who has attained to actual knowledge of the First Cause. Mr. Spencer, therefore, who knows that the First Cause is unknowable, must have attained to considerable actual knowledge of the very cause which he professes not to know. It has, indeed, been wittily remarked that there are few things in the whole realm of human knowledge with which Mr. Spencer displays from time to time such an intimate acquaintance as the "Unknowable." Thus he frequently asserts, (1) that it exists, (2) that it is the cause of all things, (3) that it always preserves in the universe the same amount of actual and potential energy, (4) that it is impersonal, and (5) that it is a stupendous and immeasurable force. But if all this can be known about the "Unknowable," Mr. Spencer can have no objection on principle to theologians knowing a few more things about it—as, for example, that it is Infinite Mind, and the Moral Governor of the universe. In reality Mr. Spencer's "Unknowable" is only a form of impersonal energy, and the inadequacy of impersonal causes to explain the universe has already been demonstrated in Chapters II. and III.

(*b*) Thoroughgoing Hegelians explain the world as a manifestation of the "Absolute." The futilities of the Hegelian Absolute have already been exhibited in Chapter II. It may be added here, that even if such a mass of logical contradictions as the Hegelian Absolute could possibly manage to exist,

it could never give existence to a world which is rational and logical.

(*c*) Schopenhauer attributed the origin of things to "unconscious will." But since will is the deliberate choice by rational and conscious beings of some particular course of action, the phrase unconscious will is a contradiction in terms. The same may be said of such phrases as "unconscious mind," "unconscious design," and the like, which are occasionally used by thinkers who reject the idea of a personal God, and yet recoil from the alternative of naked Materialism. In reality there is no logical halting-place between thoroughgoing Theism and thoroughgoing Materialism. A cosmic mind which does not think and is not conscious, is no mind at all, and might just as well be called matter at once.

(*d*) The late Prof. Clifford accounted for things by his theory of "mind-stuff." "The universe," he says, "consists entirely of mind-stuff." By "mind-stuff" he means indefinite numbers of separate sensations or feelings existing apart by themselves scattered through space, without any mind to feel them. These atoms of "mind-stuff," by combining together, gradually form themselves into matter, and mind, and all the phenomena of the universe. "A feeling," says Clifford, "can exist by itself without forming part of a consciousness. It does not depend for its existence on the consciousness of which it may form a part. Hence a feeling is a thing-in-itself, an absolute whose

existence is not relative to anything else" (*Lectures*, vol. ii. pp. 52-73). It is sufficient to say of this theory that there is no evidence that "mind-stuff" either does or can exist. Indeed, there is the strongest reason for supposing that it cannot, for to imagine that sensations or feelings exist as it were "in the air," without any mind to feel them, is like imagining that the attributes of bodies, such as heaviness, hardness, colour, and the like, exist apart from the bodies to which they belong, and apart from the minds which perceive them.

(*e*) Equally unsatisfactory are those theories which seek the origin of things in such unverifiable abstractions as "prothyle," "prodynamis," and "ethers" of various kinds, which by gyrating, or vibrating, or condensing, or expanding in various ways, give rise to the universe and all its marvellous uniformities and harmonies. As scientific speculations concerning the internal structure of matter they are legitimate enough; but when they are put forward as ultimate explanations of the universe, they become mere varieties of Materialism, the theory which has next to be considered.

(2) *Materialism.*—Materialists affirm that the order and harmony of the world are due to the primary qualities of matter and energy, from which they result by natural necessity. "All and every law," says *Physicus*, "follows as a necessary consequence from the persistence of force, and the primary qualities of matter" (*Candid Examination of Theism*, p. 52).

But, as has been already shown, the order of the world is the result not only of the properties of matter and energy, but also of the original distribution of matter in space. With a different distribution of matter, a different universe would have resulted, even if the properties of matter and energy had been the same. Now this original distribution of matter and energy must have had a cause, and since its cause was nothing connected with matter and energy, and it is illegitimate to postulate unknown or unknowable causes, its cause must have been the only remaining alternative—a Designing Mind.

Again, the primary qualities of matter and energy are such, that, when a proper distribution of matter has been made, they produce a harmonious universe. But those qualities might conceivably have been so ill-assorted and incongruous, that they would not have produced an orderly universe. What then is the cause why these qualities are so well ordered and harmonious? It cannot be the qualities themselves, and it is illegitimate to introduce unknown or unknowable causes. The only alternative is that the cause is an Intelligent, Designing Mind.

Again, the properties of matter and energy are manifestly inadequate to account for the origin of consciousness and reason. This is sometimes admitted even by Materialists. *Physicus*, for example, says, "How such a thing as conscious intelligence is possible is a wholly unanswerable question." Haeckel says, "I have entitled consciousness 'the

central mystery of Psychology': it is the strong citadel of all mystic and dualistic errors, before whose ramparts the best equipped efforts of reason [*i.e.* of Materialism] threaten to miscarry." Semi-materialists like Tyndall, Huxley, and Bain are still more explicit. Tyndall, in his Belfast address (1874), after a brilliant exposition of the arguments for Materialism, proceeds: "But now comes my difficulty. Your atoms are individually without sensation; much more are they without intelligence. May I ask you then to try your hand on this problem? Take your dead hydrogen atoms, your dead carbon atoms, your dead phosphorus atoms, and all the other atoms, dead as grains of shot, of which the brain is formed. Imagine them separate and sensationless; observe them running together and forming all imaginable combinations. This, as a purely mechanical process is *seeable* by the mind. But can you see, or dream, or in any way imagine, how out of that mechanical act, and from these individually dead atoms, sensation, thought, and emotion are to rise? What baffles and bewilders me is the notion that from those physical tremors, things so utterly incongruous with them as sensation, thought, and emotion can be derived. You may say or think that this issue of consciousness from the clash of atoms is not more incongruous than the flash of light from the union of oxygen and hydrogen.[1] But I beg to say that it is. The flash is an affair of

[1] This had been urged by the German Materialist, L. Büchner.

consciousness, the objective counterpart of which is a vibration. It is a flash only by your interpretation. *You* are the cause of the apparent incongruity; and *you* are the thing that puzzles me."

Huxley expressed himself similarly. "I cannot conceive," says he, "how the phenomena of consciousness as such, and apart from the physical process by which they are called into existence, are to be brought within the bounds of physical science. Take the simplest possible example, the feeling of redness. Physical science tells us that it commonly arises as a consequence of molecular changes propagated from the eye to a certain part of the substance of the brain. Let us suppose the process of physical analysis pushed so far that one could view the last link of this chain of molecules, watch their movements as if they were billiard balls, weigh them, measure them, and know all that is physically knowable about them. Well, even in that case we should be just as far from being able to include the resulting phenomenon of consciousness, the feeling of redness, within the bounds of physical science, as we are at present. It would remain as unlike the phenomena we know under the names of matter and motion, as it is now. It seems to me pretty plain that [besides matter and force] there is a third thing in the universe, to wit consciousness, which, in the hardness of my heart or head, I cannot see to be matter or force or any conceivable modification of either" (*Evolution and Ethics*, p. 117 ff.).

In view of the admitted impossibility of deriving

conscious intelligence from unconscious matter, some Materialists have supposed that matter itself is conscious. This theory is called *Hylozoism.* Hylozoists believe that the ultimate atoms of matter possess rudimentary mind and intelligence. The amount of mind which a single atom, or even a single molecule, possesses is infinitesimally small; but when countless multitudes of molecules are associated together to form brains and nervous systems, the result is minds of a higher order, which are conscious and intelligent in the full sense of those terms.

Ingenious as this view is, the objections to it are fatal. (1) There is no evidence whatever that ordinary matter is conscious. (2) A number of separate and distinct consciousnesses like those supposed could not produce a single indivisible consciousness such as that of man. (3) A number of inferior minds grouped together would not constitute a higher type of mind.[1] (4) The amount or degree of mind which Hylozoists suppose to be sufficient to account for the universe is ridiculously small. If mind is necessary at all to account for the universe (and Hylozoists admit that it is), then a stupendous Mind, such as Theists postulate, is necessary, and not a collection of barely conscious and quite unintelligent atoms.

(3) *The Hypothesis of a Designing Mind.*—Mate-

[1] For a conclusive refutation of the theory that mental facts can be compounded, the reader may consult Prof. James's *Principles of Psychology*, vol. 1. p. 158 ff.

rialism having failed to give a rational account of the universe, there remains only the hypothesis of a Designing Mind. We propose to show (*a*) that this hypothesis is legitimate, (*b*) that it is adequate. It is *legitimate*, because it postulates more clearly even than Materialism a known and intelligible cause. We are far more certain that we possess intelligent and designing minds, than that what is called "matter" exists. In the opinion of many excellent authorities, and those by no means inclined to paradox or scepticism, matter is simply a modification of mind. On the other hand, the reality of mind, at least as a fact of experience, has never been doubted. It is true that mind, as we know it, is invariably associated with matter in the form of a brain and nervous system; but mind can be equally well thought of as disembodied, and reasons have already been given for thinking that the Supreme Mind is so. This, however, is quite a subordinate question. The real point at issue is whether the universe is the work of a Designing Mind; not whether that Mind is embodied or disembodied.

The hypothesis of design, as advanced by Theists, is *adequate*, because it postulates the *kind* of cause required, and also the *degree* required. The mind of man, as we know it, is orderly and rational, and operates by reducing both the external and the internal world to harmony and order. Examples of its operations are government by law, treatises on various branches of knowledge, works

of art, mechanical inventions, and above all moral virtue, which is the perfect harmony of the inner forces of the soul. But Nature also is orderly and rational, as is shown by the fact that men of science are able to discover and understand her laws. True, the complexity of Nature surpasses what the human mind can grasp, but still nothing has ever yet been discovered in Nature which is fundamentally irrational, or beyond the possible comprehension of an intellect analogous to man's. The supposition therefore of a stupendous Designing Mind as the cause of the world's harmony is *adequate*, and being alone adequate, is alone true.

The conclusion which has been reached from a consideration of the general harmony of Nature may be confirmed by a consideration of some particular cases of harmonious adaptation. The most striking of these are found in the bodies of animals. For example, the structure of the eye is so exquisitely adjusted to the sense of sight, and is so closely analogous to the microscopes and telescopes made by man, that most minds find the inference irresistible that the eye was specially designed to see with. Something similar may be said of the organs of hearing, smell, taste, and feeling. But perhaps the most striking case of all is the organs of sex. These organs are remarkable not only for their obvious adaptation to one another and for their being shared between two distinct individuals, but also for their subserving a purpose which is yet future. It is characteristic of true

design, not only that it produces harmonious adaptations in things, but that it provides for future events. Now, the organs of the two sexes display in the most unequivocal manner both these characteristics, for they are not only mutually adapted to one another, but they provide for future events—viz. the continuation of the race. Of course design cannot be actually seen in Nature—it is impossible from its nature that it ever could be—but it is difficult to see how the circumstantial evidence for design could possibly be stronger than it is in cases such as these.

There remains to be noticed one great advantage which the hypothesis of design possesses over all others. It gives a natural and sufficient account of the origin of the human mind. Design may or may not exist in Nature—it is there a matter of inference at best—but it certainly exists in the human mind. Now, the most probable cause that can be assigned for the existence of the designing mind of man, is the existence of a Designing Mind greater than man's. The human mind cannot have its origin in something lower than itself, *e.g.* a physical force, nor can it have its origin in anything higher than mind, for nothing higher than mind can be conceived or proved to exist. The inevitable conclusion, therefore, is, that the origin of the human mind is due to a Designing Mind analogous to, but infinitely transcending it.

APPENDIX

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE INTELLIGIBILITY OF THE UNIVERSE

To many minds the mere fact that the universe is intelligible and science possible is the strongest of all proofs that there is a Designing Creator. "If we read a book," says Professor Baden Powell,[1] "which it requires much thought and exercise of reason to understand, but which we find discloses more and more truth and reason as we proceed in the study, and contains clearly more than we can at present comprehend, then undeniably we properly say that thought and reason *exist in that book* irrespectively of our minds, and equally so of any question as to its author or origin. Such a book confessedly exists, and is ever open to us in the natural world. Or, to put the case under a slightly different form: When the astronomer, the physicist, the geologist, or the naturalist notes down a series of observed facts or measured dates, he is not an *author* expressing his own ideas—he is a mere *amanuensis* taking down from the dictations of Nature: his observation book is the record of the thoughts of *another mind*; he has but set down literally what he himself does not understand, or only very imperfectly. . . . That which requires thought and reason to understand must be itself thought and reason. That which mind alone can investigate or express must be itself mind. And if the highest conception attained is but partial, then the mind and reason studied is greater than the mind and reason of the student. If the more it be studied the more vast and complex is the necessary connection in reason disclosed, then the more evident is the vast extent and compass of the intelligence thus partially manifested, and its reality, as *existing in the immutably connected order of objects*

[1] Savilian, Professor of Geometry at Oxford, and a contributor to *Essays and Reviews*.

examined, independently of the mind of the investigator" (*Order of Nature*, p. 238 ff.).

Physicus, who quotes this passage in his *Candid Examination of Theism*, replies that the correspondence between the human mind and the world is sufficiently accounted for by the common origin of both; but the point is that one of the factors in this correspondence is *a rational mind*, and that therefore, presumably, the other factor is so also.

LITERATURE

Nearly all the theistic works mentioned in chaps. i.–iii. deal with the Design Argument, but Paley's *Natural Theology* and Janet's *Final Causes* are still the classical treatises. The latter is the fullest and most satisfactory modern work devoted exclusively to the subject. Hobhouse's *Development and Purpose* defends design in nature, but (what to most readers will seem an impossible and irrational conception) *unconscious* design. H. Bergson's *Élan Vital*, the cause of "Creative Evolution," resembles design, but is not identical with it (see especially his *Creative Evolution*). Modern Biologists, especially those of the School of Vitalism and Entelechy, tend to recognize to an increasing extent that design exists in organic nature (cp. H. Driesch, *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, and *History and Theory of Vitalism*; see above, p. xvi). For Evolution and Design, see chap. v.

CHAPTER V

OBJECTIONS TO THE ARGUMENT FOR DESIGN

SUMMARY. — Evolution disproves the doctrine of "special creation," but not the argument for a Designing Creator. It rather strengthens it, for if the evolution of individual organisms from a formless egg proves the existence of a Designing Creator, as it is held to do, still more does the evolution of countless species of plants and animals from a minute speck of protoplasm prove it. Again, the theory of Natural Selection, supposed true, leaves the Argument for Design where it was before. Natural Selection must have a cause, and since Natural Selection tends to produce rational harmony in nature and gives birth to intelligent beings like men, its cause must be intelligent—in other words, a Designing Mind.

I.—OBJECTIONS DRAWN FROM THE FACT OF EVOLUTION

PRIOR to Darwin it was generally[1] believed that the existing species of animals were instantaneously created in substantially their present forms, and that they are incapable of any fundamental change. These views are known as the theories of "Special Creation" and of the "Immutability of Species." Darwin revived, with many improvements and a vast array of added proofs, the transformist teach-

[1] Not universally, for St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas believed in some kind of evolution, and Lamarck advocated Transformism.

ing of Lamarck, who held that there are no absolute barriers between species, but that under certain circumstances one species may develop into a different one. According to Darwin, species were not created separately, but originated gradually by development or evolution from one or a few extremely small and simple organisms. The direct evidence for Darwin's theory is slight, but the indirect evidence is strong, and although differences of opinion still exist as to the causes of organic evolution, the fact itself is no longer seriously in dispute.

What, then, are the religious consequences of the doctrine of Evolution? Materialists generally affirm that Evolution in any form is fatal to the argument for design. The Design Argument, they say, is bound up with the doctrine of Special Creation, and falls with it. If living creatures have been gradually evolved by the operation of natural laws, they cannot have been created by a Designing Mind.

Now, it is quite true that Paley and all the older apologists assumed without question the doctrine of Special Creation, and they were quite right to do so, considering that this was the accepted scientific doctrine in their day. But it is quite untrue that their argument in any way depended upon that doctrine. The Design Argument simply infers from the admitted order and harmony of Nature an adequate cause for it, and goes on to prove that the only adequate cause is a Designing Mind. It

makes no difference to the argument whether the order that exists came into existence suddenly by instantaneous acts of creation, or gradually by a process of evolution or development. To take a particular instance, the body of a living dog shows manifold marks of design. For example, its eyes are apparently made to see with, and its legs to walk with. Now, these marks of design exist, and require to have a cause assigned to them, whether the dog (or the race of dogs) was created suddenly six thousand years ago, or was evolved gradually in the course of millions of ages from a protozoön. The question of time and of method does not enter into the argument at all. In Paley's classical work a traveller across a desolate heath finds a watch, and argues, from the indications of intelligent purpose which it presents, that it was made by an intelligent designer. It makes no difference to the argument whether the watch was made by hand or by machinery, whether it took a day to make, or forty years. Similarly, if any particular organ, say an eye, shows signs of being specially designed to perform its particular function, it is no reply to this to say that the eye took a hundred million years to evolve, and that it passed through many stages before it reached its present form. It is often forgotten that Evolution is not a new fact first discovered by Darwin. Darwin only affirmed of *races* what had long been known of *individuals*. An individual man, for example, is evolved from an almost microscopic germ of very

simple character. It is only very gradually that this germ or embryo acquires a distinctively human form and human intelligence. Now, this process of generation, which is essentially a process of evolution, so far from being supposed to contradict the supposition of a Designing Creator, is always alleged as a proof of it. If, therefore, the evolution of individuals is consistent with the existence of a Designing Creator, and even a proof of it, then the evolution of races must also be consistent with His existence and a proof of it. This was not perceived by Darwin himself, but it was perceived by many other naturalists and biologists of hardly less celebrity—by A. R. Wallace, for example, the co-discoverer of the principle of Natural Selection, and by Asa Gray, who popularized the Darwinian system in America. Even Huxley, the militant champion of Agnosticism, says, "There is a good deal of talk, and not a little lamentation, about the so-called religious difficulties which physical science has created. In theological science, as a matter of fact, it has created none. Not a solitary problem presents itself to the philosophical Theist at the present day which has not existed from the time that philosophers began to think out the logical grounds and the logical consequences of Theism. . . . In respect of the great problems of Philosophy, the post-Darwinian generation is, in one sense, exactly where the pre-Darwinian generations were. . . . The doctrine of Evolution is neither anti-theistic nor theistic. It simply has no more to do with

Theism than the first book of Euclid has" (Darwin's *Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 303). Darwin himself thought otherwise, but even he said, "The theory of Evolution is quite compatible with the belief in a God" (vol. i. p. 307).

Darwin did not put forward his theory as an explanation of the universe, or even of the origin of life. He derived all species of plants and animals from certain very rudimentary forms of living protoplasm, but of the origin of living protoplasm itself he offered no explanation. Other speculators have been bolder. They suppose that living protoplasm was evolved by some unascertained, but quite natural process from inorganic matter; and having thus bridged the gulf between dead and living matter, they are enabled to postulate an unbroken chain of development from the nebula to man.

It is open to the apologist to reply that several links of this chain are weak, or rather do not exist. For instance, all recent biologists agree that "no shred of trustworthy experimental testimony" exists that dead matter ever becomes living, and it is not even pretended that known natural causes are adequate to account for the origin of consciousness and intelligence.

But even if it be granted, for the sake of argument, that the chain of natural causation from the nebula to man is unbroken, the design argument is not in the least degree weakened. If formless inorganic matter, such as existed in the nebula, possessed

the power of evolving out of itself the whole order of Nature, including life, consciousness, and reason, its properties must have been much more wonderful than has been hitherto supposed. The problem, then, is simply transferred to the nebula, or to its ultimate constituents; and the question arises, How came the nebula to possess these remarkable characteristics? And the only satisfactory answer to this question is, as has been shown, that it was formed by a Designing Creator.

The fact is that even a complete proof that the whole order and harmony of Nature is due to what is called natural causation, would not in the slightest degree diminish the philosophical proof that there is a God. That proof depends, not on the fact that so many phenomena of Nature are mysterious and cannot be assigned to natural causes, but on the fact that natural causes themselves require to be explained.

Another argument for the existence of a Designing Creator may be drawn from the general upward character of evolution. It is generally admitted that effects cannot transcend their causes—i.e. *their true efficient causes.* But in the process of evolution effects are continually transcending their *phenomenal* causes. Thus life transcends the dead matter from which it apparently originated, consciousness transcends life, and reason consciousness. We are obliged therefore to postulate over and above the known properties of matter the

continuous action of a Designing Mind, guiding the evolutionary process.

There is one objection to the Argument for Design which, had it not seemed serious to so great a man, would hardly deserve notice. Darwin himself was by no means blind to the strength of the Argument for Design—indeed, in some moods he felt it to be irresistible; but he always fell back on the objection that the human mind, owing to its animal origin, is untrustworthy when it draws any "grand conclusions." "When reflecting," he says, "[on the Argument for Design], I feel compelled to admit a First Cause, having an intelligent mind in some degree analogous to that of man. . . . But then arises the doubt, Can the mind of man, which has, as I fully believe, been developed from a mind as low as that possessed by the lowest animals, be trusted when it draws such grand conclusions? . . . [I often have an] inward conviction that the universe is not the result of chance. But then with me the horrid doubt always arises, whether the convictions of man's mind, which has been developed from the mind of the lower animals, are of any value, or at all trustworthy. Would any one trust in the convictions of a monkey's mind, if there are any convictions in such a mind?" (*Life and Letters*, vol. i. pp. 312, 316).

It ought not to need pointing out that the origin of a faculty has nothing to do with its trustworthiness. For instance, the faculty of consciousness was evolved out of a previous state of unconscious-

ness, but it is not therefore fallacious. The faculty of sight was only gradually acquired, but experience proves it to be trustworthy. And human reason, though it has been evolved out of the intelligence of the lower animals, is certainly adequate to draw very "grand conclusions." It is not necessary to prove this by elaborate arguments, because it is proved by experience every time an astronomer successfully predicts an eclipse, or a navigator determines the position of his ship at sea, or a calculator successfully solves a difficult problem. As Prof. Huxley well says, "We are told that the belief in the unity of origin of man and brutes involves the brutalization and degradation of the former. But is this really so? Could not a sensible child refute by obvious arguments the shallow rhetoricians [1] who would force this conclusion upon us? Is it indeed true that the Poet or the Philosopher, or the Artist, whose genius is the glory of the age, is degraded from his high estate by the undoubted historical probability, not to say certainty, that he is the direct descendant of some naked and bestial savage, whose intelligence was just sufficient to make him a little more cunning than the fox, and by so much more dangerous than the tiger? Or is he bound to howl and grovel on all fours because of the wholly unquestionable fact that he was once an egg, which no ordinary power of discrimination could distinguish from that of a

[1] Prof. Huxley seems to have forgotten that Darwin was one of them.

dog? No one is more strongly convinced than I am of the vastness of the gulf between civilized man and the brutes; or is more certain that whether *from* them or not, he is assuredly not *of* them" (*Man's Place in Nature*, p. 153).

II.—Objections drawn from the Theory of Natural Selection

It has now been proved that the fact of Evolution considered in itself is quite compatible with creation by design, and that the circumstance that Evolution is progressive is even a proof of it. But it may still be objected that the special Darwinian doctrine of Natural Selection is fatal to the Design Argument, at least as usually presented. Darwin himself inclined to this opinion. In his Autobiography, written in 1876, he says: "The old argument from design in Nature, as given by Paley, which formerly seemed to me so conclusive, fails now that the law of Natural Selection has been discovered. We can no longer argue that, for instance, the beautiful hinge of a bivalve must have been made by an intelligent being, like the hinge of a door by man. There seems to be no more design in the variability of organic beings, and in the action of natural selection, than in the course which the wind blows" (*Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 309).

It is important, therefore, to understand accurately what Natural Selection is. This famous

theory, the adequacy of which is still in dispute, was first suggested to Darwin by the *Essay on Population* of Malthus, published originally in 1798. Malthus's main point was that there is a constant tendency in all animated life to increase beyond the nourishment provided for it, and that consequently there arises a competition for food, or "struggle for existence." Darwin combined with the Malthusian doctrine of the struggle for existence a new theory of variation and inheritance. It had long been known that there is a tendency in offspring to vary slightly, and sometimes considerably, from the parental type, but all except Lamarck had believed that this variability was confined within narrow limits. It was thought, for example, that the influence of variability might be adequate to produce a new variety of dogs or pigeons, but not to change a dog or a pigeon into a different species of animal altogether. Darwin removed these limits, and supposed that, given sufficient time, the tendency to variability would suffice to change one species into another completely different. He regarded variability as following no fixed law, but as producing changes at random in all directions. Some of these changes or variations would be unimportant, and exercise no influence on the organism; but others would be beneficial or injurious—that is, they would help or hinder the organism in the struggle for existence. In the former case the organism would have an exceptionally good chance of surviving; in the

latter case it would probably be destroyed. Organisms, therefore, with favourable variations, would rapidly multiply, and by the law of heredity hand on their advantages to their descendants, while less favoured organisms would become extinct. The same processes would be repeated indefinitely, until at last an immensely superior type of creature would be produced. In this way Darwin supposed that the origin even of man might be accounted for without postulating an intelligent Author of Nature.

There is one point about the Darwinian theory which must be summarily rejected as unphilosophical, and that is the theory that any facts in the universe are due to chance;[1] but in other respects it is an able and legitimate attempt to solve a difficult problem. Whether it is a successful attempt, regarded scientifically, must be left to naturalists and biologists to decide. Biologists of the school of Weismann maintain that it is; but many, perhaps the majority of the best authorities, are of a different opinion. Even Darwin did not

[1] A distinction must be drawn between (*a*) absolute chance, and (*b*) relative chance. By *absolute chance* is meant the occurrence of an event without any cause at all. *Relative chance* is the accidental production by an unintelligent cause of an effect which would naturally require intelligence to produce it. Thus if the letters of the alphabet, drawn from a bag at random, happened to produce an intelligible sentence, the event would be said to be due to *relative chance*. Darwin, who was no philosopher, seems really to have believed in *absolute chance*. His followers, for the most part, attribute the appearances of design in Nature to *relative chance*.

regard it as the sole factor in Evolution, but only as the most important one. All we have here to consider is the effect of the theory of Natural Selection upon the Argument for Design, assuming for the moment that it is a true and adequate account of the process of Evolution.

The Argument for Design as applied to living organisms is that the actual existence of finite designing minds in the world, and the apparent adaptation of means to ends in the structure of organic bodies, afford strong evidence that the whole of organic Nature is ultimately due to the will of a supreme Designing Mind. We say *ultimately*, because the Argument for Design does not deny the existence of second causes. The Designing Mind may, for anything we know to the contrary, work entirely through natural causes without employing anything of the nature of a miracle or a "supernatural" event. This, perhaps, has actually been the case. It may be that Natural Selection has been the sole and sufficient natural cause of the appearance of design in organic Nature. But even so, Natural Selection must have a cause. There must be some reason why organisms multiply in excess of the food supply, and so have to struggle for existence. Nature might conceivably have been so ordered that organisms never multiplied in this way, in which case there would have been no struggle for existence and no organic evolution. Again, there must be some reason why animals tend to vary. There might conceivably

have been a law of Nature that offspring should strictly resemble their parents. Further, in order to produce the truly admirable contrivances which we find in the bodies of the higher animals, the variations assumed must be of a particular kind. Mere indefinite variations in shape, like those of stones, or waves, or of currents of air, would not suffice for the production of definite organs fulfilling definite purposes. The variations must be *definite*, they must be *sufficient in number*, and they must be *predominantly in an upward direction*, for if they were not, progressive evolution would be impossible. Again, the variations must be psychical as well as physical; mind must first be produced as the result of some favourable variation, and then it must be improved by the appearance of successively higher types of mind. This cannot be accidental. Moreover, in order that evolution may be continuous and progressive, these variations, both physical and psychical, must be *inherited*—a fact which might conceivably have been otherwise. It is thus evident that none of the so-called Darwinian "causes" is ultimate. Each of them, considered separately, requires accounting for, and it is also necessary to account for their harmonious co-operation to produce a common result in the evolutionary process. If these facts are attentively considered, it will be seen that the Argument for Design stand precisely where it did, and is neither strengthened nor weakened by the adoption of the Darwinian hypothesis. The same may be

said of any other scientific theory of Evolution that can be propounded. However far the explanation may be carried back, it is always competent to the inquirer to ask: *Why do these particular ultimate laws, rather than others, prevail in the universe?* And the only logical answer to this question is, as has been already shown, that a Designing Creator has so willed it.

III.—Miscellaneous Objections

Objection I.—The amount of waste in Nature disproves design. It is pointed out that probably not one in a million of the germs of plants and animals ever attains maturity. "The destruction of living germs," says Lange, in his *History of Materialism*, "the failure of what has begun, is the rule; complete development is a special case among thousands. It is the exception, and this exception is made by that Nature which the purblind teleologist admires for its self-preservation brought about by adapting means to ends."

Reply.—This objection assumes that the only conceivable useful function of germs is to grow to maturity. But this is contrary to experience. Seeds and fruits form exceedingly nourishing food for men and animals. The seed of wheat is man's staff of life. Animal germs in the shape of eggs are a valuable article of diet. Teleologists admit, of course, that seeds are adapted to develop under certain circumstances to maturity.

But they deny that this is their only use, or that it is necessary to suppose that every seed was intended actually to fulfil this purpose.

Objection II.—That since the variations of organisms take place, on Darwin's theory, at random, they offer no evidence of design, but rather the contrary.

Reply.—The idea that variations take place at random is the weakest part of the Darwinian theory, and has already been disproved. But even were it true, there would still be abundant evidence of design in the action of natural selection. Nature is so constructed as to select all those variations which are useful, and tend to the perfection of the animal, and to reject and destroy all those which are useless, and there must be some adequate cause of a rational character why this is so.

Objection III.—That the argument from particular cases of apparent design is not valid, because it ignores the much greater number of cases in which there is no appearance of design.

Reply.—Teleologists admit that the argument from particular cases is not so strong as the argument from the general harmony of Nature; nevertheless it is not without force. If only a single object in the universe existed showing marks of design, it would still be legitimate to infer a Designer, if the marks were only evident enough. If, for example, only a single man existed in an absolutely chaotic universe, he would have a perfect

right to infer that he had been formed by a Designing Creator, though he would have no right to infer such an origin for the rest of the universe. But the actual state of the case is far more favourable to the Argument for Design than this. Men with designing minds exist in millions, and throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms marks of design are numerous and strong, while apparent exceptions are rare. It is necessary, therefore, to postulate a Designing Mind as the cause of, at any rate, all living organisms.

Objection IV.—That the existence of useless rudimentary organs, such as the dew-claws in dogs, the splint-bones of a horse's foot, the rudimentary hind-legs of certain whales and serpents, and the appendix in man, disproves design.

Reply.—A few apparent exceptions cannot disprove an induction founded on a large number of genuine instances. The tendency of Nature undoubtedly is to eliminate organs which have become useless. But this is not done at once, perhaps because their too sudden removal would disturb the physiological balance of the organism.[1] Most of the organs mentioned are presumably in the process of elimination, and if so, they rather illustrate than disprove design. Again, it does not follow that because an organ is useless to its

[1] Prof. Huxley argues that rudimentary organs are still useful, otherwise they would long ago have disappeared. "The recent discovery," he says, "of the important part played by the thyroid gland [once supposed to be useless] should be a warning to all speculators about useless organs."

possessor, it is useless altogether. Rudimentary organs are useful to men of science. "Rudimentary organs," says Darwin, "may be compared to the letters in a word, still retained in the spelling, but become useless in the pronunciation, but which serve as a clue in seeking for its derivation."[1] Prof. le Conte says, "They are among the most obvious and convincing proofs of the origin of organic forms by derivation."[2] The same may be said of some of the anomalous features of embryology. "It is probable," says Darwin, "from what we know of the embryos of mammals, birds, fishes, and reptiles, that all the members in these four great classes are the modified descendants of some one ancient progenitor, which was furnished in its adult state with branchiæ, had a swim-bladder, four simple limbs, and a long tail fitted for aquatic life." Now, on the hypothesis that there is a God, it is reasonable to suppose that He intends natural science to be successfully cultivated. And this He has secured by ordaining that there shall be in nature certain clues to its meaning, of which these rudimentary organs and the anomalous facts of embryology are among the chief.[3]

[1] *Origin of Species*, c. xiii.

[2] *Evolution*, c. vii.

[3] The older school of Evolutionists supposed that the development of the embryo was a clue to the whole development of the race. "Ontogenesis," says Haeckel, "is a brief and rapid recapitulation of phylogenesis." This statement would now have to be modified. "The most striking general [recent] change," says Prof. Mitchell, "has been against seeing in the

Objection V.—That it is impossible to believe the doctrine of "Special Design"—the doctrine, that is, that each particular thing was specially pre-ordained to achieve the exact result that it actually accomplishes.

This objection is due to Darwin. "Do you consider," he says, "that the successive variations in the size of the crop of the pouter pigeon, which man has accumulated to please his caprice, have been due to the 'creative and sustaining powers of Brahma [God]'? . . . It seems preposterous that the Maker of a Universe should care about the crop of a pigeon solely to please man's silly fancy. . . . Do you believe that when a swallow snaps up a gnat, God designed that that particular swallow should snap up that particular gnat at that particular instant?"

Reply.—The doctrine of Special Design does not mean that each particular thing was designed separately, without reference to other things. The Divine Intellect saw from eternity in one comprehensive view the whole possible and actual operation of natural laws, and ordained each particular event, such as the death of a gnat, or the shape of a pigeon's crop, as part of a complete order of Nature. It would perhaps be unworthy of God to ordain

facts of ontogeny any direct evidence as to phylogeny. The general proposition as to a parallelism between individual and ancestral development is no doubt indisputable, but extended knowledge has led us . . . to a reluctance to attach detailed importance to the embryological argument for Evolution" (*Encycl. Brit.*, vol. xxviii. p. 342).

details merely as details (though of this we must not speak too decidedly), but to ordain them as part of a great and glorious system is not unworthy of Him. Attention to details, when those details are part of a great scheme, is a mark not of imperfection, but of perfection.

Objection VI.—That the Design Argument only proves the existence of a finite designer of the world, not of an infinite and omnipotent Creator.

Reply.—This is fully admitted. The design argument proves from appearances of design in the universe that the universe has a Designer; but since the whole universe probably, and the known universe certainly, is finite, there is no reason, so far, to suppose the designer infinite. Nor need he be the Supreme Creator. He may be some inferior being or demiurge, who has formed the world out of pre-existing materials, as the ancient Gnostics supposed. But now the design argument is supplemented by the argument for a First Cause. The latter argument proves that the demiurge, and the materials out of which He constructed the world, were created (supposing them to exist at all) by an infinite and omnipotent God. But the demiurge, being now no longer necessary to account for the world, may be eliminated, unless there is some positive reason for supposing that he exists. The only strong reason for supposing this is the evil and imperfection of the present world. This subject will be fully discussed later (c. xiv.).

Objection VII.—That it is unworthy of an omni-

potent Creator to make use of means to gain His ends.

This objection is ancient, but it has been recently revived by Mill. "Every indication of design in the Kosmos," says he, "is so much evidence against the omnipotence of the Designer. For what is meant by design? Contrivance: the adaptation of means to an end. But the necessity for contrivance —the need of employing means—is a consequence of the limitation of power. Who would have recourse to means, if to attain his end his mere word were sufficient? A man does not use machinery to move his arms. If he did, it would only be when paralysis had deprived him of the power of moving them by volition" (*Three Essays*, p. 176).

Reply.—Omnipotence is not, as Mill imagines, the power to do anything whatsoever, but the power to do whatever is not intrinsically irrational. Even Omnipotence cannot annihilate the past, or make a thing true and false at the same time, or make the sum of two and two equal five. From similar considerations it follows that Omnipotence cannot in all cases dispense with means. Not even God can make a being morally responsible without giving him free will, or educate him in the virtues of faith and hope without placing him in a state of probation in which there is scope for the exercise of those virtues. Again, many of the means employed by the Creator to carry out His designs have an intrinsic excellence of their own, and serve

to display His glory in a high degree. It is reasonable, therefore, to suppose that He chooses them not simply as means, but partly also as ends. God could, if He so willed, create adult men, without causing them to pass through any process of development; but it may be that it is His will to display in infancy and childhood some excellence of the Divine Nature which is less apparent in adult men. If there were no children, human life would certainly be poorer; and if all so-called "means" were eliminated from the universe, it would be a far less interesting place than it is.

Objection VIII.—Are we to believe that the poison-fangs of serpents, the beaks of birds of prey, and the teeth and claws of ravenous beasts are specially designed to wound and kill?

Reply.—Certainly. But this raises the problem of evil, which requires separate discussion (see c. xiv.).

Objection IX.—That the clumsiness of many of Nature's contrivances shows want of skill and intelligence in the Designer.

Even the structure of the eye is criticised. "Sturmius, says Paley, held that the examination of the eye was a cure for Atheism; yet Helmholtz, who knew incomparably more about the eye than half a dozen Sturms, described it as an instrument which a scientific optician would be ashamed to make" (J. Ward, *Gifford Lectures*, vol. i. p. 6).

Reply.—It is true that Helmholtz, in his *Popular Scientific Lectures*, uses rash and inconsiderate language upon this subject. He says, for example,

"the eye has every possible defect that can be found in an optical instrument, and even some which are peculiar to itself," and that if an optician had sent him home an instrument so carelessly made, he would have thought himself justified in returning it. But Helmholtz is here only speaking of the eye theoretically, from "the narrow but legitimate point of view of an optician." As a practical instrument he regards the eye as unsurpassed. Its defects, he says, "are all so counteracted, that the inexactness of the images very little exceeds the limits which are set to the delicacy of sensation by the dimensions of the retinal cones. The adaptation of the eye to its functions is therefore most complete, and is seen in the very limits set to its defects. The result, which may have been reached by innumerable generations under the Darwinian law of inheritance, coincides with what the wisest wisdom may have devised beforehand." This agrees very well with Darwin's opinion expressed in the *Origin* (c. vi.), where he speaks of the eye as "a living optical instrument as superior to one of glass as the works of the Creator are to those of man," and draws attention to "all its inimitable contrivances for adjusting the focus to different distances, for admitting different amounts of light, and for the correction of spherical and chromatic aberration."

But even if the imperfections of the structure of the eye were ever so great, it would still be

impossible to infer want of wisdom or skill in the Designer, considering that He has created a Helmholtz with sufficient wisdom to detect the defects, and sufficient skill to devise a better instrument.

APPENDIX I

THEORIES OF EVOLUTION

Although the more rigid Darwinians regard Natural Selection as the only, or almost the only, factor in Organic Evolution, a strong body of scientific opinion dissents. It is pointed out with perfect justice that the struggle for existence does not of itself account for the production of superior organisms, but simply operates by killing off those which are weakly or unsuitably constructed. In itself it is rather a hindrance than a help to development. A gardener who wishes to obtain the finest possible cabbages eliminates the struggle for existence altogether. He plants the young seedlings too far apart to interfere with one another, removes the weeds that might choke them, and supplies them with abundance of water and manure. A farmer who wishes to obtain a good stock of cattle does not turn twenty oxen into a pasture which contains only food enough for ten. No doubt hard work and healthy exercise develop the faculties of animals and men, but not a painful "struggle for existence." The real efficient cause of evolution is thus clearly the favourable variations, the origin of which Darwinism assigns to chance —that is, to no cause at all. Again, the question of the origin of species has become much more complicated since Darwin's day. It was believed then that the ultimate cells of which living organisms are composed were similar in all species, and that the only problem was to account

for the building up of these cells into differently shaped organisms. It is now known that the cells in each species are fundamentally different in structure, and it seems absolutely impossible to explain the origin of this difference on the principles of Natural Selection. (For full details see E. B. Wilson, *The Cell in Development.*) Other supposed causes of evolution are: (1) the *Lamarckian factors*, i.e. the direct effect of the environment on the organism, and the effect on organs of use and disuse, which Darwin admitted to be to some extent operative, and on which the American Neo-Lamarckians lay great stress;[1] (2) *Sexual Selection*, or the struggle among the males for the possession of the female, which operates among animals by the law of battle, and among birds by the law of attractiveness; (3) Romanes' theory of *Physiological Selection*, which is an attempt to show why incipient varieties, destined to become distinct species, are not swamped by cross-breeding with the parent form; and (4) the theory of *Bathmism*, which postulates the existence of an inherent growth-force in organisms, which would lead to divergent evolution even in a neutral environment. In its extreme form Bathmism postulates that just as the whole future development of an individual organism is implicitly contained in the embryo, so the whole future of organic evolution was implicitly contained in the first germ of life from which all the species of plants and animals are ultimately descended, and therefore that all the other factors in evolution, except the original growth-force, are secondary.

At present biological theory is extremely unsettled, and theologians who are well advised will beware of identifying themselves with any particular views of development. The words of Romanes spoken in 1886 remain true to-day: "At

[1] There is an important controversy between the followers of Weismann, who deny that the modifications produced by the "Lamarckian factors" are inherited, and the Neo-Lamarckians and Spencerians, who affirm it. (See further c. xiv., appendices 1, 2).

present it would be impossible to find any working naturalist who supposes that survival of the fittest is competent to explain all the phenomena of species-formation." This precisely accords with the recent utterance of Prof. Vines in his presidential address to the Linnæan Society: "(1) It is established that Natural Selection, though it may have perpetuated species, cannot have originated any. (2) It is still a mystery why Evolution should tend from the lower to the higher, from simple to complex organisms. (3) The facts seem to admit of no other interpretation than that variation is not (as Darwin supposed) indeterminate, but that there is in living matter an inherent determination in favour of variation in the higher direction." (For further testimony to the insufficiency of Darwinism, see the interesting recent book of the Rev. J. Gerard, S.J., F.L.S., *The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer*, from which the two previous quotations are derived.)

APPENDIX II

EVOLUTION AND HOLY SCRIPTURE

It is often supposed that Evolution, though consistent with Theism, is not consistent with the authority of Holy Scripture, which is assumed to teach that the world was created six thousand years ago, in six days, by a process known as "special creation." One way of meeting this difficulty is by showing that the differences between *Genesis* and modern science do not exist, or have been exaggerated. One clear difference must be admitted. In Gen. i. 11, grass, herbs, and trees are said to have been produced before the sun, which is incredible. At the same time, the writer lays very little stress on the precise order of events, and gives a quite different order in chapter ii.

By denying that Genesis fixes a date for creation, by regarding the six days as symbolizing long geological ages,

and by laying stress on the general though not precise agreement between the Mosaic order of creation and the order of production of organisms assumed by modern Evolutionists, the differences between *Genesis* and science may be reduced to a minimum. Followers of St. Augustine and St. Thomas Aquinas may even find the doctrine of Evolution covertly alluded to in Gen. ii. 4, 5 (A.V.).

But from an apologetic point of view these harmonistic expedients are unnecessary. No one except an extreme upholder of verbal inspiration believes that the Bible contains any revelation upon scientific subjects. The Biblical writers, like modern theologians, assume the secular knowledge of their time to be true, and express themselves accordingly. They all, for example, regard the earth as fixed in the centre of the universe and flat, and they speak of man's heart and reins as the seats of his intellect and emotions. The Bible is full of scientific errors, expressed or implied, but these are no hindrance to believing that it contains a religious revelation. Creation is one of these subjects in which Theology and Science come into close contact, yet even here their provinces are quite distinct. Theology deals with the ultimate explanation of things and the nature of the First Cause; Science deals with the *method* of creation, and with that alone. When, therefore, the writer of *Genesis* affirms that the world was made by an intelligent Creator whose goodness is manifested in all His works, he is dealing with a theological question, upon which he has a right to pronounce an authoritative opinion; but when, or rather *if*, he affirms that the world was made at such a date, or in such a period, or in such an order, or by such a method, he is dealing with strictly scientific questions, his solution of which can be freely rejected without calling in question his authority as a religious teacher. The Church as a whole has never believed that the Bible contains any scientific revelation. Those who think otherwise fall into the error of Paul V. and Urban VIII. when they condemned Galileo. It is interesting to notice that Galileo expressed

precisely those views upon Biblical inspiration which are stated in this appendix, and which are held by all modern theologians, at least of the Anglican Church.

APPENDIX III

AGNOSTIC TESTIMONY TO THE ARGUMENT FOR DESIGN

(*a*) KANT.—Since the principles of Kant's Philosophy forbade him to admit the validity of the Design Argument, his forced testimony to its irresistible persuasiveness is the more striking. "This proof," he says, "will always deserve to be treated with respect. It is the oldest, the clearest, and the most in conformity with human reason. It gives life to the study of Nature, deriving its own existence from it, and thus constantly acquiring new vigour. It reveals aims and intentions, where our own observation would not by itself have discovered them, and enlarges our knowledge of Nature by leading us towards that peculiar unity, the principle of which exists outside nature. This knowledge reacts on its cause, namely, the transcendental idea, and thus increases the belief in a Supreme Author to an irresistible conviction. It would, therefore, not only be extremely sad, but utterly vain to attempt to diminish the authority of this proof. Reason, constantly strengthened by the powerful arguments that come to hand of themselves, though they are no doubt empirical only, cannot be discouraged by any doubts of subtle and abstract speculation. Roused from all curious speculation and mental suspense as from a dream by one glance at the wonders of Nature and the majesty of the cosmos, reason soars from height to height till it reaches the highest, from the conditioned to conditions, till it reaches the supreme and unconditioned Author of all" (*Critique of Pure Reason* [tr. M. Müller], vol. ii. p. 535).

(*b*) J. S. MILL.—"It must be allowed that in the present state of our knowledge the adaptations in Nature afford a large

balance of probability in favour of creation by intelligence" (*Three Essays*, p. 174).

(*c*) DARWIN.—Although in his later years predominantly Agnostic, Darwin often found the design argument irresistible. He says, "I cannot be contented to view this wonderful universe, and especially the nature of man, and to conclude that everything is the result of brute force. I am inclined to look at everything as resulting from designed laws, and the details, whether good or bad, left to the working out of what we call chance. Not that this notion *at all* satisfies me" (*Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 311).

(*d*) HUXLEY.—"The teleological and the mechanical views of Nature are not necessarily mutually exclusive. On the contrary, the more purely a mechanist the speculator is, the more firmly does he assume a primordial molecular arrangement of which all the phenomena of the universe are the consequences, and the more completely is he at the mercy of the teleologist, who can always defy him to disprove that this primordial molecular arrangement was not intended to evolve the phenomena of the universe" (Darwin's *Life and Letters*, vol. ii. p. 201).

(*e*) HAECKEL.—Although in his *History of Creation* Haeckel writes, "I maintain with regard to the much-talked-of purpose in Nature, that it has no existence but for those persons who observe phenomena in animals and plants in the most superficial manner," yet he says (*Riddle of the Universe*, c. xiv.), "The idea of design has a very great significance and application in the *organic* world. We do undeniably perceive a purpose in the structure and in the life of an organism. The plant and the animal seem to be controlled by a definite design in the combination of their several parts, just as clearly as we see in the machines which man invents and constructs; as long as life continues, the functions of the several organs are directed to definite ends, just as is the operation of the various parts of a machine."

LITERATURE

Evolution and Darwinism

C. Darwin, *Origin of Species*, and *Descent of Man*; G. J. Romanes, *Darwin and After Darwin*, and *Mental Evolution in Animals*, and *Mental Evolution in Man*, and *Thoughts on Religion*; A. R. Wallace, *Darwinism*; H. Spencer, *First Principles*, and *Principles of Biology*, and *Principles of Psychology*, etc.; H. Bergson, *Creative Evolution*; A. Weismann, *Essays upon Heredity* and *The Germ Plasm*, and *The Evolution Theory* (1904); E. Wasmann, *Problems of Evolution*; J. H. Th. Eimer, *Organic Evolution*; M. M. Hartog, *Problems of Life and Reproduction*, 1913; C. C. Coe, *Nature v. Natural Selection* (still useful); T. H. Morgan, *Evolution and Adaptation*; W. Bateson, *Materials for the Study of Variation*, and *Mendel's Principles of Heredity*; H. de Vries, *Species and Varieties*, 1905; and *The Mutation Theory*, 1910; R. H. Lock, *Recent Progress in the Study of Variation, Heredity, and Evolution*, 1906; L. T. Hobhouse, *Mind in Evolution* and *Development and Purpose*; G. F. Wright, *Origin and Antiquity of Man*, 1913; K. Pearson, *Grammar of Science*,[2] 1912; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion*; A. Moore, *Science and the Faith*; P. N. Waggett, *Religion and Science*; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, and *The Realm of Ends*; Le Conte, *Evolution and its Relation to Religious Thought*; H. Drummond, *Ascent of Man*; F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*; Gerard, *The Old Riddle and the Newest Answer*; Iverach, *Evolution and Christianity*; Huxley, *Evolution and Ethics*; Croll, *Philosophical Basis of Evolution*; Haeckel, *Riddle of the Universe*; A. Fouillée, *L'Evolutionnisme des Idées-Forces*; E. B. Wilson, *The Cell in Development and Inheritance*, 1904; H. Driesch, *Science and Philosophy of the Organism*, 1908, and *History and Theory of Vitalism*, 1914; O. Lodge, *Life and Matter*,[2] 1909; O. Hertwig, *The Cell*,[2] 1909; F. le Dantec, *Théorie nouvelle de la vie*, 1908; J. S. Haldane, *Mechanism, Life and Personality*, 1913; J. Loeb, *Mechanistic Conception of Life*, 1912.

CHAPTER VI

BERKELEY'S ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE [1]

SUMMARY.—All the so-called properties of matter are thoughts and ideas of the human mind. But these thoughts and ideas exist also outside the human mind. There must, therefore, be some Universal Mind of which they are thoughts and ideas—that is, there must be a God.

THE plain man and those philosophers styled Realists believe that the world consists of two entirely different kinds of substances—viz. material substances, which occupy space, resist pressure, can be moved, etc., and thinking substances—or minds. The plain man thinks not only that material substances exist, but that they are capable of existing independently of any mind whatsoever. In this particular of belief—viz. the independency and self-sufficiency of matter—he agrees with the eighteenth-century Deists and Materialists whom Berkeley attacked, and with their modern representatives, the champions of materialistic theories of Evolution. The Deists believed that the material world had originally been created by an omnipotent God, but had then been left to itself to work

[1] The reader who dislikes Metaphysics will do well to omit this chapter.

out its own destiny, independently of the Deity, by the operation of certain mechanical laws and properties, originally impressed upon it. The Materialist believed then, as now, that matter can exist independently of any mind, finite or infinite, that it is self-existing and self-sufficing, that it existed millions of ages before any minds at all were evolved in the universe, and will continue to exist millions of ages after the last mind has ceased to be. The plain man does not believe these materialistic theories to be in fact true, but he sees no absurdity in them, and is willing to regard them as at least possible hypotheses. The Berkeleian idealist, on the other hand, regards them as palpable absurdities, destitute of any assignable meaning, and illegitimate from the start.

I.—Berkeley's Theory and Argument

We will present Berkeley's argument, in our own words, in the form of a criticism upon Locke, who represents the position of the plain man and the Materialist, that matter is an independent substance. Berkeley himself used precisely the same arguments, but expressed them in a more abstract and technical way.

Locke divided the qualities or properties of matter into two classes—the primary and the secondary. The former he believed really to be in bodies, the latter only in the mind. That the secondary qualities of matter, such as colour, sound, smell, taste, hardness, beauty, etc., exist only for the mind,

is generally admitted by all schools of philosophers. The sky, for example, can only be blue to a being possessed of sight. To suppose that a mere sensation, such as blue, can exist apart from a mind is a palpable absurdity, as even the plain man will, upon reflection, admit. Physicists have, it is true, maintained that there is something in the external world—viz. vibrations—which corresponds to the sensation of blue existing in the mind, but these vibrations are not the sensation of blue, or anything like it. Similar arguments serve to show the purely mental character of all the secondary qualities of matter. A bell, for example, is struck, and a sound is heard. Now a sound, as heard, is a sensation existing in the mind. It may be caused, perhaps, by something outside the mind —"material vibrations," for example—but such vibrations are not the sensation of sound or anything like it. It is strictly demonstrable, therefore, that all the secondary qualities of matter are modifications of mind, and can exist for mind only.

The second point of the argument is to prove that the same holds good of the *primary* qualities of matter, such as extension, capacity for motion, and inertia. This was denied by Locke. "Solidity, extension, figure, motion, and rest," he maintained, "would be really in the world as they are, whether there were any sensible being to perceive them or not" (*Human Understanding*, bk. ii. c. xxi. sect. 2). On this point, however, Berkeley undoubtedly

proved Locke to be wrong, even on the principles of "experience" to which he appealed. Solidity, extension, figure, motion, rest, etc., can all be reduced to definite experiences and inferences of a conscious mind. They do not possess a single element that is not mental. The solidity of a body, for example, is nothing more than the fact that when we press it, we experience certain sensations of hardness. The extension or figure of a body is simply a group of sensations, tactual or visual, arranged by the mind in a particular way. The figure called a cube, for example, may be recognized either by *feeling it* and allowing the mind to interpret the feelings, or by *looking at it* and allowing the mind to interpret the resulting optical impressions. In either case the cubical extension or figure of the body is nothing but a group of sensations and inferences of the mind.

Motion, again, resolves itself ultimately into certain muscular and ocular sensations. When we say that our bodies are in motion, we mean, if we are moving ourselves, that we experience certain muscular feelings of contraction, pressure, etc., joined with certain optical sensations which may be described as changes in the field of vision. These muscular feelings and changes in the field of vision exhaust all that any motion does or can mean to us. It is evident, therefore, that the *primary qualities of matter*, no less than the secondary, are purely mental, and exist only for the mind. That this is so can also be shown in

another way. A person with a vivid imagination can form with closed eyes a perfect mental picture of external material objects, with all their properties, both primary and secondary, complete, the only difference being that the one picture is real and the other ideal. The meaning of this difference will be considered presently; for the moment, it is sufficient to observe that the whole of the so-called properties of matter can be ideally reproduced in the mind, and thus shown by actual experiment to be mental in character.

But the plain man will now probably object that we have not yet done full justice to the facts. We have proved, it is true, that the so-called properties of matter are nothing but mental phenomena, but we have not explained the very real distinction which does in fact exist between a real external object and a mental picture of it.

An oak-tree, for instance, if only *thought of*, can be dismissed from the mind or made to undergo any number of changes at will; but a *real* oak-tree persists in consciousness unaffected by any efforts of the will to dismiss it or to change it. Again, a real oak-tree is visible to others as well, which is not the case with the mere idea of an oak-tree. There must, therefore, be some invisible reality external to the mind to which the visible appearances or qualities of the oak-tree belong; there must, in other words, be such a thing as material substance.

In the greater part of this argument the plain man is undoubtedly right. "Material" objects do undoubtedly exist independently of our minds, and since they consist of qualities, and qualities cannot exist alone, there must be some substance or reality, independent of our minds, to which the qualities of "material" bodies belong. But we demur altogether to the assumption that this substance must of necessity be a material or unthinking substance. We have just proved that the qualities of bodies are, without exception, sensations, ideas, or thoughts. But sensations, ideas, and thoughts can exist only in and for a mind. The substance, therefore, which underlies the material world must be a *Universal Mind*, and the properties of "matter" must be *ideas in that Mind.*

The same point may also be proved in another way. It is admitted that we must postulate the existence of *some* substance which is independent of our minds, and that the choice lies between a thinking substance and an unthinking substance. Now, a thinking substance is a *known reality*, familiar to every man from his own experience, because he himself is a thinking substance. But an unthinking substance is an *unknown abstraction*, and perhaps not a reality at all. Mind we know, and the ideas of mind we know, but what an unthinking substance is, or whether it exists or can exist, we have no notion. If therefore we are obliged to choose between the hypotheses of a thinking and an unthinking substance, there can be no hesitation as to the

choice. Science forbids the postulation of unknown causes when known causes suffice, and since in this case a known cause suffices, the unknown cause must be rejected. The ultimate reality, therefore, which underlies matter is a thinking substance, or mind—in other words, *a personal God.*

It may be added that even if the hypothesis of an unthinking substance were legitimate, it would not explain the facts. The facts are the sensible properties of matter, and these are, as has been already explained, thoughts and ideas. But an unthinking substance can possess neither thoughts nor ideas, and therefore cannot account for the known properties of matter.

II.—Objections to Berkeley's Theory

To discuss all the objections that may be raised to Berkeley's brilliant and ingenious argument, of which only the outlines are given above, would require a treatise on Metaphysics. Space can only here be found for the consideration of a few, mostly theological

Objection I.—Berkeley's argument denies the reality of matter, and thus contravenes the tradition of the Church that matter is real.

Reply.—A theory which in fact denied the reality of matter, would undoubtedly be theologically illegitimate, as throwing doubt upon the evidence of the senses, and impeaching the veracity of God.

But Berkeley's theory does not do this. It supposes that the senses are entirely trustworthy, and that matter really is what it appears to the senses to be —viz. really extended, really heavy, really coloured, really beautiful, etc. There is, in fact, no theory which makes matter so real and the senses so trustworthy as Berkeley's. It is true that the current teaching of the Church for many ages before Berkeley was expressed in terms of Realism. But this was due not to any statements in Holy Scripture, or to any authentic apostolic tradition, but to the authority of Aristotle and the Schoolmen. Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas were great men, but even they were not infallible, and cannot be allowed to bar the progress of Philosophy for ever. Berkeley's theory has now been tested by nearly two hundred years of use, and although capable of abuse, has not been found on the whole dangerous to faith.[1] It is held by an increasing number of Theists, and is probably at the present moment the predominant theory, at least in the Anglican branch of the Church.

Objection II.—Berkeley's theory is inconsistent with the Resurrection of the Body.

Reply.—The Church's doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body is a practical, not a metaphysical one. Starting from the fact that, whatever the metaphysics of the subject may be, there is a real

[1] It has occasionally been abused by Agnostics to prove that the soul itself is not a substance, but only a series of sensations; but this does not follow logically from the theory.

distinction between soul and body, and that matter is in some way essential to the soul's full realization, the Church affrms that even in the world to come the soul will possess a "material" body, and perhaps a "material" environment of some kind. The Church thus asserts a real distinction between soul and body, but does not define what that distinction is. Now Berkeleianism makes the distinction between body and soul as real as Realism. It affirms, for example, that the body is visible, tangible, extended, capable of motion, etc., and that the soul is invisible, intangible, unextended, incapable of motion, etc., and that these qualities are real. On the theoretical side it establishes a distinction between soul and body by demonstrating that the former is a thinking substance, distinct from, and, in a sense, existing independently of God, and that the latter is a thought in God's mind, standing in a close relation to, but quite independent of, the human soul. A Berkeleian, therefore, can believe the Resurrection of the Body, even its "material" resurrection, as fully and unfeignedly as the Realist.

Objection III.—If external objects were mere thoughts, they could not act as causes, and produce dynamical effects.

Reply.—Mere thoughts, even *human* thoughts, act as causes, and produce striking dynamic results. Very striking results, for example, were produced by the ideas of Liberty, Fraternity, and Equality at the French Revolution, and are now being

produced by the ideas of Arbitration and Imperialism. But if human thoughts have such power, how much more Divine thoughts!

Objection IV.—Man has the power of influencing by his will and altering the course of external Nature. But if external Nature is, as Berkeley affirms, a thought in God's mind, man must have the power of influencing and altering God's thoughts—a theory which borders on irreverence.

Reply.—To believe that, within certain limits and in a certain sense, man can influence the thoughts of God, is not irreverent, and is even scriptural. For example, God allows man to influence His will by prayer, and to provoke Him to anger by sin; much more therefore may God allow man to "influence His thoughts" by moving material bodies, and otherwise acting upon physical nature.

Objection V.—Berkeley's theory is inconsistent with the Scripture doctrine of Creation. If matter is a mere thought in God's mind, it must have existed eternally, and not have been created in time.

Reply.—Creation in time is as possible and intelligible on Berkeley's theory as on the theory of Realism. Matter existed first of all as an idea in the mind of God which He intended in due time to manifest to finite intelligences, such as those of angels and men. When the idea of matter was actually so manifested, the material world became visible to creatures, or, in the

language of Scripture, was created. On this point Berkeley may, perhaps, be allowed to speak for himself:

"*Hylas.*—The Scripture account of the Creation is what appears to me utterly irreconcilable with your notions.

"*Philonous.*—There is no sense [of Scripture] you may not as well conceive, believing as I do. I imagine that if I had been present at the Creation, I should have seen things produced into being—that is, become perceptible—in the order prescribed by the sacred historian. I ever before believed the Mosaic account of the Creation, and now find no alteration in my manner of believing it. When things are said to begin or end their existence, we do not mean this with regard to God, but His creatures. All objects are eternally known by God, or, which is the same thing, have an eternal existence in His mind; but when things, before imperceptible to creatures, are by a decree of God perceptible to them, then are they said to begin a relative existence with respect to created minds. Upon reading, therefore, the Mosaic account of the Creation, I understand that the several parts of the world became gradually perceptible to finite spirits, endowed with proper faculties; so that whoever such were then present, they were in truth perceived by them. This is the literal obvious sense suggested to me by the words of Holy Scripture, in which is included no mention or no thought, either of *substratum*, instrument,

occasion, or absolute existence. And upon inquiry, I doubt not it will be found that most plain, honest men, who believe Creation, never think of these things any more than I."

APPENDIX

AGNOSTIC TESTIMONY TO THE GENERAL SOUNDNESS OF BERKELEY'S POSITION

J. S. MILL.—"Matter, then, may be defined, a Permanent Possibility of Sensation. If I am asked whether I believe in matter, I ask whether the questioner accepts this definition of it. If he does, I believe in matter; and so do all Berkeleians. In any other sense than this, I do not. But I affirm with confidence, that this conception of Matter includes the whole meaning attached to it by the common world, apart from philosophical and sometimes from theological theories. The reliance of mankind on the real existence of visible and tangible objects means reliance on the reality and permanence of possibilities of visual and tactual sensations, when no such sensations are actually experienced" (*On Hamilton*, 6th ed. p. 233).

PROF. HUXLEY.—"The arguments used by Descartes and Berkeley to show that our certain knowledge does not extend beyond our states of consciousness, appear to me to be as irrefragable now as they did when I first became acquainted with them some half-century ago. All the materialistic writers I know of who have tried to bite that file have simply broken their teeth" (*Evolution and Ethics*, p. 130).

PROF. K. PEARSON.—"Matter as the unknowable cause of sense-impression is a metaphysical entity meaningless for science" (*Grammar of Science*, p. 251).

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G. Berkeley, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, the design of which is plainly to demonstrate the reality and perfection of human knowledge, the incorporeal nature of the soul, and the immediate providence of a Deity, in opposition to Sceptics and Atheists*; also *Principles of Human Knowledge*, and *Alciphron, or the Minute Philosopher*. See also H. Rashdall in *Contentio Veritatis*, and in *Personal Idealism*; T. Huxley, *Critiques and Addresses*, pp. 320, *seq.*; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism*, especially c. xx.

For an acute criticism from the standpoint of Aristotelian Realism, see Rickaby, *First Principles*, c. ii., especially pp. 294-6. There has of late been a strong reaction against Idealism, and the existence of matter as something distinct from mind is now maintained (as against Berkeley) not only by Aristotelian Realists, but also by H. Bergson, and the New Realists (see Introductory Chapter, pp. xvii.-xxvi., and the works mentioned there).

CHAPTER VII

THE ARGUMENT FROM RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCE

SUMMARY.—Ontologists maintain that the human soul has a certain immediate consciousness of God, independent of logical argument. This opinion at least contains truth. The contemplation of natural beauty often leads to a mystical state of "cosmic consciousness," in which the existence of a Spiritual Reality in or behind Nature is more or less clearly felt. Some persons even attain to a direct mystical consciousness of the presence of a Personal God. Even ordinary religious persons are generally conscious that they are in vital union with some actual Spiritual Being, from whom they draw supernatural strength, and in whom they find joy and peace unspeakable. Man possesses a whole group of religious faculties, and it is contrary to the analogy of Nature for these to exist unless there also exists an environment suitable for their exercise and use. But the only environment suitable to man's religious faculties is a Personal God.

THERE are certain philosophers who maintain that all rational beings possess a certain immediate rudimentary knowledge of God, which forms the basis, or at least an element, of all thought. This opinion is called Ontologism, and its defenders Ontologists.[1] Descartes, Malebranche, Rosmini,

[1] *Ontologism*, or the doctine that the human mind possesses a direct knowledge of God, must be carefully distinguished from the *Ontological Argument* referred to in c. i., with which it has nothing to do.

and other Ontologists, point out that all human minds possess, at least in germ, certain transcendental ideas, such as that of infinity, and those of moral and æsthetic perfection; and they argue that since these ideas cannot have been gained by the contemplation of finite and imperfect things, they must have been gained by the contemplation of the Deity, in whom alone they are found.

At first sight it might be supposed that Ontologism is sufficiently refuted by the mere existence of Atheists and Agnostics; but the matter is not so simple. Ontologists do not suppose that the apprehension of God by ordinary men is other than rudimentary and partial, and they admit, and even insist, that preoccupation with other affairs, prejudice, and sin, may prevent the human mind from attending to the knowledge which it implicitly has. They show, moreover, that many who call themselves Atheists or Agnostics, nevertheless retain strong traces of transcendental notions. For example, they believe in ideals of various kinds, in a real distinction between virtue and vice, and in the binding character of the duties of benevolence, justice, and self-sacrifice—beliefs which indicate some knowledge, however vague, of a higher world and a Moral Ruler of the universe, and are irreconcilable with Atheism or Agnosticism.

It is impossible in the limited space available to discuss Ontologism as a philosophical system: it must suffice in this chapter to draw attention to certain elements of truth which it undoubtedly

possesses, and to develop one or two of its less metaphysical arguments.

I.—The Argument from the Beauty of Natural Things, and from "Cosmic Consciousness"

The contemplation of Nature produces upon the human soul a twofold effect. In the first place, it stimulates and satisfies the desire of scientific knowledge; and in the second place, it produces an æsthetic—sometimes even a religious or spiritual—effect. These two effects are entirely distinct and different in kind. From the scientific point of view the most beautiful landscape is nothing but so many atoms of oxygen, hydrogen, nitrogen, carbon, silicon, calcium, etc., variously arranged and vibrating in various ways. From the artistic point of view it is beautiful, glorious, sublime. The beauty of Nature is not an imaginary thing, invented by metaphysical theologians in want of an argument, but a solid fact of experience. It has even a market value, as house agents and estate agents are well aware. Moreover, it exists not only in the mind, but in Nature. It is as certain, for instance, that a cypress-tree is objectively beautiful, as that it is solid or combustible. To deny that beauty exists, because some inartistic persons cannot see it, or because artistic authorities are not agreed on all points of taste, is like denying the existence of colour because some persons are colour-blind, or of sound because some persons are deaf. It follows, therefore, that the First Cause of the world cannot

be simply a mechanical force, but must be a being to whom beauty is a reality—in other words, an Intelligent Artistic Mind.

But it is not as a mere argument for God's existence that the beauty of nature exercises its chief religious influence upon the mind. In certain moods the sight of natural beauty brings the soul into direct communion with a Being who, if not always distinctly apprehended as personal, is yet felt to be spiritual, unutterably lovely, sympathetic, and infinite. The poets of all ages testify to this feeling—not only religious poets like Wordsworth or Tennyson, but even Agnostic poets like Shelley, Byron, and Goethe. For example, Byron, describing his feelings in the presence of Nature, says:

> Then stirs the feeling infinite, so felt
> In solitude, where we are *least* alone;
> A truth, which through our being then doth melt,
> And purifies from self: it is a tone,
> The soul and source of music, which makes known
> Eternal harmony.[1]

This peculiar and exalted state of consciousness and feeling is fully acknowledged by recent psychologists to be unique in character, and of great scientific interest. Prof. Wm. James, the famous American psychologist, speaks very decidedly upon this point. "Even the least mystical of you," he says, "must by this time be convinced of the existence of mystical moments as states of

[1] *Childe Harold*, iii. 90.

consciousness of an entirely specific quality, and of the deep impression which they make on those that have them." He proceeds to quote the Canadian psychiatrist Dr. R. M. Bucke as follows: "The prime characteristic of cosmic consciousness[1] is a consciousness . . . of the life and order of the universe. . . . There occurs an intellectual enlightenment which alone would place the individual on a new plane of existence—would make him almost a member of a new species. To this is added a state of moral exaltation, an indescribable feeling of elevation, elation, and joyousness, and a quickening of the moral sense, which is fully as striking, and more important, than is the enhanced intellectual power. With these come what may be called a sense of immortality, a consciousness of eternal life—not a conviction that he shall have this, but the consciousness that he has it already."[2]

Even the unimaginative mind of Charles Darwin was not altogether closed to such impressions. "Whilst standing," he says, "in the midst of the grandeur of a Brazilian forest, it is not possible to give an adequate idea of the higher feelings of wonder, admiration, and devotion which fill and elevate the mind. I well remember my conviction

[1] "Cosmic consciousness" is a better description of this mystical state than Prof. Sidgwick's phrase, "cosmic emotion." "Cosmic emotion" is not wholly emotional, for the emotion is based on a distinct perception of some external Spiritual Reality with which the soul feels itself in contact.

[2] *Gifford Lectures*, p. 398.

that there is more in man than the mere breath of his body."[1]

A recent writer, after quoting numerous typical passages illustrating this "cosmic consciousness," ranging from the Egyptian *Book of the Dead* to Wordsworth's famous lines on *Tintern*, sums up thus: "It will be noticed that the above quotations range through the whole of recorded history; they might have been indefinitely multiplied; and every one of them expresses, not the experience of an individual, but of endless generations of men; psalmists, poets, and even philosophers only becoming popular as they utter the innermost feelings of humanity at large. Here, then, we have evidence that Nature—the material world with its sights and sounds—has exerted, throughout all ages, a profound religious influence on the thoughts and affections of men. . . . The influence in question is independent of any particular theological interpretation; coexisting alike with Monotheism, Polytheism, Pantheism—a mystic emotion more fundamental than the varieties of creed—a primary, permanent, world-wide agent in the education of the human soul."[2]

We may agree, then, with Prof. James: "The existence of mystical states absolutely overthrows the pretension of non-mystical states to be the sole and ultimate dictators of what we may believe. . . . It must always remain an open question

[1] *Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 312.
[2] Rev. J. R. Illingworth, *Divine Immanence*, p. 47.

whether mystical states may not possibly be superior points of view, *windows through which the mind looks out upon a more extensive and inclusive world.*"

That they are so, is the contention of Ontologists.

II.—Direct Mystical Consciousness of a Personal God

The indefinite æsthetic and cosmic consciousness just described exists in some degree in most men. The higher states of mystical consciousness in which the Being with whom communion is held is distinctly apprehended as a Personal, All-holy God are more rare, but nevertheless constitute a well-established and important class of psychological phenomena. A number of excellent cases have been collected and discussed with scientific precision by Prof. James in his important *Gifford Lectures* before alluded to. A few typical examples may be quoted to illustrate what is meant.

A Swiss writes: "All at once I experienced a feeling of being raised above myself, I felt the presence of God—I tell of the thing just as I was conscious of it—as if His goodness and His power were penetrating me altogether. The throb of emotion was so violent that I could barely tell the boys to pass on and not wait for me. I then sat down on a stone, unable to stand any longer, and my eyes overflowed with tears. I thanked God that in the course of my life He had taught me to know Him, that He sustained my life and

took pity both on the insignificant creature and on the sinner that I was. I begged Him ardently that my life might be consecrated to the doing of His will. I felt His reply. . . . Then slowly the ecstasy left my heart; that is, I felt that God had withdrawn the communion He had granted, and I was able to walk on, but very slowly, so strongly was I still possessed by the interior emotion. . . . My impression had been so profound that I asked myself if it were possible that Moses on Sinai could have had a more intimate communication with God. I think it well to add that in this ecstasy of mine God had neither form, colour, odour, nor taste; moreover, that the feeling of His presence was accompanied with no determinate localization. It was rather as if my personality had been transformed by the presence of a *spiritual spirit.* But the more I seek words to express this intimate intercourse, the more I feel the impossibility of describing the thing by any of our usual images. At bottom the expression most apt to render what I felt is this: God was present, though invisible; He fell under none of my senses, yet my consciousness perceived Him."

More normal experiences are described in the following passages:

"God is more real to me than any thought or thing or person. I feel His presence positively, and more as I live in closer harmony with His laws as written in my body and mind. I feel Him in the sunshine or rain; and awe mingled with a

delicious restfulness most nearly describes my feelings."

"God is quite real to me. I talk to Him, and often get answers."

"God surrounds me like a physical atmosphere. He is closer to me than my own breath. There are times when I seem to stand in His very presence, to talk to Him. . . . I have the sense of a Presence, strong and at the same time soothing, which hovers over me. Sometimes it seems to enwrap me with sustaining arms."[1]

It is said of Brother Lawrence, whose sense of God's presence was habitual, and who found in it unbounded delight: "His very countenance was edifying; such a sweet and calm devotion appearing in it, as could not but affect the beholders. And it was observed that in the greatest hurry of business in the kitchen he still preserved his recollection and heavenly mindedness. He was never hasty nor loitering, but did each thing in its season, with an even, uninterrupted composure and tranquillity of spirit. 'The time of business,' said he, 'does not with me differ from the time of prayer; and in the noise and clutter of my kitchen, while several persons are at the same time calling for different things, I possess God in as great tranquillity as if I were upon my knees at the Blessed Sacrament.'"[2]

[1] W. James, *Gifford Lectures*, pp. 67-72.

[2] Brother Lawrence, *Practice of the Presence of God* (Fourth Conversation).

A still more remarkable case of direct consciousness of God is that of the Hebrew prophets. The sincerity of their belief that God directly revealed Himself to them, and put words in their mouths to speak, is beyond question. As Prof. Sanday says, "With one consent they would say that the thoughts which arose in their hearts and the words which arose to their lips were put there by God. . . . It is remarkable what a clear and firm distinction they draw between what comes from God and what comes from themselves. There are in their minds two trains of thought running parallel to each other, and they never seem to have the slightest hesitation as to which facts shall be referred to the one and which to the other. It is the characteristic of the false prophets to confuse the deceits of their own heart with the words of the Lord. The true prophet is never in any doubt. He may have to wait some time before a revelation comes to him—Jeremiah on one occasion waits ten days—but he does not anticipate the desired moment. The prophets always know and very frequently set down the precise time when the word of the Lord 'came to them.' . . . A proof that the prophets were not the victims of hallucination is supplied by *the extraordinary consistency of their language* in regard to themselves and their mission. If one prophet here and another there had supposed themselves to be sent by God, and to have words put in their mouths by Him, it would not have been so surprising. But as it

is, we find the whole line of prophets, stretching over a succession of centuries, from Amos, from Nathan, from Samuel, from Moses, from Malachi, all make the same assumption. The formulæ which they use are the same: 'Thus saith the Lord,' 'The word of the Lord came,' 'Hear ye the word of the Lord.' Such an identity of language implies an identity of psychological fact behind it; but, if an individual may be subject to delusions, it is another thing to say that a class so long extended could be subject to them—and to delusions with so much method about them."[1]

Upon the whole, then, there can be no doubt that a large number of sane and truthful persons have professed in all ages to enjoy an immediate and distinct consciousness of the existence of a personal God. Such evidence, though not in itself conclusive, is strong.

III.—The Religious Experience of Ordinary Men

What keeps religion alive among the masses of mankind more than anything else, is the sense of its vital power. Real religion completely transforms the character, raising it to a higher plane altogether, and making its happy possessor capable of actions of heroism and exalted virtue, which, without it, he could not possibly perform. It fills the soul with a blissful serenity and peace, which pass all understanding, and which not even the fiercest storms of

[1] *Inspiration*, pp. 145-55

life can seriously disturb. A man who is religious has surrendered himself to a Great Another, upon whom he rests, and from whom he draws ever new supplies of spiritual and moral power. "There is a state of mind," says Prof. James, "known to religious men, but to no others, in which the will to assert ourselves and hold our own has been displaced by a willingness to close our mouths and be as nothing in the floods and waterspouts of God. In this state of mind, what we most dreaded has become the habitation of our safety, and the hour of our moral death has turned into our spiritual birthday. The time for tension in the soul is over, and that of happy relaxation, of calm, deep breathing, of an eternal present, with no discordant future to be anxious about, has arrived. . . . [Religion] adds to life an enchantment which is not rationally or logically deducible from anything else. . . . Religious feeling is thus an absolute addition to the subject's range of life. It gives him a new sphere of power. When the outward battle is lost, and the outer world disowns him, it redeems and vivifies an interior world which otherwise would be an empty waste. . . . Religion ought to mean nothing short of this new reach of freedom for us, with the struggle over, the keynote of the universe sounding in our ears, and everlasting possession spread before our eyes. This sort of happiness in the absolute and everlasting is what we find nowhere but in religion."[1]

[1] *Gifford Lectures*, pp. 47, 48.

It is open, of course, to the objector to say that this power of religion is only a particular example of the power of ideas to influence human conduct—no more remarkable, for instance, than the power of ambition, or of the love of wealth, to develop a man's latent faculties, and to goad him to energetic action. The really religious man, however, who after all in this matter is the man who knows, refuses to see the question in this light. He is certain that there is a very real difference between being dominated by an ordinary idea and living by religion. Religion is felt by all who have personal experience of it, to be actual communion with a Power outside ourselves, which lifts us, as it were, on eagles' wings, far above our natural level, and places us in a position of security and peace. Religion is not simply thinking about God, but feeling Him, and knowing Him, and resting in Him, and surrendering one's all to Him, and experiencing the delicious sense of pardon, and of being sustained in His everlasting arms, and folded to His fatherly heart. Religion has its secret, which is known to none but the religious,[1] and this is its sufficient justification. This is not the kind of argument which will satisfy the Agnostic, but it is the argument which has convinced the world. The inward blissful experiences of those

[1] Cf. Rev. ii. 17, He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches; To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the hidden manna, and will give him a white stone, and in the stone a new name written, which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it."

who live by religion are an evidence of its truth far deeper and more cogent than all the arguments of the speculative reason; and if, for any cause, this evidence ever ceased to be available to the generality of mankind, religion would become extinct in a generation, except among philosophers.

IV.—The Psychological Aspect of Religious Experience

A few words may be added on the psychological aspect of religious experience. Regarded psychologically, the religious phenomena of the mind form a distinct and important group. The phenomena of cosmic consciousness, repentance, the sense of pardon, religious awe, conscience, religious exaltation, conversion, etc., are facts. They are as fundamentally human as love, hatred, jealousy, fear, or anger. Now, it is an accepted law of Nature that mental faculties are related in every case to something objectively real. The sense of sight, for instance, is related to real illuminated objects, the sense of hearing to real sounds, the sense of touch to real surfaces, the emotion of fear to real dangers, the emotion of love to real lovable objects, and so on. Even the self-regarding affections, such as self-love, are no exceptions, for the self itself is real.

A strong presumption, therefore, arises that the religious faculties also correspond to something real. Nature does not produce organs and faculties at random. She does not give earthworms eyes,

or fishes wings. Therefore, since she has evolved a religious faculty, or rather a group of religious faculties, we may rest assured that the higher spiritual environment, to which they are obviously intended to correspond, exists. If there really is a personal, holy God, the evolution of religious faculties in the higher orders of creatures is only what we should expect; but if no God, or no such God, exists, their appearance is an unexplainable anomaly.

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(*b*) Religious Experience and Mysticism

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CHAPTER VIII

THE ARGUMENT FROM THE CONSENT OF MANKIND

SUMMARY.—All nations agree that there is a Power or Powers supreme over Nature and man, which takes an interest in human affairs, and can be influenced by human prayer and conduct. This belief has persisted, in spite of severe adverse criticism. It is, therefore, probably true. This conclusion is unaffected by any theories which may be held as to the origin or evolution of religion.

THE universality of religion has been observed from very ancient times, and has generally been considered a strong confirmation of its truth. "If I were a nightingale," says Epictetus, "I would by singing fulfil the vocation of a nightingale. If I were a swan, by singing, the vocation of a swan. But since I am a reasonable being, it is mine to praise God. This is my calling: I will fulfil it."[1] "If you go round the world," says Plutarch, "you may find cities without walls, or literature, or kings, or houses, or wealth, or money, without gymnasia or theatres. But no one ever saw a city without temples and gods, one which does not have recourse to prayers or oaths or oracles,

[1] *Discourses*, i. c. 6.

which does not offer sacrifice to obtain blessings, or celebrate rites to avert evil."[1] "There is no people," says Cicero, "so wild and savage as not to have believed in a God, even if they have been unacquainted with His nature. . . . It is necessary to believe that there are gods, because we have an implanted or rather innate knowledge of them. Now, a thing concerning which the nature of all men agrees, must of necessity be true."[2]

In modern times the universality of religion has occasionally been called in question, notably by Lord Avebury, who in his *Prehistoric Times* makes an elaborate attempt to prove that numerous tribes in North and South America, Polynesia, and Australia, and some in India and Africa, are without a religion. His arguments, however, have failed to convince even those who would most gladly believe them to be true, and Prof. Tylor only expresses the general sentiment of competent Anthropologists when he says, "The assertion that rude, non-religious tribes have been known in actual existence, though in theory possible, and perhaps in fact true, does not at present rest on that sufficient proof which, for an exceptional state of things, we are entitled to demand. . . . So far as I can judge from the immense mass of accessible evidence, we have to admit that the belief in spiritual beings appears among all low races with whom we have attained to thoroughly intimate

[1] *Adversus Coleten.*
[2] *De legibus*, i. 8; *De natura deorum*, i. 17.

acquaintance; whereas the assertion of absence of such belief must apply either to ancient tribes or to more or less imperfectly described modern ones' (*Primitive Culture*, 4th ed., 1903, pp. 418, 425).[1]

A more serious attempt to impugn the universality of religion is that of M. Barthélémy de Saint-Hilaire, who maintains that Buddhism, the religion of nearly a third of the human race, is really Atheism.

Now, it is highly probable that the principles of Buddhism, if developed to their logical consequences, would result in Atheism, but that is an entirely different thing from saying that Buddhism is Atheism. Buddhism always has been, and is now, a religion, recognizing gods and heavens and hells innumerable. The founder himself, as Prof. Flint points out, has been deified. It is believed that in the course of his numerous incarnations or transformations he four times became Mahu-Brahma, the supreme god of the Hindus, and that afterwards he became Buddha, and acquired omnipotence, omniscience, and other attributes of Supreme Divinity. All Buddhist literature, ancient and modern, contains frequent allusions to the gods. "The *Lalitavistara*," says Prof. Flint, "introduces us to Buddha before his incarnation. The

[1] Prof. Gustav Roskoff, after a minute examination of Lord Avebury's instances, comes to the same conclusion. "Hitherto," he says, "no tribe has been found without a trace of religion" (*Religionswesen der rohesten Naturvölker*, p. 178). On the same side are O. Peschel, F. von Hellward, P. Gloatz, W. Schneider, and Ch. Pesch.

scene is laid in heaven. Surrounded and adored by those who are adored, the future Buddha announces that the time has come for him to assume a mortal body, and recalls to the assembled gods the precepts of the law. When in the bosom of his mother Mâyâ Devi, he receives the homage of Brahma, of Çakra, the master of the gods, of the four goddesses, and of a multitude of deities. When he enters the world, the divine child is received by Indra, the king of the gods, and Brahma, the lord of creatures. . . . And so on, and so on."[1]

The history of Buddhism, therefore, renders it extremely difficult to believe that the founder was really an Atheist.[2] If he was, the fact only proves that the tendency of the human mind towards a religion of some kind is irresistibly strong.

Another objection to the universality of religion is that a certain number of distinguished men have been Atheists. These exceptions, however, are extremely few. Comte's Positivist Calendar[3] contains the names of the five hundred and forty-three men and women whom he supposes to have done the most good in the world. Of these over ninety per cent. were convinced believers in supernatural

[1] *Anti-theistic Theories*, p. 284.

[2] Dr. Fairbairn says, "Nothing could be farther than the soul or system of the Buddha from what we mean by Atheism"; and he speaks of his "thoroughly theistic consciousness" (*Philosophy of the Christian Religion*, p. 242).

[3] It is given in *The Catechism of Positive Religion* (tr.), Appendix, table D.

religion; and of the rest, very few carried their scepticism so far as seriously to doubt the existence of a God. Comte himself, who stands head and shoulders above all other Atheists,[1] felt the need of a religion so strongly that he deliberately invented one. He established a cult of "Humanity," with a priesthood, public worship, sacraments, a reformed confessional, the honour of saints, an ideal preference for virginity—in fact, he paid Christianity, especially Catholic Christianity, the sincere compliment of imitation. He even declared his belief in certain of the Christian miracles, notably in our Lord's miraculous birth of a virgin, which, according to some modern representatives of "criticism," is incredible.

Another objection to the Argument from Consent is the existence of unbelief among cultured nations at the present time. Unbelief exists, without doubt, but not to the extent that is often supposed. Men are critical of traditional beliefs, and somewhat suspicious of orthodoxy; there is also a certain amount of anti-clerical feeling; but it would be a great mistake to identify this with Atheism, or even with Agnosticism of a radical type. Religious authority must be distinguished from religion. There is a considerable tendency to question the former; very little to question the latter. What

[1] Laplace, perhaps, might be compared with Comte; but outside mathematics he showed small ability, and Napoleon declared him only capable of "solving problems of the infinitely little."

radical unbelief there is, is mostly found among those who devote themselves exclusively to Natural Science. But even here, it would be a gross exaggeration to say, as Mr. Froude did some years ago, that the foremost scientists have gone over in a body to the materialistic camp. In recent and contemporary science such names as Balfour Stewart, Asa Gray, Clerk Maxwell, Joule, Tait, Lord Kelvin, Sir Oliver Lodge, and Sir G. G. Stokes, are sufficient in themselves to refute such a statement. There are, moreover, indications that the wave of materialism and semi-materialism which followed the publication of *The Origin of Species* in 1859 has spent itself. There have been important retractations. Prof. Wundt, for example, who in 1863 wrote his *Human and Animal Psychology* from an entirely materialistic standpoint, has now issued a new and completely revised edition, in which he speaks of his earlier work as a sin of his youth.[1] Dr. Romanes, one of the greatest representatives of the Darwinian tradition, before his death completely recanted his earlier views.[2]

[1] "As for myself, I had but little experience in the difficult work of psychological analysis, and set about my task with more zeal than discretion. So that for years before the appearance of the first edition of my *Physiological Psychology*, in which I took up the same problem with more modesty and caution, I had learned to look upon the *Lectures* as wild oats of my youthful days, which I would gladly have forgotten" (Preface to second edition, 1892).

[2] "Never was any one more arrogant in his claims for pure reason than I was—more arrogant in spirit, though not in letter, this being due to contact with science; without ever considering

And even Prof. Huxley, in his famous Romanes Lecture, *Evolution and Ethics* (1903), unsaid a great deal. At the present moment it cannot be fairly said that the general attitude of Natural Science is hostile to faith. Even if it were, it would be wrong to attach too much importance to the fact. Natural Science is only one out of many fields of human activity and knowledge, and it has many limitations.[1] The religious opinions of men of science should, of course, be treated with respect, but not with more respect than the opinions of historians, philosophers, poets, statesmen, or any other men of learning and cultivation. The study of Natural Science does not confer any special aptitude for the treatment of theological questions. These come more within the province of Philosophy, and, as is well known, almost all philosophers, including all the greatest, have been believers in religion.

how opposed to reason itself is the unexpressed assumption of my earlier argument as to God Himself, as if His existence were a merely physical problem to be solved by man's reason alone, without reference to his other and higher faculties" (*Thoughts on Religion*, p. 101).

[1] Darwin says, "It is an accursed evil to a man to become so absorbed in any subject as I am in mine. . . . I cannot endure to read a line of poetry: I have tried lately to read Shakespeare, and found it so intolerably dull that it nauseated me. I have also almost lost my taste for pictures or music. . . . My mind seems to have become a kind of machine for grinding general laws out of large collections of facts; but why this should have caused the atrophy of that part of the brain alone on which the higher tastes depend, I cannot conceive" (*Life and Letters*, vol. i. pp. 101, 102; vol. ii. p. 139).

There still remains to be considered what amount of evidential value ought to be attached to this general—almost universal—agreement as to the truth of religion. Some value it certainly has, but it is not easy to say how much. The cogency of the Argument from Consent varies very much according to the subject-matter about which there is consent. If the subject is a technical one, such as the distance of the fixed stars, or the habits of microbes, the judgment of a single expert is worth more than the judgment of all the rest of mankind; but if the subject is one which men in general are able to understand, and which affects human life at many points, then the general consent of mankind becomes an argument of great importance. That this is so is universally recognized. Every one, for example, admits that the consent of mankind that government is better than anarchy, marriage better than free love, and private property better than communism, is an argument of a most solid character. Very few, again, will seriously question the verdict of mankind that Shakespeare is a great dramatist, Dante a great poet, Victor Hugo a great novelist, Michel Angelo a great artist, and King Alfred a great statesman. Now, religion is above all a human and practical thing. It appeals, like literature, oratory, statesmanship, poetry, and art, to man as man. It touches ordinary life at every point. The arguments for it are simple, practical, and obvious, and are taken from every branch of knowledge and experience

Religion is, as has been finely said, "the total reaction of man upon the universe." But if so, it is just one of those subjects with regard to which the Argument from Consent is valid and weighty. It is weighty, whether the knowledge of God in the soul is strictly innate, as some think, or gradually acquired by reasoning, which is the more usual opinion. Whichever of these views is true, it is certain that the facts of the universe combine to produce in the mind of the ordinary man an almost overwhelming conviction that there is a God, and this is sufficient for the argument.

Another point of great importance is that the belief of mankind in religion is *persistent.* Religion survives, not because it has never been criticised, but because it has triumphed over criticism. There have been periods when the hostile critics seemed to have so effectually made out their case that the speedy downfall of religion was confidently expected. The last age of the Roman republic was such a period; but with the accession of Augustus a reaction set in, and religion regained greater prestige and influence than ever. The eighteenth century in England was another such period. "It has come," says Butler, "to be taken for granted by many persons, that Christianity is not so much as a subject for inquiry; but that it is, now at length, discovered to be fictitious. And accordingly they treat it as if, in the present age, this were an agreed point among all people of discernment; and nothing remained but to set it up as a principal

subject of mirth and ridicule, as it were by way of reprisals, for its having so long interrupted the pleasures of the world."[1] It is even said that in 1747 Butler refused the primacy because "it was too late for him to try to support a falling Church." In France the Revolution gave Atheism a short-lived triumph. On August 10th, 1793, a great festival was held to celebrate the final overthrow of religion, and the substitution of Nature and Reason for God. Yet within a year Robespierre obtained a decree recognizing a Supreme Being and the immortality of the soul, and soon afterwards the reaction went further and brought back Christianity.

The fall of religion has been confidently expected so often, that wise men have given over expecting it. Comte and his followers expected it in 1851, when they boldly came forward "to claim as their due the general direction of this world, in order to construct at length the true Providence, moral, intellectual, and material; excluding once for all from political supremacy all the different servants of God—Catholic, Protestant, or Deist—as at once

[1] Advertisement to the *Analogy*. It is amusing to observe how some people, who ought to know better, still indulge in talk of this description. For example, Prof. K. Pearson says, "I set out from the standpoint that the mission of Freethought is no longer to batter down old faiths; that has been long ago effectively accomplished, and I, for one, am willing to put a fence round the ruins, that they may be preserved from desecration, and serve as a landmark. . . . I start from the axiom that the Christian 'verities' are quite outside the field of profitable discussion" (*Ethic of Freethought*, Preface to first edition).

belated and a source of trouble."[1] Many eager Darwinians expected it in 1859, when the famous *Origin* was published, and since then the rise of the "Higher Criticism" has inspired high hopes in the minds of many Secularists. But all these hopes have been disappointed. Positivism failed to appeal either to the multitude or to the educated. Darwinism was found consistent with orthodoxy. The higher criticism, as expounded by its saner representatives, has been found useful and even edifying. And thus after two hundred years of almost continuous criticism, supernatural faith, in spite of a certain amount of unsettlement on particular points of doctrine, remains practically unshaken. In many ways religion seems to be showing greater vitality than ever. Foreign missions, for instance, have progressed during the last thirty years in a manner previously unexampled.[2]

Religion, then, being persistent, is probably true. False beliefs, however widely held, tend to disappear before criticism. Thus the once universal beliefs in the immobility of the earth, in judicial astrology, in witchcraft, in alchemy, and in sympathetic magic, collapsed as soon as they were seriously questioned. Moreover, false *religious* beliefs, such as animal-worship, fetichism, demon-

[1] These were the words with which Comte closed his third course of *Philosophical Lectures on the General History of Humanity*.

[2] In 1875 the Christian population of the world was estimated at 394 millions. Now it exceeds 500 millions. (*Encyc. Brit* xxvii. p. 54).

worship, and polytheism, have met with a similar fate. Monotheism, however, has resisted all attempts to refute it, and has proved itself fit to survive, by surviving.

It will be convenient to conclude this chapter with a consideration of a few objections to the Argument from Consent not previously noticed.

Objection I.—The consent of mankind to the truth of religion is of no value, because the various systems of Theology are extremely divergent.

This was Darwin's difficulty. "This argument," he says, "would be a valid one if all men of all races had the same inward conviction of the existence of a God; but we know that this is very far from being the case. Therefore I cannot see that such inward convictions and feelings are of any weight as evidence of what really exists" (*Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 310).

Reply.—The fact that men differ on certain points is no reason for distrusting their general agreement. Biologists differ greatly in their theories of Evolution, nations in their forms of government, historians in their views of certain facts of history, yet it would be unreasonable to doubt that Evolution is a fact, that government is a good thing, and that history in general is trustworthy. When a number of witnesses contradict one another on certain points, a jury does not therefore infer that the statements on which they agree are false. It is true that religions differ greatly in details, but there

is a very general agreement on at least the following points:

(1) That there is a Power or Powers supreme over nature and man; (2) that this Power is intelligent and personal; (3) that it takes an interest in human affairs, and can be influenced by human prayer and conduct.

Cultivated nations go further and maintain that this Power is one and holy, a friend of righteousness, and an enemy of vice. Surely, then, we have a right to maintain, on principles of common sense, that such religious doctrines as these, which have behind them universal consent, or the consent of the most advanced races, have at least a considerable degree of probability.

Objection II.—Religion owes its origin to scientific and philosophical theories, now admitted to be false, and this invalidates the testimony of mankind to its truth.

Reply.—As to the origin of religion, nothing whatever is known. Religion is as old as human history, and all attempts to trace it back further than this are pure speculation. It is sometimes thought that the religion of savages furnishes a clue to the prehistoric development of religion. But in the first place, we do not know whether the religion of savages fairly represents that of prehistoric man; and in the second place, savage religions are of a very varied character. Some savages are polytheists, others monotheists, others devil-worshippers, and there is no way of

discovering which of these cults is the oldest. It is often assumed that ethical monotheism, being the most perfect form of religion, must have been last evolved; but this seems negatived by the fact that some of the lowest races in the world, such as the Australians, the Andamanese, and the natives of Tierra del Fuego, profess an ethical monotheism of a fairly advanced type. Mr. Herbert Spencer derives gods from ghosts, and Prof. Tylor from a supposed primitive animism; but all such theories are pure conjecture. Even if Mr. Spencer or Prof. Tylor were right, the argument from the consent of mankind would still retain its force. It is not the arguments which first suggested the idea of religion to men which are important, but those which secured its universality and its survival in spite of attacks. Now, those arguments have nothing to do with ghosts or animism, but are in the main the very arguments that Theists appeal to now.

APPENDIX I

THEORIES OF THE ORIGIN OF RELIGION

Theories of the origin of religion have very little bearing upon the question of its truth, but it may be advisable, for the sake of completeness, to say a few words about the more important of them.

(1) Mr. Herbert Spencer derives religion from a belief in ghosts, which, he thinks, originated in dreams about dead people. But if religion is, as has been shown, a reaction of

the human mind upon the universe as a whole, such a special origin for it must be inadequate. Mr. Spencer's theory may perhaps account for some forms of ghost-propitiation, but not for religion in general.

(2) Professor Tylor's theory that religion arose from the belief that inanimate things, such as trees and stones, possess life and intelligence, may perhaps account for some of the grosser aspects of fetichism, but not for the higher aspects even of this, much less for polytheism and monotheism.

(3) Bayle's theory that religion was invented by priests and rulers in their own interests is refuted by the fact that religion prevails among peoples like the Australians, who have neither priests nor rulers.

(4) The theory that fear of the destructive forces of nature (lightning, earthquakes, tempests, etc.) gave birth to religion is not even plausible. A savage who saw a flash of lightning kill a man would doubtless acquire a well-grounded fear of lightning; but this fear would not of itself produce a conviction that an intelligent being directed the lightning. A belief of this kind must have had its origin, not in fear, but in reasoning.

(5) The theory that religion is due to ignorance of natural causes is refuted by facts. If it were true, religion would decline in proportion as knowledge of natural causes advances. But this is not the case. Religion has always hitherto held its own in the most progressive communities, and is nowhere stronger at this moment than in that typically progressive community, the United States of America. The prestige of religion would not be in any way impaired, even if science advanced so far as to find natural causes for everything. Religion is not based on the gaps in our scientific knowledge, but on the fact that natural causation itself requires to be explained.

(6) The theory that religion is a special form of sexual emotion does not deserve refutation. Phallic and priapic rites are mere excrescences on religion. True religion is inseparably connected with chastity.

APPENDIX II

THE MORAL AND SPIRITUAL VALUE OF SAVAGE RELIGIONS

There is a tendency among anthropologists to lay undue stress upon the crudities and imperfections of savage religions, and to fail to do justice to their higher and ennobling elements. The one-sided statements of Prof. Tylor, and especially of Mr. Spencer, have led many to suppose that religion in its lowest forms is destitute of a moral or spiritual element altogether. How false this view is, is well shown by Dr. Andrew Lang in his valuable book, *The Making of Religion*, from which the following facts are taken.

The Australians, the lowest of all races, worship a Supreme Being, generally called *Darumulun*, who imposes on men a moral law, punishes wrong-doing, and reads the secrets of the heart. Among the precepts of Darumulun are to honour and obey the old, to be unselfish and share what one has with one's friends, to live peaceably with one's neighbours, not to commit fornication, adultery, or sodomy, and to obey the food-restrictions of the tribe. At the religious mysteries these and similar ethical precepts are taught to the young men under circumstances of the deepest solemnity. Each lad is given, "by one of the elders, advice so kindly, fatherly, and impressive, as often to soften the heart, and to draw tears from the youth." The stomachs of the neophytes are kneaded to expel selfishness and greed. The future life (apparently) is illustrated by the burial of a living elder, who rises from a grave. This may, however, symbolize the new life of holiness to which the initiated are called. The Supreme Being is called "Our Father," just like the Christian God. Unselfishness is regarded as of the essence of religion, and a selfish man is spoken of as "uninitiated."

The Andamanese, another low race, once believed to be Atheists, have a god named *Puluga*, who is "like fire," but

invisible. He was never born, and is immortal. By him were all things created, except the powers of evil. He knows even the thoughts of the heart. He is angered by *yubda* = sin, or wrong-doing—that is, falsehood, theft, grave assault, murder, adultery, bad carving of meat, and (as a crime of witchcraft) by burning wax. To those in pain or distress he is pitiful, and sometimes deigns to afford relief. He is Judge of Souls, and the dread of future punishment to *some* extent is said to affect their course of action in the present life. This account is given by an educated Englishman, who knows their language, and lived among them for eleven years.

The Fuegians, a race almost as low as the Australians, have a deity who reads the heart, punishes sin, and is particularly angry at murder. "Very bad to kill man," said a Fuegian; "Big Man in woods no like it—he very angry." Capt. Fitzroy says of them: "A great black man is supposed to be always wandering about the woods and mountains, who is certain of knowing every word and every action, who cannot be escaped, and who influences the weather according to men's conduct."

Many other interesting facts bearing on the ethical side of savage religion, together with references to original authorities, are given in Dr. Lang's book.

LITERATURE

(*a*) The Argument from Consent

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Note.—The asterisked books form a useful first selection. See also Introductory Chapter, pp. lxxi.-lxxiv.

CHAPTER IX

THE UTILITY OF RELIGION CONSIDERED AS EVIDENCE OF ITS TRUTH

SUMMARY.—Religion is more useful to the state and to the individual than Agnosticism. It is a stronger social bond; it encourages virtue and discourages vice more efficiently; it is a better instrument of progress; and it promotes human happiness in a much higher degree. On the supposition, therefore, that this is a rational universe, it follows that Religion is truer than Agnosticism. Certain objections to the utility of religion are considered and refuted.

I.—THE UTILITY OF RELIGION TO SOCIETY

THE favour with which practical statesmen have generally regarded religion is mainly due to the following causes:

(*a*) Religion acts as a powerful cement, holding the social fabric together. It performs this function best when the members of a community are of one religion; but even when they are not, inasmuch as almost all religions inculcate the leading social and civic duties, the unifying effect is considerable.

(*b*) Religion encourages moral virtue, which legislation cannot do except to a very limited extent.

(*c*) Religion is a powerful check upon vice, acting inwardly upon the conscience, thus supplementing law, which acts only by external penalties, which moreover are easily evaded.

(*d*) Religion is a progressive moral and social force. It holds up a moral and social ideal, far in advance of anything that can be immediately embodied in legislation, and so prepares the way for future social and political progress.

II.—The Utility of Religion to the Individual

Religion immensely increases human happiness, chiefly in the following ways:

(*a*) Personal religion—*i.e.* communion with God—is sweet in itself, apart from all other advantages. As Prof. Wm. James says, "Religion includes a new zest, which adds itself like a gift to life, and takes the form either of lyrical enchantment, or of appeal to earnestness and heroism; [also] an assurance of safety, and a temper of peace, and in relation to others a preponderance of loving affections" (*Varieties*, p. 485).

(*b*) Religion is a great support in the sorrows of life. If a good man is misjudged by the world, he knows that there is One that judgeth uprightly. If his life is seemingly a failure, and he is undeservedly wretched, he knows that there is an eternal reward.

(*c*) Religion removes the sting of death. Only religion can do this. Religion alone offers the hope that those who have been loved on earth

will be seen again, and that beyond the gates of death is a blessed hereafter.

It appears, then, that religion is in a high degree useful to the state and beneficial to the individual. But if so, a presumption at once arises that religion is true. The principle is generally recognized that social and political theories are true in proportion as their practical application tends to promote order, progress, and general happiness. But the practice of religion conduces, as has been shown, to order and progress in the state, and to the individual happiness of all virtuous citizens. It must, therefore, according to the common way of judging theories, be true, or true in the main. Such reasoning is, of course, not demonstrative. It is quite conceivable that the universe is constructed upon such irrational principles, that the more true a theory is, the worse it works in practice; but reason refuses to entertain such a supposition, unless it is obliged. And it is not obliged.

III.—Objections to the Argument from Utility

Objection I.—The moral ideals of Agnostics are as high as those of Theists, and therefore the world would make as much moral progress under Agnosticism as under Theism.

Reply.—The moral standard of M. Comte, Mr. Matthew Arnold, and of the best educated Agnostics, is borrowed from Theism, especially from Christianity, and cannot be expected to continue indefinitely, when Theism itself has disappeared.

The higher morality is based on belief in a personal God, and if that belief is not true, has no sufficient justification in reason. The establishment of Agnosticism, therefore, would bring about a gradual deterioration of the moral standard.[1] Social progress would gradually cease, and after a time deterioration would set in.

But even if Agnosticism could succeed in maintaining the full ethical standard of Theism, it would still be inferior to Theism as an instrument of moral progress. The ethical standard of Agnosticism exists in the Agnostic's mind alone. The ethical standard of Theism is embodied in an actually existing, morally perfect Being. Theism, therefore, which acknowledges an actually existing Deity, the friend and rewarder of virtue, must always be a more effectual stimulus to virtue than Agnosticism, which denies or doubts the existence of such a Being. Mr. Mill, in his later years, admitted this. "It cannot be questioned," he says, "that the undoubting belief of the real existence of a Being who realizes our own best ideas of perfection, and of our being in the hands of that Being as the ruler of the universe, gives an increase of force to those feelings beyond what they can receive from reference to a merely ideal conception" (*Three Essays*, p. 252).

[1] The moral standard of popular Agnosticism is much lower than that of educated Agnosticism. There is no such difference between the moral standards of philosophic and popular Christianity.

Objection II.—Religion is not the only possible bond of society. Unselfish motives are as natural as selfish ones, and suffice for the maintenance of society among the social animals. Hence among men also natural motives would suffice as a bond of society.

Reply.—The question at issue is not whether Agnosticism can supply a social bond at all, but whether it can supply as strong a bond as Theism. If it cannot, then Theism is a better social theory. That unselfish or altruistic feelings are natural to man, is not denied. Often altruistic actions are performed out of pure benevolence, without reference to religion, or to self. But the Agnostic has no monopoly of such unselfish impulses. They come to all men irrespective of creed. But the Theist has this advantage over the Agnostic, that besides the natural motives to altruism which he shares with the Agnostic, he also has faith in a just God who encourages altruism, and severely punishes all breaches of social duties. Theism, therefore, is a more powerful social bond than Agnosticism, and therefore more useful to society, and therefore more likely to be true.

Objection III.—The supposed utility of religion is more than counterbalanced by the inconveniences to which it has given rise. Chief among these are, (*a*) religious wars and persecutions; (*b*) persistent opposition to education and to the advancement of science; (*c*) hostility to popular liberties; (*d*) the rise of an order of men, claiming super-

natural powers, and incurably opposed to the best interests of mankind.[1]

Reply.—All the inconveniences mentioned are due not to the principles of religion, but to ignorance or neglect of them. Thus:

(*a*) Religious wars and persecutions are contrary to the precept of religion, which commands men to love one another, even their enemies.

(*b*) To oppose education and the advancement of science is contrary to religion, because religion teaches that the physical universe is a revelation of the Divine Nature, and therefore to be studied, not only for secular, but even for religious reasons. Moreover, in most ages religion has been the pioneer of education and science. Almost all the older universities and schools of Europe are religious foundations, and the education of the poor was the business of the Church centuries before the State awoke to its responsibilities in the matter.

(*c*) The Church has in certain countries and in certain ages allied itself with despotic power, but in general its influence has been favourable to liberty and just government. It was the influence of the Church which gradually abolished slavery and serfdom in Europe. In England, in 1215, the influence of Archbishop Langton secured Magna Charta, and in 1688 the stand of the Seven Bishops greatly assisted the cause of popular liberty. It

[1] Cf. Prof. Clifford, *Lectures and Essays*, vol. ii. p. 237: "The priest is at all times and in all places the enemy of all men—*sacerdos semper, ubique, et omnibus inimicus.*"

may be added that the government of the Church has contained from the first a popular element. The bishops and clergy of a diocese were elected in early times by the whole of the clergy and people, and the affairs of the Church at large were regulated by representative councils, œcumenical, patriarchal, and provincial, which formed a model for the representative forms of government of modern states.

(*d*) The supposed opposition of priesthoods to the best interests of mankind is not supported by facts. Priesthoods have abused their powers just as other men have, but not more; and inasmuch as many of their functions are philanthropic and ethical, the existence of priesthoods may be justified even on secular principles. Moreover, if religion is true, priesthoods are necessary also on religious grounds, for persons will always be needed to teach the truths of religion and to celebrate its rites. Even Mr. Spencer, whose anti-clerical orthodoxy is beyond dispute, says, "Though ecclesiastical institutions hold less important places in higher societies than in lower societies, we must not infer that they will hereafter wholly disappear. If in times to come there remain functions to be fulfilled in any way analogous to their present functions, we must conclude that they will survive under some form or other. As there must ever continue our relations to the unseen, and our relations to one another, it appears not improbable that there will survive certain representatives of

those who in the past were occupied with observances and teachings concerning those two relations; however unlike their sacerdotal prototypes such representatives may become" (*Principles of Sociology*, vol. iii. c. 15). M. Comte also assigns to the priesthood most important functions in his ideal atheistical State.

Objection IV.—The happiness said to be produced by religion is exaggerated, and more than counterbalanced by the misery it causes. Christianity in particular teaches that the majority of mankind will perish everlastingly—a doctrine which, if sincerely believed, leads logically to pessimism.

Reply.—Christianity does not profess to make men in general happy, but only good men. A man knows whether he is sincerely trying to do his duty or not. If he is, Christianity will make him happy; if he is not, its teachings will fill him with just alarm, and seriously dispose him to repentance. This just severity of Christianity is not a thing to be regretted. If its teaching were different—if, for example, it offered happiness to the evil and the good alike—it would be a demoralizing system, deserving to be suppressed.

The subject of eternal punishment will be discussed more fully later, but it may be remarked here that Christianity does not affirm that the majority of mankind will be lost, or make any numerical statements at all upon the subject. It states, indeed, in solemn warning, that those who remain finally and obstinately impenitent will be

excluded for ever from the presence of God, and from the society of the just, but it declares nothing as to the nature of their punishment. One thing is certain, that it will be in accordance with the divine mercy and compassion, as well as with the divine justice. Exclusion from heaven may even, as many theologians teach, be quite consistent in some cases with the attainment of a certain relative happiness.[1]

Upon the whole, it is certain that religious belief tends to human happiness in a far higher degree than Agnosticism. To prove this at further length is unnecessary, because it is largely admitted by the Agnostics themselves. Prof. Clifford says: "It cannot be doubted that theistic belief is a comfort and solace to those who hold it, and that the loss of it is a very painful loss. . . . We have seen the spring sun shine out of an empty heaven, to light up a soulless earth; we have felt with utter loneliness that the Great Companion is dead."[2] Mr. Cotter Morison says: "Men will believe, in spite of science and the laws of their consciousness, in a good God, who loves them and cares for them and their little wants and trials, and will, if they only please Him, take them at last to His bosom, and wipe the tears for ever from their eyes."[3] "Physicus" says: "And forasmuch as I am far from being able to agree with those who affirm that the twilight doctrine of the

[1] See c. xxiii., appendix on *Hell*.
[2] *Lectures and Essays*, ii. 250.
[3] *The Service of Man*, c. iii.

'new faith' is a desirable substitute for the waning splendour of the old, I am not ashamed to confess that with this virtual negation of God, the universe to me has lost its soul of loveliness; and although from henceforth the precept to 'work while it is day' will doubtless but gain an intensified force from the terribly intensified meaning of the words that 'the night cometh when no man can work,' yet when at times I think, as think at times I must, of the appalling contrast between the hallowed glory of that creed that once was mine, and the lonely mystery of existence as now I find it,—at such times I shall ever feel it impossible to avoid the sharpest pang of which my nature is susceptible."[1] And again: "But now, how changed! Never in the history of man has so terrific a calamity befallen the race as that which all who look may now behold advancing as a deluge, black with destruction, resistless in might, uprooting our most cherished hopes, engulfing our most precious creed, and burying our highest life in mindless desolation" (p. 51). Viscount Amberley says: "I must to a certain extent admit the reality of the loss which the adoption of this faith [viz. of Agnosticism] entails. There is consolation no doubt in the thought of a heavenly Father who loves us; there is strength in the idea that He sees and helps us in our continual combat against evil; there is happiness in the hope that He will assign us in another life an infinite reward for all the endurances

[1] *A Candid Examination of Theism*, p. 114.

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of this. Above all, there is comfort in the reflection that when we are parted by death, we are not parted for ever; that our love for those whom we have cherished on earth is no temporary bond, to be broken ere long in bitterness and despair, but a possession never to be lost again—a union of souls, interrupted for a little while by the separation of the body, only to be again renewed in far greater perfection, and carried on into far higher joys than can be even imagined here. All this is beautiful and full of fascination—why should we deny it? Candour compels us to admit that in giving it up, with the other illusions of our younger days, we are resigning a balm for the wounded spirit, for which it would be hard to find an equivalent in all the repertories of science and in all the treasuries of philosophy." Mr. Mill says: "The beneficial effect of such a hope (*i.e.* in God, and human immortality) is far from trifling. It makes life and human nature a far greater thing to the feelings, and gives greater strength as well as greater solemnity to all the sentiments which are awakened in us by our fellow creatures and by mankind at large. It allays the sense of that irony of Nature which is so painfully felt when we see the exertions and sacrifices of a life culminating in the formation of a wise and noble mind, only to disappear from the world when the time has just arrived at which the world seems about to begin reaping the benefit of it. The truth that life is short and art long is from of

old one of the most discouraging parts of our condition; this hope admits the possibility that the art employed in improving and beautifying the soul itself may avail for good in some other life, even when seemingly useless for this."[1]

Objection V.—Religion diminishes the sum of human happiness by concentrating the thoughts upon another world, and thus hindering the performance of the practical social duties of this.

Reply.—Whether this criticism is true of any religion is doubtful. It certainly does not apply to Christianity, which makes the active service of man the best passport to heaven. (Matt. xxv. 31-46: Jas. i. 27; 1 John iii. 17; etc.).

LITERATURE

Among modern philosophers the Pragmatists, and among modern theologians the Modernists, are those who attach the greatest importance to utility as a criterion of truth. Many of them hold the exaggerated opinion that the question, "Is this philosophical or theological doctrine true?" is equivalent to the question, "Would it work well in practice?" See W. James, *Pragmatism*, 1907, and *A Pluralistic Universe*, 1908, and *The Meaning of Truth*, 1909; F. C. S. Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, 1891, and *Humanism*, 1903; J. B. Pratt, *What is Pragmatism?* 1909; A. Loisy, *L'Évangile et L'Église*, 1903; E. Leroy, *Dogme et Critique*.

The following works treat the subject on more familiar lines: J. Bentham, *Analysis of the Influence of Natural Religion upon the Temporal Happiness of Mankind*; J. S. Mill, "The Utility of Religion" in *Three Essays on Religion*; R. Flint, *Theism*, p. 329 ff.; B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*; C. L. Bruce, *Gesta Christi*; Seeley, *Natural Religion*, c. v.; Clifford, "Ethics of Religion" in *Lectures*, vol. ii.

[1] *Three Essays*, p. 249.

CHAPTER X

AGNOSTICISM AND FAITH

SUMMARY.—Agnosticism is suspension of judgment as to the truth of religion, on the ground of the insufficiency of the evidence. Agnosticism would be a possible position, if religion were a matter of pure speculation; but it is not. Religion involves *action*, and whenever it is necessary to act, it is necessary to decide the speculative questions upon which action depends. Life must be lived upon *some* principles, either those of religion or others. The Agnostic, though professing neutrality, neglects to regulate his life by the principles of religion: he therefore rejects religion as decidedly as the Atheist, and loses all the advantages which belong to religion if it is true. The Agnostic objection to religion, that its first principles cannot be logically demonstrated, is invalid, because this is the case with the first principles of all the sciences.

THE most popular type of Agnosticism at the present day is that which neither affirms nor denies the truth of religion. It is argued that since neither Theists can conclusively prove nor Atheists disprove God's existence, the only rational attitude for a thinking mind is suspension of judgment.

This argument is plausible, but it proceeds upon the assumption that a man's attitude towards a matter of practice ought to be the same as his

attitude towards a matter of pure speculation. This is a grave error. In matters of pure speculation, such as the cause of gravity, or the origin of nebulæ, or the ultimate constitution of matter or of ether, suspension of judgment is not only allowable, but is a duty, until the evidence for one particular view becomes overwhelmingly strong.

In matters of practice, however, it is necessary to *act*. And whenever it is necessary to act, it is necessary to decide at once the speculative question upon which action depends. A doctor, called in to treat a man seriously ill, has to decide at once what his patient is suffering from, and what remedies are to be employed, however obscure and conflicting the symptoms may be. An artizan out of work, and offered two posts, must decide at once which he will take, although he may be uncertain which of the two is the more advantageous. A statesman who has received an ultimatum from a foreign power must decide, within a few hours, between peace and war, often with a very insufficient knowledge of the relative advantages of the two policies.

Now, religion, being, as has been already shown, a matter of practice, offers to every man born into the world what is called a *forced option*. Life has to be lived, and since it has to be lived, it must be lived upon some principles or other. It may either be lived upon the principles of Religion, in which case a particular type of character will

be developed, or upon the principles of Atheism, in which case a quite different type of character will be developed. Between these two alternatives there is no *via media*, such as Agnosticism claims to be. Either there is a God, or there is not. If there is, then to live every moment to His glory, and to make this life a preparation for the next, is the whole duty of man. If there is not, then to live for purely secular ends is the only alternative. The Agnostic professes not to decide between these alternatives, but in reality he *does* decide. He refuses to regulate his life as he *would* regulate it if he believed in a God and a hereafter, and therefore to all intents and purposes he denies those beliefs. If religion were a mere matter of speculation, without influence upon life or conduct, the Agnostic's position would be logical; but since religion is practical, affecting every part of life and building up a special type of character, Agnosticism is mere trifling. If religion is true, it offers great advantages to its adherents both in this world and in the world to come. But these advantages are dependent upon faith, and the Agnostic forfeits them equally with the Atheist, unless he makes the great venture of faith upon which they are conditional. The Agnostic may object that if the Deity wishes to be universally acknowledged, He ought to make the evidence for His existence more plain than it is; but it may be that it is the will of the Deity to be worshipped not by those who seek purely logical demonstrations of

His existence, but by those who are satisfied with evidence mainly moral. True believers are agreed that the existence of God is not so much a matter to be argued out, as to be spiritually discerned, and perhaps the reason why the purely logical evidence for religion is not made strictly demonstrative, is that the faculty of spiritual discernment may be forced into exercise. This, at any rate, is the Christian view of the matter. (John ii. 20, xx. 29; 1 Cor. ii. 14; 1 John ii. 20, etc.)

Prof. Wm. James thoroughly endorses this argument. "We see," he says, "first, that religion offers itself as a *momentous* option. We are supposed to gain even now by our belief, and to lose by our non-belief a certain vital good. Secondly, religion is a *forced* option so far as that good goes. We cannot escape the issue by remaining sceptical and waiting for more light, because, although we do avoid error in that way, *if religion be untrue*, we lose the good, *if it be true*, just as certainly as if we positively chose to disbelieve. . . . Scepticism, then, is not avoidance of option; it is option of a certain particular kind of risk. *Better risk loss of truth than chance of error* —that is your faith-vetoer's exact position. To preach scepticism to us as a duty until 'sufficient evidence' for religion be found is tantamount to telling us, when in presence of the religious hypothesis, that to yield to our fear of its being in error, is wiser and better than to yield to our hope that it may be true. . . . I simply refuse obedience to the

scientist's command to imitate his kind of option in a case where my own stake is important enough to give me the right to choose my own form of risk. I do not wish to forfeit my sole chance in life of getting upon the winning side. . . . We feel, too, as if the appeal of religion to us were made to our own active good-will, as if evidence might be for ever withheld from us, unless we met the hypothesis half-way. To take a trivial illustration: just as a man who in a company of gentlemen made no advances, asked a warrant for every concession, and believed no one's word without proof, would cut himself off by such churlishness from all the social rewards that a more trusting spirit would earn,—so here, one who should shut himself up in snarling logicality and try to make the gods extort his recognition willy-nilly, or not get it at all, might cut himself off for ever from his only opportunity of making the gods' acquaintance. . . . I for one cannot see my way to accepting the agnostic rules for truth-seeking, or wilfully agree to keep my willing nature out of the game" (*The Will to Believe*, pp. 26-8, abridged).

We are now in a position to consider the only other plausible objection to Religion that Agnosticism can offer. Agnostics are fond of contrasting Religion with Science, very much to the disadvantage of the former. Science, they say, walks by knowledge, whereas Religion walks by faith. Science proves its principles by experience, or by logical reasoning from experience,

whereas Religion assumes its principles without proof.[1]

Now, to this statement so often made by Agnostics, and so often accepted by incautious apologists, we offer an unqualified denial. Science is as much built upon faith as Religion, and can dispense with it as little. Before Science can proceed to investigate a single question, she must make a number of pure acts of faith. She must make, for example,

(1) An act of faith in the trustworthiness of human reason—*i.e.* in its ability to lead the inquirer to true conclusions;

(2) An act of faith in the trustworthiness of human memory, for unless memory is trustworthy, it is impossible either to amass facts or to construct a chain of arguments;

(3) An act of faith in the trustworthiness of the senses, for unless the senses can be trusted, knowledge of the external world is impossible;

(4) An act of faith in a number of unprovable

[1] *E.g.* Prof. Huxley says: "Scientific men have a way of looking upon belief which is not based upon evidence, not only as illogical, but as immoral." . . . "If we set out in life with pretending to know that which we do not know, we are assuredly doing our best to deserve the character [of lying like the devil]" (*Science and Christian Tradition*, pp. 65 and 54). "Scepticism is the highest of duties; blind faith the one unpardonable sin" (*Method and Results*, p. 40). Prof. Clifford says: "It is wrong always, everywhere, and for every one to believe anything upon insufficient evidence. . . . The life of the man [who believes on insufficient evidence] is one long sin against mankind. . . . Our duty is to guard ourselves from such beliefs as from a pestilence which may shortly master our own body, and then spread to the rest of the town."

principles, generally summed up in the phrase "the uniformity of Nature."

All these propositions are assented to by acts of faith of the most absolute kind. They are not only not proved by science, but they never can be proved. Even so decided an Agnostic as Prof. Huxley says: "The ground of every one of our actions, and the validity of all our reasonings, rest upon *the great act of faith*[1] which leads us to take the experience of the past as a safe guide in our dealings with the present and the future. From the nature of ratiocination [reasoning], it is obvious that the axioms on which it is based cannot be proved by ratiocination." And again: "[The laws of Universal Causation and of the Uniformity of Nature] are neither self-evident, nor are they, strictly speaking, demonstrable. . . . If there is anything in this world which I do firmly believe in, it is the universal validity of the law of causation; but that universality cannot be proved by any amount of evidence, let alone that which comes to us through the senses" (*Evolution and Ethics*, p. 121).

The idea that faith in things incapable of proof is as necessary to Science as to Religion, although a commonplace of Philosophy, is so unfamiliar to the general reader, and even to the non-philosophical man of Science, that it is desirable to explain the matter at some length.

[1] The *italics* are ours.

All the Sciences, then, including Mathematics, are based upon certain first principles, called axioms or postulates, which, being incapable of proof, are taken for granted. Sometimes these principles are formally stated, more often they are tacitly assumed. It is, for example, a tacit assumption of Geometry that the properties which are proved to be true of the ideal figures existing in the mind of the geometer, or symbolically represented in diagrams or formulæ, are also true of actual external bodies existing in space; so that, for instance, whatever is proved true of an ideal geometrical sphere is also true of the sphere of Jupiter, or of Mars, or of the earth. But it will be more useful to devote attention to the ultimate postulate which underlies the whole of Physical Science, the Uniformity of Nature. This principle is not self-evident, for to the uninformed mind Nature appears far from uniform, and even intelligent minds can easily *conceive* of Nature as not uniform. Nor can it be proved by evidence, because the facts of Nature are infinite in number and variety, and only an infinitesimally small number of them can be examined and proved to be uniform. Moreover, even if Science could actually prove that Nature is uniform at this moment, this would not be proof that Nature will be uniform in future or has been uniform in the past. Even supposing that Nature has been experimentally proved by Science to have been strictly uniform for the last hundred years—a quite unwarrantable supposition—

this would not afford the slightest guarantee for the permanence of the routine. If Nature has been uniform for the last hundred years, then the mathematical probability[1] that it will be uniform next year is considerably less than certainty—viz. 101 to 2; the probability that it will be uniform for the next ten years is 101 to 10; the probability that it will be uniform for the next century is 101 to 100; while the probability that it will be uniform for the next *thousand* years is *adverse*—viz. 1,100 to 101 (practically 10 to 1) against it. As Prof. De Morgan, one of the highest authorities on the mathematical theory of probability, says, "No finite experience whatsoever can justify us in saying that the future shall coincide with the past in all time to come, or that there is any probability for such a conclusion."[2]

Only one serious attempt has been made to evade this reasoning. Mr. Herbert Spencer maintains that although the experience of living men, or even the combined experience of the human race during the historical period, is insufficient to prove the uniformity of Nature, yet if to this be added the experience of man's human and pre-human ancestors, extending over countless ages, such proof is possible.

[1] Adopting Laplace's formula for calculating the recurrence of events which have never been known to fail, viz. $\frac{m+1}{m+n+1}$, where m = the number of times the event has been observed to happen without fail, and n the number of unobserved cases for which the chances of recurrence are to be calculated.

[2] *Essay on Probabilities.*

Mr. Spencer supposes that every experience of the uniformity of Nature in the past has been stored up in the brain, and transmitted as a heritage to posterity; so that our present "innate" conviction of the uniformity of Nature is in reality the experience of our ancestors for millions of years that this has been always so. "The human brain," says Mr. Spencer, "is an organized register of infinitely numerous experiences received during the evolution of life, or rather, during the evolution of that series of organisms through which the human organism has been reached. The effect of the most uniform and frequent of these experiences has been successively bequeathed, principal and interest; and has slowly mounted to that high intelligence which lies latent in the mind of the infant, and which, with minute additions, it bequeaths to future generations" (*Principles of Psychology*, § 208).

In reply to this theory it is sufficient to say that if primitive man's impressions of the uniformity of Nature were stored up in his brain, so also were his impressions of its *want of uniformity*. To the unscientific mind Nature appears far from uniform; to the savage it appears inexpressibly capricious and wayward. If, therefore, our innate convictions about the general course of Nature arose in the way suggested by Mr. Spencer, we should have an innate belief not in the uniformity of Nature, but in its *capricious variability*. To common observation, Nature is partly variable and partly invariable, and its variability preponderates.

Mr. Spencer's theory is fully discussed in Prof. Wm. James's *Principles of Psychology*, who sums up as follows: "I must reaffirm my conviction that the so-called Experience-philosophy has failed to prove its point. No more, if we take ancestral experiences into account, than if we limit ourselves to those of the individual after birth, can we believe that the couplings of terms within the mind are simply copies of corresponding couplings impressed upon it by the environment. This indeed is true of a small part of our cognitions. But so far as logical, and mathematical, ethical, æsthetical, and metaphysical propositions go, it is not only untrue, but altogether unintelligible. . . . It is hard to understand how such shallow and vague accounts of them as Mill's and Spencer's could ever have been given by thinking men" (vol. ii. p. 688).

We state therefore, not as a hypothesis, but as fact, that the first principles of Science are as incapable of demonstration as those of Religion, and that consequently they must be accepted, if at all, upon Faith. But this means that the chief Agnostic and pseudo-scientific objection to Religion has disappeared. It is true that Theology cannot logically demonstrate its own first principles, but then every science is in the same predicament. The sciences can, however, *verify* their first principles. They do so by showing that the first principles which they assume explain the whole or the bulk of the facts, and that no other suggested first principles explain them as well. But such

verification is equally possible for Theology. Theologians can and do show that the actual facts of the world and of human nature are fully explained by the hypothesis of the existence of a Personal God; and that the facts are not so well explained —rather, are not explained at all—by any rival hypothesis. The method and procedure, therefore, of Natural Theology is entirely legitimate, and is as little open to rational objection as that of any other science.

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CHAPTER XI

CREATION IN TIME[1]

SUMMARY.—Eternal creation is conceivable, but strong philosophic and scientific, as well as theological, arguments render creation in time more probable.

I.—THE PHILOSOPHIC AND SCIENTIFIC ASPECT OF THE DOCTRINE OF CREATION

CREATION is popularly defined as the production of something out of nothing. More precisely it is a method of production which operates not by changing or modifying anything already existing, but by calling an entirely new substance into being. Creation is distinguished from Divine Generation and from pantheistic development by the circumstance that what is produced is distinct from and inferior in nature to the Creator, and depends not only for its first production but also for its continuance from moment to moment simply upon His will.[2]

[1] The possibility of creation is involved in the idea that God is the *First Cause*. Full proof of this has already been given. (See c. i.)

[2] The definition of St. Thomas Aquinas is as good as any: "Creation is the production of a thing according to its whole substance, no basis, either uncreated or created, being presupposed" (*Summa*, i. 65, 3).

Some theologians have held that the creation of the universe is an eternal act, and to this in the abstract no objection can be raised. There are, however, reasons, not only theological, but also philosophic and scientific, for thinking that a universe such as the present could not have existed from eternity.

(1) From the point of view of Philosophy there are serious difficulties in believing that an object liable to any kind of change or motion can be eternal. Eternity differs fundamentally from time. Both imply duration, but the duration of eternity is *changeless*, while the duration of time is *successive*. In time there is a before and after; but eternity is a changeless "now," with nothing corresponding to past or present, before or after. Clearly, then, only things absolutely changeless can be eternal, and the world, being subject to change, must be subject to time.[1]

It may be argued, however, that though the world is not eternal, it may have existed from *infinite*

[1] The philosophical distinction between time and eternity is admirably expressed by St. Augustine. "Eternal life," he says, "surpasses temporal life by its very vivacity; nor can I perceive what eternity is, except by the eye of my mind. For by that I exclude from eternity all change, and in eternity I perceive no portions of time, because these are made up of past and future movement. But in eternity nothing is past or future, because what is past has ceased to be, and what is future has not yet begun; whereas eternity only *is*,—not *was*, as though it were not still, not *will be*, as though it were not yet. Wherefore It alone can quite truly say of Itself, *I am who am*; and of It alone can it be said, *He who is sent me to you*' (*De Vera Rel.* c. xlix.).

time. Infinite time, however, is probably impossible. Time, unlike eternity, is capable of division. It is formed by the addition of moment to moment. In every actual space of time, however long, there is an actual number of moments. But an actual number is necessarily finite. It is formed by the addition, one by one, of finite units. The number of units which it contains is strictly definite. The addition of another unit would make it one more, the subtraction of a unit would make it one less. But that which is made more or less by the addition or subtraction of a finite number, must itself be finite. Every actual number, therefore, is finite; and since every actual period of time consists of an actual number of finite moments, its duration must be finite—in other words, it must have had a beginning and an end.[1]

(2) The evidence of physical science tends also, upon the whole, in the same direction. At first sight it might be supposed that modern science, in demonstrating the Conservation of Energy,[2] had demonstrated the eternity of matter and of the laws of the universe. According to the law of the Conservation of Energy, energy is absolutely indestructible. It may change its form, as when a certain amount of electricity is changed into a

[1] By a similar argument it may be shown that the quantity of matter in the universe is probably finite.

[2] This law was first fully formulated by the late Sir William Grove in his *Correlation of Physical Forces*, published in 1846. The term "Conservation of Energy" is preferable to Mr. Herbert Spencer's "Persistence of Force."

certain amount of light, or heat, or chemical action, but it cannot change its amount. The total quantity of actual and potential energy[1] in the universe remains, according to this theory, always the same, and therefore it would seem that the universe must always have been, upon the whole, such as it is now.

But not less important than the principle of the Conservation of Energy is that of the *Degradation of Energy*. According to this principle, the amount of energy available for the actual work of the universe continually diminishes. The tendency of the working forces of nature is to pass into heat, and much of this heat is diffused into space and absolutely lost, so far as capacity for doing work is concerned. The effective forces of nature, therefore, are being continually wasted, so that within a long but finite period they will have disappeared altogether. Then the laws of the universe, as we know them, will have ceased to operate, and matter will either have been annihilated, or reduced to a state indistinguishable by our senses from annihilation. The properties of matter—probably all, certainly most of them—depend upon the rapidity and amplitude of certain molecular motions, and when, owing to the dissipation of effective energy in diffused heat, this motion is reduced to a minimum, matter will

[1] *Energy* is best defined as matter (or ether) in actual or potential motion. *Potential energy* is variously defined as "energy of position," or "energy of stress." There is potential energy in a bent bow, in a compressed spring, in a stored accumulator, or in a stone supported by the hand.

become imperceptible to the senses—*i.e.* practically annihilated.

Upon this important point the leading scientific authorities are agreed. "Heat," say the authors of *The Unseen Universe*,[1] "is *par excellence* the communist of our universe, and it will no doubt ultimately bring the present system to an end. So far as we yet know, the final state of the present universe must be an aggregation (into one mass) of all the matter it contains—*i.e.* the potential energy gone—and a practically useless state of kinetic energy—*i.e.* uniform temperature throughout that mass" (pp. 126, 127). Prof. Mach says, "A tendency exists towards a diminution of the *mechanical* energy and towards an increase of the *thermal* energy of the world."[2] Prof. Balfour Stewart says, "The energy of the universe is in process of deterioration. Universally diffused heat forms what we may call the great waste-heap of the universe, and this is growing larger every year."[3] Lord Kelvin has also frequently expressed himself in the same sense.

From this it follows that the visible universe came into existence at a definite date in the past, which may perhaps, when physical science is more advanced, be even approximately fixed. It is clear that it cannot have existed from the infinite past, for in that case the whole of its mechanical energy

[1] Profs. B. Stewart and P. G. Tait.
[2] *Popular Scientific Lectures* (tr.), p. 175.
[3] *Conservation of Energy*, § 209.

would have been already dissipated.[1] It remains, then, that it had its origin in time—or, to speak more accurately, *at the beginning of time*, for time itself did not exist until the universe came into being. The world may thus be regarded as a lamp which has been lighted, and is gradually burning out. "Looked at in this light," says Prof. Balfour Stewart, "the universe is a system that had a beginning and must come to an end; for a process of degradation cannot be eternal. If we could view the universe as a candle not lit, then it is perhaps conceivable to regard it as having been always in existence; but if we regard it rather as a candle that has been lit, we become absolutely certain that it cannot have been burning from eternity, and that a time will come when it will cease to burn."

Certain attempts have from time to time been made to escape this unwelcome conclusion and to devise means by which the lost mechanical energy of the universe may be restored to it. It has been supposed, for example, that when the diffused heat reaches the limits of the ether, it is reflected back

[1] Unless, of course, the stock of mechanical energy is *infinite in amount*. But the amount of mechanical energy in any given part of the universe, say in the solar system, is certainly finite, and even if the universe is infinite in extent, this would not make the amount of energy in any given part of it other than finite. There are, too, the strongest philosophical reasons for believing that any actual and concrete universe, such as ours, must be finite in extent. Even *space* (i.e. *actual*, as distinguished from *ideal*, space) is probably finite. See above, sect. (1).

into the interior of the universe, where it forms intensely heated *foci*, and that when extinct suns pass through these *foci* they are instantly rekindled. Sir William Crookes has given his support to a modification of this theory.[1] But all such theories are, as their authors admit, pure conjectures based on no evidence. So far as the scientific evidence goes, the visible universe must have originated in time, and must end in time.

At this point the interest of Theology in creation ceases. Whether the world was created in anything like its present form; whether matter was created directly, or formed out of something simpler;[2] whether life was a new creation, or developed from the ordinary forces of matter; whether the species of plants and animals appeared suddenly and separately, or were evolved gradually out of simpler forms; whether man has a separate origin, or is descended from some animal ancestor, are purely scientific questions, and the answers to them have no appreciable bearing upon religion. Attempts to "reconcile" Geology with Genesis, or

[1] His views are expressed in his Address to the Chemical Section of the British Association in 1886, and in his Presidential Address to the Chemical Society in 1888.

[2] There is no direct evidence that matter is composed of simpler elements, for though, since the discovery of *radium*, it is clear that the atom can be split, the fragments appear still to be matter. Many physicists, however, assume that matter is built up out of ether, prothyle, mindstuff, pyknatoms, or other hypothetical entities. These supposed substances, though *non-matter* from the point of view of Physics, are *matter* from the point of view of Philosophy and Theology.

Genesis with Geology, once so common, are as unnecessary as they are probably futile. The Bible contains the record of a religious, not of a scientific, revelation, and ingenious endeavours to find the Darwinian Doctrine or the Nebular Hypothesis foreshadowed in the Mosaic Cosmogony tend generally to bad exegesis, and are in any case a doubtful service to Theology.[1]

II.—Objections and Difficulties

Objection I.—The process of Creation is inconceivable, and therefore impossible. Mr. Spencer says: "The commonly received or theistic hypothesis, creation by external agency, the assumption not only of theologians, but of most philosophers, turns out, when critically examined, to be literally unthinkable. It is not a question of probability, or credibility, but of conceivability. Experiment proves that the elements of this hypothesis cannot even be put together in consciousness" (*First Principles*, pp. 27-9, slightly adapted).

Reply.—We can imagine the disappearance of the present universe, and the appearance of a new one. We can also imagine a Being possessed of the power to make the present universe disappear, and a new one come in its place. We can conceive, therefore, both creation and annihilation. On this point both Mr. Mill and Prof. Huxley are against Mr. Spencer, and on the side of the

[1] On this point see further chap. v.

theologians. "What is intended," says Prof. Huxley, "by *made out of nothing*, appears to be *caused to come into existence*, with the implication that nothing of the same kind previously existed. This is perfectly conceivable, and therefore no one can deny that it may have happened. It appears to me that the scientific investigator is wholly incompetent to say anything at all about the first origin of the material universe" (*Science and Hebrew Tradition*, p. 186 ff.).

Objection II.—If the universe is good in itself, and it befits God to bring into existence what is good in itself, He must have created the universe from eternity.

Reply.—All that is good in itself exists eternally, in the most absolute and perfect way, within the Divine Nature. God has no occasion, therefore, to create, in order to realize and enjoy in perfection all that is good. If He does create, it is an absolutely free and spontaneous act, in no way necessary to His perfection and blessedness, and therefore not necessarily eternal. The *decree* to create, no doubt, is eternal: this follows from the Divine omniscience. But it does not, therefore, follow that the *effect* of the decree is eternal. The idea of an eternal decree to create in time involves no contradiction.

Objection III.—Creation implies change in God, and is therefore inconsistent with the Divine Perfection.

Reply.—Creation does not imply *essential* change in God. No power or perfection has appeared in created things which did not already exist in a

far more unqualified and perfect manner in God from eternity. The relation of God to created things may be compared to the relation of an absolute monarch to his ministers. The monarch gives his ministers certain of his powers to exercise, but this arrangement does not increase or diminish his regal authority. The authority delegated to his ministers is all his, and is exercised in dependence upon him, and he himself continues to possess the same regal power as absolutely as before. Similarly, when God creates, the powers manifested in created things are not added to or taken from God: they are only partial externalizations of an already existing, unchangeable, infinite Power and Perfection.

Objection IV.—Since God is perfect, the world which He has created ought to be the most perfect conceivable. But this is not the case.

Reply.—It belongs to no created thing to be absolutely perfect. However excellent a creature may be, it is always possible to imagine one more excellent. Hence there can be no such thing as a best possible creature or best possible world. A thing so perfect that nothing more perfect could be conceived, would not be a creature at all, but God.

Since, then, there can be no such thing as a best possible world, it rests with God Himself, in the exercise of His unlimited freedom, to decide what degree of His own infinite perfection He shall manifest in the actual universe. A universe created by a good God must, of course, be good, but it

cannot be decided *a priori* by philosophy how good it must be. Proof that the universe is good is given in c. xiv.

Objection V.—There is no proof that the universe was created immediately by God. It may have been created by some inferior being or demiurge.

Reply.—It is perhaps impossible to demonstrate strictly that the power of creation cannot be delegated to a creature; but the production of substances from nothing is a work of such prodigious causal efficiency, and is so clearly the *primary act* upon which all things else depend, that it seems natural to restrict it to the Deity Himself. The hypothesis of creation by a demiurge is unnecessary, introduces serious complications into Theology, and, though it has been regarded with a certain amount of favour by a few modern writers,[1] may be safely consigned to the limbo of forgotten beliefs.

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[1] See, for instance, Prof. James's *Varieties of Religious Experiences*, p. 525.

CHAPTER XII[1]

THE HUMAN SOUL

SUMMARY.—Consciousness testifies that the soul is a really existing spiritual substance, distinct from the body and from its own thoughts; further, that it is indivisible, and persists in unchanging self-identity through life. It follows from this that the soul is neither developed from matter nor formed from the souls of parents, but created. Hume's objections to the substantiality and unity of the soul are considered, together with certain difficulties arising from the phenomena of alternating personality, hypnotism, and automatic writing.

I.—PROOF THAT THE SOUL IS A SUBSTANCE

THE object of this chapter is to consider the arguments of those modern speculators who deny the existence of the soul as a distinct substance.

The great majority of philosophers have always held that the soul is a really existing entity or substance, uncompounded, indivisible, self-identical through life, and distinct both from the body and from its own changing thoughts and feelings. This was the view of Plato and Aristotle, of all early and mediæval Christian thinkers, of Descartes, Leibnitz, Hobbes, Reid, Berkeley, and Hamilton, and even of such philosophical sceptics as Locke

[1] This chapter (except the first two sections) may be omitted at a first reading.

and Kant, and the Deists of the eighteenth century. Even Thomas Paine himself believed in a substantial soul.

The reasons for this belief lie upon the surface, and may be briefly summarized thus.

(1) We know that the soul really exists by direct experience. Whenever a man thinks, or is in any way conscious, he is always more or less conscious of his Self, Ego, or Soul, and of its distinction from other things. Thus a man distinguishes between (*a*) himself and other persons, (*b*) between himself and the material world, (*c*) between himself and his body, and (*d*) between himself and his own thoughts, sensations, emotions, and feelings.

If, therefore, the testimony of consciousness is to be trusted—and it must be trusted, otherwise all knowledge becomes impossible—the Self (*i.e.* the soul, or ego) is a real thing, distinct from matter, and from its own variable thoughts and feelings.

(2) The soul is not only a "thing" or phenomenon in general, but is that particular kind of a thing known as a *substance.* A substance in philosophy is a thing that exists *per se* or of itself, and is thus distinguished from an attribute or a thought, which exists in dependence upon some substance. Thus solidity, heaviness, motion, etc., which are attributes, cannot exist apart by themselves, but only as attributes of some actually existing material substance,[1]

[1] We do not here raise the question discussed in ch. v., whether material substance is not ultimately a thought in God's mind.

which is solid, heavy, moves, etc. Similarly, thoughts, emotions, or feelings, such as love, hatred, knowledge, etc., must belong to some soul or mind. There cannot be love without a mind that loves, or hatred without a mind that hates, or knowledge without a mind that knows. The mind or soul, therefore, is a substance existing *per se*; but its thoughts and feelings exist not *per se*, but in and for the mind to which they belong.

(3) Memory testifies that I am the same person that I was yesterday, or a year ago, or thirty years ago. This means that the soul is persistent, and remains always the same identical substance through life.

(4) The nature of thought proves the existence of the soul. Thinking consists very largely in comparing ideas together, and observing their similarities and differences. Now, that which compares ideas together, and discovers new ideas and new facts from the comparison, must be something distinct from the ideas compared.

(5) The unity, simplicity, and indivisibility of the soul are indicated by the unity of consciousness. We feel ourselves to be one person and no more. This unity of the *Ego*, or soul, is so absolute, that its division into parts is not even conceivable. The thoughts, perceptions, and emotions of the Ego are many and variable; but the Ego itself which experiences them, remains ever a single, simple, indivisible, self-identical unit.

(6) The spirituality of the soul is a necessary inference from the spirituality of its effects, which

are the facts of consciousness. All the thoughts and feelings of the soul are immaterial. They neither exist in space, nor possess any of the properties of matter. To affirm that a *pain*, for example, is square, or pink, or five feet long, or that a *thought* weighs a hundredweight, or describes an elliptical orbit, is not only not true, but nonsense. Now, that which produces immaterial effects cannot be material: if it could, an effect would transcend its cause, which is absurd. It follows, then, that the soul is an immaterial or spiritual substance, not bound by the laws and limitations of matter, but transcending them in various ways.[1]

(7) The existence of the soul may also be proved by dynamical considerations. It is a matter of common observation that the human mind produces physical changes in the world which would not take place without it. Thus, except under the guidance of mind, matter would never spontaneously form itself into clothes, or houses, or reaping machines, or telescopes, or printing presses. Mind, therefore, produces actual dynamical effects which, apart from mind, would be impossible. Now, that which produces real effects, must itself be real. It is idle to say that these effects are produced by the mere material particles of the brain. What produces them is not the brain, but the immaterial intelligence

[1] The spirituality of the soul may also be proved from the existence of *general ideas*. These cannot be derived from the material world, because all material objects are strictly *individual*. They must therefore be derived from some spiritual principle transcending matter altogether.

of which the brain is the organ. Mind as mind is the causal agent here, and therefore mind as mind is a substance.

II.—Theological Inferences

(1) The human soul, being a *spiritual* substance, cannot have been originally developed from matter, nor is it now derived from the bodies of parents.

(2) Being an *indivisible* substance, it cannot give rise to new souls by subdivision. The souls of offspring, therefore, are not derived from the souls of parents.

(3) It follows that all ordinary forms of *Traducianism* (the doctrine which derives the soul from the souls or bodies of parents) are unsatisfactory, and must be rejected. Traducianism rightly lays stress on the fact of heredity, but it fails to take account of other important elements in the problem.

(4) *Creationism*, therefore (the doctrine that each soul is a new creation infused by God into the embryo at conception),[1] is the most satisfactory theory; but to account for heredity, it must be further supposed that there is a *real influence* of the souls of the parents, and in them of the souls of ancestors, upon the soul of the child.

III.—Objections

To this account of the nature of the soul philo-

[1] Some Creationists hold that the rational soul is not created and infused, until the embryo assumes a distinctively human form. Lotze affirms the *gradual* creation of the soul.

sophers of the Empirical School of Hume offer the following objections.

Objection I.—The existence of the soul is not a direct deliverance of consciousness, but an *inference* All that we are directly conscious of is our feelings and thoughts from moment to moment. Apart from these we have no knowledge of any self or soul at all.

Reply.—When a feeling comes into our minds, we are conscious not only of the feeling, but of ourselves as feeling it. When a thought comes into our minds, we are conscious not only of the thought, but of ourselves as thinking it. Without any process of argument at all, we are directly conscious that we ourselves—*i.e.* our souls, or *Egos*—are distinct from the feelings and thoughts that we have now, and have ever had. We not only know things, but know that we know them, and that we who know them are distinct from the things themselves. The thinker is always distinguished from his thought, the feeler from his feeling, and the willer from the thing willed.

Objection II.—To assume an indivisible substantial soul is unnecessary. The so-called soul can be readily and successfully analysed into a mere succession of ideas, thoughts, or mental states, following one another in certain regular ways, it is true, but without any substantial link between them. "The soul," says Hume, "is nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable

rapidity, and are in a perpetual flux and movement. Our eyes cannot turn in their sockets without varying our perceptions. Our thought is still more variable than our sight; and all our other senses and faculties contribute to this change; nor is there any single power of the soul which remains unalterably the same, perhaps for one moment. The mind is a kind of theatre, where several perceptions successively make their appearance, pass, repass, glide away, and mingle in an infinite variety of postures and situations. There is properly no simplicity in it at one time, nor identity in different, whatever natural propension we may have to imagine that simplicity and identity. The comparison of the theatre must not mislead us. They are the successive perceptions only that constitute the mind; nor have we the most distant notion of the place where these scenes are represented, nor of the material of which it is composed" (*Treatise of Human Nature*, pt. iv. par. 6).

Reply.—(1) It is impossible to realize in thought what is meant by sensations or ideas existing by themselves independent of the mind which is conscious of them. All thoughts imply a thinker, and feelings a feeler.

(2) A series of mere sensations would not know themselves to be a series. A sensation is just what it is and no more. It cannot, while remaining a mere sensation, get beyond itself and know other things. The sensations of sweetness and toothache, for instance, are just sweetness and toothache, and

do not contain within themselves a knowledge either of one another, or of other things. Sweetness does not know what toothache is, nor toothache what sweetness is. If, then, a sensation of sweetness be followed by a sensation of toothache, neither the toothache nor the sweetness can know that this is the case. But somehow or other, when this sequence takes place, it *is* known; and since the sensations cannot know it, it must be known by something else, viz. by the *soul*, which thus is proved to exist as an independent reality. As Prof. Knight well says, "A succession of states of mind *has no meaning* except in relation to the substrate of self that underlies the succession, giving it coherence, identity, and intelligibility" (*Hume*, p. 177).

This argument was used against Hume in his lifetime, and neither he nor any of his numerous followers [1] have been able to answer it. Hume, in fact, admitted the inadequacy of his theory, and stated in an appendix to the First Book of his

[1] Among Hume's more prominent followers are James Mill, J. S. Mill, Bain, Ribot, Taine, Binet, and Sully. They have all built upon him, without doing anything to strengthen his weak metaphysical foundations. Clifford's *mind-stuff* theory represents a recent extreme development of Humism. Physiological psychologists, being, as a rule, not philosophers, generally show a tendency towards Hume's superficial views, and cognate theories of Psychical Atomism. Representative of this tendency is *Ziehen*, who in his recent *Physiological Psychology* accepts Hume's doctrine as axiomatic. Münsterberg assumes the same theory, with only a very thin disguise, disclaiming "all kinds of compromise with Philosophy and Ethics" (*Psychology and Life*, p. 4).

Treatise that the actual continuity of consciousness was, on his theory, "a difficulty too hard for my understanding." John Stuart Mill, a faithful disciple of Hume, made even more serious admissions. "The theory [of Hume]," he says, "has intrinsic difficulties which we have not set forth, and which it appears to me beyond the power of metaphysical analysis to remove. . . .

"The thread of consciousness which composes the mind's phenomenal life consists not only of present sensations, but likewise, in part, of memories and expectations. Now what are these? In themselves they are present feelings, states of present consciousness, and in that respect not distinguished from sensations. They all, moreover, resemble some given sensations or feelings, of which we have previously had experience. But they are attended with this peculiarity, that each of them involves a belief in more than its own present existence. A sensation involves only this; but a remembrance of a sensation, even if not referred to any particular date, involves the suggestion and belief that a sensation, of which it is a copy or representation, actually existed in the past; and an expectation involves the belief, more or less positive, that a sensation or other feeling to which it directly refers will exist in the future. Nor can the phenomena involved in these two states of consciousness be adequately expressed without saying that the belief they include is, that I myself formerly had, or that I myself, and no other, shall

hereafter have, the sensations remembered or expected. The fact believed is that the sensations did actually form, or will hereafter form, part of the self-same series of states, or thread of consciousness, of which the remembrance or expectation of those sensations is the part now present. If, therefore, we speak of the mind as a series of feelings, we are obliged to complete the statement by calling it a series of feelings which is aware of itself as past and future; and *we are reduced to the alternative of believing that the mind, or Ego, is something different from any series of feelings or possibilities of them, or of accepting the paradox that something which, ex hypothesi, is but a series of feelings, can be aware of itself as a series*" (*Hamilton*, pp. 247, 248).

It is unnecessary to criticise further a theory which, by the admission of its most capable supporters, is bankrupt, and incapable of explaining such fundamental psychical facts as memory, anticipation, and the sense of personal identity.

Objection III.—It is possible to regard the soul as a series of successive mental states, each of which, as it occurs, has the power of knowing the states that went before, and of thus giving rise to memory and the sense of personal identity.

This is the theory of Prof. William James, who states it as follows: "The consciousness of self involves a stream of thought, each part of which as 'I' can (1) remember those that went before, and know the things they knew; and (2) emphasize and care paramountly for certain ones among them

as *me*, and *appropriate to these* the rest. The *I* which knows is a *thought*, at each moment different from that of the last moment, but appropriative of the latter, together with all that the latter called its own. All the experiential facts find their place in this description, unencumbered with any hypothesis save that of the existence of passing thoughts or states of mind. Thought itself is the thinker, and Psychology need not look beyond" (*Principles of Psychology*, vol. i. p. 401, abridged).

Reply.—This theory is more satisfactory than Hume's, because it recognizes the need of some real connection between successive mental states, and attempts to provide one. It is unsatisfactory, however, for several reasons.

(1) Prof. James says: "Thought is itself the thinker." But this is contrary to experience. Consciousness testifies that it is not thought that thinks, but the thinker. Whenever thought takes place, there is always a felt distinction between (i.) that which thinks (viz. the mind, ego, or soul), and (ii.) that which is thought. The thinker and his thought are two realities, not one, and any attempt to reduce them to one is bad psychology. As Prof. Ward correctly says, "However much assailed or disowned, the conception of a mind or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatever,—not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who accepts it as a fiction. This being so, we are far more likely to reach the truth eventually if we openly acknow-

ledge this unexpugnable assumption, if such it prove, instead of resorting to all sorts of devious periphrases to hide it. . . . Common sense is right in positing, wherever experience is inferred, (i.) a factor answering to what we know as self, and (ii.) another factor answering to what each of us knows" (*Encycl. Brit.*, "Psychology," vols. xx., xxxii.).

(2) Prof. James's theory postulates a changing self. "The *I* which knows," he says, "is different from that of the last moment." But this again contradicts experience. Experience assures us that the *I* which knew something a moment ago, or last week, or last year, is identically the same *I* which knows something now. If Prof. James's theory were correct, we ought to remember that we were *somebody else* a moment ago, and still other persons last week, and last year.

(3) Prof. James's theory accounts for memory by supposing that each momentary mental state, or "section of the stream of thought," knows the previous one, and the previous one the one before, and so on, each mental state handing down to the next a knowledge not only of itself, but of all the previous states.

This hypothesis, ingenious as it is, must be pronounced contrary to experience, and inherently impossible. We are not always remembering the past. Often, when engaged upon some absorbing work, we do not think of the past for hours. Now, a state of consciousness cannot contain more than

it does contain, and since present consciousness often contains no consciousness of past things at all, and never a consciousness of *all* past things, it is impossible that it can transmit a memory of things in the way supposed.

Again, the stream of consciousness is not unbroken, as Prof. James's theory requires, but interrupted often for hours at a time by periods of unconsciousness—as, for instance, when a person is sound asleep or chloroformed. Now, to pass over the strange and, as most will think, absurd result of Prof. James's theory, that a man's soul is annihilated every time he goes to sleep, it may be pertinently asked, How, when a man wakes from a night's rest, does his first waking thought become aware of his last thought the night before? Of course, if the man has a soul, which continues to exist while he is asleep, there is no difficulty; but if he has none, there is a chasm of eight hours between one thought and the next, and nothing to bridge it.[1] We affirm, therefore, that Prof. James's ingenious and elaborate theory fits the facts no better than Hume's and Mill's, and hence we are not surprised to find that he is not very enthusiastic about it himself, and at times expresses a decided hankering after the old-fashioned substantial soul of metaphysics and theology. "[I feel] strongly," he says, "the logical respectability of the arguments for that well-known spiritual agent in which

[1] It cannot be bridged by the continuity of the brain, because memory is a *psychical* and not a merely cerebral function.

scholastic psychology and common-sense have always believed. The fact is that one cannot afford to despise any of these great traditional objects of belief. Whether we realize it or not, there is always a great drift of reasons, positive and negative, towing us in their direction. I confess, therefore, that to posit a soul influenced in some mysterious way by the brain-states, and responding to them by conscious affections of its own, seems to me the line of least logical resistance, so far as we have yet attained" (*Psychology*, vol. i. p. 181, abridged).

Objection IV.—A "substance" is a metaphysical fiction—an unknown and unknowable *substratum*, supposed, without evidence, to underlie the appearances of things, and to cause them to be what they are. It cannot be proved that there is such a thing as a substance, and therefore it cannot be proved that the soul is a substance.

Reply.—The definition of substance given above is the sceptical one of Kant, and of certain mediæval writers, and is not the true one. A substance, according to its true definition, is not something unknowable, but simply a thing that exists *of itself*, as distinguished from an attribute or a thought, which can only exist as an inherent in something else. By the "substance" of the mind or soul is simply meant the Self, or Ego, as distinguished from its thoughts and feelings. The substantial self is not unknowable, but known:—better known, in fact, than any other thing.

Objection V.—It is not possible to define what is meant by the soul, or to form a distinct idea of it.

Reply.—Definition, strictly speaking, is an enumeration of the parts of which a thing consists, and when a thing, such as the soul, does not consist of parts, it cannot be strictly defined. The soul can, however, be defined *according to its activities*, as that which feels, thinks, wills, etc. As to forming a distinct idea of the soul, if by that is meant a sensuous mental picture, it is of course impossible, the soul being spiritual. But there is such a thing as a spiritual apprehension of a purely spiritual object.

Objection VI.—There is no evidence of the continuity of the soul during sleep and unconsciousness.

Reply.—There is no evidence of the continuity even of material objects when no one is looking at them, but it may be justly inferred. Similarly, the continued existence of the soul during sleep may be justly inferred from the persistence of memory, and from the sense of continued identity. If the soul does not persist during sleep, two daily miracles must be assumed—one of annihilation at night, and another of re-creation in the morning.

Objection VII.—The facts of alternating personality prove that the soul is not simple, but divisible. Cases are known in which a person falls into a trance, and upon waking has no memory of his former state, but appears a new person, not only from lapse of memory, but from a distinct alteration of disposition. Generally speaking, after a few

weeks or months another trance occurs, and when the subject awakes, he resumes his original personality, recovering full memory of his earlier life, but forgetting all about his secondary state. In some cases these alternations of personality continue through the whole of life.

Reply.—The evidence of such morbid cases is of small weight compared with that of normal ones; but such as it is, it rather favours the theory of a substantial soul. For:

(1) In all these cases each of the alternating states of consciousness shows all the characteristics of true personality. There is (within the limits of the state) the sense of personal identity, also memory and expectation. The Ego distinguishes itself from its body and from its thoughts; there is the exercise of will and imagination: in fact, the hypothesis of a substantial soul is as much required to account for the phenomena of these abnormal states as for those of normal ones. The thoughts in these abnormal states are not disconnected, as, on Hume's hypothesis, they ought to be, but are linked together by memory, and by the consciousness that they are all experiences of one and the same person.

(2) These phases of personality are not simultaneous, but *successive*, and therefore afford no evidence that the Ego can be split in two. Rather is their successiveness evidence that the Ego persists, and that the periodical discontinuity is due, mainly at least, to some obstruction of the memory.

(3) The discontinuity between the states is seldom, perhaps never, absolute. In the well-known case of Felida X., first described by Dr. Azam, of Bordeaux, two different states, which we will call A and B, alternated through life. Felida A knew nothing whatever about Felida B; but Felida B knew everything about Felida A, and this is clear proof of continuity. Mary Reynolds, of Pennsylvania, had two alternating states, *neither* of which had the least knowledge of the other. Yet even here there was a certain amount of continuity. The first time her second state occurred, she remembered a few words which she had learnt in her first state, and later in life, when she had permanently settled into her second state, "she said she did sometimes seem to have a dim, dreamy idea of a shadowy past, which she could not fully grasp." It is also said that towards the end of her life her character became more harmonious, and embraced the characteristics of both states combined. Thus even this case, which is perhaps the strongest that can be urged for the theory that personality is divisible, really affords evidence to the contrary.

(4) Even if there were undeniable proof that distinct personalities do occasionally exist in the same organism, this would not be proof that the soul is divisible. It would only prove that, just as there are physical monsters born with two heads or two bodies, so there are *psychical* monsters born with two or more souls.

(5) The differences of character which distinguish the alternating personalities are not absolute. As a rule, one state is comparatively normal, and the other a weakened and perverted form of it. The difference is like that between the healthy state of a person who is naturally cheerful, amiable, and industrious, and a morbid state of the same person rendered melancholy, savage, and lethargic, by a liver attack. There is nothing, then, in the phenomena of alternating personality which is inconsistent with the unity and substantiality of the soul, or which cannot be reasonably explained as due to imperfect functioning of the brain.

Objection VIII.—The phenomena of automatic writing, unconscious cerebration, and hypnotism, prove that many trains of thought go on in the mind, of which the Ego is unconscious. These can only be split-off portions of the thinking Ego, which is thus proved to be divisible.

Reply.—These phenomena can be explained in several ways without resorting to the violent expedient of dividing the substance of the Ego. For example,

(1) There may be subordinate centres of consciousness, closely associated with, but not strictly identical with, the central Ego, and capable of performing a certain limited amount of independent thinking. If this is so, the structure of the mind is analogous to the structure of the nervous system, in which the lower nervous centres are capable of functioning independently to a certain extent,

but are nevertheless controlled in the main by the unifying brain.[1] Such a theory would be in substantial harmony with the traditional view that the human soul is formed by the superposition of a unifying rational soul upon the lower psychical activities which man shares with plants and animals.

(2) It is possible that the Ego, without division of substance, is able to carry on several subordinate trains of thought concurrently with the main one, but that its consciousness of them is generally so faint, that they cannot be described or remembered.

Either of these explanations is better than the theory of a composite Ego, which contradicts the plain testimony of consciousness.

LITERATURE

(*a*) Maintaining the Substantiality of the Soul.

Plato, *Phædo*; Locke, *Human Understanding*, bk. ii. c. 23; Berkeley, *Three Dialogues*; Descartes, *Meditations*; Leibnitz, *Monadology*; Kant, *Critique of the Practical Reason*; Lotze, *Metaphysics*, bk. iii. c. 1, and *Microcosmus*; Maher, *Psychology*; Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*; Renouvier, *La Nouvelle Monadologie*; A. Fouillée, *La Psychologie des Idées-forces*,[2] 1893; J. S.

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[1] "We conclude," says Mr. Syme, "that each psychical centre has a consciousness of its own, and that this consciousness is related to the supreme consciousness (the Ego) as the subordinate nerve centres are related to the supreme nerve centres (the cerebral hemispheres)" (*The Soul*, p. 73).

Ward, article "Psychology" in *Encycl. Brit.*, 1911; H. Bergson, *Matter and Memory* (tr.), 1911, and *Time and Free Will* (tr.), 1910; Ladd, *Philosophy of Mind*; R. Eucken, *The Life of the Spirit*, etc.; Mercier, *Psychologie*, 1904; Gutberlet, *Psychologie*; Driscoll, *The Soul*, 1898; Shield's *Ultimate Philosophy*, 1905; Pesch, *Welträtsel*, 1907; also the Pluralist School in general. (See Introductory Chapter, pp. xxii. xxiii.)

Although such writers as W. James (see his *Principles of Psychology*, 1890), and W. Wundt (see his *Physiologische Psychologie*,[6] 1908, and other works) are strictly to be classed as "mediating," their position is far nearer that of the defenders than of the deniers of the soul's substantiality. They stand for the essential unity and spirituality of the soul, as against all theories of materialism, or psychical atomism.

(*b*) Denying the Substantiality of the Soul

D. Hume, *Treatise*, etc.; J. Mill, *Analysis*; J. S. Mill, *Hamilton*; Bain, *Emotions and Will*, etc.; Sully, *Psychology*, etc.; Binet, *Double Consciousness*; Ribot, *Diseases of Personality*; Ziehen, *Physiological Psychology*; H. Spencer, *Principles of Psychology*.

For some account of recent Psychology, see Introductory Chapter, pp. xv. xvi.

CHAPTER XIII[1]

FREE-WILL AND DETERMINISM[2]

SUMMARY.—The actual moral faculties which man possesses can only be rationally accounted for on the hypothesis that he possesses free-will. Moreover, direct consciousness testifies to freedom, and this testimony cannot be set aside. The opposing theories of Automatism and Materialistic Monism are refuted, and certain scientific, philosophical, and theological objections to the free-will doctrine are considered.

IF the truth of a belief is to be measured by its persistency in face of opposition, no belief has a better claim to be regarded as true than that of the Freedom of the Will. After two thousand years of criticism it still remains the belief of the bulk of mankind, and if there is a disposition among a certain class of students of natural science to discard it on account of its alleged discrepancy with certain mechanical views of the universe, contemporary

[1] This chapter, with the exception of section i., may be omitted at a first reading.

[2] Modern deniers of Free-will object to be called Necessarians or Fatalists, and prefer the title *Determinists*. They agree, however, with Necessarians and Fatalists in denying the existence of real options. They affirm, of every action that takes place, that it is the only action that is possible, and that we delude ourselves by imagining that any other action could have occurred in its place. Libertarians, on the other hand, maintain that options are real.

philosophers have made ample amends by a series of brilliant vindications of the reality of moral freedom. To mention only a few, in France and Belgium, MM. Fonsegrive, Renouvier, Couailhac, Noël, Boutroux, and Piat; in Germany, Dr. Lotze and Dr. Gutberlet; in England, Profs. W. R. B. Gibson, Poynting, and J. Ward, Mr. F. C. S. Schiller, and Dr. Martineau; in America, Prof. Ladd, Prof. Wm. James, and Mr. Hazard, have declared themselves on the Libertarian side; and a large number of others, who do not go the whole way with these, follow Prof. W. Wundt in repudiating the materialistic Determinism which has characterised so much recent Psychology.[1]

I.—The Case for Moral Freedom

(1) *The argument from the primary ethical emotions.*

Moral feelings, such as self-approbation, shame, repentance, and remorse, also moral judgments, such as the distinction between justice and injustice, are natural: they arise instinctively in quite young children and uneducated persons, and are unconnected with any particular philosophical or theological views. They are so ingrained in human nature that even *Fatalists*, who regard them as absurd, cannot help entertaining them to some extent.

Now, all these instinctive feelings and judgments presuppose the reality of moral freedom. Take,

[1] *E.G.* Dr. Stout and Mr. Bradley advocate *psychical* as distinguished from materialistic Determinism.

for example, the feeling of *remorse.* When a man has done a dastardly deed—basely injured a benefactor, for instance, or betrayed a friend—he experiences, on reflection, acute remorse. *This remorse is unquestionably based on the belief that he could have acted otherwise than he did.* If he believed that no other act was possible than the one he did, he would not blame himself for it, and would not feel remorse. Common sense always draws a strong distinction between actions which are avoidable and those which are unavoidable. A man may kill his own father ; but if the act be pure misadventure, he feels no remorse. A man may fail in business, and bring his wife and children to destitution ; but if the failure be due not to his own fault, but to unavoidable circumstances, he does not blame himself, but simply bewails his bad fortune. All moral judgments about an action turn upon the question whether it was, or was not, the only action possible to the agent. If it was the only action possible, the agent is neither praised nor blamed. Thus no one is grateful to another for doing him a benefit, if he knows that the other could not help doing it. No one admires the useful diligence of convicts in making roads and harbours, because he well knows that they are compelled to make them. Similarly, no one blames a maniac for massacring a whole family of helpless children, because it is well known that his act was necessitated by the nature of his mental disease. As Prof. Sidgwick, himself a Determinist, admits, "The

conception of freedom is, so to say, the hidden pivot upon which our moral sentiments naturally play" (*Methods of Ethics*, bk. i. c. 5).

Moral Freedom, then, is postulated by, and forms a rational justification of, the ordinary unsophisticated moral sentiments of mankind. Determinism, on the other hand, is in flagrant contradiction to every one of them. Determinism teaches that no action is ever possible except the one that actually takes place. The desperado cuts a throat, and the hero sacrifices his life, by a law as inevitable as that by which an unsupported stone falls to the ground. Such a doctrine, if really accepted, renders every moral judgment irrational. Thus it is irrational to be grateful for a kindness, because, on this theory, the doer could not help doing it; it is irrational to be angry with a man who beats in his wife's head with a poker, because the unfortunate man had no alternative; it is irrational to attribute merit to a child who has resisted a temptation, because he could not help resisting it; and it is irrational to praise a saint, because he can no more help being a saint than a thief can help picking pockets. As Prof. Sidgwick says, "On the Determinist theory, 'ought,' 'responsibility,' 'desert,' and similar terms, have to be used, if at all, in new significations." Or as Mr. Cotter Morison graphically expresses it:— "Nothing is more certain than that no one makes his own character. That is done for him by his parents and ancestors. The hero was born with

his noble and fearless heart; the saint came into the world with his spontaneous aptitude for good works and lofty feeling; and the moral monster, the cowardly, selfish, unscrupulous criminal, was born with his evil passions inherited from progenitors near or remote. No merit or demerit attaches to the saint or the sinner in the metaphysical and mysterious sense of the word. Their good or evil qualities were none of their making. A man inherits his brain as much as he inherits his estate. . . . It will perhaps be said that this view does away with moral responsibility, and that those who hold it cannot consistently blame any crime or resent any injury; that we should not on this hypothesis reproach a garotter who half murders us—he is a machine, not a man with free-will. It is no more rational to blame him, than it would be to blame a runaway engine which knocks you down, and mangles or kills you. To which the answer is, that *the sooner the idea of moral responsibility is got rid of, the better it will be for society and moral education. What do we gain by this fine language as to moral responsibility?*"[1]

Determinism, then, by the confession of its advocates, can only hope to establish itself by completely abolishing the present moral instincts of mankind. But this is tantamount to a confession of defeat, for the majority of men will always prefer a theory which is in harmony with and explains the facts, to one which, finding the facts against it,

[1] *Service of Man*, c. ix. The *italics* are ours.

says, *So much the worse for the facts.* The moral sentiments are instinctive, and therefore only to a very limited extent alterable by education or philosophic training. The prospect, therefore, that the moral sentiments of the human race will, within any calculable time, be brought into approximation to the Determinist scheme, is extremely remote. *Naturam expellas furca, tamen usque recurret.*

(2) *The argument from the sense of obligation.*

Kant argued: "I ought, therefore I can"; in other words, I must be able to do what it is my duty to do, otherwise the universe is irrational.

(3) *The argument from consciousness.*

Whenever we perform a deliberate act, we are conscious before, and after, and during the action, that we are able to act otherwise. If, for example, we are about to choose a profession for a son, we are convinced, before we begin deliberating at all, that we have a real power of choice between alternative professions. All the time we are deliberating—a process that may last for months—we remain under the same conviction. We never think that the result is a foregone conclusion, but rather that there is a *real option* between (say) the Army, the Navy, and the Church. If any one were to suggest that the option is only apparent, and that in reality only one choice is possible, we should regard him as talking nonsense. Again, in the act of choosing, we are fully conscious that the choice is free, and that we could choose otherwise; and finally when we look back on our

conduct, we are convinced that we have exercised a real choice between real alternatives, all of which remained possible down to the very moment of decision. The same irresistible conviction of real freedom accompanies all deliberate actions. In actions in which right and wrong are directly involved, the consciousness of freedom and responsibility is particularly strong, both before and afterwards. When a man has deliberately done a mean or dishonourable action, he never thinks of excusing himself on the plea that he could not help it, but takes the full blame for it as an action which he deliberately and freely did, and which he ought not and need not have done. Professor James does not exaggerate our inward conviction of freedom when he says, "The whole feeling of reality, the whole sting and excitement of our voluntary life, depends on our sense that in it things are *really being decided* from one moment to another, and that it is not the dull rattling off of a chain that was forged innumerable ages ago."[1]

(4) *The argument from utility.*

Belief in free-will encourages men to greater exertions to attain virtue and happiness, than the opposite doctrine. It makes for optimism and progress, while determinism makes for pessimism. This is often admitted even by determinists. For example, Mr. Mill says: "The free-will doctrine, by keeping in view precisely that portion of the truth which the word 'necessity'

[1] *Psychology*, vol. i. p. 453.

puts out of sight, namely the power of the mind to co-operate in the formation of its own character,[1] has given to its adherents a practical feeling much nearer to the truth than has generally, I believe, existed in the minds of Necessarians. The free-will doctrine has, I believe, fostered, especially in the younger of its supporters, a much stronger spirit of self-culture. Necessarians do really in some instances (I speak from personal experience) suffer those depressing consequences, which their opponents erroneously impute to the doctrine of Necessity itself" (*Logic*, bk. vi. c. 2).

II.—Objections and Difficulties

Objection I.—The sciences of Physiological Pyschology and Brain-physics have demonstrated that all the activities of the mind, and consequently of the will, are strictly determined by the mechanical vibrations of the molecules of the brain.

This is the well-known Automaton theory of Tyndall, Huxley, and Clifford.[2] Huxley states it as

[1] Mill is here decidedly illogical. If Determinism is true, the mind has no power to form its own character. See the more consistent statement of the case by Mr. Morison above.

[2] The only *philosopher*, as distinguished from scientist, who has espoused Automatism, is Dr. Shadworth Hodgson. Both in his *Theory of Practice* and in his *Metaphysic of Experience* he denies that thoughts or feelings, however intense, can have the least influence upon action. Mind is to him a mere *epiphenomenon* of matter. "Consciousness," he says, "is initiated by, and depends on, nerve-motion, and not *vice versa*." He even says, "There is no real action and reaction of states of consciousness upon *each other*."

follows: "Consciousness would appear to be related to the mechanism of the body simply as a collateral product of its working, and to be as completely without any power of modifying that working as the steam-whistle which accompanies the work of a locomotive engine is without influence on its machinery. Volition is an emotion *indicative* of physical changes, not a *cause* of such changes. The soul stands related to the body as the bell of a clock to the works. Our mental conditions are simply the symbols in consciousness of the changes which take place automatically in the organism. The feeling we call volition is not the cause of a voluntary act, but the symbol of that state of the brain which is the immediate cause of that act. We are conscious automata."

Clifford says: "We are to regard the body as a physical machine which goes by itself according to a physical law. We go by ourselves when we have had food. If anybody says that the will influences matter, the statement is not untrue, it is nonsense."[1] Tyndall says: "The logic seems of iron strength which claims for the brain an automatic action uninfluenced by states of consciousness."[2]

Reply.—(1) It is not true that Physiological Psychology or Brain-physics has discovered facts inconsistent with free-will, much less proved the theory of

[1] *Lectures*, vol. ii. p. 33.

[2] *Apology for the Belfast Address.* Tyndall, however, was not so confident in his Automatism as Huxley and Clifford.

Automatism. Prof. Ladd says: "Nothing of scientific value which Physiological Psychology has to offer, throws any clear light on the problem of the 'freedom of the will.' Physiology neither disproves nor verifies the postulate of free-will; accordingly this postulate must be raised and discussed on other grounds" (*Physiological Psychology*, p. 544). Professor James speaks of "the strange arrogance with which the wildest materialistic speculations persist in calling themselves 'science,'" and adds: "The last word of Psychology here is ignorance. . . . *The consciousness doesn't count*, these reasoners say; it doesn't exist for science, it is *nil*; you mustn't think about it at all. The intensely reckless character of all this needs no comment. It is making the mechanical theory true *per fas aut nefas*. My conclusion is that to urge the automaton theory upon us, as it is now urged, on purely *a priori* and quasi-metaphysical grounds, is an unwarrantable impertinence in the present state of Psychology" (*Psychology*, vol. i. pp. 138, 454).

(2) If conscious intelligence had not been in some way useful to the creatures that possessed it, it would never have been evolved and perfected, as it has been, in the course of the struggle for existence. "Up to a certain point," says Dr. Romanes, "mechanism is able to perform all the compensations or adjustments which are performed by the animal body; but we also find that beyond this level such compensations are never performed without the

intervention of consciousness. Surely this large and general fact points with irresistible force to the conclusion that in the performance of these more complex adjustments, consciousness—or the power of feeling and the power of willing—are of some *use.* All the organs and functions of animals are of use to animals; we never meet, on any large or general scale, with organs and functions which are wholly adventitious. Is it to be supposed that the highest functions of the highest organs of the highest animals stand out of analogy with all other functions in being themselves functionless? To this question I, for one, can only answer, and answer unequivocally, No. As a rational being, I am forced to conclude that, apart from the activity of mind, this planet could never have held the wonderful being who, in multiplying, has replenished the earth and subdued it—holding dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth" (*Mind and Motion and Monism*, p. 23).

(3) Experience testifies that the mind, by willing, can move the body, and through it other things, and that therefore the will *is* capable of producing physical or mechanical effects.

(4) If human consciousness has no influence upon human action, it follows logically that if man had been created without a mind, *the same outward actions as are now performed, would still have been performed by him.* That is to say, that blind painters would have painted pictures, and exhibited them in public

galleries to blind spectators; that deaf composers would have composed elaborate symphonies, and have caused them to be played by deaf musicians to deaf audiences; and that two human automata, precisely resembling Shakespere and Newton in every outward respect, but possessing not the faintest degree of consciousness or intelligence, would have mechanically produced, the one the tragedy of *Hamlet*, the other the *Principia*. These and other unspeakable absurdities are necessarily involved in Automatism, and yet Materialists have the audacity to call believers credulous.

Objection II.—Free-will is inconsistent with the law of the Conservation of Energy. This law asserts that the amount of energy in the universe remains always the same. But if the human will has the power to produce physical effects, it must have the power of creating new energy, which is a manifest violation of the principle.of the Conservation of Energy.

Reply.—The law of the Conservation of Energy, as stated by Profs. Stewart and Tait, is as follows: "In any system of bodies whatever, to which no energy is communicated by external bodies, and which parts with no energy to external bodies, the sum of the various potential and kinetic energies remains for ever unaltered"[1] (*Unseen Universe*, p. 114).

[1] The words *for ever* have no right in the definition. Science knows nothing about eternity. It should be noticed also that the law of Conservation only applies to *closed systems of bodies*, and not to the whole universe. "It is plainly impossible," says

It is evident, then—

(1) That the law in question is a purely physical one, having reference only to inorganic bodies. There is no proof that it holds true of animated bodies of any kind, much less that it holds true of man. The materialist may urge that the general analogy of nature requires us to believe that a law which holds good of matter must also hold good of mind; but this we entirely deny. The argument is purely analogical, and the force of such an argument varies, as Bishop Butler correctly pointed out, according to the degree of resemblance of the things compared. When the things compared are very much alike, then the presumption that a given law which holds good of one will hold good of the others, is very strong; but if the resemblance of the things is slight, the presumption also is slight. Now, mind and matter differ more markedly in their general properties than any other things whatsoever. As Prof. Bain, himself a semi-materialist, confesses: "We are in this fix: mental states and bodily states are utterly contrasted; they cannot be compared; they have nothing in common except the most general of all attributes—degree, and order in time; when engaged with one we must be oblivious of all that distinguishes the other. Extension is but the first of a long series of

Prof. J. Ward, "to prove that the phenomenal energy in the universe is fixed in amount. The physicists themselves are beginning to see this more and more clearly, and frankly to admit it" (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, vol. ii. p. 76).

properties, all present in matter, all absent in mind" (*Mind and Body*, pp. 125, 135). The inference therefore is *not* that it is probable that the law of the Conservation of Energy applies to mind, but that it is *in the highest degree improbable.*

(2) The law in question only affirms that the quantity of energy in a system of bodies remains unaltered, *provided that it is not acted upon from without.* Now mind, as we have already proved, has the power of producing physical effects (*e.g.* tools and machines), which physical agents, of themselves, could never produce. This implies that mind can add energy to matter;[1] but this is no breach of the law of the Conservation of Energy, because the energy is added from without. "It is better," says Prof. Poynting, "to face the situation boldly and claim for our mental experience as great certainty as that which the physicist claims for his experience in the outside world. If our mental experience convinces us that we have freedom of choice, we are obliged to believe that in the mind there is territory that the physicist can never annex. . . . *Undoubtedly will results in physical motion*" (*Hibbert Journal*, July, 1903).

Objection III.—Neither mind determines the activities of matter, nor matter the activities of mind; but both mind and matter are attributes of a single

[1] Some speculators, however, suppose that the will, by acting on the moving molecules of the brain, *always at right angles to the direction in which they are moving*, directs the motions of the body without adding energy to matter. This view seems to the writer unnecessary and over-subtle.

substance, which determines the activities of both.

Reply.—This is the theory of Semi-materialistic Monism, advocated by Prof. Bain and certain other modern Psychologists. It is held in two forms.

(1) It is said that mind and matter are both attributes of some unknown *tertium quid*, which causes the activities of both. But there is absolutely no evidence that any such *tertium quid* exists. Mind is known, and matter is known, but nothing whatever is known about this hypothetical third thing. All the existing facts can be explained by the ordinary theory that mind influences matter, and matter mind. Exactly how this interaction takes place is a mystery, but the actual fact of it is demonstrated by constant experience. Besides, the mystery is not removed by assuming an unknown *tertium quid*. For, in the first place, this *tertium quid* is another mystery; and, in the second place, it being *ex hypothesi* neither mind nor matter, it is a mystery how it can act upon either. Thus this theory substitutes several mysteries for one.

(2) It is said that mind and matter together make up a single reality, and constitute "a double-faced entity." This, however, contradicts consciousness. Consciousness (which, after all, is the only possible guide) draws an absolute distinction between the mind and the brain. To affirm, in opposition to consciousness, that these two things are the same because they happen to be connected, is arbitrary in the extreme.

(3) It may be urged, both against this hypothesis and that of Automatism, that *the mind is conscious of being itself a real cause, a real originator of effects*, and not a mere effect of something else. If Monism or Automatism were true, the mind would never imagine itself to be a primary and efficient cause. That we do imagine ourselves to be causes is certain. "We are more certain," says Prof. Poynting, "of our power of choice and of responsibility, than of any other fact, physical or psychical. We are certain, all of us, in every-day life, that this power of choice exists, whatever conclusion we may come to in the quiet of our studies. The freedom of choice is unlike anything else in Nature—it is a simple fact. Holding this view, I am bound to repudiate the physical account of Nature, when it claims to be a complete account."

Objection IV.—If free-will were a fact, the prediction of future acts would be impossible.

Reply.—Rational freedom is not inconsistent with rational uniformity of action. If it is good and rational to act according to general rules, then it may be confidently expected that rational beings will, upon the whole, elect to do so. God Himself, who is the freest of all beings, acts, both in Nature and Grace, in a highly uniform manner. Of course, if free-will is a fact, we cannot expect to predict *all* actions, but we may expect to forecast a great many, at least with a high degree of probability. Beyond this we cannot fairly expect to go, and experience shows that this is all that is, in fact,

possible. It is only physical events, such as eclipses, that can be predicted with certainty Human actions admit of probable prediction only.

Objection V.—If free-will is a fact, men's actions do not flow from their characters, but are arbitrary excrescences upon them.

Reply.—A character embraces not one only, but a great variety of different possible motives. In any given circumstances, a man's character supplies him, through its various motives, with a number of different possibilities of action, and it lies with him to decide which of these possibilities shall become actual. No action can be performed which does not lie within the capacities of the character; but these capacities are indefinite in number and often sharply contrasted. Some thoroughly mean men, for example, are capable at times of acts of surprising generosity; and some of the worst of mankind have occasional fits of goodness. Every action, therefore, being chosen out of a number of alternative actions which the character renders possible, is both free and a true outcome of character.

Objection VI.—The regularity of voluntary actions, as disclosed by statistics, disproves free-will. For example, the statistics of marriages and suicides are approximately regular.

Reply.—(1) It has already been remarked that regularity of conduct is fully consistent with moral freedom.

(2) Statistics give an entirely fallacious appearance of uniformity to phenomena which are highly

variable. Facts have, in fact, to be averaged, just because, individually considered, they cannot be predicted. Facts, when averaged, cease, strictly speaking, to be facts. The "average Englishman," for example, who marries at a certain average age, is a pure statistical fiction, and to know when he marries affords no information as to when a particular Englishman will marry, or whether he will marry at all. Similarly the statistics of suicide do not inform us when or whether a particular person will commit suicide, or anything about the matter. It is hard, therefore, to see how statistics, which deal with averages, throw any light at all upon freedom of choice which is possessed, if at all, by individuals. Dr. Venn, in his *Logic of Chance*, has conclusively shown that statistics give no information as to the causes from which the events tabulated arise, and that even if an element of pure chance were at work, it would not necessarily affect the final average. As Dr. Martineau well says, "The percentage decides nothing about the necessary or free disposal of the working energy detailed through men and things. . . . The average on which we rely is the joint product of a necessary and a contingent factor; the latter being qualified for partnership in a constant result, by the limits of its variation, and the equality of its possibilities. The steadiness of the total is saved, while the freedom of the individual is reserved" (*Study of Religion*, ii. 253 ff.).

Objection VII.—Free volition is motiveless volition, and therefore irrational.

Reply.—Free-will is not action without a motive, but rational and deliberate choice between motives.

Objection VIII.—The will is always determined by the strongest motive.

Reply.—This is contrary to experience. When resisting a strong temptation, we know that we are reinforcing by an act of will the *weaker* motive, and that, apart from our will, the right would have no chance of prevailing. As Prof. James says, "We feel in all cases of hard volition as if the line taken, when the rarer and more ideal motives prevail, were the line of greater resistance, and as if the line of coarser motivation were the more pervious and easy one, even at the very moment when we refuse to follow it. The sensualist never says of his behaviour that it results from a victory over his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of his as a victory over his propensities. If a brief definition of ideal or moral action were required, none could be given which would better fit the appearances than this—*It is action in the line of greatest resistance*" (*Psychology*, ii. p. 548).

Objection IX.—Mr. H. Spencer says: "Physical changes either conform to law, or they do not. If they do not, this work, in common with all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense: no science of Psychology is possible" (*Psychology*, i. p. 503).

Reply.—(1) A great group of facts cannot be excluded from the realm of science because they contain a small, or even a large, incalculable element. The incalculable element in *history* is

extremely large, and yet there is a science of history.

(2) It does not follow that because human volitions do not conform to the mechanical laws to which Mr. Spencer and other materialistic philosophers labour to subject them, they do not conform to laws at all. There may be, and are, psychical and spiritual laws to which even volitions conform. But these are laws of freedom, not of mechanical necessity.

Objection X.—Free-will is inconsistent with the Divine Omnipotence.

Reply.—(1) It is not inconsistent with an omnipotence which is moral and benevolent, to limit itself voluntarily for the benefit of its creatures.

(2) It is a greater exhibition of omnipotence to create a free, moral personality such as man's, than to create a conscious automaton of the kind postulated by Determinism.

Objection XI.—Free-will is inconsistent with the Divine Foreknowledge.

Reply.—The two principles may be reconciled in either of the two following ways:

(1) It may be supposed that the Deity does not foresee contingent actions, but only those final ends to which He is guiding particular creatures and creation at large. On this theory the Deity foresees all the human volitions which are possible, and also all the measures which He can take to counteract wrong volitions. In this way, although ignorant of the actual outcome of future volitions, He can guide the world unerringly to its predetermined goal.

This view, however, is based on a superficial view of the Divine Perfections, and is less probable than the following.

(2) It may be supposed that the duration of time is contained in the duration of eternity, and that therefore God, who sees events *sub specie æternitatis*, sees the events of time as part of an eternal present. He thus foresees even human volitions, and ordains His own corresponding actions from eternity in accordance with this absolute fore-knowledge. This species of knowledge transcends, not only in degree, but also in kind, all human knowledge, and is called by theologians *Scientia Media.*

LITERATURE[1]

(*a*) Libertarian

Butler, *Analogy*, pt. i. c. 6 ; Kant, *Critique*, etc. ; Fonsegrive, *Essai sur le Libre Arbitre* ; Renouvier, *Les Dilemmes de la Métaphysique Pure*, c. iv., etc. ; Boutroux, *La Contingence des Lois de la Nature* : Noël, *La Conscience du Libre Arbitre* ; W. J. Ward, *Philosophy of Theism*, essays vi.-xi. ; W. James, *The Will to Believe* (vi.), and *Psychology*, ii. p. 486 ; Momerie, *Personality* (iii.) ; Sturt, *Personal Idealism* (iii.) ; Hazard, *Freedom of the Mind in Willing* ; Martineau, *Study of Religion*, bk. iii. c. 2 ; Maher, *Psychology*, c. xix., Ladd, *Physiological Psychology*, pp. 524-44 ; Romanes, *Mind and Motion and Monism*, cc. v. vi. ; Temple, *Bampton Lectures*, iii. ; A. Moore, *Essays*, vii. ; Lotze, *Microcosmus* (tr.), i. p. 256 ff. ; A. Fouillée, *La Liberté et le Déterminisme*, and *L'Evolutionnisme des Idées-*

[1] The most important modern literature of free will is French.

forces; Rickaby, *Free-Will and Four English Philosophers*, 1906; Gutberlet, *Die Willensfreiheit*[2], 1907; Joel, *Der freie Wille*, 1908; H. Bergson, *Time and Free Will* (tr.), 1910; and *Creative Evolution* (tr.), 1911; J. Ward, *Realm of Ends*, 1912, p. 270 ff., and *Naturalism and Agnosticism*; Boyce Gibson, Essay in *Personal Idealism*; H. H. Williams, article "Will" in *Encyl. Brit.*, 1911; W. Benett, *Religion and Free Will*, 1913.

(*b*) Deterministic

Hobbes, *Leviathan*; Hume, *Treatise of Human Nature*; Mill, *Hamilton*, c. xxvi., and *Logic*, bk. vi. c. 2; J. Edwards, *Freedom of the Will*; Spinoza, *Ethics*, props. xxvi.-xxxvi.; Bain, *Emotions and the Will*; L. Stephen, *Science of Ethics*, pp. 278-92; H. Sidgwick, *Methods of Ethics*, bk. i. c. 5; O. Pfister, *Die Willensfreiheit*, 1903; S. Hodgson, *Philosophy of Experience*, iv. 118 ff; H. Rashdall, *Theory of Good and Evil*, 1907, vol. ii. bk. iii.; McTaggart, *Some Dogmas of Religion*, 1906, ch. v.; A. E. Taylor, *Elements of Metaphysics*, 1903, p. 357 ff.; perhaps also W. Wundt, *Principles of Morality* (tr.), pp. 1-59, though it is by no means clear that he is not, after all, a Libertarian.

CHAPTER XIV

THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

SUMMARY.—Evil arises from the abuse of free-will by finite minds. Moral evil is not caused by God, but overruled by Him for good. The transmission of a tendency to sin is not unjust, because a remedy for it has been provided, and there are important compensations. Physical evil is shown to subserve important moral purposes in the case of man, and in the case of animals to be more than compensated for by physical good.

I.—MORAL EVIL [1]

To the Polytheist, who believes in numerous gods, some of whom are good and others evil, and to the Dualist, who acknowledges two eternal principles, the one good and the other evil, the problem of evil presents no particular difficulty; but to the

[1] Theologians and Philosophers distinguish between (1) Moral Evil and (2) Physical Evil. Moral evil proper is the deliberate choice by a rational being of what he knows to be wrong. Cognate with it is Original Sin, which is a transmitted tendency to moral evil. Physical evil consists mainly of pain, sorrow, disease, and death. Ignorance, as far as it is deliberate and sinful, is moral evil. Indeliberate ignorance is physical evil. Leibnitz adds a category of "metaphysical evil"—*i.e.* the natural imperfection which belongs to every created thing. Mere imperfection, however, is not properly evil.

Theist, who attributes the origin of the universe to a single Being, whom he regards as not only good, but also infinitely wise and powerful, the problem is much more serious. Some have regarded it as altogether insoluble. Hume, for example, says (*Human Understanding*, sect. viii.): "It is not possible to explain distinctly how the Deity can be the mediate cause of all the actions of men, without being the author of sin and moral turpitude. These are mysteries, which mere natural and unassisted human reason is very unfit to handle; and whatever system she embraces, she finds herself involved in inextricable difficulties, and even contradictions, at every step which she takes with regard to such subjects. To reconcile the indifference and contingency of human actions with prescience; or to defend absolute decrees, and yet free the Deity from being the author of sin, has been found hitherto to exceed all the power of Philosophy. Happy if she be thus sensible of her temerity, when she pries into these sublime mysteries!" Others, less cautious or less modest than Hume, have said roundly, that either the goodness or the omnipotence of the Deity, or both, must be given up. Mr. J. S. Mill, for example, says (*Three Essays*, p. 186): "We have not to attempt the impossible problem of reconciling infinite benevolence and justice with infinite power in the Creator of such a world as this. The attempt to do so not only involves absolute contradiction in an intellectual point of view, but exhibits to excess the revolting spectacle

of a jesuitical defence of moral enormities." In a similar spirit Mr. St. George Stock writes (*Hibbert Journal*, July, 1904): "The problem and the mystery are entirely made for us by our theology, which postulates that the cause of all things is the will of a single almighty, all-wise, all-loving Being. . . . This doctrine, I venture to say, will have to be given up, if Theology is to be brought into touch with the times. The mystery of this unfathomable universe is one that the plummet of our thought will never sound. But at least we can avoid, and as an intellectual duty we are bound to avoid, plain and palpable self-contradictions. We cannot assert in the same breath the reality of evil, and the fact of creation by an omnipotent, omniscient, and benevolent Being. . . . Let us therefore make up our minds what God it is we worship. Is it the God of Nature revealed to us by science, or the God whom our hearts reveal to us? We must take our choice, and desist from the vain endeavour to fuse the two into one."

These objections, however, are based on the assumption that the theory of Necessity or Determinism, in some form or other, is true. If it is true, then, of course, all the evil in the world must be attributed directly to the Deity, who is thereby proved to be either weak or wicked. But on the opposite supposition of *Moral Freedom*, which has already been proved to be true, moral evil is not to be attributed directly to the Deity, but to those finite spirits, human and superhuman, who

abuse the gift of free-will entrusted to them. This is not, as is sometimes alleged, a mere evasion of the difficulty. On the free-will hypothesis, the causality entrusted to free finite spirits is *real.* God is not even *ultimately* the cause of the free choice which a rational creature makes, and therefore a man is, within the limits assigned to him by God, the first and ultimate cause of his own volitions, and the chain of causation, when traced back to him, ends.

It may, nevertheless, be objected, that the Deity, having perfect foreknowledge that moral evil would arise unless prevented, ought to have prevented it. He might have prevented it in three ways: (1) He might have refrained from creating beings liable to sin; (2) He might have created such beings, and secluded them from temptation; (3) He might have allowed them to be tempted, but have forcibly prevented them from falling.[1]

Now, we maintain decidedly that each of these alternatives is less worthy of God, and would have resulted in a worse universe, than the alternative which He actually adopted. For—

(1) If He had created beings incapable of sin, those same beings would have been incapable of virtue.

Not even Omnipotence can create a being capable of virtue, without making it at the same time capable of sin. Virtue is impossible without

[1] This treatment of the subject is suggested by Dr. Momerie's *Origin of Evil.*

moral freedom, and moral freedom is impossible without freedom of choice, and freedom of choice is power to choose wrong as well as right. No doubt if God had made us what Mr. Huxley says we are, *conscious automata*, we should have been incapable of sin; but it is better to be men, with all the glorious possibilities of freedom and virtue, than to be machines, however excellent. The crowning dignity of man, and the chief part of the image of God in which he was created, is moral freedom, and to wish it away is to be untrue to the best ideals of the race.

(2) God might, it is said, have created free moral beings, and have saved them from sin by secluding them from temptation. This could not have been done *entirely*, without depriving them of passions or propensions altogether, but it might have been done to a very considerable extent.

It might have been done; but if it had been, mankind would never have advanced, as they have, from innocence to virtue. Between innocence and virtue there is a great distinction. *Innocence* is that negative goodness which results from ignorance of vice or absence of temptation. *Virtue* is that state of stable moral excellence which is attained by him who has again and again wrestled with evil in its most seductive forms, and by continual conquests over self has formed habits which secure him against all likelihood of falling. If, therefore, it was the design of the Creator (as in fact it was) that His creatures should attain to virtue as

distinguished from innocence, it was impossible for Him to seclude them from temptations in the way suggested. A boy brought up at home by an over-careful mother and artificially guarded from temptation may be innocent, but certainly is neither virtuous nor manly, and when he is actually forced to take his part in the battle of life, is in much greater danger of irretrievably falling than a lad who has already learnt what evil is, and has begun to struggle with it in earnest. Whatever the explanation of it may be, finite creatures like man cannot become perfect at once, but require to be perfected through much temptation and suffering. Even the Son of Man Himself was "in all points tempted like as we are"; "offered up prayers and supplications with strong crying and tears unto Him that was able to save Him from death"; "learnt obedience by the things that He suffered"; and that He might encourage us to face the same conflict boldly, was "perfected through sufferings" (Heb. iv. 15; v. 7; ii. 10).

(3) God might, it is said, have allowed His creatures to be tempted, but have forcibly prevented them from falling.

To have done this, however, would have been to deprive them of all real moral freedom. A man who can only exercise his free-will in one way, is only one degree above an automaton with no free-will at all. It is better, upon the whole, that sinners, by actually falling, should taste the bitter fruit of sin, and, becoming conscious

of their own weakness, should seek more earnestly for strength where it may be found. Often a fall, shattering, as it does, a man's pride and self-confidence, is the beginning of higher things. This was the case with St. Peter, who, through his fall and subsequent repentance, attained a new stability of faith, and justified the prophetic name which his Master gave him. Better, no doubt, it would be never to fall; but better to fall, and fall often, than to be irresistibly prevented from falling.

II.—Original Sin

The question, however, is seriously complicated by the existence of *original* or *transmitted sin*. Original sin may be defined as a bias towards evil which renders the choice of the virtuous alternative more difficult than it ought to be. Thus stated, the doctrine of Original Sin constitutes a real moral difficulty. It seems as if the individual who inherits, through no fault of his own, original sin, has a fair ground of complaint against the Deity. The game of life which he has to play is not a fair one. The dice are loaded against him, and he has no real chance of winning. His character is warped, before ever he receives it, by the vicious choices of innumerable ancestors, for whose mistakes he is obliged to suffer. He seems to suffer, at the hands of a God who claims to be just, a monstrous injustice

It is, however, fortunately possible to vindicate completely the justice of God's dealings in this

matter. The principle of heredity,[1] of which original sin is a particular example, cuts both ways. The individual inherits not only the *vicious* tendencies of his ancestors, but their *virtuous* tendencies also. The character of the saint descends to posterity, as well as the character of the criminal. If the individual is discouraged by the thought that so many of his ancestors have been wicked, he may comfort himself with the reflection that probably more of them were good, and many of them far better than himself. It is wrong to exaggerate the amount of evil in the world. In spite of original sin, the world contains a great deal of good, and the amount of good is steadily increasing. No serious student of history denies the reality of moral progress; and though the progress would have been much more rapid and thorough if sin had never been, this consideration must not blind us to the good which now is, and always has been, in the world, and which is as much transmitted to posterity as the evil. The evil which the individual inherits is doubtless a disadvantage to him, but it is more than counterbalanced by the good which he receives with it. If every individual started where Adam started, the world would make no progress. It is better to accept cheerfully the evil with the good, recognizing that much good comes out of evil, than to indulge in pessimistic complaints against the Creator, who is steadily guiding the world to greater and greater perfection.

[1] On the nature of heredity, see appendix ii.

This is the place to deal with another objection which is often brought against the doctrine of Original Sin. It is alleged that God acts unjustly to the individual in imputing to him as guilt the original sin which he innocently inherits. This, however, is precisely what God does *not* do. Calvinism indeed affirms it, but the Church has always protested against so monstrous a calumny upon a just and merciful Creator. There is a Christian doctrine of Original *Sin*, but none of Original *Guilt*. Although, as the ninth Anglican Article expresses it, "the corruption of the nature of every man," considered in itself, "deserveth God's wrath and damnation," yet the man himself, who innocently inherits it, is an object, not of wrath, but of Divine pity and compassion. The good and merciful Creator, having complete knowledge of the difficulties against which fallen man has to struggle, makes full allowance for his inevitably imperfect conduct. Knowing the secrets of the heart, He often condescends to see victory and merit where human eyes see nothing but failure and sin. Knowing, then, what we do of God's infinite moral perfection, we are sure that each individual case will receive absolute justice at His hands, and that justice will be tempered with mercy.

It is, however, through the sublime doctrine of human redemption through Christ that God's justice and mercy are most convincingly demonstrated. If, when the race had fallen, God had left it to itself, His justice might, perhaps, have been

successfully impugned; but He did not. He provided a perfect remedy both for actual and original sin, and made it available for all mankind. Thus the effects of the Fall were reversed, and the possibility of sinless perfection was again freely offered to man. But this doctrine is best considered in connection with Christianity.

III.—Physical Evil

The existence of physical evil, by which is chiefly meant pain, sorrow, disease, and death, has been held by many to constitute a strong argument against the benevolence of the Deity. "In sober truth," says Mr. J. S. Mill, "nearly all the things which men are hanged or imprisoned for doing to one another, are Nature's every-day performances. Killing, the most criminal act recognized by human laws, Nature does once to every being that lives; and in a large proportion of cases, after protracted tortures, such as only the greatest monsters whom we read of ever purposely inflicted on their living fellow-creatures. Nature impales men, breaks them as if on the wheel, casts them to be devoured by wild beasts, burns them to death, crushes them with stones like the first Christian martyr, starves them with hunger, freezes them with cold, poisons them by the quick or slow venom of her exhalations, and has hundreds of other hideous deaths in reserve, such as the ingenious cruelty of a Nabis or a Domitian never surpassed. All this Nature does with the most supercilious disregard both of mercy

and of justice, emptying her shafts upon the best and noblest indifferently with the meanest and worst. She mows down those on whose existence hangs the well-being of a whole people, perhaps the prospects of the human race for generations to come. Everything, in short, which the worst men commit, either against life or property, is perpetrated on a larger scale by natural agents. . . . The worshipper [of the God revealed in Nature] must learn to think blind partiality, atrocious cruelty, and reckless injustice, not blemishes in an object of worship, since all these abound to excess in the commonest phenomena of Nature" (*Three Essays*, pp. 28, 112).

It will be convenient to consider the subject of physical evil, firstly in its relation to man, and secondly in its relation to the animal creation.

(i) *Physical evil in its relation to man.*—Mr. Mill's arguments are a singular mixture of weakness and strength. It is difficult to treat seriously the contention that because it is wrong for men to destroy the lives or goods of their fellows, therefore it is wrong for God. If there is a God at all, He is the maker and absolute owner of man, and of all that is his. Everything that man is or has, is a loan from a Lender, whose title to reclaim it when He wills cannot possibly be questioned.

The other arguments adduced by Mr. Mill are more worthy of attention. Although God has a right to take life, He has no right, as Mr. Mill justly implies, to take it with cruelty, and it is

equally true that if He allows men to exist at all, He is morally bound to treat them with justice. There certainly are *prima facie* some facts in Nature which are hard to reconcile with the divine benevolence and impartiality.

It is important, however, to bear in mind two considerations: (1) that man is a moral being, requiring for his advance in holiness *moral discipline*; and (2) that he possesses an *immortal soul.* As will be shown more at length in the next chapter, belief in the being of God is for all logical minds inseparable from belief in a future life. If the arguments for religion are adequate to prove the existence of a personal God, they are adequate to prove human immortality, and therefore all attempts to justify the ways of God to man must be logically based on the assumption of human immortality. If human immortality is denied, the existence of God must also be denied, and there is no need for a theodicy at all.

Now, on the assumption that man is immortal, and is at present in a state of probation, the utility of pain and sorrow is at once evident. Their function clearly is to detach the soul from the world. Had this life been made a state of unalloyed pleasure, the tendency of men, even of good men, would have been to live for this life alone, and to forget that they are "strangers and pilgrims on the earth" (Heb. xi. 13). Even as it is, the attraction of earthly pleasures is so great, that many live for these alone, neglectful of their higher destiny. God,

therefore, in His great goodness, sends sorrow, pain, disease, and especially death, to detach men's affections from the things of the earth, and to incline them to things above. He sends these physical evils to all men, because all men require to be taught by them, but most often to the wicked, because the wicked require this teaching most. Physical evil, then, subserves a moral purpose. It withdraws the soul from the pursuit of vanities, and leads it to find rest in Him who alone can give it lasting happiness.

Again, were it not for the existence of physical evil, few of the higher human virtues would be developed at all. In the absence of danger, there would be no courage; in the absence of uncertainty, no faith; in the absence of calamity, no fortitude; in the absence of pain, no patience; in the absence of misfortune in others, no compassion. Not the hour of pleasure, but the hour of stress and trial brings out the best that is in a man. *No battle no victory, no cross no crown*, is the teaching, not only of Jesus Christ, but of the best moralists of all faiths, and duly considered, it contains a full justification of most of the physical evil that affects humanity.

It is desirable, nevertheless, to consider with some attention certain particular points of difficulty emphasized by Mr. Mill.

(1) He alleges a complete want of justice in the Author of Nature. "There is no evidence whatever," he says, "in Nature for divine justice,

whatever standard of justice our ethical opinions may lead us to recognize. There is no shadow of justice in the general arrangements of Nature" (*o.c.*, p. 194).

This surely is a great exaggeration, for—

(*a*) We are assured, even by Agnostic moralists, that the virtuous are as a rule much more happy than the vicious. Now this surely means, on the assumption that there is an Author of Nature, that He makes a practice, not perhaps an *invariable* practice, but still a practice, of rewarding virtue with happiness. If He were *indifferent to justice*, as Mr. Mill generally represents Him, He would make no difference at all between the virtuous and the vicious in His distribution of happiness. If He were positively *unjust*, as Mr. Mill sometimes says that He is, He would ordinarily render the vicious happy and the virtuous miserable. But, as a matter of fact, He does the very opposite of this.

(*b*) Mr. Mill says that Nature never discriminates between virtue and vice.

This again is an exaggeration. Certain of her gifts, such as sunshine and rain, Nature bestows indiscriminately on all. Other gifts, however, are reserved for the righteous above. Health and long life, for example, belong predominantly to the temperate and the chaste. Plentiful harvests are reaped only by diligent husbandmen. Success in life is rarely attained without some degree of honesty, diligence, and prudence. Again, Nature places a great premium upon knowledge, and a

heavy penalty upon ignorance, and, as is well known, the possession of knowledge and the lack of it are important indications of moral character. Indeed, it would almost seem that moral discrimination on the part of Nature is the general rule, and non-discrimination the exception.

(*c*) If the facts of social life are included among the phenomena of Nature, as in all reason they ought to be, then it is still more evident that Nature discriminates between virtue and vice. For it is unquestionably true that all human societies discriminate in a most marked manner between virtuous and vicious men, assigning honours and conveniences to the former, and dishonour and inconveniences to the latter. As Bishop Butler well remarks, "From the natural course of things, vicious actions are, to a great degree, actually punished as mischievous to society: and besides punishment actually inflicted upon this account, there is also the fear and apprehension of it in those persons, whose crimes have rendered them obnoxious to it, in case of a discovery; this state of fear being itself often a considerable punishment. The natural fear and apprehension of it too, which restrains from such crimes, is a declaration of Nature against them. It is necessary to the very being of society, that vices destructive of it should be punished *as being so*; the vices of falsehood, injustice, cruelty: which punishment therefore is as natural as society; and so is an instance of a kind of moral government, naturally established and

actually taking place. And since the certain natural course of things is the conduct of Providence or the government of God, though carried on by the instrumentality of men; the observation here made amounts to this, that mankind find themselves placed by Him in such circumstances, as that they are unavoidably accountable for their behaviour, and are often punished and sometimes rewarded under His government, in the view of their being mischievous or eminently beneficial to society. . . . The Author of Nature has as truly directed that vicious actions, considered as mischievous to society, should be punished, and put mankind under a necessity of thus punishing them; as He has directed and necessitated us to preserve our lives by food" (*Analogy*, pt. i. c. 3).

Mr. Mill's reply is that man establishes these moral distinctions *in defiance of Nature* (*o.c.*, p. 194). A more unphilosophical position than this can hardly be conceived. Whether upon Christian or upon Agnostic principles, *man is part of Nature*, and the instinct which leads him to punish vice and reward virtue is as much part of the cosmic order as the law of gravitation.[1] The result, then, is that there *is* evidence that the Author of Nature distinguishes between virtue and vice. He distinguishes even through *physical nature*, which is by no means indifferent to moral distinctions. He distinguishes

[1] This curious and unphilosophical severance between Nature and Man is also found in the otherwise excellent *Romanes Lecture* of Prof. Huxley, delivered in 1893.

much more decidedly through *human nature and human society*; and since these are the highest products of Nature, they must be supposed to represent Nature's true meaning and aim. Christians admit that the justice of the Deity as manifested in Nature and in human society is not yet perfect, but it is real, and is sufficiently evident to form a real corroboration of the secret presentiment of the soul that one day the Divine Justice will be perfectly revealed.

(ii) *Physical evil in its relation to animals.*—The amount of physical pain in the world was sometimes underestimated by the old Apologists. Paley's great chapter on the Goodness of the Deity (*Natural Theology*, c. xxvi.) perhaps errs on the side of optimism, but it is far nearer the truth than Tennyson's well known representation, or misrepresentation, of "Nature red in tooth and claw with ravine," shrieking against the creed that God is love. The judicious Paley may in this instance have slightly overshot the mark, but the soundness of his general conclusions no responsible naturalist has ever disputed. He laid down and proved by solid evidence two main propositions: (1) "That in a vast plurality of instances in which contrivance is perceived, the design of the contrivance is *beneficial*"; (2) "That the Deity has superadded pleasure to animal sensations, beyond what was necessary for any other purpose, or when the purpose, so far as it was necessary might have been effected by the operation of pain."

Both these positions are unhesitatingly endorsed by modern authorities. Darwin, whose tendencies were decidedly pessimistic, and who regarded the amount of suffering in the world as a great hindrance to faith, yet wrote: "According to my judgment, happiness decidedly prevails. . . . All sentient beings have been formed so as to enjoy, as a general rule, happiness" (*Life and Letters*, vol. i. p. 310). "Natural selection will never produce in a being anything injurious to itself, for natural selection acts solely by and for the good of each. No organ will be formed, as Paley has remarked, for the purpose of causing pain or for doing an injury to its possessor. If a fair balance be struck between the good and evil caused by each part, each will be found, on the whole, advantageous." "When we reflect on this struggle [for existence], we may console ourselves with the full belief, that the war of Nature is not incessant, that no fear is felt, that death is generally prompt, and that the vigorous, the healthy, and the happy, survive and multiply" (*Origin*, cc. iii. vi.). Dr. A. R. Wallace, the co-discoverer with Darwin of the principle of Natural Selection, says: "On the whole, we conclude that the popular idea of the struggle for existence entailing misery and pain in the animal world is the very reverse of the truth. What it really brings about is the maximum of life and of the enjoyment of life, with the minimum of suffering and pain. Given the necessity of death and reproduction—and without these there could

have been no progressive development of the organic world—and it is difficult even to imagine a system by which a greater balance of happiness could have been secured. . . . Violent deaths are painless and easy. Illness, and what answers to poverty in animals—continued hunger—are quickly followed by unanticipated and almost painless extinction. . . . Thus the poet's picture of 'Nature red in tooth and claw with ravine' is a picture the evil of which is read into it by our imaginations, the reality being made up of full and happy lives, usually terminated by the quickest and least painful of deaths" (*Darwinism*, c. ii.). Even Mr. Mill concedes that, "granting the existence of design, there is a preponderance of evidence that the Creator desired the pleasure of His creatures. There is a certain amount of justification for inferring, on grounds of Natural Theology alone, that benevolence is one of the attributes of the Creator" (*o.c.*, p. 191).

It may be added that pain in many, perhaps in the majority of cases, can be shown to be directly *useful*. Thus noxious and deadly things, such as poison and fire, are clearly rendered painful by God, in order that they may be avoided. The pain of disease is intended to force the patient to rest, and so to afford him a better chance of recovery. In the case of man, the pain of disease is also useful in diagnosis. The painful emotion of fear is clearly intended to prompt the more defenceless animals to escape with all speed from

their foes. In all these cases pain is a proof at least of the *relative* benevolence of the Deity. Again, the fierce ravages of destructive animals, about which Agnostic controversialists say so much, are not such serious evils as they seem. If animals did not prey upon one another, they would multiply with such rapidity, that they would starve one another to death—a far worse calamity than being eaten. Being eaten is certainly a less painful death than starvation, which, we must remember, is the fate of all animals that live to be old. All authorities agree that creatures devoured by birds or beasts of prey have, as a rule, an easy death. The case of a cat playing with a mouse, which was such a difficulty to Darwin, is clearly exceptional, and even in this case, the mouse is probably too stupefied to feel its situation acutely. Livingstone, we know, under the claws of a lion felt no pain whatever. The fangs of serpents, again, and the stings of scorpions, another well-known difficulty, are at any rate evidence of benevolent design towards the animals that possess them. Their main function is *protective*, not aggressive, and rarely do such creatures go out of their way to attack anything but their natural prey. With reasonable care, the danger from venomous beasts may be generally avoided, even in those countries which they most infest.[1]

[1] Europeans in India are seldom bitten by serpents. On the other hand, the careless natives, who walk through the jungle barefoot, perish by thousands every year.

IV.—The Hypothesis of a Personal Devil

All this and much more may be said in extenuation of the physical evil which exists in the world, but it does not amount to a proof that no evil exists. Evil—real, undeniable, irreducible evil—exists in abundance. Speaking for myself, I am unable to believe that hideous and excruciating diseases, such as cancer, which affect both men and animals, and which cannot, in the case of *animals* at least, be explained as a means of moral discipline, are the work of a good and benevolent God. I endorse absolutely the words of Dr. E. A. Abbott. "I cannot think," he says, "of disease and pain, and the conflict in the animal world for life and death, as being, so to speak, part of God's *first intention.* Stoics, and Christians who imitate Stoics, may call these things 'indifferent.' I cannot. And even if I could, what of the ferocity, and cruelty, and exultation in destruction, which are apparent in the animal world? 'Death,' say the Stoics, 'is the mere exit from life.' Is it? I was once present at a theatre at Rouen where the hero took a full quarter of an hour to die of poison, and the young Normans who sat round me expressed their strenuous disapprobation: 'C'est trop long,' they murmured. I have made the same remonstrance in my heart of hearts ever since I was a boy, and saw a cat play with a mouse, and a patient stoat hunt down and catch at last a tired-out rabbit: 'It is too long,' 'It is too cruel.'

'Did God ordain this?'—I asked: and I answered unhesitatingly, 'No.' These are but small phenomena in Nature's chamber of horrors; but for me they have always been, and will always remain, horrible. I believe that God intends us to regard them with horror, and perhaps to see in them some faint reflection of the wantonly destructive and torturing instinct in man" (*The Kernel and the Husk*, pp. 87, 88).

What, then, is the cause of this commingling of evil with good in the texture of the universe? There are two possible explanations. One is that God is the cause of the evil as well as of the good, and is therefore a morally imperfect being. But a morally imperfect being would not require from man a standard of absolute moral perfection (see ch. iii.). The other explanation is that the universe is—partially, at least—under the control of a hostile and evil power, which seeks continually to frustrate the benevolent intentions of the Creator. Two forms of this theory may be distinguished: (1) *the Zoroastrian*, which regards the hostile power as eternal and uncreated; and (2) *the Theistic*, which regards it as created and subordinate.

The Zoroastrian view must be rejected, (1) because it postulates two first principles, which is a plain metaphysical impossibility (see ch. i.); (2) because conscience testifies that the moral law is ultimately supreme; and (3) because the theory issues ultimately in a pessimism, and is therefore objectionable from the practical point of view.

The Theistic view is open to none of these objections. It supposes that a large share of the government of the material universe was committed at the creation to a *personal spirit*, of great, but not unlimited, power and intelligence, who, having been originally created good, subsequently fell, and introduced evil and disorder into the world. In Scripture this powerful being is alluded to as the "prince of this world" (John xii. 31; xiv. 30; xvi. 11); "the prince of the power of the air" (Eph. ii. 2); "the prince of the devils" (Matt. ix. 34); "the evil one" (Matt. vi. 13, R.V.); "Satan" (Matt. iv. 10); "the devil" (Matt. iv. 1); "Beelzebub" (Matt. x. 25); "Apollyon" (Rev. ix. 11); "that old serpent" (Rev. xii. 9); and his inferior ministers are called "the principalities," "the powers," "the world-rulers of this darkness," and "the spiritual hosts of wickedness in the heavenly places" (Eph. vi. 12). The New Testament represents his power as so great, that "all the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them" are his to bestow (Matt. iv. 8). St. John declares that the whole world "lieth in the evil one" (ὁ κόσμος ὅλος ἐν τῷ πονηρῷ κεῖται), and that the Son of God is manifested to destroy his works (1 John v. 19; iii. 8). Not only moral evil, but also physical evil of all kinds, such as death, disease, sorrow, and pain, are attributed to him (Heb. ii. 14; Acts x. 38; etc.), and the apostles are thus enabled without doing violence to the facts, to attribute perfect goodness and benevolence to the Author of Nature (Matt. v. 48).

This hypothesis of a personal devil has many advantages. It explains the whole of the facts; it avoids the postulation of two first causes; it vindicates the moral perfection of the Deity; and it allows the optimistic hope to be entertained that in the end good will triumph over evil.

It involves, however, one not inconsiderable difficulty. If God is really omnipotent, how comes it, it may be asked, that He permits the activity of the devil to continue?

Some help towards a solution may be gained from a consideration of what God permits in the case of man. God has entrusted the human race with a power over Nature analogous to that which Satan exercises over the universe, *and He permits the abuse of that power.* When, for instance, a cruel child pulls off the legs of a fly, or a brutal driver maltreats a horse, God does not directly interfere. Why He does not, we cannot tell: we can only surmise. Perhaps He respects the native dignity of the free moral beings which He has created, and for this reason is unwilling to deprive them of their power, until they have shown themselves finally and completely unworthy of it. Perhaps some important educational purpose is served by this permission to sin. However this may be, it is plain that the permission accorded to the devil to do evil, presents no greater difficulty than the same permission accorded to man. Both are extremely perplexing, and both admit the same

kind of solution. This is most obviously the case, if it be supposed that the devil, like man, is in a state of probation, and that repentance is still open to him until the end of the world. On this hypothesis, which has much to recommend it, the case of the devil and the case of man are so closely analogous that the problem of non-human evil receives a complete *analogical*, though not, of course, a complete *philosophical*, solution. With our present faculties, and with our present information, a complete solution of the question is probably impossible, but this need not prevent us from maintaining that by far the most satisfactory solution of the origin of evil yet advanced, is the traditional one, that it arose from the abuse of free-will by angels and men.

APPENDIX I

EVOLUTION AND THE FALL

THERE is a general impression that the doctrine of the Fall has been "hard hit," as Romanes expressed it, "by the scientific proof of Evolution."[1] A little reflection, however, will show that Evolution is as consistent with the doctrine of the Fall as it is with the doctrine of Creation. The doctrine of the Fall itself needs no modification. All that is needed is to translate it from one terminology into another.

On the assumption that Evolution is true, man must be regarded as "created" when that "arboreal animal," from

[1] *Thoughts on Religion*, p. 176

which he is supposed to be descended, first became conscious of right and wrong, and of duty to a Higher Power. It is not necessary to suppose that man's moral faculty appeared suddenly, although it may have done so, for Nature operates sometimes *per saltum*. More probably, the moral and religious faculties appeared at first, as the author of Genesis himself seems to suggest, in a rudimentary and inchoate form. Man's moral sense was probably active at first only in certain directions, and with relation to certain definite subject-matter. Yet man was a responsible being before God from the very first moment that conscience awoke in him, and forthwith he owed it to his Maker to do the right so far as he knew it. Man's condition was not one of *perfection*, as is sometimes affirmed, but of *innocence*, as the Greek theologians rightly apprehended. "By nature," says St. Clement of Alexandria, "we are adapted for virtue; not so as to be possessed of it from our birth, but so as to be adapted for acquiring it. And by this consideration is solved the question propounded to us by the heretics—viz. 'Was Adam created *perfect* or *imperfect*? If *imperfect*, how could the work of a perfect God, and, above all, how could *man*, be imperfect? If *perfect*, how did man transgress God's commandments?' For they shall hear from us that he was not perfect at his creation, but adapted to the reception of virtue. For it is of great importance in regard to virtue to be made fit for its attainment. For it is intended that we should be saved by means of ourselves" (*Miscellanies*, bk. vi. ch. 11, 12).

A still earlier writer, Theophilus of Antioch, compares unfallen man to an *infant*. "Adam," he says, "being yet an infant in age, was on this account as yet unable to receive knowledge worthily. For now also, when a child is born, it is not at once able to eat bread, but is nourished first with milk, and then with the increment of years it advances to solid food. Thus, too, would it have been with Adam; for not in any grudging spirit, as some suppose, did God command him not to eat of knowledge. But He wished also to

make proof of him, whether he was submissive to His commandment. And at the same time He wished man, infant as he was, to remain for some time longer simple and sincere. For this is holy, not only with God, but also with men, that in simplicity and guilelessness subjection be yielded to parents. But if it is right that children be subject to parents, how much more to the God and Father of all things? Besides, it is unseemly that children in infancy be wise beyond their years; for as in stature one increases in an orderly progress, so also in wisdom. . . . God, then, created and blessed man, and transferred him to Paradise, *giving him means of progress and development, in order that maturing, and becoming perfect, and being exalted even to become a god, he might ascend into Heaven in possession of immortality*" (*Ad Autolycum*, bk. ii. ch. 18–27).[1]

It is sometimes stated that man cannot have been created sinless, because he must have received from his bestial ancestors an inheritance of selfish, lustful, and irrational ferocity, which it was beyond the power of his will to control.

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[1] Although unfallen man was rude and naked, and destitute of the arts of civilization, he must not be compared with any existing savages. In the first place, he was innocent and sinless; and in the second place, he contained within himself the promise of all future moral and material progress. Savages are Nature's failures. They are those races which have deteriorated, or which have failed to progress as they ought.

As to the form of religion of primitive man, it is unwise to dogmatize. If, however, we may be allowed to speculate, it was probably a naïve, childlike monotheism. For (1) *theologically*, it is natural to suppose that, in the absence of sin, the soul would rightly apprehend the object of worship; and (2) *scientifically*, nearly all peoples, savage and civilized, preserve traces of *true ethical monotheism*, however much overlaid and incrusted with polytheism and superstition. In spite of confident statements to the contrary, there is no evidence that monotheism is of later origin that polytheism or animism. On this point see A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*, and *cf.* ch. viii.

For such an assumption we can see no justification either from the point of view of Theology or of Natural Science. For (1) from the point of view of Theology, it behoved God to give man a fair start, and endow him with a nature suitable to his new dignity, and therefore capable of rational control; and (2) from the point of view of Natural Science, the faculties and powers of every creature are, as a rule, perfectly adapted to its way of life. The passions of animals are no more in excess of their requirements than the organs of their bodies. In birds and beasts which are solitary by nature and live by prey, the passions of ferocity predominate; but in gregarious animals there is, as a rule, a distinct preponderance of social and altruistic instincts. In *man*, descended, as he probably was, from gregarious and monogamous ancestors, there need not have been, and ought not to have been, an overplus of selfishness and ferocity, but rather of altruism and domesticity.[1]

It belongs to Science rather than to Theology to decide the interesting question whether the human race is descended from a single pair.[2] From the theological point of view the question is indifferent. The principle of Parsimony favours descent from a single pair, and as there is at present no scientific evidence either way, this hypothesis is preferable. If, however, it should ever be proved that mankind is descended from a plurality of original pairs, the familiar Adam and Eve of the Genesis story would be interpreted to mean the first male and first female ancestors of man, irrespective of their number. There is nothing new about such an interpretation. Indeed, even upon grounds of pure exegesis, it may be fairly maintained that Adam and Eve in Genesis are only personifications of the human race. *Adam* in Hebrew is not really a proper name, but a collective noun, meaning *the human race*.

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[1] For proof that man is naturally monogamous, see Westermarck's *History of Human Marriage*.

[2] For a discussion of this point, see Lotze, *Microcosmus*, bk. vii. ch. 4.

APPENDIX II

WEISMANNISM AND THE TRANSMISSION OF SIN

Prof. A. Weismann, in his *Essays upon Heredity* and in his *Germ-plasm, A Theory of Heredity*, maintained that the transmission of acquired characteristics by heredity is a biological impossibility. Mr. Tennant, an adherent of this school, has recently maintained, in his *Hulsean Lectures* (1901–2), that since sinful tendencies, upon the hypothesis of a fall from innocence, are *acquired characteristics*, they cannot have been transmitted to posterity by physical heredity, as the Augustinian doctrine of Original Sin assumes.

This is a true and important observation, but it must be remembered that there are other theories of the transmission of Original Sin besides that of St. Augustine. The Augustinian theory postulates the transmission of a tendency to sin by means of physical procreation. There is, however, the alternative that it is transmitted by what may be called *social heredity*. Social heredity is moral influence, good and evil, transmitted from generation to generation by such means as parental and pedagogic training, social intercourse, public opinion, literature, and good or bad institutions. So far as the formation of moral character is concerned, social heredity is a far more potent force than physical heredity. Contrary to what is popularly supposed, the really important thing for the acquisition of virtue is not to have virtuous ancestors, but to have virtuous training. The thousands of waifs and strays which are rescued every year from the worst surroundings by the various benevolent societies and orphanages, as a general rule turn out well. Although most of them are the children of vicious, vagabond, drunken, and even criminal parents, and have behind them a long evil ancestry, it is claimed that ninety per cent. of them become virtuous and useful citizens. There is, perhaps, a little natural and pardonable exaggeration in these claims, but the percentage of successes is certainly

large. The adoption of Weismannism, therefore, does not necessitate the abandonment of the doctrine of Original Sin, but only the adoption of a new theory of the manner of its propagation and transmission—a theory, too, which is by no means unfamiliar to Theology.

Personally, we are inclined to accept Weismannism, on the authority of the best-informed scientific experts at the present moment. At the same time, it is only right to confess candidly that the question is far from settled. The opponents of Weismannism are numerous and important. Among them may be mentioned Hertwig, Romanes, Spencer, Cope, Eimer, Haeckel, E. B. Wilson, and the bulk of American Naturalists, most of whom are Neo-Lamarckians, and hold strongly the inheritance of the effects of use and disuse. Weismannism is also contrary to popular opinion, which, in such a question, is worth something, though perhaps not very much; also to the opinion of the medical profession as a whole (though probably not to the best-informed opinion); and above all to the opinion of practical breeders. That acquired vices, such as habitual drunkenness, tend to be inherited, is based at least upon strong *prima facie* evidence,[1] and in this case the vice must be *acquired*, for alcohol is an artificial product.

If Weismannism should in the end be found untenable, the

[1] Most medical men regard the transmission by heredity of acquired evil habits as beyond dispute. "There is no doubt," say Drs. Fagge and Pye-Smith, "that proclivity to intemperance is capable of hereditary transmission. The tendency is by some writers regarded as itself a neurosis, to which they give the name suggested by Roesch, 'Oinomania,' more correctly 'Oenomania'" (*Principles and Practice of Medicine*, 1891, vol. i. p. 798). Dr. Mann says: "The habit of drinking to excess is but too easily acquired by those who have no special proclivity to it, but there are undoubtedly cases in which it is directly due to hereditary transmission. In addition to the immediate effects of alcohol on the mind, a further and debasing change is produced in the moral character" (*Forensic Medicine*, 3rd edit. 1902).

Augustinian doctrine of the propagation of Original Sin would probably have to be accepted as correct.

[REMARK.—Weismannism is now (1914) largely discredited, and biological opinion tends to favour the Lamarckian view that acquired characters may be inherited. There is thus no longer any scientific objection to the ordinary (*i.e.* the Augustinian) doctrine of Original Sin. See the discussion in the Introductory Chapter, pp. xii., xiii.]

LITERATURE

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CHAPTER XV

HUMAN IMMORTALITY

SUMMARY.—The immortality of the soul, which is a truth of natural as well as of revealed religion, is proved from the following facts. (1) The natural powers of the soul are greatly in excess of the needs of a short earthly life. (2) The soul naturally desires perfect happiness and perfect holiness, which are unattainable on earth. (3) Virtue is often oppressed and vice triumphant in this world, and therefore, if there is a just God, there must be a future life in which all wrongs are righted. (4) The soul is a simple substance, and therefore incapable of dissolution. (5) It has also a natural excellence, which makes it worthy of preservation at the hands of a good and benevolent Deity. Certain objections to the soul's immortality, chiefly pantheistic and materialistic, are considered.

THE belief in a future life is based for Christians mainly on the testimony of their great Founder, who made this doctrine a cardinal point of His teaching, and finally proved it in the most practical of all ways, by dying and rising from the dead. It is, however, important to remember that belief in some kind of future life is also a truth of Natural Religion, and is almost as widely accepted as belief in a Higher Power. Cicero testifies to this when he says, "As it is by nature that we believe in the existence of the gods, and by reason that we apprehend their nature, so it is *by the unanimous*

opinion of all nations that we hold the doctrine that the souls of men continue permanently to exist" (*Tusculan Disputations*, i. 16, 36). We propose in this chapter to show that the immortality of the soul is probable on grounds of pure reason, without assuming the truth of any revelation.

I.—The Argument from the Natural Powers of the Soul

By a universal law of Nature every creature is adapted to its environment. In animals every organ and every instinct is precisely adapted to supply some actual need of the organism. Even vestigial or nascent organs either have been or will be of some actual use. Nowhere do we find either organs or faculties in excess of the creature's actual needs. Thus Nature provides faculties for catching and assimilating food, for avoiding enemies and other dangers, and for reproducing the kind, but not for purposes extending beyond the life-history of the animal or the needs of the race.

Man, on the other hand, is endowed with faculties which are ridiculously superfluous, if he is only a superior animal, destined to live some seventy years, and then to perish for ever. Nature has given him an intellect which passes beyond the immediate pressing needs of life to take in all space, all time, and all existence. He investigates the past history of mankind and the geological history of the earth. He speculates about the process by which the world came to be what it

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is, and about its probable destiny. His researches are not confined to this planet. By means of the telescope, the spectroscope, and the resources of mathematical analysis, he solves recondite problems of astronomy, calculating the orbits of the other planets, weighing them, determining their specific gravity, and speculating on their physical condition. He has even succeeded in calculating the all but infinite distances of some of the fixed stars, and by the spectroscope has determined their chemical composition. Nor is his insatiable curiosity bounded by the limits of purely physical science. He essays the solution of the ultimate mysteries of the universe, the nature of appearance and reality, of substance and accident, of mind and matter, of cause and effect, of time and space, of freedom and necessity, of possibility and actuality, of good and evil, of immortality, and of that stupendous Origin of all things, the Mind of the Omnipotent Himself.

Particularly noticeable is the fact that his mind takes in not only the actual but the possible, not only particular things but general notions, not only concrete facts but ideals. The soul of a beast is almost entirely "immersed in matter." It possesses some slight powers of memory and anticipation, but, so far as we know, its ideas are entirely derived from sense-impression, and are never of an abstract or general kind. On the other hand, the soul of man transcends the actual universe altogether. He inquires not only what is, but what might be, and what ought to be. The true

home of his soul is among the ideals, the immensities, and the eternities of the universe—perfect beauty, perfect happiness, perfect knowledge, and perfect goodness, things which do not exist at all in the visible world, but belong entirely to the supernatural order. If Nature intends man simply to eat, and drink, and die to-morrow, then assuredly she has provided him with a mental outfit out of all proportion to his needs. If, on the other hand, she intends him for a state of existence in which he will be in closer touch with the ideals and ultimate realities of things, then (and only then) the wide range of his intellect is intelligible. As M. Piat truly says, "Our thought is not enclosed, like that of the brutes, within a limited portion of time and space; its natural reach carries it far further: in whatever way it employs its powers, in whatever direction it turns, there is always something *eternal* which it has in view. Now surely there must be something deeply significant in this excellence of our spirit. In comparison with eternity, time counts as nothing. However long we may have lived, our whole existence has been a failure when we come to die, if we die for good and all. When we depart from this life, the adaptation of our thought to its natural environment has not commenced; there remains a radical disproportion between our ideal and us. It is necessary, therefore, if the sense of finality is to be satisfied, that our existence be prolonged indefinitely" (*Destinée de l'Homme*, p. 159).

II.—The Argument from the Natural Desires of the Soul

The desires, like the capacities, of creatures are adapted to their way of life, and correspond to actually attainable objects. Thus thirst corresponds to real water, hunger to real food, and love to real beings capable of receiving and returning love. Except in plainly exceptional and, as it were, monstrous cases, Nature never implants desires which have no prospect whatever of being gratified. Every desire of every animal can, as a rule, be fully satisfied through the natural exercise of the faculties which Nature gives.

It is otherwise with man. He is the one discontented creature in the universe. His desires are out of all proportion to his means of gratifying them. He desires perfect knowledge; but his most advanced science is only a superficial film of hypothesis floating on an ocean of nescience. He desires perfect happiness; but those who have tasted this world's pleasures to the full, pronounce them vanity.[1] He desires perfect holiness,

[1] "I the Preacher was king over Israel in Jerusalem. . . . And I gave my heart to know wisdom, and to know madness and folly: I perceived that this also is vexation of spirit. For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. I said in mine heart, Go to now, I will prove thee with mirth, therefore enjoy pleasure: and, behold, this also is vanity. I said of laughter, It is mad: and of mirth, What doeth it? . . . I made me great works. . . . Then I looked on all the works that my hands had wrought: . . . and, behold, all was vanity and vexation of spirit, and there was no profit under the sun" (Eccles. i. ii.).

but the utmost efforts of the greatest saints only avail to make them a little less vile in their own esteem. Not a single one of man's characteristic natural desires can be fully gratified in his present state of existence. No possible advance along the lines of purely natural knowledge and goodness can give him what his soul craves for.

Now, on the assumption that this universe of ours is a rational one—and this assumption both Science and Religion are bound to make—it is incredible that Nature should ordain that all the *lowest desires* of men and animals should be completely gratified, but that man's *highest and most godlike desires* should be for ever empty and vain. It is necessary, therefore, in the interests of rational thinking, to suppose that man really has a future life such as religion claims for him. It is possible, of course, to reject this hypothesis; but let not him who does so claim that he does so in obedience to reason. Reason imperatively demands a future life, and to disbelieve it is the suicide of reason, and the triumph of intellectual anarchy and pessimism. This argument for immortality is as old as Plato, and it is as strong now as when he advanced it. It has probably never been better stated than by St. Thomas Aquinas. "Every creature," he says, "naturally desires in accordance with its nature. Now, desire, in creatures capable of apprehension, follows apprehension. Sense-perception apprehends things only under the limitations of *here* and *now*; but intellect appre-

hends existence absolutely and in relation to all time. Accordingly, every creature possessed of intelligence naturally desires to exist for ever. Now, a desire implanted by Nature cannot be in vain, and therefore it follows that every intellectual substance [*i.e.* every reasonable soul] is incorruptible" (*Summa*, i. 75, 6).

III.—Ethical and Religious Arguments

(1) *First Ethical Argument.*—Hitherto we have been arguing for human immortality from purely scientific considerations. For the rest of this chapter we assume the theological results already attained, the chief of which are, for our present purpose, the substantiality of the soul and the existence of a just and omnipotent God.

We argue, then, that since God is omnipotent and just, He will perfectly recompense all mankind for their good and evil conduct; and that since He does not do it in this life, He will certainly do it in another.

To this argument, however, certain objections are offered.

Objection I.—It is selfish and immoral to look for a reward for virtue and a punishment for vice. Virtue should be sought for its own sake.

Reply.—It is not selfishness, but a desire to vindicate the Divine Justice, that makes men desirous that virtue should be perfectly rewarded, and vice perfectly punished. It is quite true that it behoves men to seek virtue for its own sake;

but, on the other hand, it behoves God, in the exercise of His perfect justice, to reward virtue with happiness and vice with misery. That the desire for retributive justice is not selfish is shown by the fact that we desire it equally when we are not directly concerned in the matter. Thus, if it were proved that in the planet Mars virtue is frequently oppressed, and vice triumphant, we should feel the need of a future life and future retribution for Martians quite as much as we feel it for the inhabitants of the earth.

Objection II.—Virtue and vice are sufficiently recompensed by public opinion.

Reply.—If by public opinion is meant the administration of justice, this is ridiculously false. Some of the most heinous sins, such as ingratitude, selfishness, and pride, are not legal offences at all. Besides, an immense number of criminals escape justice altogether, and a not inconsiderable number of persons are wrongfully convicted and even put to death for crimes they have never committed. If by public opinion is meant the praise and blame of society, these again are often capriciously and unjustly awarded. Even when society is really anxious to do impartial justice, it is unable to do so, because it is unable to read the heart and discern a man's real motives. Generally speaking, society has no such just intentions. Society has an instinctive dislike for virtue or capacity above the ordinary standard.

Its way is to neglect or crucify its benefactors, and then after a few centuries to discover its mistake, and build them splendid monuments. Moreover, the social penalties against vice are ridiculously inadequate. No penalties are imposed at all on vices that happen to be fashionable; and when a man is expelled from society for some unfashionable fault, he quickly finds refuge in a fast or disreputable set, among whom he is more at his ease than he was in respectable society. Upon the whole, society enforces neither virtue nor justice, but its own social code, which is often very far removed from both.

Objection III.—A good conscience is the sufficient reward of virtue, and a bad conscience the sufficient punishment of vice.

Reply.—The conscience of virtuous men is, as a rule, far more sensitive than that of vicious men, and gives them far more uneasiness. The good have so high a standard of goodness, that the least defect in their character is a serious trouble to them. Charles Simeon, one of the greatest saints of the eighteenth century, wrote, after many years of devoted work for God, that he was so corrupt in heart that he constantly wondered that he was so mercifully kept out of hell. It is not the virtuous, but the vain, the hypocritical, and the spiritually blind, who find the greatest satisfaction in the approval of their consciences. Thoroughly vicious men generally feel the reproaches of conscience but little. At the beginning

of their downward career, and especially after their first serious sin, they feel, no doubt, both shame and remorse; but gradually, as conscience is more and more often violated, it ceases to protest, and at last, when a state of hardened guilt is reached, conscience is commonly torpid or dead. Dr. Martineau puts the case well when he says: "It is not true that the conscience, in its retrospective action, adequately administers its own law: were that the only justice, the greatest criminal would have the completest impunity. The function which it really performs in our nature corresponds, not to the judge's sentence on the past, but to his prospective warnings addressed to the young offender for whom he would yet save a 'place of repentance';—warnings grave and earnest at first, but fainter at each repetition, and at last relinquished as a mere waste and mockery of right. So it is with our natural contrition; it startles us with a fearful vision of what we are and may become. Treat it as a *premonition*, and it comes to us with its full intensity at the moment of happiest promise for its full effect; but treat it as a *punishment*, and where it is most wanted, it entirely fails" (*Study of Religion*, ii. 366).

Objection IV.—The ethical argument does not prove that the future life is everlasting. It would be possible for God to reward virtue and punish vice adequately within a finite period.

Reply.—This is true; but it is not claimed that the argument proves more than the actual existence

of a future life. How long the life lasts is to be gathered from other arguments.

(2) *Second Ethical Argument.*—If there is no future life, it is not reasonable always to do one's duty; but if there is a future life, then right conduct is always reasonable.

All the best authorities, or nearly all, are agreed that the interests of self do not always coincide with the interests of others, and that in many instances the performance of social duties involves a real sacrifice of self, for which there is not, in this life at least, any adequate return. To live for others may be a very noble and glorious thing, but it cannot, from a merely worldly standpoint, be shown to be either wise or prudent, except to a very limited extent. In particular, it can never, under any circumstances whatsoever, be reasonable to sacrifice the only life one has for others. To die for one's country, to man the lifeboat in a tempest, to visit the sick in time of plague, are sublime actions, and under some circumstances are imperative duties; but if this life ends all, they are simply irrational folly. No posthumous reward given by a grateful country to heroes who have shed their blood for it, can in the least degree reward them for what they have done. If there is no hereafter, then the noblest of all human acts lack all justification in reason. The force of this argument is admitted even by so cautious a thinker as Prof. Sidgwick. "It seems then," he says, "that we must conclude that the inseparable connection between Utilitarian

duty and the greatest happiness of the individual who conforms to it, cannot be satisfactorily demonstrated. The utmost development of sympathy would not cause a perfect coincidence between Utilitarian duty and self-interest. . . . Therefore it is, one may say, a matter of life and death to the Practical Reason that this premiss [viz. that it is always to the interest of the individual to do his duty] be somehow attained. In proportion as man has lived in the exercise of the Practical Reason —as he believed—and feels as an actual force the desire to do what is right and reasonable as such, his demand for the removal of conflict from the intuitions of his reason will be intense and imperious. Thus we are not surprised to find Socrates—the type for all ages of the man in whom this desire is predominant—declaring, with simple conviction, that 'if the Rulers of the Universe do not prefer the just man to the unjust, it is better to die than to live.' . . . We have, then, to regard [belief in a future life] as an hypothesis logically necessary to avoid a fundamental contradiction in one chief department of our thought" (*Methods of Ethics*, concluding chapter, slightly adapted).

(3) *Third Ethical Argument.*—Religion is a real and vital union between the soul and God, and since God is the fountain of eternal life, every soul that is really and vitally united to Him must be everlasting.

This argument, it will be observed, only avails to prove the immortality of *religious* men.

IV.—Metaphysical Argument

The metaphysical argument is not so conclusive as some of the other arguments, but it is not without a persuasiveness of its own, and is especially useful in combating the presumption, arising from Physiological Psychology, that the soul, being in some sense dependent on the body, necessarily perishes with it. The metaphysical argument is very ancient, being used by Socrates in the *Phædo* to refute the materialistic assumption that the soul is a "harmony" of the body, and therefore mortal. Briefly stated, it is as follows:—

(1) It follows from the principle already established that the human soul is a really existing spiritual substance, distinct from the body (ch. xii.), that the destruction of the body cannot, of itself, involve the destruction of the soul. If the soul perishes at all, it must be from some cause distinct from the physical death of the body.

(2) It follows from the fact that the soul is an indivisible unit (see ch. xii.) that it cannot be destroyed even by internal dissolution. Dissolution is the separation of an aggregate into its component parts; and since the soul possesses no parts, it cannot be dissolved.

(3) There remains the possibility that it may be destroyed by gradual or sudden annihilation. This supposition, though possible in the abstract, cannot be pronounced probable on grounds of

reason. The continuance of creatures in existence depends upon the will of the Creator. As long as He wills them to exist, they exist; but as soon as He ceases thus to will, they are annihilated. Now, what the will of the Creator is in this respect may be ascertained from the analogy of Nature. The law of the indestructibility of matter and energy, as ascertained by modern science, proves unquestionably that it is His will to sustain material substance in existence, if not eternally, at least for an indefinitely long time. Again, inasmuch as the Deity acts not capriciously, but in accordance with the highest reason, we must suppose that material substance possesses an intrinsic excellence sufficient to justify its continual preservation. But spiritual substances, or *souls*, possess an intrinsic excellence infinitely transcending that of matter,—so far transcending it, in fact, that a single soul is of greater worth than the whole material universe. If, therefore, the intrinsic worth of matter moves God to allot to it a term of existence indefinitely long, the intrinsic worth of the human soul must move Him to allot to it a term of life practically infinite.[1]

[1] It has often been pointed out that this argument tends to prove the immortality of *all* souls, even of plant-souls and animal-souls. This is true; but it does not prove their *personal* immortality, which is the only kind of immortality which we are discussing. Only *personal* souls can enjoy this. Personal souls are distinct from and transcend the material organism with which they are placed in a manner in which sub-human souls do not. The evidence, therefore, for the immortality of personal souls is much stronger than for that of inferior souls.

V.—Objections

Objection I.—Thought is simply a function of the brain, and therefore perishes with the brain. "Not only consciousness," says Herr E. Duhring, "but every stirring of life depends on functions that go out like a flame when nourishment is cut off. The destruction of any piece of apparatus involves the loss of some one or other of the vital operations; and the consequence is that as far as life extends, we have before us only an organic function, not a separate thing (*thing-in-itself*), or an expression of that imaginary entity the soul. This fundamental proposition carries with it the denial of the immortality of the soul, since, where no soul exists, its mortality or immortality cannot be raised as a question" (quoted in W. James's *Human Immortality*, pp. 93, 94).

Reply.—This objection depends on the supposition that the soul is not an independent substance, but a mere function of matter. A full refutation of this theory, and a proof that it leads to consequences that are palpably absurd, are given in chapters xii. and xiii.

To discuss the immortality of sub-human souls belongs rather to Metaphysics than to Theology. It may, however, be remarked that there are strong metaphysical reasons for thinking that just as there is a law of *physical conservation* affecting matter and energy, so there is a law of *psychical conservation* affecting souls of every grade. A conception of this kind gives Evolution a deeper meaning. (*Cf.* Schiller, *Riddles of the Sphinx*, bk. iii., and Welldon, *Hope of Immortality*.)

Objection II.—Even if the soul is a distinct substance, it is dependent on the body in the most absolute manner, and can neither feel nor think without it. Thus the whole of the ideas of the soul come to it through the bodily senses. Even its higher functions, such as memory, imagination, and reasoning, cannot be performed without the assistance of a normal and healthy brain. When, therefore, the brain is destroyed, the soul (even supposing it to exist) must of necessity become inactive and unconscious—*i.e.* be practically annihilated.

Reply.—Not all the ideas of the soul are derived through the medium of the bodily senses. For example, general or abstract notions, and ideals, cannot be derived from this source; nor can such conceptions as possibility, necessity, contingency, freedom, substance, cause, and effect. Thus the human soul, in its most characteristic ideas and conceptions, transcends matter and sense-impression altogether. It is, however, true, that all its feeling and thinking, even the highest, is carried on through the instrumentality of the brain, and that when the brain is seriously deranged, thought is carried on with great difficulty, or not at all. It does not, however, follow from this, that when the brain is destroyed, consciousness must permanently cease. It has been already shown in this chapter that one chief reason why we believe that the soul will continue to exist after death, is that it possesses an intrinsic excellence sufficient

to justify its preservation at the hands of a good and benevolent Deity. But if this is so, it will exist to exercise those powers on which its excellence depends. An unconscious and unthinking soul would possess none of those qualities that make it worthy, in God's sight, of preservation. It is evident, therefore, on grounds of reason, that God will either give the soul the power of feeling and thinking without the aid of a body (a supposition which, if we regard death as a metamorphosis from a lower to a higher state of existence, is perfectly legitimate), or else will assign to it a body endowed with new and higher powers. The latter supposition is that which Christianity adopts. The grounds for it are given in chap. xx.

Objection III.—The powers of the soul decay with the decay of the body; therefore it is probable that when the body perishes, the powers of the soul will be entirely destroyed.

Reply.—The best workman cannot do good work with a worn-out tool. Similarly, the soul cannot do good work with a worn-out brain. If the brain is, as physiological psychology teaches, *the organ of mind*, it is clear that its decay is sufficient to account for the impaired memory, etc., of old age, without assuming any decay of the soul itself, or of its inherent powers.

Objection IV.—The metaphysical argument does not prove the immortality of the wicked; for their

souls possess no excellence that can move the Creator to will their continuance.[1]

Reply.—The souls of the wicked are, as to their essence, not evil, but good. They possess by nature the same fundamental excellences as the souls of the righteous; they differ from them, however, "accidentally," as theologians say, by the existence within them of moral evil. If, now, it can be shown that the moral evil of such souls can and will be separated from them, their immortality is proved.

Moral evil may be separated from sinful souls in two conceivable ways—either by their voluntary repentance, or by the act of God annihilating their free-will and compelling them to act rightly for the future. In the case of the finally impenitent, the first alternative is excluded; there remains therefore the second, which is, that when the souls of the wicked have been adequately punished for their sins, and found incorrigible, God will forcibly deprive them of the Divine image, destroy their free-will, and degrade them to the rank of necessary agents. Such souls, deprived of free-will, but not of intelligence, would still possess a natural excellence sufficient to justify their eternal preservation. It is a truth of revealed, and probably of natural religion, that the material universe will be preserved to share in the glory that shall be revealed

[1] Some theologians admit this objection to be valid, and maintain that the immortality of the wicked cannot be proved by reason alone.

(*cf.* Rom. viii. 18 ff.). If so, it is highly probable that rational souls, even though lacking the crowning perfection of freedom, will also be preserved for ever, and given some useful work to perform in the economy of the universe. Such a view is preferable to the usual one which makes moral evil absolutely eternal. It is difficult to believe that a holy and omnipotent God will allow finite beings to defy His will for ever. (See further chap. xxiii., appendix 2.)

Objection V.—The soul is immortal in its essence; but when it passes from the body, it is merged in the Universal Mind, and loses all personal identity. This view is characteristic of Pantheism.

Reply.—Although this theory of immortality has already been virtually refuted by the previous disproof of Pantheism, it is advisable to say a few words about it here.

(1) It has already been demonstrated that each individual soul is a really existing substance, distinct from other souls, and from the universe, and from the Author of the universe. It has also been shown that souls do not admit of fusion with other souls. The supposed absorption, therefore, of the human soul by the Infinite Mind is a metaphysical impossibility.

(2) The most complete conceivable union of the individual soul with other souls and with God need not imply loss of personality. It is not of the essence of personality to be limited to itself. Ethical personality perfects itself by going beyond itself, and making itself one with the universe, and with other

souls, and with God, by means of knowledge, sympathy, and love. In the Godhead, where personality exists in its most perfect form, the three mystical Persons completely interpenetrate and mutually contain one another.[1] Hence the most complete union between the finite soul and God—even that "deification" of the soul which results from the enjoyment of the beatific vision—will not result in the destruction, but in the enhancement of personality.

(3) Personal immortality is the only immortality that can satisfy the craving of the human heart or vindicate the justice of God. If all men, good and bad, receive from the Infinite the same reward—namely, absorption, which is only another name for *annihilation*—then Infinite Injustice is seated on the throne of the universe, and, as Socrates long ago said, "it is better to die than to live." Schleiermacher, an advocate of this doctrine of Pantheistic Absorption, once tried to comfort with it a young widow who had just lost a dearly loved husband. This is what she replied: "Schleier, shall I not find him again? O my God! I implore you, Schleier, by all that is dear to God and sacred, give me, if you can, the certain assurance of finding and knowing him again. Tell me your inmost faith on this, dear Schleier. Oh! if it fails, I am undone. It is for this that I live, for this that I submissively and quietly endure; this is the one only outlook that

[1] This interpenetration is called by the Greeks περιχώρησις, and by the Latins circuminsessio, or circumincessio.

sheds a light on my dark life—to find him again, to live for him again, to bless him again. O God, it cannot be destroyed. Speak to my poor heart; tell me what you believe. . . . Do you know when it is that I feel the grasp of the sorrow too bitterly? It is when I think, 'In that future the old things will go for nothing'; and when I think, 'His soul is resolved back—quite melted away in the great All. The old is quite gone by; it will never come to recognition again.' Oh, Schleier! this I cannot bear; oh! speak to me, dear" (quoted in Martineau's *Study of Religion*, vol. ii. p. 337 ff.).

VI.—The Evidence of Psychical Research

The recently founded (1882) Psychical Research Society numbers among its objects the scientific proof (or disproof) of a future life. Some of its members, trained in scientific methods, and inclined rather to scepticism than to credulity, assert that there are certain imperfectly investigated facts, which afford at least *prima facie* evidence that the soul survives death. The subject is important, and, in a book entirely devoted to the problem of human immortality, would require to be dealt with at length. Here it must suffice to refer the reader to the great posthumous work of Mr. F. W. H. Myers, *Human Personality, and its Survival of Bodily Death*, and to the smaller book recently translated from the French, M. Gabriel Delanne's *Evidence for a Future Life (L'Ame est Immortelle).*

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The subject is discussed in most works on Dogmatic Theology, Natural Theology, and the Philosophy of Religion.

CHAPTER XVI

MIRACLES AND ANSWERS TO PRAYER

SUMMARY.—Miracles are possible (*a*) because the process of evolution cannot be accounted for without assuming the continuous action upon the world of a guiding supernatural cause; (*b*) because the origin of life, consciousness, and reason must have been miraculous; (*c*) because the mere fact that there exists a personal God distinct from, and infinitely transcending Nature, proves the possibility of the intrusion of supernatural phenomena into the existing universe. Certain objections to miracles from the deistic, pantheistic, and sceptical standpoints are considered, and some account is given of the *rationale* of prayer.

I.—MODERN SCIENCE AND MIRACLES

IT is commonly supposed, not only by Agnostics, but even by well-informed Christians, that the discoveries of modern science, and in particular the fact of Evolution, have in some way rendered miracles more difficult to believe. Thus, in a recent book which professes to be a philosophical defence of the Christian Faith (*Contentio Veritatis*, 1902), it is said: "To admit in practice the possibility of such an event [as a miracle] is to destroy the canons upon which not only our ordinary reasoning about matters of science, but in particular our

ordinary canons of historical criticism, are based" (p. 53). And again: "The miraculous element in the Gospels is a very serious crux" (p. 87).[1] We maintain, on the other hand, that the order of Nature, as revealed by modern science, is steeped in the supernatural, and that it is necessary to assume, in the present state of our scientific knowledge, that miracles have actually taken place.

(1) It has already been pointed out that the evolutionary process has been mainly in an upward direction. In the nebula was no life, nor sensation, nor intelligence, but only heated matter. Yet out of the absolutely lifeless nebula arose in process of time first vegetative organisms, then sensitive organisms, and finally intelligent organisms. Now, since reason refuses to entertain the supposition that effects can transcend their true efficient causes, it is clear that this process of evolution, in which effects have continuously transcended their antecedent conditions, cannot be regarded as one of purely natural causation. Evolution being a process of development from inferior to superior orders of being, it is plain that what goes before in evolution is only partially the cause of what comes after. The nebula is not the whole, but only a part of the cause of the present order of Nature. It accounts for the formation of the heavenly bodies and for their movements; it also accounts for the

[1] After mature consideration of this book, we feel bound to say of it: *Non tali auxilio, nec defensoribus istis.*

dynamic phenomena investigated by physical science; but it does not in the least degree account for the origin of life, or for organic evolution, or for the facts of psychology, or of any of the higher or philosophical sciences. The supposition of Laplace, that a perfect mathematician, who had had an opportunity of examining the original nebula, would have been able to calculate unerringly the whole of the subsequent history of the world, is, on the face of it, ridiculously false. Not only would such a calculator have been unable to predict the appearance of life, consciousness, and reason, but inasmuch as mind influences the motion of matter in various ways, he would have been unable to calculate correctly even physical events. He could not, for instance, have predicted the appearance on the earth of tools, or houses, or machinery, which, though physical events, are dependent upon mind for their production. Evolution, then, can only be accounted for by supposing the continuous action upon the world of a supernatural cause, leading created things towards a perfection which they are not naturally capable of attaining, and guiding and directing the blind forces of Nature towards a predetermined and rational end.

Materialists seek to avoid this conclusion by saying that although life and consciousness and reason were not *actually* in the nebula, they were there *potentially*. This, however, is only an obscure and mystifying way of saying that though they

were not there at first, they came to be there afterwards. The mysterious word "potentially," as used by materialists, is a kind of philosophical red herring drawn across the track of the argument to prevent the unwary from perceiving the undeniable fact that life and consciousness *were not there.* But if they were not there originally, but came to be there afterwards, there must have been some cause why they came to be there. And since things which do not yet exist cannot cause their own existence, and since purely blind and physical forces cannot of themselves give rise to the infinitely higher phenomena of consciousness and reason, it follows that a *Supernatural Cause* co-operated with the physical forces of Nature in producing them.[1]

The wise words of Aristotle on this subject are worth remembering: "Those philosophers who, like the Pythagoreans and Speusippus, adopt the supposition that what is best and fairest in the universe is not to be found in the principle of things [because plants and animals are developed from potential germs], do not form their opinions correctly. For seed arises from other natures that are antecedent and perfect, and the perfect organism comes first, not the seed' (*Metaphysics*, xi. 7).

[1] It requires an intelligent cause to make the potential actual. This Manual of Apologetics is potential in the compositor's box of type, but it requires the intelligence of the writer and of the compositor to make it actual.

(2) The chain of causation in the evolutionary process is not continuous, but broken at various points, so that there arise from time to time certain "new beginnings," which cannot be accounted for as effects of what went before, and which therefore must be assumed to have had a miraculous origin. Prof. Emil du Bois-Reymond's famous *Ignorabimus* speech, delivered in 1880, is the *locus classicus* on this point. The Berlin professor enumerated no fewer than seven "world-enigmas" impossible or extremely difficult of solution. They were:

(i.) The nature of matter and force;

(ii.) The origin of motion;

(iii.) The origin of life;

(iv.) The apparently pre-ordained orderly arrangement of Nature;

(v.) The origin of simple sensation and consciousness;

(vi.) The origin of rational thought, and of the cognate faculty of speech;

(vii.) The freedom of the will.

Of these he regarded the first, the second, and the fifth to be for ever insoluble. The third, the fourth, and the sixth he regarded as *possibly* capable of solution, though extremely difficult. As to the last, he expressed himself undecided. On all these points he declared that the deliberate verdict of science was: *Ignoramus, ignorabimus.* No advance has been made by science towards solving these enigmas since 1880. Indeed, one of them, the origin of life, which some of the more

hopeful spirits in 1880 regarded as soluble, is now involved in greater obscurity than ever. Dr. E. B. Wilson, the eminent American biologist, in a recent technical work on cell-development, writes as follows: "The study of the cell has, on the whole, seemed to widen rather than to narrow the enormous gap that separates even the lowest forms of life from the inorganic world. . . . I am well aware that to many such a conclusion may appear reactionary or even to involve a renunciation of what has been regarded as the ultimate aim of biology. In reply to such a criticism, I can only express my conviction that the magnitude of the problem of development, whether ontogenetic[1] or phylogenetic,[2] has been underestimated; and that the progress of science is retarded rather than advanced by a premature attack upon its ultimate problems' (*The Cell in Development and Inheritance*, 1900, p. 434).[3]

It is necessary, then, to admit that in the present state of our scientific knowledge it is impossible

[1] *Ontogenetic* = of individual organisms.

[2] *Phylogenetic* = of species.

[3] The speculation of Lord Kelvin and von Helmholtz that life was introduced into this planet by a meteorite which contained in some crevice a living organism, is almost universally regarded as impossible. Prof. K. Pearson says: "Our experience of meteorites—especially the intense cold they are subjected to in space, and the intense heat they undergo in passing through our atmosphere, together with the probability that they are fragments of azoic, rather than of zoic bodies—does not allow of much significance being attributed to this pleasant conceit" (*Grammar of Science*, pp. 347-8).

to explain the existing facts of the world, without having recourse to the hypothesis of miracles. It may be, and is, unwise to build too much on the existing gaps in our knowledge, but it is equally unwise to ignore them; and since some of them, according to the best authorities, *never can be filled*, it would be wrong not to draw such provisional conclusions as the facts suggest. Setting aside, then, the two questions of creation and of the appearances of design in Nature, science in its present condition is obliged to postulate unadulterated miracles to account for (i.) the origin of motion, (ii.) the origin of life, (iii.) the origin of consciousness, (iv.) the origin of reason, and (v.) the origin of moral freedom. Even if it be assumed, against the weight of authority, that motion is eternal, that life is mechanical motion, and that moral freedom is an illusion, there still remain (i.) consciousness and (ii.) reason to be accounted for. And since few persons are now sanguine enough to suppose that a natural origin will ever be found for these, science will probably always have to assume that two miraculous events at least have really occurred. We are not surprised, therefore, to find one of the most eminent of contemporary scientific men declaring, "I cannot say that with regard to the origin of life Science neither affirms nor denies creative power. *Science positively affirms creating and directive power, which she compels us to accept as an article of belief*" (Lord Kelvin, in the *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1903).

II.—Philosophy and Miracles

After a proof from natural science that miracles have actually taken place, it seems superfluous to prove that they are possible. Since, however, their possibility has been denied on philosophical grounds, a brief consideration of the question is desirable.

The whole problem of the possibility of miracles turns upon the view that is taken of the nature of God, and of His relation to the universe. If He is a Being distinct from the universe and morally free, as Theists maintain that He is, the possibility of miracles cannot for a moment be denied. If, on the other hand, He is identical with Nature, as the Pantheists affirm, or if, having created the world, He left it to work out its own destiny under the operation of general laws, as the eighteenth-century Deists imagined, then miracles are impossible. Much has already been said in disproof of Pantheism and Deism, but it is still desirable to consider them in a little more detail in connection with the problem of miracles.

(1) *Deism.*—From the Deistic point of view, M. Renan states the argument against miracles in the following form. "Miracles," he says, "are special interpositions like those of a watchmaker, who, although he has made a very fine watch, yet is compelled to regulate it from time to time in order to compensate for the insufficiency of the mechanism."

We reply—

(*a*) That the relation of God to the world is not

in the least like that of a watchmaker to a watch. God is *immanent* in the world, sustaining it in existence every moment by His almighty will, and concurring in all its operations. He is, as Scripture says, the Life of the world, upholding all things by the Word of His Power. The religious proof of this is the fact that the human soul holds actual dynamic communion with God through Nature and through conscience (see ch. vii.). Science also demands an immanent First Cause. Prof. Le Conte says (*Evolution*, p. 300): "[Science demands] the frank return to the old idea of direct divine agency, but in a new, more rational, less anthropomorphic form,—the belief in a God not far away beyond our reach, but a God *immanent*, a God resident *in* Nature, at all times and in all places directing every event, and determining every phenomenon—a God in whom in the most literal sense not only we, but all things have their being, in whom all things consist, through whom all things exist, and without whom there would be and could be nothing."

(*b*) The doctrine of Evolution, unknown to the earlier Deists, shows that it is God's will that the universe should not be perfect at the first, but should gradually advance towards perfection. But the process of Evolution implies, as has been already proved, a continuous divine action upon the world of a supernatural and miraculous character.

(*c*) There has been an interruption of the divine plans brought about by human and superhuman sin. Disorder has been introduced into the universe,

and thus it has become necessary for God to work *redemptive miracles* to restore the violated order of Nature.

(2) *Pantheism.*—The system of Pantheism has closer affinities with modern thought than Deism, and some of the strongest objections to miracles are based upon it. The classical statement of the Pantheistic argument against miracles is the sixth chapter of Spinoza's *Theologico-Political Treatise*, published in 1670. He there argues—

(*a*) That Nature is a full manifestation of the divine knowledge and will; that God wills all that He knows and all that He is capable of willing; and that consequently Nature exhausts all that there is in God, and actually *is* God. "The laws of Nature," he says, "embrace everything conceived by the divine intellect. . . . The power and efficiency of Nature are in themselves the divine power and efficiency."

(*b*) From this he concludes: "Any event happening in Nature which contravened Nature's universal laws would necessarily also contravene the divine decree, nature, and understanding; or if any one asserted that God acts in contravention of the laws of Nature, he *ipso facto* would be compelled to assert that God acted against His own nature—a manifest absurdity."

The reply is that God is *not* identical with Nature, and does *not* will all that He knows, and all that He is capable of willing. We have shown that His immeasurable Being transcends the world to an

infinite extent; and that His will is adequate to the production and government not only of this present world, but of all conceivable or possible worlds. There is therefore an infinite reserve of power in God, which makes miracles for ever possible. This reserve has actually been drawn upon, from time to time, for the production of new creatures, which, as we have shown, could never have come into existence through the operation of the already existing forces of Nature. (See above, sect. i., and *cf.* ch. ii.)

(3) *Scepticism.*—The sceptical argument of Hume, which is regarded by many modern Agnostics as a decisive disproof of the possibility of miracles, is stated by its author, with his usual lucidity of style, in the tenth section of his *Enquiry concerning Human Understanding*. "A miracle," he says, "is a violation of the laws of Nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined."

Hume himself regarded his argument as invulnerable. "I flatter myself," he says, "that I have discovered an argument which, if just, will, with the wise and learned, be an everlasting check to all kinds of superstitious delusion, and, consequently, will be useful as long as the world endures."

His argument is, however, vulnerable at several points.

(i.) Miracles are not correctly described as

"violations of the laws of Nature." They are not even suspensions of those laws. Their method of operation is analogous to that of human volition. When the human will acts upon the external world, and produces a sensible effect, it does not thereby violate any law of Nature. When, for instance, a man raises a stone weighing a hundredweight, and holds it in his hands, he does not in so doing violate or suspend the law of gravitation. That law continues in full force, as is proved by the continuance of the sensation of weight; but the effect of the law is counteracted by the operation of the greater force of the human muscles, directed by the human will. Similarly, when God works a miracle, it is not supposed by theologians that any of the laws of Nature are suspended, but that God counteracts or modifies some of the effects which those laws would ordinarily produce, by a process analogous to that by which the human will acts upon and influences physical Nature. This is admitted by John Mill, who says, "The interference of human will with the course of Nature is not an exception to law; and by the same rule interference by the divine will would not be an exception either" (*Three Essays*, p. 227).

(ii.) Hume says that a firm and unalterable experience has established the strict invariability of the laws of Nature.

To this we reply:

(*a*) That the strict invariability of the laws of nature is a truth not of experience, but of *faith*.

It not only has not yet been proved by experience, but never can be proved. (See ch. x.)

(*b*) Science has shown that certain miracles, such as the origin of life, of consciousness, and of reason, have actually taken place. (See sect. i. of this chapter.)

(*c*) No one even so much as pretends that the most important of all the phenomena of Nature—namely, those of human conduct—have up to the present time been proved to be uniform. When biographies of great men and histories of nations are correctly written in advance, it will be time to discuss the question whether the strict uniformity of Nature has been proved by any "firm and unalterable experience." At the present moment even the weather cannot be confidently predicted twenty-four hours beforehand.

(*d*) There is much evidence, some of it extremely circumstantial and strong, that phenomena not readily to be explained by natural causes have actually occurred and still occur. Hume himself mentions the then recent miracles wrought in France at the tomb of Abbé Paris, the famous Jansenist, which were so undeniable that even the Jesuits, who were bitterly hostile to Jansenist opinions, and had the support of the civil magistrate, were unable to challenge their truth. "Many of the miracles," says Hume, "were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the

most eminent theatre that is now in the world. The curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were everywhere talked of as the usual effects of this holy sepulchre." He also alludes to a marvellous Spanish miracle attested by such irreproachable evidence, that even the sceptical Cardinal de Retz was unable to detect a flaw in it; and to two miracles of the Emperor Vespasian at Alexandria, attested by no less an authority than the sceptical and philosophic historian Tacitus. Indeed, Hume himself admits—"So long as the world endures, I presume, will the accounts of sacred miracles and prodigies be found in all history, sacred and profane."

But if there is all this profusion of strong evidence in favour of miracles, what becomes of the assertion that "a firm and unalterable experience" has established the unvarying uniformity of Nature, and that "the proof against a miracle is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined"? Even Mill admits that at this point Hume has blundered. "[Hume's] argument," he says, "has the appearance of assuming that the testimony of experience against miracles is undeviating and indubitable, as it would be, if the whole question was about the probability of future miracles, none having taken place in the past; whereas the very thing asserted on the other side is that there have been miracles, and that the testimony of experience is not wholly on the negative side. All the evidence alleged in favour of any miracle ought

to be reckoned as counter-evidence in refutation of the ground on which it is asserted that miracles ought to be disbelieved. The question can only be stated fairly as depending on a balance of evidence: a certain amount of positive evidence in favour of miracles, and a negative presumption from the general course of human experience against them."

Mill also correctly observes that all the evidence against miracles is *negative evidence*, and that such evidence is much weaker than positive. It is proverbially difficult to prove a negative, and to prove such sweeping negatives as those of Hume, is, in the actual state of the evidence, impossible. Hume is quite right in drawing attention to the fact that many miracles are false and fraudulent; but when he proceeds to argue from this that *all* are false or fraudulent, he is manifestly guilty of special pleading.[1] Different miracles differ greatly in the character of their attestation. Some are evidently false; others weakly attested; others are attested by evidence so cogent, that, unless one has made up one's mind beforehand that miracles never happen, it is extremely hard to disbelieve them.

Hume has another argument against the credibility of miracles, which he admits is somewhat subtle.

[1] To argue that because some miracles are false, all are so, is as unreasonable as to argue that because Herodotus makes many false statements in his *History*, nothing in it is to be believed.

He says that the alleged miracles of different forms of faith mutually cancel one another. Thus Mahometan and Pagan miracles cancel Christian miracles; Roman Catholic miracles cancel Jansenist and Protestant miracles, etc.

But inasmuch as all the chief religions contain much that is good, it is perfectly credible that God allows supernatural powers to be exercised by men of very different religious persuasions. As to miracles alleged to be wrought in aid of falsehood and wickedness, these, if genuine, must be regarded as diabolical miracles.[1]

Upon the whole, then, seeing that in all ages and countries miracles are alleged to happen, and that there exists in this country an Incorporated Royal Society for the scientific investigation of alleged supernatural phenomena, it cannot be said, upon the evidence, that there is any effective presumption against the occasional occurrence of miracles.

(*d*) But the chief defect of Hume's argument is its neglect to take into account the question of

[1] The possibility of diabolical miracles must always be a serious one to those who believe in superhuman intelligences. There is a tendency in these days to regard belief in angels and devils as intrinsically absurd. In reality it is a thoroughly philosophical belief. "At present," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "in the cosmic scheme we strangely draw the line at man. We know of every grade of life from the amœba upwards—but the series terminates with man. From man the scale of existence is supposed to step to God. Is it not somewhat sudden? The step in the other direction from man to the amœba is as nothing to it. Why this sudden jump from the altitude of man into infinity? Are there no intermediate states of existence?" (*Hibbert Journal*, Jan., 1903).

the existence of a personal God. If there is no God, then, of course, miracles are impossible; but if there is a God, then no philosophy can prove them impossible. As Mill well says, "[Hume's argument] is far from being equally [conclusive] when the existence of a Being who created the present order of Nature, and therefore may well be thought to have the power to modify it, is accepted as a fact, or even as a probability resting on independent evidence. Once admit a God, and the production by His direct volition of an effect which, in any case, owed its origin to His creative will, is no longer an arbitrary hypothesis to account for the fact, but must be reckoned with as a serious possibility."

The objection advanced by Mill seems to have occurred to Hume himself, for towards the end of his famous chapter he remarks that the fact that a miracle is alleged to have the Almighty for its Author, does not make it a whit more probable, because, says he, "it is impossible for us to know the attributes or actions of such a Being, otherwise than from the experience which we have of His productions in the usual course of Nature." To this we reply that it is not through external nature, but through conscience, that the most valuable part of our knowledge of God's attributes comes to us, and that therefore we *have* independent knowledge as to how, under exceptional moral and spiritual circumstances, He may be expected to behave. The evidence

for miracles is, in fact, as much spiritual as historical.

III.—Answers to Prayer

On the principle that the greater includes the less, the proof of the possibility of miracles proper is also a proof of the possibility of answers to prayer. A few words may be added on the theory of the subject. Assuming prayers to be really answered—and all religions make this assumption—two theories of the method are possible. One is that God, knowing from eternity what prayers would be offered, and which of them He would answer, so fixed the order of Nature at the creation, that answers to prayers are given by the operation of the natural laws. The other theory is that God answers prayer at the time that it is made by a direct supernatural influence upon the forces of Nature, or upon human souls, analogous to the influence which the human will exerts upon Nature and upon other souls. The second theory seems more worthy of God, and more in accordance with that direct personal dealing between God and the individual soul which constitutes vital religion.

Some persons have supposed that God does not or cannot answer prayers for temporal benefits, and that therefore it is illegitimate to pray for rain, or fair weather, or bountiful harvests. This supposition cannot be justified either from the philosophical or from the scientific point of view. Physical nature is not a cast-iron system, incapable

of modification by the action of intelligent will. Even the human will can act upon Nature, without any breach of natural laws, and therefore *a fortiori* the divine will can do so. "Prayer for rain," says Sir Oliver Lodge, "need involve no greater interference with the order of Nature than is implied in a request to a gardener to water the garden" (*Hibbert Journal*, Oct., 1902).[1]

APPENDIX I

MIRACLES AND THE FREEDOM OF THE WILL

There is a very close connection between the philosophical doctrine that the human will is free and the theological doctrine that miracles are possible. If liberty is a fact, the human will is not subject to those laws of mechanical

[1] There is a strong philosophical reaction at present against the crude mechanical view of the universe which renders prayer useless and miracles impossible. M. Fonsegrive says (*Essai sur le Libre Arbitre*, p. 360), "Since the publication of the first edition of this essay in 1887, the movement in favour of the theory of the contingency of events, begun or revived by MM. Renouvier and Boutroux, has become accentuated. Deterministic Necessitarianism has lost some of its influence over men's minds, as they have gradually come to see how extremely narrow are the limits of positive science." MM. Ch. Renouvier and L. Prat, in their *La Nouvelle Monadologie*, speak still more decidedly. (See particularly p. 133 ff.) In America there action has gone so far that Mr. C. S. Pierce advocates the existence of chance in the universe, and calls himself a *Tychist*. (See the *Monist*, April, 1892.) Even Prof. Wm. James regards the theory of chance as preferable to that of mechanical determinism (*The Will to Believe*, p. 145 ff.). The metaphysics of the subject are well discussed in *De la Contingence des Lois de la Nature*, by M. Boutroux.

uniformity which prevail in the material world, but belongs to a higher order of being altogether. Its action, therefore, upon physical nature, regarded from the standpoint of physical science, is the intrusion of a higher and incalculable power—in other words, a *miracle*. This explains the extreme reluctance of opponents of religion to admit the fact of free-will. If they admit it, they admit a *perpetual miracle*, and, therefore, cannot easily deny the possibility of other miracles.

APPENDIX II

MIRACLES AND THE RATIONALITY OF THE UNIVERSE

It is sometimes said that belief in miracles introduces intellectual chaos into philosophy, and renders natural science and the science of history impossible.

We reply:

(1) That miracles are too rare to render the order of nature doubtful, and therefore do not interfere with natural science.

(2) That the incalculable action of the human will does not render the science of history impossible, and therefore the incalculable action of *miracle* does not either.

(3) That though miracles cannot be predicted, they can be seen to have a rational purpose. The Resurrection of Jesus, for example, was intended to reveal the fact of a future life. Now belief in a future life is, as we have shown, necessary to a thoroughly rational view of the universe. It follows, therefore, that the miracle of the Resurrection, which establishes that belief, establishes also the rationality of the universe.

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CHAPTER XVII

THE CHRISTIAN REVELATION

SUMMARY.—The imperfections of Natural Religion render a Supernatural Revelation antecedently credible. A Supernatural Revelation requires confirmation by miracles. Christianity possesses the characteristics of a perfect religion, and therefore the evidences of its truth are worthy of serious examination.

1.—THE CREDIBILITY OF A SUPERNATURAL REVELATION

"IT is natural," says Mr. Illingworth, "that in proportion to our belief in a Personal God, we should expect that He would reveal Himself to man; not merely to a favoured few, but to the human race as such. For the desire of self-communication is, as we have seen, an essential function of our own personality; it is part of what we mean by the word; and we cannot conceive a person freely creating persons, except with a view to hold intercourse with them when created." Some sort of a revelation, or manifestation of God to His creatures, is therefore antecedently probable, and as a matter of fact, all nations, or nearly all, have believed that real revelations have been vouchsafed to them.

It may be objected, however, that God has sufficiently revealed Himself in Nature, and that therefore a supernatural or supplementary revelation is not to be looked for.

We have no desire to disparage the religion of Nature, for we are convinced that it furnishes the only solid foundation upon which the fabric of revealed religion can be reared. We admit that those who have the time and the inclination for abstract thought, and who are able to divest themselves of all prejudice, and follow reason wherever it guides them, are able to attain a reasonable assurance that there is a good God who loves His creatures, and that the soul is immortal, and that after death there are rewards for the righteous and punishments for the wicked. It may be that in the absence of all sin and prejudice these facts would be so luminous and plain to every human being, that they could no more be denied than the laws of thought or the axioms of Euclid. But in the existing state of the world there is so much sin and prejudice, that it is difficult for men to attain strict truth upon any subject whatsoever outside pure mathematics. Admitting, then, to the full, that in an unfallen world reason would infallibly attain to a true knowledge of God, we still contend that in a world like this, in which the most deadly errors—religious, moral, and political—everywhere prevail and are most difficult to refute successfully, a republication of the principles of Natural Religion in a supernatural

and impressive manner by the Author of Nature Himself is most desirable, and therefore entirely credible.

Natural Religion rests upon strong and solid arguments, but even its most ardent friends do not venture to maintain that it has ever yet on its own merits established itself as the creed of any nation. A philosopher here and there, a Socrates, or an Aristotle, or a Cicero, has perceived its truth, but not one of them succeeded in making its cult popular. The attempt of the English and French Deists in the eighteenth century to establish a religion of Nature proved a complete failure. The modern Unitarians have set themselves the same task, but, so far as we can see, without any real prospect of success. Unitarianism, however the fact may be explained, does not commend itself to religiously minded men. It seems to be an unstable halting-place for those who are making the journey from Faith to Agnosticism, or from Agnosticism to Faith. Its tone is not devotional. It inspires no enthusiasm, sends out few missionaries, and seems likely to be crushed out of existence between the two real competitors for the allegiance of the modern world, Christianity and Unbelief. The only seemingly successful attempt to found a philosophic religion is that of the Neo-Platonists in the third and fourth centuries A.D. But this is no real exception to the rule, for the Neo-Platonists, in order to make their system a success, incorporated into it bodily the whole supernatural

machinery of Paganism. For reasons which it is difficult to explain fully, but which must lie deep in human nature, Natural Religion has never succeeded in propagating itself apart from Revealed Religion. Its principles are of the highest value, and fortunately are now professed by more than half the human race; but men have learnt them, not through Philosophy, but through the great monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, all of which are based upon faith in a revelation. Nor is there any reason for supposing that Natural Religion is any more able to stand alone now than it ever was. So far as we can see, it still needs the support of revelation to give it stability. Those who at the present day lose belief in revelation, generally become, not Deists or Unitarians, but Agnostics or Pantheists. In theory, the personality of God and the immortality of the soul are truths of reason; but in practice those who reject revelation find it hard to attain them, and still harder to hold them with sufficient firmness to make them real motives of action. The human mind is so constituted that it shrinks from trusting too absolutely to abstract reasoning. A man may be convinced by the most cogent philosophical arguments that there is a personal God and that the soul is immortal; He may be unable to detect any flaw in these proofs, and may in addition be able to answer all the Agnostic objections against them. Nevertheless, his mind craves for independent verification. He wishes

for a supernatural message from the Author of Nature Himself to convince him that his reason has not erred. No one with any real knowledge of human nature will deny this.

II.—The Miraculous Attestation of Revelation

Without going so far as to say that physical miracles are indispensably necessary to attest a revelation, we nevertheless maintain that they are in the highest degree desirable. As there is a tendency in some quarters to deny this, we desire to lay particular stress upon it.

The great danger to which Theism is always exposed, is that of degeneration into Pantheism. The Monotheism of Cicero and of Plutarch lapsed in the second and third Christian centuries into Neo-Platonism, which degraded the living, personal God into an abstract and impersonal First Cause. The religions of India, originally polytheistic and personal, have for many ages been fundamentally pantheistic. Nor is this tendency confined to ancient times or to the East. The recent Hegelian movement is a form of philosophic Pantheism, and Mr. Spencer's doctrine of "the Unknowable" is a scientific Pantheism. The progress of physical science, which is continually reducing seeming disorder to order, and extending the reign of law to phenomena which were once regarded as lawless and incalculable, is making it difficult for many minds to retain their belief in the personal God of Theology and of the human heart, Who cherishes

a tender individual love for every human soul. The earthquake, the tornado, and the pestilence overwhelm in a common destruction the saint and the sinner. Nature seems an adamantine system of blind, resistless forces, which roll on for ever, careless of human needs and human tears or groans. The student of physical Nature moves amid the complications of an apparently soulless machine, and the conclusion seems forced upon him that if there is a God at all, He is bound and fettered by His own laws, and incapable of any independent action upon Nature. It is true that this way of arguing is illogical, and that men ought to form their ideas of God from *man* and not from Nature; but the fact remains that the seeming inexorableness of physical Nature, and its comparative failure[1] to draw moral distinctions, are difficulties that all men feel acutely at times, and which in a scientific age like the present are particularly insistent and paralyzing. What therefore is imperatively required in a revelation designed to satisfy human needs and to supply the defects of purely natural religion, is such a supernatural interference with the mechanical uniformity of Nature as shall make it clear that Nature is ruled by a personal Being friendly to the human race, and attentive to the needs of individual men. The presumption against the personality (or the benevolence) of the Author of Nature, created by cyclones

[1] Nature does draw moral distinctions to some extent. See ch. xiv.

and devastating eruptions, requires to be rebutted by the contrary evidence of miracles of mercy such as those recorded in the Gospels.[1]

The other pressing problem of religion—a problem never more pressing than at the present time—is the question of human immortality. The philosophical arguments in favour of it are strong, and the scientific arguments against it can be shown to be without weight; nevertheless every cautious reasoner feels the urgent need of some corroborative evidence to clinch the matter. The actual resurrection of a corpse, or at least the return of a spirit, is wanted to show that the world beyond

[1] How strongly this need of a miraculous interference with the monotony of natural law is felt, may be illustrated by the following powerful passage from Mr. Blatchford's little book *God and my Neighbour*: "Christ was not justified in claiming that God is a better Father to man, than man is to his own children. 'Who among you, if his child asks bread, will give him a stone?' None among us. But in the great famines, as in India and Russia, God allows millions to die of starvation. These His children pray to Him for bread. He leaves them to die. Is it not so? He has for millions of years looked down on the ignorance, the misery, the crimes of man. For thousands of years—perhaps for millions of years—the generations of men prayed to God for help, for comfort, for guidance. God was deaf, and dumb, and blind. A tidal wave rolls landward, and twenty thousand human beings are drowned or crushed to death. A volcano bursts suddenly into eruption, and a beautiful city is a heap of ruins, and its inhabitants are charred or mangled corpses. And the heavenly Father who is love, has power to save, and makes no sign. Is it not so? Blindness, epilepsy, leprosy, madness, fall like a dreadful blight upon a myriad of God's children, and the Heavenly Father gives neither guidance nor consolation. Only man helps man. Only man pities; only man *tries* to save."

the grave, to which Philosophy points, really exists. It is not, therefore, an argument against Christianity, but rather a strong one in its favour, that it claims to demonstrate the reality of a future life by the miraculous resurrection of its Founder. Miracles of resurrection are those which are most wanted, and are therefore those which are most likely to happen in a genuine revelation intended to meet human needs. There are some who maintain that Christianity must get rid of its miracles, if it wishes to be universally accepted. We maintain, on the contrary, that its miracles are its strength, and that it is credible just because it offers that miraculous attestation of religion which reason shows to be necessary. A revelation which did not offer miraculous attestation of such fundamental truths as the personality of God, of His sympathy with the individual soul, and of a future life, would lie under the gravest suspicion of not being a revelation at all, but a mere human invention.

III.—The Characteristics of a Perfect Religion

In order to ascertain what form a true revelation may be expected to take, it is necessary to consider what would be the characteristics of the most perfect conceivable religion.

An absolutely perfect religion—perfect, that is to say, from the point of view of human needs—would—

(1) Reveal truly the nature of God, so far as it is necessary for man to know it;

(2) Bring about a perfect reconciliation between the sinner and his God;

(3) Render sinless perfection possible for fallen man;

(4) Achieve the supreme end of religion, the most perfect and intimate union conceivable between the worshipper and the object of worship;

(5) Unite mankind in social bonds of love and brotherhood.

These, be it observed, are the ideals not only of Christianity, but of all religions, and they therefore form a reliable criterion for judging the merits of a supposed revelation. A revelation is not necessarily true because it satisfies them—the historical claims of the revelation to acceptance would still require to be considered—but nevertheless any revelation which satisfies them fully, or even in large measure, merits a full and impartial inquiry into its evidences. On the other hand, a religion which does not satisfy them at all, or only to a very slight extent, is obviously false, and does not require serious consideration.

The case for Christianity is that it satisfies these ideals far more perfectly than any other religion, and therefore has the best claim to be considered true. Whether it actually is true or not, is a matter for further investigation.

IV.—Christianity as the Ideal or Perfect Religion

We proceed now to take the points which

characterize a perfect religion in order, and to inquire how far Christianity appears to satisfy them.

(1) As to the nature of the Deity, Christianity reveals that He is personal, and is most adequately described not by metaphysical terms, such as the First Cause, the Infinite, and the Absolute, but as the Father of spirits. Not God's power or immensity, but His spiritual affinity to man, His moral personality, His holiness, His tender sympathy, and His unutterable redemptive love, are the main themes of the Gospel. If Christianity does not satisfy all the demands of the speculative intellect, it satisfies in the fullest manner the demands of the human heart. The personality of God is the life of religion. Science and Philosophy may perhaps content themselves with an abstract First Cause, but the only God that can satisfy the soul is one who cherishes with tender love every soul that He has made. The main message, then, of Christianity to the world is the true and proper personality of the Creator, and His love to man, as revealed in the Incarnation. It would have been possible for God to have made this revelation by means of prophecy. But when the fulness of time was come, a far more satisfying method was adopted. "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by His Son" (Heb. i. 1). The Incarnation of the Son of God, as it actually occurred, does not strike the mind at first as being

worthy of Omnipotence. It seems derogatory to the Divine Nature to take upon itself human limitations, to be born, to be tempted, to suffer, and to die. But regarded from the point of view of man's needs, the Incarnation is the most satisfactory kind of revelation conceivable. The following points may be briefly noticed. Some of them will be dealt with more fully hereafter.

(*a*) The Incarnation made God intelligible. It brought Him down from the abstract into the concrete, and made plain men and women, unskilled in abstract thought, able to understand more of the Divine Nature than the profoundest philosophers had understood before. "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him" (John i. 18).

(*b*) By becoming incarnate as an individual man, and not as an influence in the whole human race, the Son of God revealed in the clearest manner the Divine Personality. If He had become incarnate in the race, the Divine Personality would have been obscured, and encouragement would have been given to pantheistic conceptions of the Divine Nature.

(*c*) By becoming incarnate as an individual man, the Son of God revealed the importance of human personality, and the infinite value of the individual human soul.

(*d*) By being conceived and born, the Son of God sanctified human life from its first beginnings.

In the ancient world, which did not regard infanticide as a crime, this teaching was particularly needed.

(*e*) By becoming subject to human limitations, to temptation, and even to pain, sorrow, and death, the Son of God revealed in the most practical possible manner the infinite compassion of God, and His sympathy with human suffering.

(*f*) By becoming poor, He taught men that riches and honours are not the highest goods, and that the very poorest can be virtuous, religious, and happy. By becoming poor He also taught the rich to respect the poor, and to treat them kindly.

(*g*) By living an actual human life, He set a perfect example for men to follow. Precepts are good, but example is better.

(2) The Incarnation made possible a complete reconciliation between God and man.

Superficial thinkers have affirmed that no reconciliation is necessary, or that if it is, it can be effected by human penitence. There is truth in this, but only a half-truth. It is quite true that penitence is the natural and fitting atonement for sin. Thus when one human being sins against another, penitence is accepted as an adequate atonement. Even in the case of a sin against God, a really adequate repentance would be an adequate atonement. But the awakened conscience of man knows that this is impossible. His penitence for sin, like all his other virtuous acts, is weak and ineffectual, and he needs some transforming power

that will make his penitence perfect. The Incarnation provides for this. The incarnate Son of God, as the head of the human race, and as responsible for it, renders to God adequate sorrow for the sins of the world, and gives individual men grace to attain deeper and deeper penitence, until in the end their penitenee will become perfect, and God will accept it as adequate.

(3) The Incarnation makes sinless perfection possible, not at once, but in due course. It effects this not simply by the inspiring effect of Christ's perfect example, but by means of constant supplies of supernatural grace given to those who are really walking by faith. According to the Christian theory, Christ, by virtue of His Holy Incarnation, becomes the new ancestor of the human race. As by our natural birth and training we inherit the evil nature and sinful tendencies of our ancestors, so by our new and spiritual birth we are made partakers of Christ's holy and sinless human nature, and in its strength are enabled to obtain complete victory over sin. This sounds mystical, and to some minds fanciful, but it represents the central and vital religious experience of Christians. All who have advanced far in the religious life testify that through Christ they have been brought into vital union with God, and have received a new strength against the powers of evil.

(4) The supreme end of religion is complete union between the worshipper and the object of worship. This is brought about in the most perfect conceiv-

able manner by the Incarnation. In Christ human nature is personally united to God, and since individual believers are related to Christ as members to the head, or as branches to the vine, they are thereby brought into a supernatural union with the life of God. In this world the full fruition of this divine life is not attained; but in the world to come, when human nature has been perfected through suffering, and cleansed from all stain of sin, every true believer will see God as He is, and will be united to Him perfectly by knowledge and love, and will so fully partake of His nature as to be in a manner "deified."

Some forms of religion, such as Buddhism, profess to offer a closer union with God even than this. They teach that the soul is destined at the last to be absorbed altogether into the Divine Nature. This, however, is not really a doctrine of union at all, but of annihilation, and is therefore immeasurably inferior to the Christian doctrine of the Beatific Vision.

(5) A perfect religion must inculcate universal benevolence, and the active and unselfish service of man. Moreover, since man is naturally a social animal, a perfect religion must be social. Now, Christianity possesses both these characteristics in a marked degree. It inculcates mutual benevolence and helpfulness more completely and successfully even than Buddhism. It also meets the social or gregarious instinct of man by presenting itself in the form of a visible, organized Church. Some

modern forms of Christianity have discarded the Church idea, but Christ's own purpose was certainly to found a visible, authoritative Church, and all the historic Churches of Christendom confess this.

We conclude, then, that Christianity perfectly fulfils the ideal requisites of a universal religion,[1] and that therefore its historic claims to be a genuine revelation deserve candid and careful investigation.

APPENDIX I

BUDDHISM AND CHRISTIANITY

It is sometimes claimed for Buddhism that it inculcates a moral standard as exalted as that of Christianity, and it is certainly true that some of the founder's sayings are worthy of a place in the New Testament. For example, Gautama was once asked, What is the highest happiness of man? and he replied, "To serve wise men and not to serve fools; to give honour to whom honour is due; to have right desires for oneself; to succour father and mother; to cherish wife and child;[2] to follow a peaceful calling; to give alms and live

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[1] It should be particularly noted that Christianity is the only religion capable of accommodating itself to all races and all civilizations. It is this because it is less a religion of institutions than of *principles*. Its only positive social institution is *monogamy*, which is natural to the whole human race. Its only *religious* institutions are the Apostolic Ministry and the Holy Sacraments. Judaism and Mahometanism, on the other hand, are religions of *institutions*, and thus lack elasticity and adaptability.

[2] Gautama is speaking of ordinary adherents of his doctrines living in the world. His more earnest followers are celibates and mendicants.

righteously; to help one's relatives and do blameless deeds; to cease and abstain from sin; to eschew strong drink; not to be weary in well doing; reverence and lowliness, contentment and gratitude, the regular hearing of the law; to be long-suffering and meek; to associate with members of the Sangha;[1] religious talk at due seasons; temperance and chastity; a conviction of the Four Great Truths; the hope of Nirvana; a mind unshaken by the things of the world, without anguish or passion, and secure,—this is the greatest blessing. They that act like this are invincible on every side, on every side they walk in safety, and theirs is the greatest blessing."

We fully admit that many of these sentiments are not unworthy of Christ Himself. When, however, it is seriously maintained that the religion of Buddha is equal or superior to that of Christ, it is necessary to enter an emphatic protest. In the first place, it is a system of unmitigated Pessimism. The Four Great Truths of the Buddhist religion are these:

(1) That misery always accompanies existence;

(2) That existence results from passion or desire;

(3) That there is no escape from existence except by destruction of desire;

(4) That the destruction of desire may be accomplished by following the fourfold way to Nirvana.

The pessimism of Gautama is as radical as that of those Western pessimists who counsel universal suicide. Gautama and his disciples only refrain from suicide because they regard suicide as insufficient of itself to end existence. Death is followed, except for those who have attained Buddhistic perfection, by an endless series of transmigrations into other bodies, in which the sins committed in previous states of existence are mercilessly chastised. The only way to attain annihilation is to practise the strictest asceticism, and to extinguish the very desire to live. When all desire has been

[1] The monks or mendicants of Buddhism.

extinguished, and not till then, the soul at death enters into Nirvana—that is, is absolutely annihilated.

Christianity, on the other hand, is an optimism. It believes that life is worth living, that the evils of the world are capable of remedy, and that for the righteous there is reserved, after death, an exceeding great reward.

Buddhism, in spite of its precept of universal benevolence, is upon the whole a reactionary, paralyzing, and unethical creed. It is *unethical*, because its whole system of transmigrations is vitiated by a fundamental injustice. Europeans generally imagine that the personal, individual soul is by Buddhists supposed to pass from body to body, and to be punished with retributive justice for sins committed in a previous state of existence. This would, of course, be strictly just, but it is not the doctrine of Gautama. According to him, the individual soul perishes at death, and that what passes on to the next incarnation is not the soul, but its *Karma*. This Karma is the sum of the merits and demerits of the previous soul, which its successor is forced to inherit. Buddhism therefore teaches that men are rewarded and punished for the sins of *other persons* who lived ages before they were born—a doctrine which is monstrously unjust. Buddhism is *reactionary*, because if its principles were fully carried out, the human race would be reduced first to mendicancy and then to extinction. The mere fact that it discourages marriage is sufficient to condemn it in the eyes of all practical men.

It is hardly possible to treat seriously the suggestion of Mr. A. Lillie, M. Burnouf, and some other writers, that Christianity has borrowed its principles from Buddhism. It is not possible to conceive two systems more widely divergent. There are, no doubt, interesting parallels between Christianity and Buddhism, but very few of them occur in those Buddhist writings which are known to be early. The most famous parallel of all, the miraculous birth of Buddha, is not really a close one, for it is expressly affirmed in the

Buddhist narratives that his mother was not a virgin. Prof. Hopkins, one of the most recent authorities, says: "Where the parallels make borrowing seem probable, as in the case of miracles and legends not found in other religions, and striking enough to suggest a loan, the historical evidence is strongly in favour of Christianity having been, not the copyist, but the originator."

APPENDIX II

CHRISTIANITY, JUDAISM, AND MAHOMETANISM

Neither Judaism nor Mahometanism can be regarded as serious competitors of Christianity for world-wide supremacy. Judaism is the religion of a race, and still retains its original racial exclusiveness. It has, moreover, in its *canonical* documents, no clear revelation to offer on the all-important question of a future life. Mahometanism, again, is, to a large extent, though less than Judaism, a racial religion. It has propagated itself in many lands, largely by the sword; but its institutions are too closely bound up with the conditions of Eastern society to allow it to become the religion of the Western races. It possesses the great merit of affirming clearly the doctrine of immortality, but its eschatology is in general sensual, unedifying, and unjust. "The doom of the infidels," says Gibbon, "is common: the eternal mansions of the Christians, the Jews, the Sabians, the Magians, and the idolaters, are sunk below each other in the abyss; and the lowest hell is reserved for the faithless hypocrites who have assumed the mask of religion. After the greater part of mankind has been condemned for their opinions, the true believers only will be judged by their actions. . . . Instead of inspiring the blessed inhabitants [of heaven] with a liberal taste for harmony and science, conversation and friendship, he [Mahomet] idly celebrates the pearls and diamonds, the robes of silk, palaces of marble, dishes of gold, rich wines, artificial dainties, numerous

attendants, and the whole train of selfish and costly luxury, which becomes insipid to the owner even in the short period of this mortal life. Seventy-two Houris, or black-eyed girls, of resplendent beauty, blooming youth, virgin purity, and exquisite sensibility, will be created for the use of the meanest believer; a moment of pleasure will be prolonged to a thousand years, and his faculties will be increased a hundredfold, to render him worthy of his felicity."

The Mahometan religion is a good one, but not good enough to make it worthy of serious consideration as a final and perfect revelation.

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CHAPTER XVIII

THE CHRISTIAN DOCUMENTS

SUMMARY.—The genuineness of those New Testament documents, which were unquestioned in the ancient Church, is vindicated. Some account is given of the present state of Old Testament criticism.

IT is sometimes supposed that the principles of criticism were first discovered in the nineteenth century, and that until Baur and the Tübingen school arose, the Christian records were never subjected to any really adequate examination. In reality, the profusion of spurious and heretical works which were produced even in the second century forced Christian scholars to adopt early an extremely critical attitude towards all writings professing to emanate from Apostles. The most rigid tests of genuineness were applied, and great hesitation was shown in admitting new works into the sacred canon. The result has been that, so far as the New Testament is concerned, the judgment of modern critics largely endorses that of antiquity. It is universally recognized that the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles which are contained in the New Testament are immensely superior

to those which the ancient Church rejected, and that, if any apostolic works are genuine, these are.

The Old Testament stands upon a somewhat different footing. The Jewish canon was taken over bodily by the Christian Church, without independent investigation, and the result has been that in this case received views have had to undergo a more extensive revision. Nothing, however, has been discovered which tends to throw doubt upon the main features of the history of Israel. The most disturbing result of criticism has been the establishment of the legendary character of the first eleven chapters of Genesis.[1] This, however, is not such a serious matter as it seems. The history of most nations begins with a legendary period, and if this is found to be the case with Israel also, it is no indication that the subsequent history is untrustworthy. From the call of Abraham onward there can be little doubt that the narrative is, in the main, historical. To discuss the problems of Old Testament criticism with anything like fulness, however, would be out of place in a work like this. Judaism prepared the way for Christianity; but Christianity is not, to the extent which some suppose, dependent upon Judaism. The acceptance of the most extreme results of Old Testament criticism is perfectly compatible with Christian orthodoxy, so long as the moral and

[1] The fact that the narratives contained in these chapters are not strictly historical, does not prevent their having a real spiritual and even theological value.

spiritual value of the Old Testament revelation is recognized.

I.—The Pauline Epistles

The earliest Christian documents of which the dates can be certainly fixed are the Pauline Epistles. They are divided into four groups :—

(1) 1 and 2 Thessalonians—A.D. 51.

(2) 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians,[1] Romans—A.D. 55, 56.

(3) Philippians, Colossians, Ephesians, Philemon—A.D. 59-61.

(4) Titus, 1 and 2 Timothy—A.D. 61-64, or 66, 67.

It will be seen that the first two groups were written less than thirty years after the Ascension, at a time when the great bulk of the original disciples of Jesus were still alive. Their evidence, therefore, is of great importance.

The authenticity of the four Epistles of the second group (1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, and Romans) was admitted as unquestionable by the founder of modern negative criticism, Ferdinand Christian von Baur (1792-1860), and since his time the general tendency of his school has been to accept almost the whole of the Pauline Epistles. For example, Harnack, Jülicher, and Renan, whose negative orthodoxy is beyond dispute, accept the whole of St. Paul's Epistles, except those to

[1] Personally, I am inclined to date Galatians considerably earlier, even before 1 Thessalonians.

Timothy and Titus.[1] Since, however, a small group of irreconcilables, represented by van Manen, Steck, and Volter, reject every Pauline Epistle, and their quite impossible views are represented in the *Encyclopædia Biblica* as being those of "criticism," it may be worth while to state briefly the evidence for the Pauline authorship of the chief epistles attributed to St. Paul.

The thirteen epistles mentioned above were recognized in the second century as unquestionably genuine. Even the heretic Marcion rejected only the Pastoral Epistles, and that, in all probability, because his doctrines are so strongly condemned in them.[2] From the middle of the second century onwards, when Christian literature first begins to be abundant, they are quoted copiously, and without the least indication of doubt. Traces of them are also found in the very earliest Christian writings outside the canon. The Epistle of St. Polycarp to the Philippians, which was written about A.D. 110, and is certainly genuine, contains abundant evidence that the Epistles of St. Paul were even then regarded as Scripture. "Neither I," says Polycarp, "nor any such one, can come up to the wisdom of the blessed and glorious Paul. . . . When absent from you, he wrote you a letter, which, if you

[1] Renan expresses doubts about the Ephesians, but Jülicher decidedly defends it. Harnack thinks that even the Pastoral Epistles contain genuine Pauline matter, and are not mere forgeries.

[2] Some think that he rejected them because they were private letters, and therefore unsuitable for reading in church.

carefully study, you will find to be the means of building you up in that faith which has been given you. . . . Do we not know that the saints shall judge the world? as Paul teaches. . . . It is declared in these passages of Scripture, *Be ye angry and sin not*, and *Let not the sun go down upon your wrath.*"[1] Polycarp quotes or alludes to the following Epistles: 1 Thessalonians, twice; 2 Thessalonians, twice; 1 Corinthians, four times; 2 Corinthians, three times; Galatians, four times; Romans, three times; Philippians, five times; Ephesians, four times; 1 Timothy, five times; 2 Timothy, twice. Thus Polycarp, in his short Epistle of fourteen chapters, quotes or uses no fewer than ten of the thirteen Pauline Epistles, the only three unused being Colossians, Philemon, and Titus.

St. Ignatius, who wrote about the same time, and whose seven Greek Epistles have generally been accepted as genuine since the publication of Lightfoot's great edition of Ignatius in 1885,[2] gives similar testimony. There are fewer allusions to Scripture in Ignatius than in Polycarp, but he quotes or uses at least seven Pauline Epistles—viz. 1 Thessalonians, once; 1 Corinthians, seven times; Galatians, once; Romans, once; Ephesians, twice; 1 Timothy, once; Titus, twice.

[1] Quoted from Eph. iv. 26.

[2] Lightfoot's arguments were accepted as decisive by Harnack, the leader of advanced criticism in Germany, so that the genuineness of these seven letters may now be regarded as certain.

The oldest Christian writing outside the New Testament, the Epistle of Clement of Rome to the Corinthians, which was written about A.D. 95, contains fairly close correspondences with seven Pauline Epistles—viz. one with 1 Thessalonians, seven with 1 Corinthians, one with 2 Corinthians, one with Romans, two with Ephesians, one with 1 Timothy, and two with Titus.

Weightier evidence than this it would be difficult to produce for any ancient work. If the Pauline Epistles were secular productions, and St. Paul a classical writer, no one would think of resisting it. It is only because St. Paul is a Christian writer, and his writings are appealed to as evidences of the truth of Christianity, that their authenticity is denied. Rationalistic critics are fond of demanding that the books of the New Testament should be treated precisely like any other ancient books. This is precisely what Christian critics desire, and precisely what rationalistic critics refuse to concede. Classical scholars, in investigating the genuineness of classical writings, regard it as an axiom that the traditional opinion as to their authorship is to be accepted, unless it can be disproved by really cogent arguments. Rationalistic critics, on the contrary, regard it as an axiom that all the books of the New Testament are spurious, unless their genuineness can be proved by absolutely irresistible evidence. This is the attitude, not of criticism, but of prejudice.

II.—The Epistles of Peter and John

Besides the Pauline Epistles, two other unquestioned apostolic Epistles have been transmitted to us—viz. 1 Peter and 1 John. These Epistles, being written by the two most eminent disciples of Jesus, are of even greater evidential value than the Pauline Epistles, which were not written by an actual disciple.

1 Peter is one of the best attested works in ancient literature. Eusebius says of it (*Ecclesiastical History*, bk. iii. ch. 3), "One Epistle of Peter, that known as the First, is fully acknowledged. It has been frequently cited by the ancient Fathers also in their own writings, as unquestionably genuine." Origen (A.D. 240) says: "Peter has left one acknowledged Epistle." It is quoted frequently, and in express terms ascribed to the Apostle by Clement of Alexandria, and Tertullian of Carthage (A.D. 200), also by Irenæus (A.D. 180) and by other good authorities. The earliest evidence is also completely satisfactory. It was quoted, as Eusebius assures us, by Papias of Hierapolis (A.D. 130). Polycarp, writing about A.D. 110, quotes it again and again.[1] The still earlier Epistle of Clement of Rome (A.D. 95)

[1] Polycarp's short epistle contains no less than fourteen quotations or close coincidences. The following are typical examples: "In whom, though now ye see Him not, ye believe, and believing rejoice with joy unspeakable and full of glory" (ch. i. = 1 Pet. i. 8). "Believed in Him who raised up our Lord Jesus Christ from the dead and gave Him glory" (ch. ii. = 1 Pet. i. 21); "Not rendering evil for evil or railing for railing" (ch. ii. = 1 Pet. iii. 9).

also contains six coincidences with 1 Peter, three of which are so close as to be convincing.

Against this decisive evidence only two objections of any weight are offered. One is that 1 Peter represents the Roman State as persecuting the Christians for the sake of their religion, whereas the Pauline Epistles and the Acts agree in representing the Roman magistrates as protecting the Christians against the malice of their enemies. If, however, 1 Peter was written shortly after the Neronian persecution in A.D. 64, which is the usual supposition, this objection falls to the ground.

The other objection is that this Epistle is not mentioned in the Muratorian list of canonical books drawn up towards the end of the second century. The reply is that the Muratorian list has come down to us in a fragmentary state, and has been copied by an exceptionally careless and ignorant scribe. There can be little doubt that in its original and complete form it mentioned 1 Peter.

The attestation of 1 John is not less satisfactory. Eusebius mentions it several times among the undisputed books. "Besides the Gospel of John," he says, "his First Epistle is acknowledged without dispute, both by those of the present day and by the ancients" (*Eccl. Hist.* iii. 24; see also iii. 25, v. 8, vi. 25). It is quoted as St. John's by Dionysius of Alexandria, and by Cyprian of Carthage (A.D. 250), by Origen (A.D. 240), and by Tertullian and Clement of Alexandria (A.D. 200), also by the Muratorian fragment (A.D. 180). Irenæus

(A.D. 180), who, as a hearer of one of John's disciples, is a specially valuable authority, ascribes it without hesitation to St. John. "For this reason he [John] has thus testified to us in his Epistle, Little children, it is the last time, and as ye have heard that Antichrist doth come, now have many Antichrists appeared, whereby we know that it is the last time. . . ." (*Against Heresies*, iii. 16, *cf.* 1 John ii. 18). The earlier evidence is also thoroughly satisfactory. The Epistle was quoted, as Eusebius informs us, by Papias (A.D. 130), and also by Polycarp (A.D. 110). Polycarp's knowledge of the Epistle is quite unquestionable, "For whoever does not confess that Jesus Christ has come in the flesh, is Antichrist" (Polycarp, *Epist.* ch. vii. = 1 John iv. 3). It was also in all probability known to the writer of the *Didache* (*c.* A.D. 100).

We may have every confidence, therefore, in ascribing it to the Apostle John.

III.—The Disputed Epistles and the Apocalypse

The rest of the Epistles ascribed to Apostles—viz. Hebrews,[1] James, 2 Peter, 2 John, 3 John, and Jude—were of disputed authority in the ancient Church, and therefore, although they are probably genuine, cannot be fairly used in controversy. The same may be said of the Apocalypse, or Revelation of St. John, which was rejected by many ancient Churches.

[1] Hebrews was not written by St. Paul, and its real author is unknown. It is, however, a genuine work of the apostolic age, as its use by Clement of Rome sufficiently indicates.

IV.—The Acts of the Apostles

The Acts, in spite of its ignominious rejection by the Tübingen school, must be pronounced, on the evidence, certainly genuine. It was received by all ancient authorities as the unquestioned work of Luke, the companion of Paul. Tertullian, Clement of Alexandria, and the Muratorian fragment all ascribe it to St. Luke. Irenæus transcribes long passages from it into his work *Against Heresies.* It is quoted in the Epistle of the Churches of Gaul, A.D. 177. Polycarp (A.D. 110) quotes Acts ii. 24, "Whom God raised up, having loosed the pains of death" (c. i.). Ignatius says that after the resurrection Jesus ate and drank with His disciples (*συνέφαγεν καὶ συνέπιεν—Ad Smyrn.* iii.; cf. *συνεφάγομεν καὶ συνεπίομεν*—Acts x. 41). Clement of Rome praises the Corinthians for being fonder of giving than of receiving, which is apparently a reference to Acts xx. 35. Moreover, the internal evidence proves conclusively that the author was a companion of St. Paul.[1]

Two main objections are offered to the authenticity of Acts. One is that it represents St. Peter and St. Paul as friends, and as in essential agreement on points of principle, whereas it is alleged that they were really irreconcilable opponents.

[1] The *we-sections* (Acts xvi. 10-17; xx. 5-15; xxi. 1-18; xxvii.; xxviii. 1-16) are accepted as genuine, even by Schmiedel and van Manen. But the rest of Acts is in precisely the same style, therefore the *whole* of it is genuine.

The view that Peter and Paul were enemies, which for fifty years maintained itself among negative critics, is based solely on the late and untrustworthy evidence of the Clementine *Homilies* and *Recognitions*,[1] which cannot be placed earlier than A.D. 160, and which many scholars assign to the third, or even to the fourth century. All the really ancient evidence points to the fact that St. Peter and St. Paul were friends, and held identical views on all important points. This is evident even in the Epistle to the Galatians, written in the very heat of the controversy about circumcision.[2] St. Peter is represented in that Epistle as in entire agreement with St. Paul, but as weakly allowing himself on a particular occasion to act inconsistently with his real opinions. Clement of Rome, writing about A.D. 95, speaks of the two Apostles with equal respect, and nowhere hints at any difference between them. "Let us take," he says, "the noble examples furnished in our own generation. Let us set before our eyes the good Apostles. Peter through unrighteous envy endured not one or two, but numerous labours; and when he had at last suffered martyrdom, departed to the place of glory due to him. Owing to envy Paul also obtained the reward of patient endurance, after

[1] The Clementine *Homilies* and *Recognitions* are Gnostic, not orthodox, productions, and their doctrine is a mere caricature of Christianity.

[2] In the opinion of the writer, Galatians was written *before* the Council of Jerusalem, not afterwards.

being seven times thrown into captivity, compelled to flee, and stoned. . . . These men spent their lives in the practice of holiness" (ch. v. vi.).

The other objection is that the Acts records miracles, and that books written by eye-witnesses never contain miracles. Professor Blass, himself a disbeliever in miracles, replies to this as follows: "The miraculous element in Acts presents no difficulty. The most portentous miracles which Luke, has narrated he did not witness; if in his account of things he actually witnessed there are a few errors or deviations from the truth, they can be readily condoned. What right have we to blame Luke, unless we also find fault with Paul himself? Luke narrates miracles about Paul, but Paul boasts of his own miracles, both to the Romans (xv. 19) and to the Corinthians (2 xii. 12), writing that signs and wonders and mighty works have been performed by him. Let critics cease to dream about a primitive age, pure and uncontaminated by miracles, and to wish to date writings according to their antecedent notions about miracles" (*Prolegomena to Acts*).[1]

V.—The Synoptic Gospels[2]

The four canonical Gospels have been transmitted

[1] There is a further objection that Acts quotes Josephus, but the evidence for this is so slight that it is not worth discussing.

[2] The first three Gospels are called "synoptic" because they narrate our Lord's ministry from the same general point of view, and have much matter in common.

to us as the unquestioned productions of the authors whose names they bear. Eusebius begins his catalogue of the undisputed books of the New Testament thus: "And here among the first must be placed the holy quaternion of the Gospels" (*Eccl. Hist.* iii. 25). Since, however, certain special difficulties are raised against the authenticity of the fourth Gospel, it will be well to begin by considering the case of the Synoptic Gospels.

(1) St. Matthew's Gospel is extremely well attested. Not to mention later authorities, Irenæus says: "Matthew also issued a written Gospel among the Hebrews, while Peter and Paul were preaching at Rome, and laying the foundation of the Church." St. Matthew's Gospel is included in Tatian's *Diatessaron*, or *Harmony* (A.D. 160), is frequently quoted by Justin (A.D. 150), and is cited as Scripture by Barnabas (A.D. 120): "*As it is written*, Many are called, but few are chosen" (Barnabas, ch. iv. = Matt. xx. 16). Clear traces of its use are also found in Polycarp, Ignatius, Clement of Rome, and the *Didache*.

This evidence proves that it is an authoritative work of the apostolic age, but there are three arguments of considerable strength against its direct ascription to the Apostle Matthew. The first is the statement made by Papias (A.D. 130), and afterwards repeated by many authorities, that St. Matthew wrote in Hebrew. Papias's words are: "Matthew therefore compiled the oracles (*τὰ λόγια*) in the Hebrew tongue, and each one interpreted

them as he was able" (Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* iii. 39). The most natural view to take of Papias's language is that he is alluding not to the present Greek Gospel, but to an earlier work in Hebrew. If so, the existing Gospel is probably not by St. Matthew.

The second difficulty is the acknowledged fact that St. Matthew used St. Mark's Gospel. This is certainly not what one would expect an eye-witness, and above all an Apostle, to do.

The third difficulty is that those touches which mark an eye-witness are absent from the first Gospel. This, however, may be due to the fact that the author deliberately preferred to adopt an impersonal style.

It is best, perhaps, to leave the question more or less open. Direct Matthæan authorship is defensible; but, upon the whole, the weight of the evidence seems to incline, not strongly, but still perceptibly, against it. A Gospel written by a disciple upon the basis of Matthew's Hebrew work would still be a Gospel *according to* Matthew.

(2) St. Mark's Gospel is now universally recognized as genuine. Papias (A.D. 130) gives the following account of its origin: "This also the presbyter [or elder] used to say. Mark having become Peter's interpreter [or translator], wrote accurately but not in order whatsoever things [Peter] remembered—namely, the things which had been said or done by Christ. For [Mark] neither heard the Lord, nor followed Him. But afterwards,

as I said, he followed Peter, who used to frame his instructions to meet his [immediate] needs, and did not, as it were, attempt to frame an orderly account of the Lord's words. So that Mark made no mistake, when he thus wrote certain things as [Peter] remembered them. For he made one thing his care, not to omit to record anything that he had heard, or to set down anything false among them" (Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* iii. 29).

(3) The evidence that the third Gospel is the work of Luke, the companion of St. Paul, is quite conclusive. It is admittedly by the same author as Acts, and, as has been explained, the "we-sections" of Acts prove incontestably that the writer of this work accompanied St. Paul on his missionary journeys.

The date assigned to the third Gospel depends on the date assigned to Acts. Acts, according to many authorities, was written during the first Roman imprisonment of St. Paul—*i.e.* about A.D. 61. This would throw the Gospel back to A.D. 59 or 60. Others date both books after the destruction of Jerusalem (A.D. 70).

It is probable that St. Luke gathered many of the materials for his Gospel during St. Paul's imprisonment at Cæsarea (Acts xxiv. 27).

VI.—The Fourth Gospel

External Evidence.—The fact that since 1820, when Bretschneider published his *Probabilia*, there has been a continual controversy as to the authorship

of the fourth Gospel, must not blind us to the circumstance that it has been handed down to us from the earliest times as an absolutely unquestioned work. It is, in fact, attested by a greater amount of evidence, internal and external, than any other Gospel, and than almost any other New Testament writing. Eusebius classed it without hesitation among the undisputed writings. Clement of Alexandria (A.D. 200) says of it: "But John last of all perceiving that the bodily things had been made clear in the [earlier] Gospels, encouraged by his familiar friends, and inspired by the Spirit, composed a spiritual Gospel" (Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* vi. 14). The learned Origen, Clement's successor as the head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria, says: "I have learnt by tradition concerning the four Gospels, which alone are uncontroverted in the Church of God spread under heaven, that that according to Matthew . . . was written first, . . . that according to Mark second, . . . that according to Luke third, . . . that according to John last of all" (Eusebius, *o.c.* vi. 25). And again: "Why need I speak about him who reclined upon the breast of Jesus, John who has left behind a single Gospel, though he confesses that he could make so many as not even the world could contain?" Tertullian (A.D. 200), another well-informed witness, expressly states that the present four Gospels have been acknowledged ever since the Apostolic period. "I affirm," he says, "that not only among the Churches founded by Apostles, but among all the Churches

that are united to them in Christian fellowship, that Gospel of Luke, which we earnestly defend, has been maintained from its first publication. . . . The same authority of the Apostolic Churches will uphold the other Gospels which we have in due succession through them and according to their usage, I mean those of Matthew and John" (*Against Marcion*, iv. 5).

These three learned witnesses, Clement, Origen, and Tertullian, who had access to earlier authorities now lost, and who affirm positively that all their predecessors from the Apostolic age onwards acknowledged the fourth Gospel as St. John's, are really sufficient; but since their evidence is questioned, it is desirable to produce still earlier witnesses.

The Muratorian Fragment (A.D. 180) affirms that "the author of the fourth Gospel is John, one of the disciples." Irenæus, about the same date, says: "It is not possible that the Gospels can be either more or fewer in number than they are. . . . The Word, the artificer of all, He that sitteth upon the cherubim, has given us the Gospel under four aspects, but bound together by one spirit. . . . The Gospel according to John relates His original, effectual, and glorious generation from the Father, thus declaring: 'In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God.' Also, 'All things were made by Him, and without Him was nothing made.'" Irenæus also testifies that St. John's Gospel was as much

recognized by the Gnostics as by the Church. "Those who follow Valentinus," he says, "making copious use of the Gospel according to John, shall be proved to be totally in error by means of this very Gospel. For since our opponents bear testimony to us, and make use of these documents, our proof derived from them is firm and true" (*Against Heresies*, bk. iii. ch. 11, 12). Irenæus is a particularly valuable witness, because his own teacher, Polycarp, had been a hearer of John. This can be proved from Irenæus' own writings. In an epistle to his friend Florinus he says: "While I was yet a boy, I saw thee in Lower Asia with Polycarp, endeavouring to gain his approbation. For I have a more vivid recollection of what occurred at that time than of recent events, so that I can even describe the place where the blessed Polycarp used to sit and discourse—his going out, too, and his coming in—his general mode of life and personal appearance, together with the discourses which he delivered to the people; also how he would speak of his familiar intercourse with John, and with the rest of those who had seen the Lord; and how he would call their words to remembrance. . . . These things, through God's mercy which was upon me, I then listened to attentively, and treasured them up, not on paper, but in my heart; and I am continually, by God's grace, revolving these things accurately in my mind" (quoted by Eusebius, *o.c.* bk. v. ch. 20).

It is clearly impossible that Irenæus, with such exceptional opportunities of knowing the truth, could be deceived with regard to the authorship of the fourth Gospel.

Ascending now to an earlier generation, Tatian, about A.D. 160, compiled a harmony of the four Gospels called the *Diatessaron*, which, after being long lost, has recently been recovered. It was long denied by advanced critics that the *Diatessaron* made use of St. John's Gospel; but the publication of a newly discovered Arabic version of it by Ciasca in 1888 set the matter at rest. The *Diatessaron* uses the present four Gospels, and no others, and therefore it is evident that already at that early date the canon of the four Gospels was complete.[1]

Tatian's teacher, Justin Martyr, also knew and used the fourth Gospel. This has been denied, but is not really doubtful. Among other close coincidences with St. John is the following. In the sixty-first chapter of his first *Apology*, Justin describes the rites of Christian Baptism as follows: "As many as are persuaded and believe that what we teach and say is true, and undertake to live accordingly, are brought by us where there is water, and are regenerated in the same manner in which we were ourselves regenerated. For in the Name of God the Father and Lord of the

[1] A document cannot attain canonical rank at once, and therefore St. John's Gospel must have existed much earlier than A.D. 160.

universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Spirit, they then receive the washing with water. For Christ also said, 'Except ye be born again, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven.' Now, that it is impossible for those who have been once born to enter into their mothers' wombs is manifest to all." The reader who compares this passage with John iii. 4, 5, and notices how awkwardly the statement about a man entering into his mother's womb is introduced by Justin, and how naturally by St. John, will have no difficulty in deciding on which side the obligation lies.

It is sometimes maintained by advanced critics that though Justin knew the fourth Gospel, he valued it little; but inasmuch as he makes it the basis of his whole Christology, and continually speaks of Jesus as *the Word made flesh*, it is clear that he valued it highly.

The remains of Christian literature earlier than Justin are scanty, but they yield distinct traces of St. John's Gospel. The Gospel of Peter, a Docetic work, discovered in 1885, and published in 1892, is assigned by a preponderance of critical opinion to the former half of the second century.[1] Its use of the present canonical Gospels, including that of St. John, is sufficiently evident. Dr. Armitage Robinson says: "The unmistakable

[1] Harnack, who thinks that Justin used it, dates it near the beginning of the century. Dr. Sanday assigns it to A.D. 125, Zahn to 130, Dr. Swete to 150.

acquaintance of the author with our four Evangelists deserves a special comment. He uses and misuses each in turn. To him they all stand on an equal footing. He lends no support to the attempt which has been made to place a gulf of separation between the fourth Gospel and the rest, as regards the period or area of their acceptance as canonical. Nor, again, does he countenance the theory of the continued circulation in the second century of an *Urevangelium*, or such a præ-canonical Gospel as we feel must lie behind our synoptists. He uses our Greek Gospels, and there is no proof . . . that he knew of any other Gospel record than these."

The two great Gnostic heretics, Basilides and Valentinus, who flourished early in the second century, undoubtedly recognized the authority of the fourth Gospel. This is sufficiently evidenced by the quotations from their writings given by Hippolytus in his *Refutation of all Heresies.* In the thirtieth chapter of the sixth book of this work he quotes Valentinus as saying, "All that have come before me are thieves and robbers"—a clear reference to St. John x. 8. In his seventh book he introduces the following passages from Basilides: "And this is what is meant in the Gospels, *There was the true light which lighteth every man coming into the world*"; and, "That everything has its own proper seasons is sufficiently proved by the words of the Saviour, *Mine hour is not yet come.*" The former passage contains a quotation

from John i. 9, the latter passage from John ii. 4. Valentinus flourished about A.D. 140, and Basilides as early as 120, so that the origin of the fourth Gospel is thrown back by this evidence to A.D. 100 at least. Hippolytus also tells us that the fourth Gospel was freely used by the still earlier sects of the Naassenes and Peratæ, so that its date must be placed well within the first century.

The orthodox evidence of this period is in exact accordance with the heretical. Papias (A.D. 130), whose works are unfortunately lost, almost certainly knew the fourth Gospel. Eusebius tells us that he quotes the First Epistle of John; and since the Gospel is admittedly by the same author, he probably knew the Gospel also. There is, in fact, direct evidence to this effect. An ancient preface to St. John's Gospel[1] says: "The Gospel of John was published and given to the Churches by John, while he was still in the body, as one named Papias, of Hierapolis, a dear disciple of John, has related in his *Exoterica*, *i.e.* at the conclusion of his five books [of Exposition of the Oracles of the Lord]." Irenæus also quotes a comment of certain presbyters upon John xiv. 2, "In my Father's house are many mansions," apparently from the work of Papias, as Lightfoot and Harnack agree.

The Apology of Aristides, discovered in 1889, describes the Incarnation in terms peculiar to the fourth Gospel. "It is acknowledged," writes

[1] This preface is published in the Wordsworth-White edition of the Vulgate.

Aristides, "that Jesus is the Son of the Most High God, and that by the Holy Ghost He came down from heaven for the salvation of men. And that having been conceived of a holy virgin without seed and incorruptibly, He took upon Him flesh, and was manifested to men." Only St. John uses the expression "came down from heaven"[1] in connection with the Incarnation, and speaks of our Lord's perfect human nature as "flesh." Eusebius states that this *Apology* was presented to the Emperor Hadrian, so that its date lies between A.D. 117 and 128.[2]

The evidence of the still earlier writer Ignatius (A.D. 110) is more definite and copious. In one place he reproduces John iii. 8 almost verbatim—"He knoweth whence he cometh and whither he goeth." He speaks of the Eucharist not, after the manner of the Synoptists, as Christ's Body and Blood, but as his *Flesh* and Blood. "I desire," he says, "the bread of God which is the Flesh of Jesus Christ, and I desire as drink His Blood, which is love incorruptible" (*cf.* John vi. 33, 51, 55). He speaks of Jesus as the *Logos* (Word) of God, as the Door of the Father, and as the Living Water. He also calls the devil "the prince of this world." All these phrases are peculiar to St. John.

[1] *Cf.* St. John iii. 13; vi. 33, 38, 41, 42, 50, 51, 58.

[2] Dr. Rendel Harris thinks that Eusebius has made a mistake, and that the *Apology* was really presented to Hadrian's successor Antoninus Pius. I agree with Dr. Armitage Robinson that this is not probable.

Upon the whole, the use of the fourth Gospel by Ignatius must be regarded as established.

Ignatius's contemporary, Polycarp, does not quote St. John's Gospel, but he quotes his First Epistle, and this, as we have seen, is equivalent.

Internal Evidence.—The internal evidence agrees with the external. The Gospel professes to be written by an eye-witness (i. 14, *cf.* 1 John i. 1; xix. 35; xxi. 24); it shows a remarkably accurate knowledge of the topography of Palestine, of Jewish opinions and customs, and of Jerusalem and the temple as they were before the great catastrophe of A.D. 70. It would have been exceedingly difficult for a writer of the second century to have acquired the information which the fourth Evangelist possesses. If the writer was not St. John, he must have been an extremely able forger. That he was a forger, few readers of the Gospel will consent to believe.

Objections.—The objections brought against the authenticity of the fourth Gospel are numerous, but only a few are of decisive importance.

(1) It is said to be incredible that one who had enjoyed familiar intercourse with Jesus on earth could ever have come to regard Him as divine, as the fourth Evangelist does (See xx. 28, ff.).

This argument assumes that the original Apostles regarded Jesus as a mere man, and that it was St. Paul, who never saw our Lord, who first taught that He was equal to God. But we have no right to assume this. Our business as critics is to

ascertain what documents, on the actual evidence, are to be regarded as apostolic, and from these to ascertain what the Apostles believed about our Lord. To make up our minds first of all that the Apostles held Unitarian views, and then to reject all the documents which contradict this supposition, is not criticism. Of course, if Jesus worked no miracles and never rose from the dead, it is obvious that the original Apostles would never have come to believe in His divinity. But if, as not only the fourth Gospel, but the whole New Testament, affirms, He actually did these things, and in addition ascended into heaven, a belief in His divinity might naturally arise, even among the Apostles themselves. St. Matthew's Gospel affirms that after the Resurrection He claimed all power in heaven and earth, and directed all mankind to be baptized in the Name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost (Matt. xxviii. 18, 19). This is as clear an affirmation of our Lord's divinity as anything in the fourth Gospel.[1]

(2) It is said that the theology, and especially the Christology, of St. John's Gospel is more developed than that of the Synoptic Gospels.

This, if true, is only what is to be expected in a work written twenty or thirty years later. But the Christology of St. John is not really much in advance of that of St. Paul and St. Peter. It is only somewhat more fully expressed. The idea that Jesus is a pre-existent divine Being who

[1] This subject will be further considered in a later chapter.

became incarnate for the salvation of the world, is found as certainly in Romans and Colossians, and even in 1 Peter, as in the fourth Gospel. If St. Paul in A.D. 56 could speak of Jesus as "He that is over all God blessed for ever" (Rom. ix. 5),[1] St. John could write in A.D. 90, "And the Word was God." There is hardly a statement in St. John, either about the Person of Christ or about the Holy Spirit, which cannot be paralleled in the Pauline Epistles.

(3) It is said that the speeches of Jesus are in the style of the Evangelist, and therefore presumably untrustworthy.

But this is also true of the speeches in St. Mark's Gospel, and even of those in St. Matthew's. The fact that St. John is translating from the Aramaic, and is presenting, not ordinary discourses, but carefully selected sayings bearing upon our Lord's superhuman claims,[2] is sufficient to explain most of the facts. If the fourth Evangelist was really the son of Zebedee, there is every reason to suppose that his report of our Lord's sayings is at least true in substance.

(4) Another difficulty is that St. John seems to contradict the Synoptic Gospels in several important particulars. He represents our Lord's ministry

[1] For a demonstration that this is the true sense of the passage, see Sanday and Headlam's Commentary, *in loc.*

[2] The Evangelist expressly states that he writes with the purpose of producing faith in our Lord's Divine Sonship. This purpose regulates the choice both of sayings and incidents (see John xx. 26-31).

as lasting three years instead of one. He records a number of visits to Judæa, which are entirely unnoticed by the Synoptists. He represents the Crucifixion as taking place before, instead of after, the Passover.

In reply, it may be said that the Synoptists nowhere state how long the ministry lasted. As to the Judæan ministry, although they do not relate it, they imply it. See, for example, Luke xiii. 34, "O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, . . . how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her own brood under her wings, and ye would not!" The reason why the Synoptists do not record the visits to Jerusalem, is probably that St. John alone accompanied our Lord on these occasions, the other Apostles being left behind in Galilee to carry on the work. St. John apparently possessed a house at Jerusalem, and so was able to entertain Jesus suitably.

The solution of the difficulty about the Passover is probably this. The proper time for eating the Passover was Friday night, as St. John states, but Jesus, knowing that He would be put to death before this, ate the Passover on Thursday night with His disciples, as the Synoptists record.

Conclusion.—We conclude, therefore, that the evidence for the genuineness of the fourth Gospel, both external and internal, is entirely satisfactory, and that the objections raised by negative critics are unimportant. This is not only the judgment of orthodox critics, who may be supposed to be

biassed in favour of the Gospel, but also of many Unitarians, to whom the doctrines it contains are particularly distasteful. Dr. J. Drummond, for instance, a pupil of Dr. J. J. Tayler and Dr. Martineau, both strong opponents of the genuineness, has recently issued a learned and able defence of the Johannine authorship. He writes: "In the last quarter of the second century, and subsequently, if we except the shadowy *Alogi*, the Gospel was universally, and without hesitation, received as the work of the Apostle John, who composed it at Ephesus in his old age, after the publication of the other Gospels. This, then, is the view, which, following a well-established rule in literary questions, we are to accept, unless adequate reason can be shown for not doing so. . . . Of course, I do not say that this is conclusive, for there may be an explanation which it is no longer possible to discover; but I do say that the argument is a real and strong one, and that those who can see nothing in it, simply show that they are uncritical, and unable to estimate the force of evidence." He concludes as follows: "We have now gone carefully through the arguments against the reputed authorship of the Gospel, and on the whole have found them wanting. . . . The external evidence (be it said with all due respect to the *Alogi* is all on one side, and for my part I cannot readily repel its force. A considerable mass of internal evidence is in harmony with the external. A number of

difficulties which have been pressed against the conclusion thus indicated, melt away on nearer examination, and those which remain are not sufficient to weigh down the balance. In literary questions we cannot look for demonstration, and where opinion is so much divided, we must feel some uncertainty in our conclusions; but on weighing the arguments for and against to the best of my power, I must give my own judgment in favour of the Johannine authorship."[1]

VII.—The Old Testament

Old Testament criticism is still so immature that it is impossible to speak very positively about its results. There seems, however, to be a fairly general consensus of opinion upon the following points.

The prophetical books are in the main the work of the prophets to whom they are traditionally assigned. The second part of Isaiah, however (cc. xl.–lxvi.), was written in the time of the Captivity. Of the minor prophets, Joel is probably post-exilic, and Jonah is an allegory rather than a prophecy. Daniel, which is not by the Jews reckoned among the prophets, is probably an Apocalypse of the second century B.C.

[1] *Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 79 ff, p. 514. Another learned Unitarian defence of the Gospel is Dr. Ezra Abbot's *External Evidence of the Fourth Gospel.* The present writer began the investigation with a decided prejudice against the authenticity, but found the evidence too strong to be resisted

The Pentateuch, traditionally ascribed to Moses, is only partly his. The Ten Commandments and the Laws associated with it (Exodus xx.—xxiii.), and certain other parts of the Pentateuch, are probably Mosaic, but the work as a whole is a compilation of documents of different dates, brought into its present form during the Captivity or later. Joshua probably formed originally part of the Pentateuch.

The historical books, Judges, Samuel, Kings, Ezra, and Nehemiah, are valuable historical authorities, based to a large extent on contemporary documents, but often defective in arrangement and chronology. Less valuable as history is the work of the Chronicler, who is too much inclined to idealize the past. Still less valuable is Esther.

The criticism of the Psalter has led to few decisive results, the indications of date being extremely scanty. There is, however, a tendency to ascribe fewer Psalms to David than formerly.

Job is a dramatic poem of the period of the Captivity.

Proverbs probably contains genuine Solomonic sayings, but is, as a compilation, of much later date.

Ecclesiastes is to be placed in the Persian, possibly even in the Greek, period.

The Song of Songs is not by Solomon, but is of early date. Whatever may have been its original meaning, it was as an *allegory* that it was admitted into the Canon of Scripture.

APPENDIX I

INSPIRATION AND CRITICISM

In this book a frankly critical attitude is adopted towards the Christian Scriptures. It is not assumed that they are inspired or free from error, or in any special degree trustworthy. They are regarded simply as ancient records, and are subjected to the same critical examination as other ancient records.

At the same time it is important for the reader to understand clearly, that the doctrine of Biblical Inspiration, rightly understood, is no obstacle to the free criticism of the Bible. Inspiration admits of degrees. The New Testament is on a higher level of inspiration than the Old, and even in the same Testament there are great differences of spiritual level. Isaiah is more fully inspired than Judges or Esther, and St. John's Gospel than St. Mark's.

Again, belief in inspiration is quite consistent with the admission of a large human element in the sacred books. The prophet or inspired writer is not a passive instrument in the hand of God, like a harp in the hand of a player. Nor is he a mere scribe, writing by dictation at the mouth of an angel or of God Himself. God's message is generally mediated through the spiritual experience and character of the prophet, and bears the impress of his personality. Inspiration acts not by superseding the prophet's natural spiritual insight, but by heightening it.

It follows from this view of inspiration that criticism of the sacred records is not only permissible, but is even a duty. Nor must criticism, as some maintain, be confined to the historical and literary features of revelation. The substance of the revelation must itself be freely criticised from the spiritual and religious standpoint. The personal equation must be allowed for. The eternal truth must be disentangled

from the historical setting in which it occurs. The imperfections which necessarily characterize the earlier stages of an historical revelation, must be recognized as such, and discarded. If the religious, criticism of revelation is not allowed, the imprecatory Psalms must logically be regarded as on a level with the Sermon on the Mount, and the ferocious exploits of an Ehud or a Jehu as worthy of the imitation of Christian people.[1] There is in man a faculty of spiritual insight which is given for the very purpose of discerning between the spiritually true, and the spiritually imperfect or false. "Beloved," says St. John, "believe not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God."[2] "Moses," says our Lord, "because of the hardness of your hearts suffered you to put away your wives: but from the beginning it was not so."[3] St. Paul says: "If any man think himself to be a prophet, or spiritual, let him acknowledge that the things that I write unto you are the commandments of the Lord"; "He that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man."[4]

APPENDIX II

OLD TESTAMENT DIFFICULTIES

The moral difficulties of the Old Testament were felt as early as the second century, when the Gnostics, especially Marcion, maintained that the Old Testament is too imperfect to be the work of the Supreme God, and must therefore be a revelation from an inferior being, or Demiurge. The Deists of the eighteenth century held that no revelation which con-

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[1] One of the capital errors of Puritanism was its over-estimation of the spiritual value of the Old Testament.

[2] 1 John iv. 1.

[3] Matt. xix. 8.

[4] 1 Cor. xiv. 37; ii. 15.

tained any imperfection could be real, and they therefore rejected the Old Testament with great unanimity. The Deistic point of view is not entirely unrepresented even now. Mr. Blatchford, for example, says: "I cannot believe that the Bible is the word of God. For the word of God would be above criticism, and beyond disproof, and the Bible is not above criticism nor beyond disproof. I cannot believe that any religion has been revealed to man by God. Because a revealed religion would be perfect, but no known religion is perfect" (*God and my Neighbour*, p. 9).

In this matter, however, the doctrine of Evolution has been of great assistance to orthodox apologists. It has familiarized men's minds with the idea that in Nature perfection is gained not at once, but by slow degrees, and has thus rendered it credible and even probable that God, if He revealed Himself at all, would reveal Himself gradually. This is precisely what, according to the Christian view of the matter, He has done. Christianity accepts the Old Testament, but only as an inferior and preliminary dispensation. The Old Testament is essentially a progressive revelation. It advances gradually from more imperfect to less imperfect religious and ethical ideas. It also frankly recognizes its own imperfections, and points forward to a time when it will be superseded by a perfect and eternal covenant (Isa. lv. 3; Jer. xxxi. 31, xxxii. 40; Ezek. xxxvii. 26, xi. 19). It is not fair, therefore, to judge the Old Testament by a standard of abstract perfection to which it makes no claim. Its true justification is the fact that it contained the germ of higher things, and was destined in due course to develop into the religion of Christ. If Christianity can be justified, then the seed from which it sprang is *ipso facto* justified. To find fault with the Old Testament for its imperfection is like finding fault with an embryo because it is not yet a perfect animal.

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CHAPTER XIX

THE TEACHING OF JESUS[1]

SUMMARY.—The religious teaching of Jesus is shown to be in full accordance with Natural Religion, and His ethical teaching to be ideally perfect. It is argued that He must be regarded as at least a prophet, with a unique mission from God.

IT was stated in c. xvii. that the teaching of Jesus appears *prima facie* to be in accordance with the principles of Natural Religion, and that its moral precepts are of the highest excellence. In this chapter these positions are established by a detailed examination of Christ's teaching.

I.—CHRISTIANITY A RELIGION, NOT AN ETHICAL SYSTEM

Christianity is distinctively a religion, not an ethical system like Confucianism and Taouism. This must be carefully borne in mind in attempting to estimate the value of its ethical creed. Its ethical precepts are, no doubt, ethically beautiful, but they rest upon a supernatural basis which

[1] The quotations in this chapter are from the A.V., revised by the help of the R.V. and other modern authorities

alone gives them their true meaning and justification. Christian ethics starts with the assumption that man is an immortal being, placed in this world to qualify himself by the practice of piety and virtue for a higher state of existence. Its precepts, therefore, differ considerably in substance, and still more in spirit, from those of teachers who regard this present life as the only one.

II.—Christianity a Supernatural Revelation, not a Philosophy

Christianity is not a product of philosophical speculation, but claims to be a direct and final revelation from the Supreme Being. From a certain point of view it is, no doubt, as the Deists insisted, "a republication of natural religion," but it is a republication of it by authority, and with many improvements. Without raising the question —which will be discussed in the next chapter— whether Jesus claimed in any sense to be a Divine Being, it may be stated as beyond controversy that He claimed to be a prophet, and the greatest of prophets. He recognized the inspiration of other prophets, including His contemporary John, but He placed Himself in a higher category altogether. Those who build upon His sayings, build (He says) upon an unshakable rock (Matt. vii. 24). To receive His words is to receive the words of God (Matt. x. 40). Those who wilfully reject His teaching will be severely condemned at the judgment (Matt. xi. 20). Accordingly, we find Him

handling freely, and subjecting to drastic revision, the precepts of the Old Testament, even those attributed to God Himself (Matt. v.-vii.), and promulgating His new teaching with all the authority of an ambassador sent from heaven with plenary powers (Matt. ix. 2, etc.).

III.—Christ's Teaching about God

The character of every religion is mainly determined by its teaching about God, and it is accordingly to this that we first turn in order to estimate the religious worth of Christianity.

Christianity endorses all that Reason and Philosophy teach about the transcendence and omnipotence of the Deity, but it lays the chief stress upon His *personality* and His *love*. In Christ's teaching God is not predominantly Lord and King, but "Our Father which art in heaven" (Matt. vi. 9). He loves all men, even the wicked. "He maketh His sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust" (Matt. v. 45). "He is kind unto the unthankful and to the evil" (Luke vi. 35). He is ever ready to forgive men their sins, on condition that they forgive one another (Matt. vi. 14). When the sinner goes astray, God seeks him as a shepherd does a lost sheep (Matt. xviii. 12). He earnestly desires all men to be saved. "It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven, that one of these little ones should perish" (Matt. xviii. 14). "There is joy in the presence of the angels of God over one sinner that

repenteth" (Luke xv. 10). Christ's characteristic teaching about our Father in heaven is focussed in the exquisite parable of the Prodigal Son. The Prodigal leaves his home, and deeply grieves his kind Father. Yet his Father does not cast him off. No sooner does the Prodigal begin to return, than his Father is filled with tender compassion. *While he is yet a great way off*, his Father sees him, has compassion on him, runs to him, falls on his neck, and kisses him. The Prodigal, who is deeply penitent, asks to be no longer treated as a son, but as a hired servant;[1] but his Father bids the attendants bring forth quickly the best robe, and put it on him, and put a ring on his hand, and shoes on his feet, and kill the fatted calf, and make merry, "for this my son was dead, and is alive again; he was lost, and is found" (Luke xv. 11 ff.).

Christ brings out wonderfully God's individualizing love for each single soul. Judaism had emphasized mainly God's love for the holy nation, but Christ taught that God's providence extends to the smallest details of daily life. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father. But as for you, the very hairs of your head are all numbered" (Matt. x. 29, 30). "If God so clothe the grass of the field, . . . shall He not much more clothe you, O ye of little faith?" (Matt. vi. 30). "Your Father knoweth what things ye have need of before ye ask Him" (Matt. vi. 8).

[1] See the text of Westcott and Hort.

God's willingness to give both temporal and spiritual blessings to those who ask is often insisted on. "What man is there of you, whom if his son ask a loaf, will he give him a stone? Or if he ask a fish, will he give him a serpent? If ye then, being evil, know how to give good gifts unto your children, how much more shall your Father which is in heaven give good things to them that ask Him?" (Matt. vii. 9–11)—or, as St. Luke records the saying, "How much more shall your heavenly Father give the Holy Spirit to them that ask Him?" (Luke xi. 13).

Christ showed particular anxiety to bring religion within the reach of the humble, the uneducated, the poor, and the young. The Rabbis and legalists of Israel seemed to imagine that God cared particularly for the learned, and for those who kept the Law with pedantic accuracy. Christ's teaching was the very opposite of all this. "I thank Thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because Thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes. Yea, Father: for so it seemed good in Thy sight" (Matt. xi. 25). "Have ye never read, Out of the mouth of babes and sucklings Thou hast perfected praise?" (Matt. xxi. 16). "Whosoever shall humble himself as this little child, the same is greatest in the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. xviii. 4). "Take heed that ye despise not one of these little ones; for I say unto you, That in heaven their angels do always behold the face of My Father which is in heaven" (xviii. 10).

"Blessed are ye poor: for yours is the kingdom of God" (Luke vi. 20). "Blessed are the poor in spirit: for theirs is the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 3). "The Spirit of the Lord is upon Me, because He hath anointed Me to preach the Gospel to the poor" (Luke iv. 18). "Go and shew John: . . . the poor have the Gospel preached to them" (Matt. xi. 4-5). The essence of Christ's teaching on this subject is nowhere better expressed than in the glorious Magnificat of His holy mother—"He hath scattered them that are proud in the imaginations of their heart. He hath put down princes from their thrones, and exalted them of low degree. The hungry He hath filled with good things; and the rich He hath sent empty away" (Luke i. 51-3).

Christ did not, however, emphasize exclusively the mercy and benevolence of God. If God is a loving Father, He is also a just Judge, distributing to every man according to his works. It is to be observed, however, that the anger of God is chiefly directed against those who sin against the Law of Love. In the striking parable of the Unmerciful Servant, God is represented as saying, "O thou wicked servant, I forgave thee all that debt, because thou desiredst me: shouldest not thou also have had compassion on thy fellowservant, even as I had pity on thee?" And our Lord adds: "And his lord was wroth, and delivered him to the tormentors, till he should pay all that was due unto him. So likewise shall My Heavenly Father do

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also unto you, if ye from your hearts forgive not every one his brother their trespasses" (Matt xviii. 32-5). Severity of this kind emphasizes rather than obscures the truth that God is Love. God is so fully Love, and so desirous that Love should everywhere prevail, that He regards uncharitable conduct as the worst of sins, and punishes it accordingly.

IV.—Religion and Worship

Jesus insisted strongly on the absolute and undivided homage that the human soul owes to its Creator, and many of His most striking sayings deal with this fundamental truth. "No man can serve two masters: for either he will hate the one, and love the other; or else he will hold to one, and despise the other. Ye cannot serve God and mammon" (Matt. vi. 24). "Seek ye first the kingdom of God, and His righteousness; and all these things shall be added to you" (Matt. vi. 33). "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple" (Luke xiv. 26). It was not, however, a slavish fear of God that Jesus encouraged, but filial love. "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment" (Matt. xxii. 37-8).

Jesus protested earnestly against the idea that religion consists mainly of the scrupulous per-

formance of external ceremonies. The pedantic and unspiritual glorification of the letter of the Law and the insistence upon trivial traditions, which characterized contemporary Rabbinism, were criticized by him with great severity. "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 20). "The sabbath was made for man, and not man for the sabbath" (Mark ii. 27). "It is lawful to do well on the sabbath day" (Matt. xii. 12). "Ye have made the word of God of no effect for the sake of your tradition. . . . Not that which goeth into the mouth defileth a man; but that which cometh out of the mouth, this defileth a man. . . . Evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, railings: these are the things which defile a man: but to eat with unwashen hands defileth not a man" (Matt. xv. 6 ff.). "Now do ye Pharisees make clean the outside of the cup and the platter; but your inward part is full of ravening and wickedness. . . . Woe unto you, Pharisees! for ye tithe mint and rue and all manner of herbs, and pass over judgment and the love of God: these ought ye to have done, and not to leave the other undone" (Luke xi. 39 ff.). "God is one; and there is none other but He: and to love Him with all the heart, and with all the understanding, and with all the strength, and to love his neighbour as himself, is much more than all whole burnt offerings and sacrifices" (Mark. xii.

32).[1] "The true worshippers shall worship the Father in spirit and in truth: for the Father seeketh such to worship Him. God is a Spirit: and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth" (John iv. 23-4).

The religion that Jesus approved was *personal* religion, not the religion of mere rites and ceremonies. According to Him, the kingdom of God or of heaven, which He came to found, was, in its fundamental aspect, the reign of God in the believer's soul. This personal, living relation of the soul to God was represented by Jesus as the believer's most cherished possession. It is the pearl of great price, to buy which a man must sell all that he has. It is the treasure hidden in a field, "which when a man hath found, he hideth, and for joy thereof goeth and selleth all that he hath, and buyeth that field" (Matt. xiii. 44). It is the white stone, with a new name written therein, "which no man knoweth saving he that receiveth it" (Rev. ii. 17). According to many authorities, this is the true meaning of the saying, "Behold, the kingdom of God is within you" (Luke xvii. 21).[2]

In accordance with the practical character of His religion, Jesus repeatedly declared that the Service of God necessarily involved the Service of Man. The first commandment was to love God,

[1] Jesus did not utter, but He highly approved, this sentiment.

[2] So Godet, McClellan, Field, R.V. The context, however, favours the rendering, "The kingdom of God is *among* you," and this is adopted, among others, by Plummer, Meyer, Weiss, Alford, and Bengel.

but the second was to love man. "The second commandment," said Jesus, "is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself. On these two commandments hang all the Law and the prophets" (Matt. xxii. 39-40). Great stress was laid by Him upon good works. "Not every one that saith unto Me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven; but he that doeth the will of My Father which is in heaven. . . . Wherefore by their fruits ye shall know them" (Matt. vii. 20 ff.). The future judgment is declared, both in the parables and in plain dogmatic statements, to be according to *works* (Matt. xvi. 27). Works of mercy are frequently represented as the best title to eternal happiness. "Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world: for I was an hungred, and ye gave Me meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave Me drink: I was a stranger, and ye took Me in: naked, and ye clothed Me: I was sick, and ye visited Me: I was in prison, and ye came unto Me. . . . Verily I say unto you, Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these My brethren, ye have done it unto Me" (Matt. xxv. 34 ff.).

Jesus endorsed the Jewish opinion, generally current since the Captivity, that among the most notable duties of religion are (1) Prayer, (2) Fasting, and (3) Almsgiving.

Prayer. According to Jesus, the great requisite of successful prayer is Faith; the great hindrance to it, want of Faith. "Ask, and it shall be given

you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you: for every one that asketh receiveth; and he that seeketh findeth; and to him that knocketh it shall be opened" (Matt. vii. 7-8). "If ye have faith, and doubt not, ye shall not only do this which is done to the fig tree, but also if ye shall say to this mountain, Be thou removed, and be thou cast into the sea; it shall be done. And all things, whatsoever ye shall ask in prayer, believing, ye shall receive" (Matt. xxi. 21-2). "Verily, verily, I say unto you, If ye shall ask anything of the Father, He will give it you in My Name. Hitherto have ye asked nothing in My Name: ask, and ye shall receive, that your joy may be fulfilled" (John xvi. 23-4). These sayings must of course be understood with the limitations which are elsewhere expressed or implied. For example, the thing asked for must be good (Matt. vii. 11), and in accordance with God's will (vi. 10); also the asker must be in a right relation to God (John ix. 31; 1 John iii. 22).

In opposition to the Pharisees, who for pretence made long and public prayers, Jesus recommended short and private petitions. "When ye pray, ye shall not be as the hypocrites are: for they love to pray and stand in the synagogues and in the corners of the streets, that they may be seen of men. Verily I say unto you, They have received their reward, But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thine inner chamber, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father which seeth in secret shall reward thee. But when

ye pray, use not vain repetitions, as the Gentiles do: for they think that they shall be heard for their much speaking" (Matt. vi. 5-7).

Our Lord's precepts about prayer mainly have reference to unpremeditated, *extempore* prayer; but it is clear from the fact that He taught His followers the *Pater Noster*, that he did not reject the use of precomposed forms. Some have denied this, arguing from Matt. vi. 9 ("After this manner therefore pray ye") that the Lord's Prayer is a *model*, not a form. But the words of Jesus in St. Luke's Gospel are quite express: "When ye pray, *say*, Father, hallowed be Thy Name" (xi. 2). The teaching of the Lord's Prayer is important. From its first words we learn that God loves us, and that we ought to love one another in Him. By the use of *our* for *my*, and of *us* for *me*, we are taught to pray for others as often as we pray for ourselves. We are further instructed that God's glory and the advancement of His kingdom should be the chief aim of our lives; that we should strive to do God's will on earth as perfectly as the angels do it in heaven; that we should pray for nothing but what we may fairly suppose to be in accordance with God's will; that, consequently, we should pray mainly for spiritual benefits, and when we pray for things temporal, should do so with reserve, asking for necessaries, not for luxuries; that we are sinners depending upon God's mercy for forgiveness, and that we can only obtain it on condition that we forgive others; that we are weak,

and therefore should avoid temptation, but that when temptation comes upon us without our seeking it, God will save us, if we ask Him, from our ghostly enemy.

There are Jewish parallels to some clauses of the Lord's Prayer; but as a composition it is of undoubted originality, and condenses in a striking way some of the most fundamental of the ideas of Jesus.

Fasting.—Jesus laid less stress upon fasting than a reader of the Authorized Version would suppose. The allusions to it in Matt. xvii. 21, Mark ix. 29, disappear from the Revised Version. At the same time, it is undeniable that He intended His followers to make a moderate and rational use of this aid to devotion. He speaks of public fasts in Mark ii. 20: "The days will come, when the bridegroom shall be taken away from them, and then will they fast in that day." Private fasts are alluded to in the Sermon on the Mount: "When ye fast, be not, as the hypocrites, of a sad countenance: for they disfigure their faces, that they may be seen of men to fast. . . . But thou, when thou fastest, anoint thy head, and wash thy face; that thou be not seen of men to fast, but of thy Father which is in secret" (Matt. vi. 16-8).

Almsgiving.—Almsgiving naturally takes a prominent place in a religion of universal benevolence. The following are the most striking sayings: "When thou doest alms, let not thy left hand know what thy right hand doeth" (Matt. vi. 3). "Give

alms of your meat and drink,[1] and, lo, all things are clean unto you" (Luke xi. 41). "Sell that ye have, and give alms; provide yourselves bags which wax not old, a treasure in the heavens that faileth not, where no thief approacheth, neither moth corrupteth" (Luke xii. 33). "Give to him that asketh thee, and from him that would borrow of thee turn not thou away" (Matt. v. 42). "When thou makest a feast, call the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blind: and thou shalt be blessed; for they cannot recompense thee: for thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just" (Luke xiv. 13-4).

Besides these three recognized religious duties there was another upon which Jesus laid great stress, viz.—

Repentance.—The duty of repentance and confession of sin is clearly recognized in the Old Testament, especially in the writings of the exilic and post-exilic period. Rabbinic theology also recognized its importance in theory, but nullified it in practice, by associating with it an arrogant doctrine of human merit. Jesus insisted that repentance should be really humble and sincere. His most characteristic teaching on the subject is contained in the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. In this parable the Pharisee, who represents the Rabbinic point of view, confesses not his sins, but his merits—"God, I thank thee, that I am

[1] This somewhat free rendering brings out the meaning of a difficult expression. See the Revised Version and the commentators.

not as other men are, extortioners, unjust, adulterers, or even as this publican. I fast twice in the week, I give tithes of all my income." The publican, on the other hand, standing afar off, does not lift up so much as his eyes to heaven, but smites upon his breast, saying, "God be merciful to me, the sinner." Christ's comment is, "I tell you, this man went down to his house justified rather than the other: for every one that exalteth himself shall be abased; and he that humbleth himself shall be exalted" (Luke xviii. 10 ff.).

It is important to observe that Jesus required repentance and confession of sin, not only from the unconverted, but also from practising Christians. A striking saying to this effect is given by St. Luke (xvii. 10): "When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do." Again, the Lord's Prayer, which is meant to be used by Christians alone, contains a prayer for the pardon of daily sins. There are Christians in our day who profess to be absolutely sinless and to need no repentance; but it is to be feared that such are self-deceived. Perfectionists of this type would probably be classed by Jesus with the Pharisee, rather than with the publican.

Ceremonial Worship.—Although Jesus warned His followers against unreal ceremonialism, and laid stress on the spiritual and practical aspects of religion, He did not undervalue formal public

worship and edifying ritual.[1] He was zealous for the sanctity of the temple (Matt. xxi. 13), and constantly attended its worship. He frequented the liturgical services of the synagogues (Matt. iv. 23, etc.). He founded a visible Church (Matt xvi. 18), with social worship (Matt xviii. 20), centring in a social sacrament (1 Cor. xi. 25). Even the kingdom of God, which from one point of view is the reign of God in the individual soul, is from another point of view the visible Church which exists to establish God's reign. The identity of the kingdom of God with the Church is implied in the parables of the Tares and of the Net, and is expressly taught in Matt. xvi. 18.

V.—The Universality of Christianity

Some critics maintain that Jesus never intended to found a universal religion, and that this idea first occurred to the Apostle St. Paul. Appeal is made to two classes of passages—one class in which He speaks of the perpetual obligation of the Law (Matt. v. 18; vii. 12; Luke xvi. 17); and another class in which He restricts His own and the Apostles' mission to Israel (Matt. x. 5; xv. 24).

(*a*) It is certain, nevertheless, that Jesus regarded the authority of the Law as lapsing with His advent. "The Law and the prophets," he says, "were

[1] See the really admirable treatment of this subject by Cranmer in the Preface *Of Ceremonies*, prefixed to the Book of Common Prayer.

until John: since that time the kingdom of God is preached, and every man presseth into it" (Luke xvi. 16). It is true that He adds, "But it is easier for heaven and earth to pass, than one tittle of the Law to fail"; but this does not mean that the Law continues in force, but that it is "fulfilled" in the Gospel. It was a favourite idea of Jesus that His teaching was not new, but rooted in the past; not a reversal of old teaching, but a development of it; not an entirely fresh Law, but the old transformed. The eternal Law of which He speaks, is not the old Law as Moses left it, but the same Law as perfected by Himself. That this is the true sense of His words is proved by a number of quite unambiguous passages. Thus He says of the greatest prophet of the Old Dispensation: "Notwithstanding, he that is least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he" (Matt. xi. 11). The incompatibility of the Law and the Gospel is strikingly taught in Matt. ix. 16-7: "No man putteth a piece of undressed cloth unto an old garment; for that which is put in to fill it up taketh from the garment, and a worse rent is made. Neither do men put new wine into old wine-skins: else the wine-skins break, and the wine runneth out, and the wine-skins perish: but they put new wine into fresh wine-skins, and both are preserved." It appears to have been the intention of Jesus that the Law should continue to be observed by the Jews until the destruction of the Temple, but that with this event the Old

Dispensation should finally close (Matt. xxiv. 2; Luke xxi. 5; John iv. 21).

(*b*) It is also certain that Jesus intended to found a universal religion. The apparent statements to the contrary refer only to our Lord's own ministry, and to that of the Apostles *during His lifetime.* Many striking sayings of Jesus deal with the world-wide extension of His Church. "This Gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations; and then shall the end come" (Matt. xxiv. 14). "Many shall come from the east and west, and shall sit down with Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, in the kingdom of heaven. But the children of the kingdom shall be cast into the outer darkness" (Matt. viii. 11-2). "He that soweth the good seed is the Son of Man; the field is *the world*" (Matt. xiii. 37-8). "The kingdom of God shall be taken from you, and given to a nation bringing forth the fruits thereof" (Matt. xxi. 43). "He shall sit upon the throne of His glory: and before Him shall be gathered all nations" (Matt. xxv. 31-2). "Go ye, and teach all nations" (Matt. xxviii. 19). "It behoved the Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day: and that repentance and remission of sins should be preached in His Name among all nations, beginning at Jerusalem" (Luke xxiv. 46-7).[1] It will be observed that the sayings spoken before the Resurrection are as decisive as those spoken afterwards.

[1] Christ Himself ministered in Samaria (John iv.), and among the heathen (Matt. xv. 21-39; *cf.* John xii. 20 ff.).

VI.—The Future Life

In no respect are the Old and the New Testaments more sharply contrasted than in their attitude towards a future life. The Old Testament appeals to motives which are earthly and transitory. Children are to honour their parents that their days may be long in the land which the Lord their God gives them. The patience of Job is rewarded by a fresh family, a double number of sheep, camels, oxen, and asses, and by a prolongation of his life by a hundred and forty years.

Jesus, on the contrary, taught His followers to look for their reward in the world to come. The sanctions of the beatitudes, except the third, refer to eternity—"Theirs is the kingdom of heaven . . . they shall be comforted . . . they shall be filled . . . they shall obtain mercy . . . they shall see God." And our Lord concludes: "Blessed are ye, when men shall revile you, and persecute you, and shall say all manner of evil against you falsely, for My sake. Rejoice, and be exceeding glad: for great is your reward in heaven: for so persecuted they the prophets which were before you" (Matt. v. 3-12). Many of the sayings of Christ upon this subject are of wonderful beauty. "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father" (Matt. xiii. 43). "Fear not, little flock; for it is your Father's good pleasure to give you the kingdom" (Luke xii. 32). "Lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven, where neither moth nor rust

doth corrupt, and where thieves do not break through nor steal: for where your treasure is, there will your heart be also" (Matt. vi. 20-1). "In My Father's house are many mansions; if it were not so, I would have told you; for I go to prepare a place for you" (John xiv. 2).

Jesus opposed the materialistic and sensuous notions about the future life which prevailed universally in His time. When the Sadducees asked Him whose wife a woman, who had been seven times married, would be in the world to come, He replied: "Ye do err, not knowing the Scriptures, nor the power of God. For in the Resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as angels in heaven" (Matt. xxii. 29-30).[1]

VII.—The Judgment

According to the teaching of Jesus, the soul at death passes into an intermediate state of joy or misery (Luke xvi. 19 ff.; xxiii. 43). This implies that at death there is an individual judgment which decides the destiny of the soul, certainly for the intermediate period, and probably for eternity. It would appear that the punishments of the intermediate state are remedial, and that many who suffer them will be finally saved. This, at any rate,

[1] Jewish ideas of the Resurrection were grossly materialistic. Some account of them is given by Edersheim in his *Life and Times of Jesus the Messiah*, vol. ii. p. 396 ff. A fuller statement, with quotations from original authorities, is given in Wetstein's valuable commentary. Some of the later Rabbis adopted Christ's doctrine of a spiritual resurrection.

was St. Peter's view, and upon such a matter he is likely to have been well informed (1 Pet. iii. 18 ff.).

At the end of the world, the date of which is not disclosed, there will be a general resurrection, and a judgment of all men according to their works. The object of this final judgment will be the complete justification of God's dealing with all His creatures. Then time will come to an end, and angels and men will enjoy their eternal recompense (Matt. xvi. 27; xxv. 31 ff.).[1]

VIII.—Characteristics of Christian Morality

Universality.—Christian morality consists of principles rather than of positive precepts, and to this fact it owes its wonderful adaptability to every race and every civilization. Thought is required before the principles of Christ can be reduced to practice, and thus His teaching is morally and intellectually stimulating.[2]

High Standard.—Christ did not, like Mahomet, lower His moral standard to suit the average man, but required from every one of His followers a serious attempt to reach moral perfection. Christians are to take God Himself as their standard

[1] The joy of heaven is uniformly represented in the New Testament as spiritual in character (Matt. v. 8; 1 Cor. xiii. 12; 1 John iii. 2, etc.). The teaching of Jesus as to the future punishment of the wicked is dealt with elsewhere (xxiii. cp. 2).

[2] To protect His teaching against being taken too literally, He expressed much of it in the form of paradoxes, which must be understood in the spirit rather than in the letter.

of perfection. "Be ye therefore perfect, even as your Father which is in heaven is perfect" (Matt. v. 48).

Holiness.—Ancient moralists aimed at *virtue.* Christianity raises virtue to the higher plane of *holiness.* Holiness or saintliness is a new type of character, unknown to the ancient world, and hardly known even now outside Christianity. "Among all the men of the ancient heathen world," says Professor Seeley, "there were scarcely one or two to whom we might venture to apply the epithet holy. In other words, there were not more than one or two, if any, who, besides being virtuous in their actions, were possessed with an unaffected enthusiasm of goodness, and besides abstaining from vice, regarded even a vicious thought with horror. Probably no one will deny that in Christian countries this higher-toned goodness which we call holiness has existed. Few will maintain that it has been exceedingly rare."

Inwardness.—Christianity goes to the root of morality in requiring purity of motive. It forbids not only murder and assault, but anger and hatred; not only adultery and fornication, but lustful thoughts and looks. It demands also that virtue be sought for its own sake, and not for the reputation which it brings.

Christ's Attitude towards Conscience.—There is profound insight in the teaching of Jesus about conscience. He recognized that conscience is a God-given faculty, intended to guide us to discern the path

of virtue, but He often insisted that by unfaithful use conscience may become so perverted as to lead us into error. It is therefore our duty to enlighten and instruct our consciences by every means in our power. "The lamp of the body is the eye: if therefore thine eye be sound, thy whole body shall be full of light. But if thine eye be evil, thy whole body shall be full of darkness. If therefore the light that is in thee be darkness, how great is the darkness!" (Matt. vi. 22-3). "First cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then shalt thou see clearly to cast out the mote out of thy brother's eye" (Matt. vii. 5).

Benevolence.—Christianity is the only religion which makes universal benevolence the primary duty of man. It does so to a greater extent even than Buddhism, for the ultimate aim of the latter is not benevolence, as we understand it, but the extinction of human existence.

The originality of Christ's teaching upon this subject appears mainly in the following particulars.

(*a*) Benevolence is to be shown not only to equals, but to inferiors. The poor, the despised, and the outcast, who cannot recompense their benefactors except by their prayers, are to be the special object of Christian bounty (Luke xiv. 14, etc.)

(*b*) Benevolence is to be extended to men of other races and other religions. Jesus taught this in the parable of the Good Samaritan, and enforced it by healing numerous Gentiles, and feeding four

thousand of them in the wilderness (Matt. xv. 21-39).

(*c*) Benevolence is to be shown even towards enemies. "Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt love thy neighbour, and hate thy enemy: but I say unto you, Love your enemies, and pray for them which persecute you; that you may be sons of your Father which is in heaven" (Matt. v. 43-5). "Love your enemies, do good to them which hate you, bless them which curse you, and pray for them which despitefully use you. And unto him that smiteth thee on the one cheek offer also the other. . . . For if ye love them that love you, what thank have ye? for sinners also do even the same. . . . But love your enemies and do good, . . . and ye shall be children of the Highest: for He is kind to the unthankful, and to the evil. Be ye merciful, as your Father also is merciful" (Luke vi. 27 ff.).

(*d*) Self-denial and self-sacrifice are required of Christians. "If any man would come after Me, let him deny himself, and take up his cross, and follow Me. For whosoever would save his life shall lose it: and whosoever shall lose his life for My sake shall find it" (Matt. xvi. 24-5).

(*e*) Benevolence is to be shown not only by conferring temporal benefits, but by attempting to bring others into the way of salvation. This is to be done partly by preaching and teaching, and partly by setting a good example. "Let your light so shine before men, that they may see your

good works, and glorify your Father which is in heaven" (Matt. v. 16).[1]

(*f*) Benevolence is translated into social duty in the Golden Rule: "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you, do ye even so to them: for this is the Law and the Prophets" (Matt. vii. 12).

Truthfulness is regarded by Christ as so much a matter of course among His followers, that (ideally at least) oaths will be no longer necessary in a Christian community, and a plain Yea and Nay will suffice for all purposes (Matt. v. 37).

Humility.—In no respect does Christianity present a greater contrast to pagan morality than in its teaching about humility. The Greeks and the Romans admired the ambitious and self-assertive type of character, and despised humility as weakness and poverty of spirit. Christ, on the other hand, took every opportunity of checking ambition and encouraging meekness among His followers. "Be not ye called Rabbi. . . . Neither be ye called masters. . . . . But he that is greatest among you shall be your servant. And whosoever shall exalt himself shall be humbled; and whosoever shall humble himself shall be exalted" (Matt. xxiii. 8 ff.). "The kings of the Gentiles exercise lordship over them; and they that exercise authority upon them are called benefactors. But ye shall not be so: but he that is greatest among you, let him be as the younger; and he that is chief,

[1] Christ condemns with great severity those who set a bad example, especially to the young (Matt. xviii. 6).

as he that doth serve" (Luke xxii. 25-6). "Ye call Me Master and Lord: and ye say well; for so I am. If I then, your Lord and Master, have washed your feet; ye also ought to wash one another's feet. For I have given you an example, that ye should do as I have done to you" (John xiii. 13-5).

Wealth.—There can be no doubt that Jesus regarded wealth, and the worldly honours and advantages which it brings, as serious spiritual dangers. "The care of the world, and the deceitfulness of riches, choke the word, and [the man] becometh unfruitful" (Matt. xiii. 22). "It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle, than for a rich man to enter into the kingdom of God" (Matt. xix. 24). He seems to have regarded voluntary communism as the ideal state of society. "If thou wilt be *perfect*, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow Me" (Matt. xix. 21; *cf.* also Luke xii. 33). In practice, however, Jesus recognized the lawfulness of private property, asserted that rich men could be saved, and only required His immediate followers, who intended to devote their whole lives to the spread of the Gospel, to abandon their wealth. Christians are frequently exhorted to be free from covetousness, to be contented with small means, and not to be over-anxious for the future (Luke xii. 15; Matt. v. 3; vi. 25; etc.). In the parable of the Unjust Steward Jesus exhorts His followers to make friends of the angels by means of a judicious use of their wealth, in

order that when they die, the angels may receive them into the eternal habitations. And He adds: "He that is faithful in that which is least is faithful also in much: and he that is unjust in the least is unjust also in much. If therefore ye have not been faithful in the unrighteous mammon,[1] who will commit to your trust the true riches?" (Luke xvi. 9 ff.).

Marriage.—The tenderness of Christ towards children (Mark x. 13-6, etc.) shows a high esteem for family life, and for the spiritual advantages of marriage. His teaching in this respect accords with that of the Old Testament, and is in sharp contrast to that of Gautama and other pessimists.

Marriage is so clearly the fundamental relation of human society, that Jesus, departing from His general practice, laid down definite regulations with regard to it. He declared—(1) that monogamy is the only natural and lawful form of marriage; (2) that husband and wife become one flesh, and are bound to love one another more than any one else; (3) that the marriage tie can only be dissolved by death.

Whether He permitted divorce in the single case of adultery is a point upon which the Eastern and Western Churches differ, and upon which modern critics are also divided. The exception is only mentioned in St. Matthew, and some think that it

[1] Mammon, or wealth, is called "unrighteous" because of the unrighteousness which is frequently associated with it. Compare the expression "filthy lucre."

is a later insertion, or refers to pre-nuptial fornication.[1] All the other accounts represent Christ as forbidding divorce absolutely. In any case, it would appear that He forbade remarriage after divorce (Matt. v. 31; xix. 3; Mark x. 11; 1 Cor. vii. 10).

Asceticism.—Christianity is not in its primary aspect an ascetic religion. It is intended mainly for men and women living in the world, marrying and giving in marriage, and performing the ordinary duties of society. The Founder Himself was no ascetic. He attended the marriage festivities at Cana. He shared in the social life of all classes. He expressly contrasts His own manner of life with that of John. "For John came neither eating nor drinking, and they say, He hath a devil. The Son of Man came eating and drinking, and they say, Behold a man gluttonous, and a winebibber, a friend of publicans and sinners. And yet wisdom is justified of her works" (Matt. xi. 18-9). Jesus only recommended asceticism to a limited extent, as when He counselled moderation in the use of worldly pleasures, the weaning of the heart from worldly objects of ambition, liberal almsgiving, and occasional secret fasting. The kind of fasting which Jesus approved is well expressed in one of the recently discovered Oxyrhyncus logia: "Except ye fast from the world, ye shall in no wise see the kingdom of God."

Jesus recognized, however, that there would be some who under the new Dispensation would feel

[1] The word used is *πορνεία*, fornication, not *μοιχεία*, adultery.

themselves called to devote their whole lives to God in an especial manner. To these He gave two "counsels of perfection"—viz. (1) celibacy (Matt. xix. 12), and (2) voluntary poverty (xix. 21). To these the monastic communities added later the precept of "obedience."

Prudence.—Maxims of selfish prudence find no place in our Lord's teaching, but there are several sayings which deal with the need of prudence in carrying on the work of evangelization. "Behold, I send you forth as sheep in the midst of wolves: be ye therefore wise as serpents, and harmless as doves. . . . When they persecute you in this city, flee ye into another. . . . Give not that which is holy unto the dogs, neither cast ye your pearls before swine, lest they trample them under their feet, and turn again and rend you" (Matt. x. 16, 23; vii. 6).

Citizenship.—It is not correct to say that the teaching of Jesus has no bearing upon politics. His frequent exhortations to be faithful in the exercise of delegated authority, and His threats of Divine vengeance upon those who abuse their privileges, contain teaching of the most practical kind for rulers and magistrates, whether of monarchical or democratic communities. Jesus also expressly endorsed the principle of civil obedience both by example and precept.

As to the theory of Church and State, He held that the two are essentially distinct. There is a distinct sphere that belongs to Cæsar, and a distinct sphere that belongs to God (Matt. xxii. 21).

It follows that the magistrate has no right to persecute, or to enforce uniformity of religion. It also follows that such forms of Church establishment as practically identify Church and State, and deprive the Church of its inalienable right to spiritual freedom, are contrary to the Divine will.

IX.—The Prophecies of Christ

A prophet is much more a *forth*-teller than a *fore*-teller, yet there can be no doubt that Jesus, in common with other prophets, claimed to have the power of foretelling events. Some of His prophecies have received so remarkable a fulfilment, that they have contributed not a little to the success of His religion.

(1) He prophesied repeatedly that His religion would extend itself among all nations, and become the universal religion of mankind (Matt. xxiv. 14; xxv. 32; xxviii. 19; Mark xvi. 15; Luke xxiv. 47; Acts i. 8; John xii. 32; etc.). His followers now number over a third of the human race, including all the most advanced peoples; and if the progress of Christianity during the present century is as rapid as it was during the last thirty years of the nineteenth, by the beginning of the twenty-first century nearly all the world will be Christian.

(2) He prophesied the fall of Jerusalem, and the complete destruction of the Temple, during the lifetime of persons then living (Matt. xxiv. 2; Luke xix. 41 ff.; etc.), which came to pass.

(3) He prophesied His own death and resurrec-

tion (Matt. xvii. 9; xvi. 21; Mark viii. 31; Matt. xxvi. 32; etc.).

(4) He prophesied Peter's denial (Matt. xxvi. 34) and the treachery of Judas (Matt. xxvi. 25, etc.).

Objection.—Jesus prophesied that His second coming to judgment would take place immediately after the destruction of Jerusalem (Matt. xxiv. 29), which did not happen.

Reply.—It is absolutely certain from Mark xiii. 32 that Jesus did not disclose the time of His second coming, and Luke xxi. 24 shows conclusively that He did not expect that it would happen immediately upon the fall of Jerusalem. It is probably merely a defect of arrangement in the great eschatological discourse, which makes the Second Advent and the fall of Jerusalem appear to synchronize. It must be remembered that those who reported the discourse expected that Jesus would return in their own lifetime, and would naturally arrange His words in such a manner as to be not inconsistent with this view.

X.—Reasons for accepting Christ's Teaching as Inspired

We accept Christ's teaching as inspired for the following reasons:—

(1) Because it is antecedently credible that the imperfections of Natural Religion would be supplied by a fuller Supernatural Revelation, and because the only serious claimant to be such a Revelation is the religion of Christ.

(2) Because Christ's teaching is, as has been shown, in full accordance with the teaching of Natural Religion, and even when it passes beyond it, as in its teaching that God is Love, it does so, not by contradicting Natural Religion, but by developing its principles further.

(3) Because Christ's teaching deals explicitly and fully with the most vital and also most doubtful points of Natural Religion—namely, the true personality of God, His providential care for the individual soul, the efficacy of prayer, the possibility of forgiveness, the possibility of perfect holiness, human immortality, and future retribution.

(4) Because the moral teaching of Christ appeals to the conscience as ideally perfect.

(5) Because Christianity has superseded all other religions and philosophies among the most advanced races, and, in spite of severe criticism, still maintains its position.

(6) Because the teaching of Christ is upon one level of excellence, and does not, like other religions and philosophies, mingle truth with error, piety with superstition, and lofty morality with puerilities and ineptitudes.

(7) Because Christ's teaching is an optimism, and thus conduces in the highest degree to progress and happiness.

(8) Because the Christian type of character is higher than any other, and the Christian Church produces more saints, and better ones, than any other.

(9) Because Christ, whose character, as delineated in the Gospels, is as beautiful as His teaching, claims to be a teacher sent from God, and it is impossible to disbelieve Him.

(10) Because it is impossible that an uneducated Galilean carpenter, brought up in an atmosphere of narrow Jewish particularism, could, without supernatural assistance, have discovered and founded the Universal Religion of Mankind.

APPENDIX I

TESTIMONY OF FREETHINKERS AND AGNOSTICS TO THE EXCELLENCE OF CHRIST'S CHARACTER AND TEACHING [1]

Matthew Arnold (1822—1888).—"Jesus Christ's new and different way of putting things was the secret of His succeeding where the prophets failed. And this new way He had of putting things is what is indicated by the expression *epieikeia*—an expression best rendered by the phrase, 'sweet reasonableness.'"

"Now, never were there utterances concerning conduct and righteousness which so carried with them an air of consummate truth and likelihood as Jesus Christ's did; and never therefore were any utterances so irresistibly prepossessing. He put things in such a way that His hearer was led to take each fact or rule of conduct by its inward side, its effect on the heart and character; then the reason of the thing, the meaning of what had been mere matter of blind rule, flashed upon him. . . . Jesus made His followers first look

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[1] Several of the following quotations are taken from Luthard's *Moral Truths*, and from Mr. Ballard's *The Miracles of Unbelief*.

within and examine themselves; He made them feel that they had a best and real self as opposed to their ordinary and apparent one, and that their happiness depended on saving this best self from being overborne. . . . Self-examination, self-renouncement, and mildness, were, therefore, the great means by which Jesus Christ renewed righteousness and religion. . . . *Jesus over the heads of all His reporters!*—this idea is for us a constant guide in reading the Gospels. . . . The victory of Jesus is won and sure. Conscience and self-renouncement, the method and the secret of Jesus, are set up as a leaven in the world, nevermore to cease working until the world is leavened" (*Literature and Dogma; God and the Bible*).

Dr. Lecky.—"It was reserved for Christianity to present to the world an ideal character which through all the changes of eighteen centuries has filled the hearts of men with an impassioned love, and has shown itself capable of acting on all ages, nations, temperaments, and conditions; has not only been the highest pattern of virtue, but the highest incentive to its practice, and has exerted so deep an influence that it may be truly said that the simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and than all the exhortations of moralists. This has indeed been the well-spring of whatever has been best and purest in the Christian life. Amid all the sins and failings, amid all the priestcraft, the persecution, and fanaticism, which have disgraced the Church, it has preserved, in the character and example of its Founder, an enduring principle of regeneration" (*History of European Morals*, vol. ii. p. 88).

J. J. Rousseau (1712—1778).—"I do not know why men will insist on ascribing the excellent morality of our books to the progress of Philosophy. This morality, which is derived from the Gospel, was Christian before it was philosophical. . . . Can the Person whose history the Gospels relate be Himself a man? What sweetness, what purity in

His manners! What affecting goodness in His instructions! What sublimity in His maxims! What profound wisdom in His discourses! What presence of mind, what ingenuity of justice in His replies! Yes, if the life and death of Socrates are those of a philosopher, the life and death of Jesus Christ are those of a God" (*Troisième Lettre de la Montaigne; Emile*).

S. Laing (1811—1897).—"The Sermon on the Mount, and St. Paul's description of Christian charity, carry their own proof with them, and such parables as that of the Good Samaritan require no support, either from historical evidence or from supernatural signs, to come home to every heart whether in the first or in the nineteenth century. The fact that the son of a Jewish mechanic, born in a small town of an obscure province, without any special aid from position, education, or other outward circumstance, succeeded, by the sheer force of the purity and loveliness of His life and teaching, in captivating all hearts and founding a religion which for nineteen centuries has been the main civilizing influence of the world, and the faith of its noblest men and races—this fact, I say, is of itself so admirable and wonderful, as not to require the aid of vulgar miracles and metaphysical puzzles in order to be recognized as worthy of the highest reverence. And when such a life was crowned by a death which remains the highest type of what is noblest in man, self-sacrifice in the cause of truth and for the good of others, we may well call it divine, and not quarrel with any language or any forms of worship which tend to keep it in view and hold it up to the world as an inducement to a higher life. . . . The highest and most consoling beliefs of the human mind are to a great extent bound up with the Christian religion. If we frankly ask ourselves how much, apart from this religion, would remain of faith in a God and in a future state of existence, the answer must be, Very little. . . . After all, we must fall back on Christianity for any grounds upon which to trust, more or less faintly, in the 'larger hope.' The

Christian religion, apart from any question of miracles, is an existing fact. It is a fact which for nineteen centuries has proved, on the whole, in accordance with other facts and with the deepest feelings and highest aspirations of the noblest men and women of the foremost races in the progressive march of civilization. . . . It requires no train of reasoning and laboured reflection to make us feel that 'right is right,' and that it is better for ourselves and others to act on such precepts as those of 'loving our neighbours as ourselves,' and 'doing as we would be done by,' rather than to reverse these rules and obey the selfish promptings of our animal nature.

"Of the same order, though less clear and cogent, are the teachings of the Gospel respecting God and immortality. They are less clear and cogent, because the only evidence by which they could be demonstrated from without, that of miracles, has broken down and failed us;[1] and because we cannot verify them experimentally by an appeal to facts, as we can in regard to the working of moral laws and precepts. But it still remains that they are ideas which have arisen inevitably in the course of the evolution of the human mind; and that they fit in with and satisfy, in a way which no other ideas can do, many of the best and deepest feelings which have equally been developed in that mind, in the course of its progressive ascent from lower to higher things. It remains also true that science, while it can add nothing to this proof, takes nothing from it" (*Modern Science and Modern Thought*, c. ix., published by the Rationalist Press Association).

Renan (1823—1892).—"Jesus is in every respect unique, and nothing can be compared with Him. Be the unlooked-for phenomena of the future what they may, Jesus will not

[1] Mr. Laing here concedes the point we have so often insisted upon, that no revelation can be really satisfactory which is not supported by miracles.

be surpassed. Noble Initiator, repose now in Thy glory! Thy work is finished, Thy divinity established. A thousand times more living, a thousand times more loved since Thy death than during the days of Thy course here below, Thou shalt become the corner-stone of humanity, insomuch that to tear Thy name from this world would be to shake it from its very foundations. No more shall men distinguish between Thee and God."

Prof. Seeley (1834—1895).—"The story of His [Christ's] life will always remain the one record in which the moral perfection of man stands revealed in its root and its unity, the hidden spring made palpably manifest by which the whole machine is moved. And as, in the will of God, this unique Man was elected to a unique sorrow, and holds as undisputed a sovereignty in suffering as in self-devotion, all lesser examples and lives will for ever hold a subordinate place, and serve chiefly to reflect light on the central and original Example. In His wounds all human sorrows will hide themselves, and all human self-denials support themselves against His cross. . . . The achievement of Christ in founding by His single will and power a structure so durable and so universal [as the Christian Church] is like no other achievement which history records. When we speak of it, the commonplaces of admiration fail us altogether. If a high and complete morality often exists outside the Church, it does not often exist independent of it. The atmosphere of Europe has been saturated for some fifteen centuries with Christian principles, and however far the rebellion against the Church may have spread, it may still be called the Moral University of the world—not merely the greatest, but the only great School of Virtue existing. While this is so, it is idle for any virtue that springs up in its neighbourhood to claim to be independent of it" (*Ecce Homo*, pp. 360-9, xx., Eversley edition).

Viscount Bolingbroke (1678—1751).—"No religion ever appeared in the world whose natural tendency was so much

directed to promote the peace and happiness of mankind as Christianity. The system of religion which Christ published, and His evangelists recorded, is a complete system for the purposes of religion, natural and revealed. Christianity as it stands in the Gospels is not only a complete but a very plain system of religion. The Gospel is, in all cases, one continued lesson of the strictest morality, of justice, of benevolence, and of universal charity."

Schopenhauer (1788—1860).—"The purely ethical portion [of Christianity] is unassailable."

Goethe (1749—1832).—"The greatest praise is due to the Christian religion, which has at all times proved the purity of its origin, inasmuch as it has ever re-emerged in its pristine and admirable peculiarity as a mission, a brotherhood, a family friend for the supply of men's wants, from those great errors in which man had in his blindness involved it unawares. Let mental culture go on advancing, let the natural sciences progress in ever greater extent and depth, and the human mind widen itself as much as it desires, beyond the elevation and moral culture of Christianity as it shines forth in the Gospels, it will not go."

D. F. Strauss (1808—1874).—"Among the personages to whom mankind is indebted for the perfecting of its moral consciousness, Jesus occupies at any rate the highest place. . . . With reference to all that bears upon the love of God and of our neighbour, upon purity of heart and upon the individual life, nothing can be added to the moral intuition which Jesus Christ has left us."

Thomas Paine (1736—1809).—"Jesus Christ was a virtuous and amiable man. The morality which He preached was of the most benevolent kind—it has not been exceeded by any."

J. S. Mill (1806—1873).—"The most valuable part of the effect on the character which Christianity has produced by holding up in a Divine Person a standard of excellence and a model of imitation is available even to the absolute un-

believer, and can never more be lost to humanity. For it is Christ rather than God whom Christianity has held up to believers as the pattern of perfection for humanity. It is the God incarnate, who being idealized has taken so great and salutary a hold on the modern mind. And whatever else may be taken away from us by rational criticism, Christ is still left; a unique figure, not more unlike all His precursors than all His followers, even those who had the direct benefit of His personal teaching. . . . About the life and sayings of Jesus there is a stamp of personal originality combined with profundity of insight which . . . must place the Prophet of Nazareth, even in the estimation of those who have no belief in His inspiration, in the very first rank of the men of sublime genius of whom our species can boast. When this pre-eminent genius is combined with the qualities of probably the greatest moral reformer, and martyr to that mission, who ever existed upon earth, religion cannot be said to have made a bad choice in pitching on this man as the ideal representative and guide of humanity; nor even now would it be easy even for an unbeliever to find a better translation of the rule of virtue from the abstract into the concrete than to endeavour so to live that Christ would approve our life. . . . To this we add that to the conception of the rational sceptic it remains a possibility that Christ actually was what he supposed Himself to be, . . . a man charged with a special, express, and unique commission from God to lead mankind to truth and virtue" (*Three Essays*, pp. 253 ff.).

Carlyle (1795—1881).—"Look on our divinest Symbol—on Jesus of Nazareth and His life and His biography and what followed therefrom. Higher has the human thought not yet reached: this is Christianity and Christendom, a symbol of quite perennial infinite character, whose significance will ever demand to be anew inquired into and anew made manifest."

Prof. P. Gardner.—"The true *differentia* of Christian teaching seems to me to have been rightly set forth by Matthew Arnold in the word *inwardness*. The Founder of

Christianity stands above all other religious teachers, because alike in life and in words . . . He taught that purity of heart leads a man to the vision of God; that evil proceeding out of the heart defiles and corrupts his whole being; that sin consists not in deed, but in intention; that righteousness consists not in the keeping of outward rules, but in a right attitude of spirit. . . . The divine obedience of Jesus is the fountain among remote hills whence has flowed down in a never-interrupted stream that loyalty of heart to the divine, which is the living principle of Christian faith. . . . The whole merit of the religion is that it is one which is not bound to formulæ and rules—that it has a spring of vitality, and can adapt itself to the hopes and the needs of successive generations. . . . The teaching is very general: it is adapted not merely to the times or to the Jewish race, but to mankind" (*Historic View of the New Testament, lect.* iii.).

APPENDIX II

OBJECTIONS TO THE MORAL TEACHING OF JESUS

As the unsurpassed excellence of the moral teaching of Jesus is generally recognized by Rationalists, the objections to it may be briefly dealt with.

Objection I.—The moral teaching of Jesus is lacking in originality. Most, if not all, of His utterances can be paralleled.

Reply.—(1) A system which concentrates and puts into a practical form the best wisdom of all the moralists of the world, must be pronounced original. Originality is not claimed for precepts in detail, though many of them really are original, but for the system as a whole.

(2) No system except Christianity teaches the highest morality without admixture of baser elements.

(3) No system except Christianity makes universal love its primary and fundamental principle.

Objection II.—Christianity contains no teaching about political duties.

Reply.—See sect. viii. of this chapter (*Citizenship*). Detailed instructions on political duties could not be expected, because these duties differ greatly in different countries and different ages. The law of love as taught by Christ contains all that is necessary.

Objection III.—Christianity is essentially effeminate and unmanly. It tends to make men cowardly and lacking in spirit.

Reply.—A religion which teaches men to protest against evil, and to suffer persecution and even death for the truth's sake, cannot be an unmanly one. The number of *martyrs* which Christianity has produced is enough to vindicate it against such a charge. The precept to turn the other cheek to the smiter has been often stigmatized as mean-spirited, but in reality it requires more courage to do this than to retaliate.

Objection IV.—Christian morality is selfish; it teaches men to do good for the sake of an eternal reward.

Reply.—On the contrary, Christianity teaches men to do good out of pure love to God and their fellow-men. An action which is not done from this motive is not, according to Christian teaching, a good action at all.

Objection V.—Christianity teaches indiscriminate almsgiving, and experience shows that this is injurious to society.

Reply.—It has been already explained that such precepts as *Give to him that asketh thee* must be understood in the spirit and not in the letter. The law of love requires that we should give wisely, and in such a way as to benefit and not injure the recipient. This implies that alms must sometimes be refused, and that indiscriminate almsgiving is wrong. Christians are not forbidden to revise their practical rules about almsgiving in the light of the teachings of Political Economy, or to meet changes in social conditions (see further ch. xxiii., sect. i, *Promotion of Philanthropy*).

APPENDIX III

THE MYTHICAL THEORY OF THE ORIGIN OF CHRISTIANITY

It is impossible to treat seriously the theory first advanced in Holland by Loman (1882), and Pierson and Naber (1886), that Jesus never existed; yet since Mr. J. M. Robertson [1] and Mr. Blatchford [2] in widely read books adopt the theory, and Mr. Grant Allen [3] regards it as credible, it may be desirable to say a few words on the subject.

We reply, then—

(1) No Biblical scholar of repute holds the mythical theory.

(2) The Biblical writings, *some* of which at any rate are genuine, speak of Jesus as a person only recently dead, and of His personal disciples as still living (1 Cor. xv. 6; Gal. i. 17-9; etc.)

(3) The Pagan historian Tacitus entirely corroborates the statements of the Gospels.[4]

(4) Jesus is too great a character to have been invented by myth-makers. He is one of the colossal figures of history,

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[1] "It is not even certain that the earliest Jesuism took shape round the memory of an actual man" (*Short History of Christianity*, p. 15).

[2] "I cannot believe in the existence of Jesus Christ, nor Buddha, nor Moses. I believe that these are ideal characters constructed from still more ancient legends and traditions" (*God and my Neighbour*, p. 9).

[3] "We may well be excused for gravely doubting whether Jesus] is not rather to be numbered among the wholly mythical and imaginary figures of legend and religion" (*Evolution of the Idea of God*, c. xviii.).

[4] Tacitus says: "The founder of that name was Christ, who suffered death in the reign of Tiberius, under his procurator, Pontius Pilate. This pernicious superstition, thus checked for a while, broke out again; and spread not only over Judæa, where the evil originated, but through Rome also" (*Annals*, bk. xv. 44). Tacitus was born about A.D. 53.

and only a colossal genius could have invented Him. The inquirer who will take the trouble to read some *real* myths, like those of Jupiter, Perseus, or Hercules, in a classical dictionary, will at once perceive the difference between the Gospels and mere mythical legends.

LITERATURE

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(*b*) The Mythical Theory

J. M. Robertson, *Pagan Christs*[2], 1911, and *Christianity and Mythology*; Virolleaud, *The Legend of Christ*; A. Drews, *The Christ Myth*, and *Witnesses to the Historicity of Jesus*; A. Kalthoff, *The Rise of Christianity*; T. W. Doane, *Bible Myths and their Parallels in Other Religions*; T. J. Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ, Historical or Mythical?* (reply to Drews); Tisdall, *Christianity and Other Faiths*, and *Mythic Christs and the True* (do.). (See also Introductory Chapter, pp. xxix., xxx., lxxi.-lxxiv.)

CHAPTER XX

THE PERSON OF JESUS

SUMMARY.—It is shown that Jesus taught and the Apostles believed that He was "the Son of God"—that is, a pre-existent Divine Being who became incarnate for the salvation of the world.

THAT Jesus was the noblest and purest character that ever appeared upon earth, is the verdict of Rationalism as well as of Christianity, and not a few Rationalists are willing to admit that the excellence of the teaching of Jesus entitles Him to be considered in some sense a prophet, and the greatest of prophets. Assuming, then, these points to be provisionally proved, we proceed in the present and following chapters to consider whether the present faith of the Church that Jesus was not only a prophet, but a Divine Person, can be reasonably sustained. The inquiry involves two distinct questions:

(1) Did Jesus Himself claim to be divine, or was the claim afterwards made for Him by the Church?

(2) Is the claim, supposing that Jesus really made it, credible?

I.—What is Christianity?

There can be no doubt that the essence of Christianity, as understood by believers, consists in a unique and quite unlimited devotion to Christ Himself. Christ is trusted, loved, and adored, with absolute self-surrender, as the Incarnate Son of God, the Divine Propitiation for sin, the Gate of access to the Father, the Giver of Eternal Life, the Dispenser of the gifts of the Spirit, the Divine Indweller in the soul, the Light and Life of the world, the Refuge in the storms of life, the Rescuer in temptation, the sympathizing Friend, the Reader of the heart, and the Almighty Judge. That Christianity means this now, and has meant it in the past to every true believer, cannot possibly be denied. Christianity means the worship of the Founder as a divine Mediator and Redeemer.[1] Wherever this faith is sincerely held, Christianity is a vital power. Wherever it is abandoned, as in modern Unitarianism, Christianity becomes cold and lifeless, and ceases to produce its characteristic effects. It is a fact of experience, not denied by Unitarians, that in warmth of devotion, in Christian heroism, in missionary zeal, and in the power of producing the highest types of Christian character, "orthodox" Christianity stands unrivalled; and so conscious are the orthodox that devotion to Christ

[1] No other religion assigns to its founder the place which Christianity assigns to Christ. Moses, Mahomet, and Buddha claim devotion to their *teaching*, not to their persons.

as a Divine Person is the motive power of Christianity, that they do not recognize as genuine Christians any who take a lower view of their Founder's nature.

We have now to inquire whether the "orthodox" view of Christ's Person is original.

II.—What the First Christians believed about Christ

(*a*) *The doctrine of St. Paul.*

In the Pauline epistles, the chief of which were written less than thirty years after the Ascension, the doctrine of Christ's divinity is already fully developed. Thus St. Paul teaches:

(1) That Jesus existed in heaven before His Incarnation as a personal Being equal to the Father in glory and majesty (Col. i. 17; Phil. ii. 6; 1 Cor. xv. 47; 1 Cor. x. 4; *cf.* 1 Tim. iii. 16; Gal. iv. 4).

(2) That He created angels and men, and the whole universe, as the agent of the eternal Father (Col. i. 16-7; 1 Cor. viii. 6).

(3) That He sustains Creation in existence, and is the cause of its rational order (Col. i. 17).

(4) That His assumption of human nature was voluntary, and had a redemptive purpose (Phil. ii. 7).

(5) That His death was of cosmical efficacy, reconciling the whole creation to God (Col. i. 20; *cf.* Eph. i. 10).

(6) That He truly rose from the dead (1 Cor. xv., etc.).

(7) That He ascended to the right hand of God, where He now rules the universe, and is worshipped by all creation, with the full approbation of the Supreme Father (Phil. ii. 9, etc.).

(8) That He is the future Judge of the world (2 Cor. v. 10; 2 Thess. i. 7, etc.).

(9) He is so completely divine, that His name is joined with the Father's on terms of equality, as the giver of the highest spiritual gifts to men (2 Cor. xiii. 14; Gal. i. 1; Eph. v. 5; 1 Thess. iii. 11). His name is invoked in prayer—in fact, prayer to Christ is the distinguishing mark of a Christian (Rom. x. 13; 2 Cor. xii. 8). Believers are mystically united to Him as their Head, and He dwells in their hearts (2 Cor. xiii. 5; Gal. ii. 20, iii. 27; etc.). Faith in Him is equivalent to faith in God (*passim*); and He is actually called God in express terms in Rom. ix. 5, "Who is over all, God blessed for ever"; *cf.* Titus ii. 13, "Our great God and Saviour Jesus Christ" (R.V.).

It is perfectly true that as Son of God Jesus is inferior to Him who begets Him, and that He owes Him filial subjection (see especially 1 Cor. xv. 28); but it is impossible to deny, in the face of such passages as Phil ii. 6, 2 Cor. xiii. 14, that He shares the Father's divine nature, and that His Sonship is, as the Athanasian theology expresses it, "essential" or "consubstantial."

Two points should be particularly noticed with regard to this teaching: (1) that it is not proved controversially against objectors, but alluded to

incidentally as the unquestioned faith of all who profess and call themselves Christians; and (2) that St. Paul assumes that it is equally the faith of the other Apostles. The second point is made clear by Galatians ii., where St. Paul says that on a certain famous occasion he went up to Jerusalem, and *communicated to them that Gospel which he preached among the Gentiles*, and that they *added nothing to him*, but that *contrariwise James, Cephas, and John, who seemed to be pillars, gave to him and Barnabas the right hands of fellowship.*

Now, if the original Apostles had held Jesus to be a mere human Messiah, it is certain that the great controversy of the apostolic age would have turned not upon circumcision, but upon the Person of Christ. There would have been a Unitarian party, led by St. Peter, maintaining that Jesus was a mere man, and a Catholic party, led by St. Paul, maintaining that He was very God; and between parties so divided no peace or compromise would have been possible. This consideration, joined with the fact that not only in Galatians, but elsewhere, St. Paul represents St. Peter's doctrine as fundamentally the same as his own, renders it critically certain that the original apostolic doctrine of Christ's Person was a very exalted one.

(*b*) *The doctrine of St. Peter and the Twelve.*

1 *Peter.*—This conclusion is fully confirmed by the first Epistle of St. Peter, which has been already proved to be unquestionably genuine.

St. Peter shows himself not less impressed than St. Paul with the divine majesty of Christ. According to him, Christ existed before His Incarnation, as is shown by the fact that He sent His Spirit to inspire the Old Testament prophets (i. 11). He was manifested in the flesh for the salvation of men—"manifestation" implying previous existence (i. 20). He is everywhere represented as the centre of Christian love and devotion (i. 8, etc.). His mystical union with His people, whereby He gives them spiritual life, is often alluded to: "Sanctify in your hearts Christ as Lord" (iii. 15); "Life in Christ" (iii. 16); "Eternal glory in Christ" (v. 10); "All that are in Christ" (v. 14). Great stress is laid upon His absolute sinlessness: "Without blemish and without spot" (i. 19); "Who did no sin, neither was guile found in His mouth" (ii. 22); "Christ suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to God" (iii. 18). Salvation is declared to be through Christ, and through faith in Him (i. 9; v. 10). His death was of supernatural efficacy, atoning for sin, and bringing mankind into a new relation to God: "Unto sprinkling of the blood of Jesus" (i. 2); "Redeemed with precious blood, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot, even the blood of Christ" (i. 18); "Who His own self bare our sins in His body upon the tree, . . . by whose stripes ye were healed" (ii. 24); "Christ suffered for sins once" (iii. 18); "Suffered on your behalf" (ii. 21). Christ now exercises almighty power

over the universe: "Who is at the right hand of God, having gone into heaven; angels and authorities and powers being made subject unto Him" (iii. 22). Christ's *revelation*, or second coming in glory, is earnestly expected (i. 7, 13; iv. 12; v. 3), when He will be the judge of quick and dead (iv. 5). He is the one and only Mediator through whom cometh salvation, and through whom alone acceptable prayer and worship can be offered to the Supreme Father (ii. 5; iv. 11; etc.).

If the doxology in iv. 11 refers to Christ, as grammatical considerations render probable, divine worship is paid to Christ in express terms.

The impression that the Epistle of Peter makes upon the candid reader is that it was written by one who had a firm belief in Christ's essential Deity. Neither in doctrine nor in devotional attitude towards Christ's Person does the author in any way fall short of St. Paul. Apart from the style, which is quite different, the epistle might pass as Pauline.

1 *John.*—The unquestioned Epistle of St. John teaches similar doctrine. Briefly stated, St. John's account of Jesus is as follows. He existed with the Father before His Incarnation, as His *Logos*, or Word, and shared His eternal divine life (i. 1-2). He was manifested in the flesh to destroy the works of the devil, to take away sin, and to give eternal life to men (i. 2; iii. 5; iv. 2; iii. 8). His death is a propitiation for the sins of the whole world, and His blood cleanses the soul from sin

(i. 7; ii. 2; etc.). Faith in Him is the same as faith in the Father, the Father and the Son being inseparably united (ii. 23-5, etc.). How completely the author associates the Son with the Father, and assigns to Him the essential attributes of divinity, may be seen from the following typical passages: "The witness is this, that God gave unto us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath the life; and he that hath not the Son, hath not the life" (v. 11, 12); "This is the Antichrist, even he that denieth the Father and the Son. Whosoever denieth the Son, the same hath not the Father: he that confesseth the Son hath the Father also" (ii. 22); "We have beheld and bear witness that the Father hath sent the Son to be the Saviour of the world. Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God abideth in him, and he in God" (iv. 14-5).

Hebrews.—The same type of doctrine is represented by the Epistle to the Hebrews, which, though not by an Apostle, belongs certainly to the apostolic age. In it Jesus is represented as eternal (i. 12; xiii. 8); as the agent in creation (i. 2; i. 10); and as the sustainer of the universe (i. 3). He is the effulgence of the Father's glory, and the very image of His substance (i. 3). He is superior to all the angels, and is worshipped by them (i. 4-6). He is probably called God in i. 8: "Thy throne O God, is for ever and ever" (where, however, Westcott's note should be consulted). The fact that this epistle lays such great stress upon our Lord's

subjection to human conditions (v. 15; v. 7-10; etc.), make its testimony to His Divinity all the more striking.

(c) Probable source of the Apostles' Christology.

The fact that belief in Christ's Divinity was common to all the Apostles, renders it highly probable that this doctrine was taught by Christ Himself. Had the Apostles been Gentiles, this inference would have been doubtful. Gentiles in general had no adequate idea of the infinite gulf which divides the Creator from the creature. Gentile gods were little more than magnified men. They were born like men, they had passions like men, they were subject to the decrees of fate and to changes of fortune. So narrow was the line that divided mortal men from the immortal gods, that intermarriages were common, and heroes at death were often deified. Popular imagination exalted to divine rank in heaven a Romulus, an Æsculapius, or a Hercules. A Roman emperor was worshipped by the provinces while he lived, and by the Senate and Roman people when he died. Had Peter and Paul been Greeks or Romans, they might spontaneously have deified their Teacher after His death, just as the Roman Senate, not many years before, had deified Augustus. But Peter and Paul were *Jews*, and therein lay a world of difference. The absorbing passion of the Jew was zeal for the exclusive worship of the one true God. The God of the Jews was a jealous God: "I am Jehovah: this is My name: and My glory will I not give to

another, neither My praise unto graven images" (Isa. xlii. 8). Even Moses and Elijah, great as was the place they filled in the imagination of the Jews, were never deified. To suppose, then, that typical Jews like St. Peter and St. Paul deified Christ without express warrant from Him, is quite inadmissible. Even if no Gospels existed, we should know for certain from the apostolic epistles that Jesus taught a very high view of His own person.

We have now to examine the evidence of the Gospels; but before doing so, it is desirable to consider certain objections which are offered to the conclusions already reached.

Objection I.—The documents alleged to emanate from Apostles are spurious.

Reply.—This objection has been sufficiently met in c. xviii. sects. 1, 2.

Objection II.—St. Paul's deification of Jesus is readily explained. The real or apparent vision which he experienced at Damascus convinced him that Jesus was a supernatural Being, dwelling in heaven, and possessed of enormous power. He became so possessed with this thought, that the figure of the real historical Jesus faded from his mind, and was replaced by the ideal figure of a superhuman, divine Christ. As St. Paul was not an original disciple, and had never seen our Lord in the flesh, there was nothing to check this idealizing process, which culminated at length in the full doctrine of Christ's Divinity.

Reply.—(1) St. Paul, a strict Pharisaic Jew brought up at the feet of Gamaliel, would have been as unlikely as St. Peter to deify, of his own accord, one whom he knew certainly to be a man.

(2) St. Paul expressly states that his doctrine was not his own, but was communicated to him in a supernatural manner by Christ Himself (Gal. i. 20). That Christ instructed St. Paul not by mere spiritual influences, but by spoken words, is clear from 1 Cor. xi. 23, where St. Paul states that the account which he there gives of the institution of the Eucharist was communicated to him by Christ.

(3) Even if the above hypothesis could explain how *St. Paul* came by his doctrine of Christ's Divinity, it cannot explain how the same doctrine came to be held by St. Peter and the Twelve.

Objection III.—The Epistle of St. James and St. Peter's speeches in Acts take a much lower view of Christ's person than 1 Peter. They do not imply more than that Jesus was the Messiah of the Jews, and the last and greatest of Jewish prophets.

Reply.—(1) The evidence of the disputed Epistle of James, which is not ascribed to him until the time of Origen (A.D. 230), and of which Eusebius says, "It is held to be spurious: at least, not many of the ancients have made mention of it," is not to be received against that of the certainly genuine Epistle of Peter. Similarly, the speeches of St.

Peter recorded in Acts by a person who never heard them, and whose sources of information are doubtful, are less valuable evidence of what St. Peter really believed than his own epistle.

(2) Assuming the Epistle of James and the speeches in Acts to be authentic, it may be replied:

(*a*) The Epistle of James is an untheological production. It is chiefly concerned with morality, and contains hardly any allusions to doctrine. Yet when Jesus is mentioned, it is with the highest reverence, and in language which expresses a high view of His person. Thus in the first verse St. James co-ordinates Christ with God quite in the manner of St. Peter and St. Paul, by describing himself as the slave of God and of the Lord Jesus Christ. In ii. 1 he describes Jesus as "the Lord of glory," a title suggesting superhuman dignity and power. He also looks for Christ's second coming to judgment: "Be ye also patient; stablish your hearts: for the coming of the Lord is at hand. Murmur not, brethren, one against another, that ye be not judged: behold, the judge standeth before the doors" (v. 8-9). In ii. 7 he speaks of "the honourable name" of Jesus, and in iv. 15 he alludes to His power to heal the sick and to forgive sin. Upon the whole, considering the untheological character of St. James's Epistle, its language about our Lord's person cannot be pronounced unsatisfactory from the point of view of orthodoxy.

(*b*) The speeches in Acts belong to that extremely early period, immediately following the Ascension, when the Christian doctrine of our Lord's Person was not yet distinctly formulated. It was not until after the Resurrection that faith in Christ's Divinity was definitely reached, and it took time to grasp its meaning fully, to determine its relation to other truths, such as the unity of God and the supremacy of the Father, and to find the best method of expressing and teaching it. What, therefore, the Apostles preached first and foremost were *facts*, especially those to which they could give their personal testimony, such as the Resurrection and Ascension of their Master. The facts they taught explicitly, the doctrine which lay behind the facts they taught implicitly.

It is necessary, moreover, to remember that the speeches in Acts were addressed to persons outside the Church, and must not be taken to represent the full faith of the Christian Society. They were intended to prepare the way for deeper teaching. The Apostles themselves had been led to faith in Christ's Divinity through faith in His Messiahship, and they wisely aimed at leading their converts along the same road. In their public preaching, therefore, they strove to prove that Jesus was the long-expected Messiah of the Jews, that He had truly risen from the dead, and had been exalted to the throne of the universe, whence He dispensed the Holy Spirit and every kind of gift and blessing to men. The Apostles rightly considered that

persons who believed this already virtually believed Christ's Divinity, and that nothing but reflection was required to make the belief explicit.

Turning now to the actual teaching of the book of Acts, we assert that it implies the highest view of Christ's person. Thus, for example,—

(1) Prayer to Jesus is represented as universal. Christians are described as those "who call upon the name" of Jesus (Acts ix. 14). The dying Stephen prays, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit," and adds, "Lord, lay not this sin to their charge" (Acts vii. 59). The nature of Stephen's prayer should be particularly noticed. He does not say, "Jesus, pray for me," which would be the form of invoking a saintly intercessor, but, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit," as if Jesus were equal to God, and able Himself to confer life and immortality. The more this point is pondered, the more evident it becomes that the first Christians regarded Christ as divine.[1]

(2) Omnipotence is ascribed to Jesus both in express terms and by implication. Thus He is "Lord of all"—*i.e.* of the whole universe (x. 36). It is He who sends down the Holy Spirit (ii. 32). He is the Prince or Author of life (iii. 15). He is

[1] The earliest Christians neither invoked nor prayed to saints. The invocation of saints first began to be practised in the second half of the fourth century, and was not introduced into the services of the Church until several centuries later. Direct prayer to saints is a still more modern development (Bingham, *Antiquities*, xiii. 3; Mason, *Purgatory*; Luckock, *After death*, p. 174 ff.). On the whole subject see Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*, vii.

at God's right hand—"Behold, I see the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God" (vii. 56); "Him did God exalt to [*or* with] His right hand to be a Prince and a Saviour, for to give repentance to Israel, and remission of sins" (v. 31); "God hath made Him both Lord and Christ" (ii. 36).

(3) He is the sole Mediator between God and man, and the only giver of salvation: "In none other is there salvation: for neither is there any other name under heaven, that is given among men, wherein we must be saved" (iv. 12).

(4) He is sinless: "The Righteous One" (vii. 52); "The Holy and Righteous One" (iii. 14).

(5) The "name" of Jesus is used where we should expect to find the name of God. The converts are baptized in the "name" of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins (ii. 38). In the "name" of Jesus the lame man walks (iii. 6). Signs and wonders are done through the "name" of God's Holy Servant (or Son)[1] Jesus (iv. 30). Through His "name" every one that believeth on Him shall receive remission of sins (x. 43).

(6) His second coming to judge the world is declared: "He charged us to preach unto the people, and to testify that this is He which is

[1] The word παῖς, as applied to Jesus in Acts iii. 13, 26, iv. 25, 27, 30, is translated "Servant" in the R.V.; but Dalman argues strongly for the rendering "Son" (*Words of Jesus*, tr., pp. 276–80). The same title occurs (apparently in the sense of *Son*) in the *Didache* and in Clement of Rome.

ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead" (x. 42).

These declarations do not amount to a formal statement of the Deity of Christ, but it is impossible for one who sincerely accepts them to avoid arriving at that conclusion. In the same way the Apostles' Creed[1] does not expressly state Christ's Deity, though its statements imply it.

Objection IV.—1 Peter makes use of the Epistle to the Romans, and probably of the Epistle to the Ephesians. It is therefore likely that the author has borrowed his high view of Christ's person from St Paul.

Reply.—It is most unlikely that St. Peter, the leader of the original Apostles, would have fundamentally altered His doctrine to suit that of St. Paul, who had never been a disciple. Moreover, there is evidence that St. Peter and St. Paul were in doctrinal agreement long before 1 Peter or even the Pauline epistles were written (Gal. i. ii.).

Objection V.—The tendency of Jewish Christianity to degenerate into Ebionism or Unitarianism is an indication that the original Apostles taught a low view of Christ's person.

Reply.—The tendency referred to was natural enough. For *Jews* the doctrine of the Divine Unity was all-absorbing, and it was difficult to assimilate with it the doctrine of Christ's Divinity. To believe in Christ's Divinity seemed to many Jews

[1] A consensus of recent authorities dates the original Apostles' Creed not later than about A.D. 100. Ignatius (110) uses it.

equivalent to believing in two Gods. Moreover, the observance of the Law obscured the true view of Christ's person and work. Jewish Christians who kept the law of Moses naturally gravitated towards the view that they were saved by the Law as well as by the Gospel, and tended to take a low view of Christ's Person and work.

This tendency, however, is not evidence that the original Apostles taught a low view of Christ's Person. The evidence points, as we have seen, in quite a different direction.

Objection VI.—The original Christian view of Christ's person was that Jesus, up to the time of His Baptism, was an ordinary man, but that, on the occasion of His Baptism in Jordan, the Spirit of God descended upon Him, and He became from that moment the Son of God and the Messiah.

In favour of this view it is urged—

(1) That at the Baptism of Jesus the true words spoken by the Father were not, "Thou art My beloved Son in whom I am well pleased," but, "Thou art My Son, *this day have I begotten Thee.*" This version of the utterance is found in certain MSS. of St. Luke (iii. 22), and also in St. Justin's account of our Lord's Baptism (*Dialogue with Trypho*, lxxxviii.; ciii.).

In reply it may be said—

(*a*) That this reading in St. Luke is certainly not the original one, as all textual critics are agreed.

(*b*) That St. Mark's Gospel, from which St. Luke derived his account, and also St. Matthew's, have

the ordinary form of the words, which is thus plainly original.

(*c*) That the reading *this day have I begotten Thee* is easily explained as an assimilation of the Gospel text to that of Psalm vii. 5, which was regarded in early times as a prophecy of Christ's Baptism. Thus St. Justin says, "There came at the same instant from the heavens a voice, which was also uttered by David when he spoke, personating Christ, what the Father would say to Him, 'Thou art My Son, this day have I begotten Thee'" (*Dialogue*, ch. lxxxviii.).

(2) It is also urged in favour of this view, that certain early heretics, such as the Cerinthians, the Ebionites, and the Carpocratians, believed that Jesus was a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary by natural generation, and that there descended upon Him at His Baptism the *Logos*, or the Holy Spirit, or a heavenly Aeon called Christ (Irenæus, *Against Heresies*, bk. i. 25, 26).

Reply.—Such views are repugnant, as we have shown, to the authentic Epistles, not only of St. Paul, but also of St. Peter and St. John, and therefore cannot be regarded as original. Their advocacy by Cerinthus was so repugnant to St. John, that, on one occasion, recognizing Cerinthus among the bathers in the public baths, he rushed away without bathing, exclaiming, "Let us flee, lest even the bath-house fall down, because Cerinthus, the enemy of truth, is within" (Irenæus, *Against Heresies*, bk. iii. 3).

Objection VII.—Two types of Christology were current in the Apostolic Church: (1) the Pauline view, that Christ was a pre-existent heavenly Being, or *Spirit*, who became incarnate; and (2) the Judaic view, that Jesus was a mere man, who, on account of His extraordinary goodness, was *adopted* by God to be His Son. The former type of Christology is called by Prof. Harnack *Pneumatic*, the latter *Adoptianist.*

Reply.—There is no evidence either in the New Testament or in the Fathers that Adoptianist views were ever held in the Church. Even Hermas, upon whom Harnack especially relies as favouring Adoptianism, distinctly teaches Christ's pre-existence. The following passage is quite explicit: "Listen and understand, O ignorant man. The Son of God is older than all His creatures, so that He was a fellow-counsellor with the Father in His work of creation: for this reason He is old" (Hermas, *Similitudes*, ix. ch. 12).

That Adoptianist views prevailed among the Ebionites and other heretical sects, is admitted; but that is another matter altogether.

III.—What Jesus believed about Himself

Any confidence which we have or may have about Christ's testimony to Himself must be based upon confidence in His moral character. If He can be shown to have been in no ordinary degree a good and sincere man, then we shall be inclined to give His claims at least a serious and candid

consideration. If, on the other hand, He appears to have been in any way insincere or deficient in goodness, we shall be justified in summarily rejecting His claims as preposterous. In the last chapter we have already given reasons for believing that Jesus was one of the noblest characters in human history, and have quoted agnostic testimony to that effect. Nevertheless it is desirable, considering the greatness of the issues involved, to treat the subject here more fully.

(1) The goodness of Jesus is shown by the excellence of His moral and religious teaching, which is not derived from other teachers, but is stamped with the impress of His own beautiful personality. The best rationalist opinion agrees with this. Keim, for instance, says: "The first great fact in the personal existence of Jesus is that His whole being was constantly full of the idea of God in the sunny expansion of God into the Father; and the second great fact is the complete domination of the idea of moral good, which is indissolubly connected with the former as explanation and expression. It is usual to call the former His unbroken fellowship with God, and the latter His unsullied sinlessness. . . . The lofty religion which He preached assumed flesh and blood first in His own person, and that in a unique manner, because imperfection reigns in others. The Church lives upon this belief; and this belief seems to be established, without need of further proof, by the fact that Jesus' religious preaching originated

essentially in His personal religion, and his wonderfully lofty and spotlessly pure religion is therefore the outcome of the personal perfection of religious experience and moral practice" (*Jesus of Nazara*, tr., vol. vi. p. 403). Similarly Strauss says: "This intuition of a God good to all [as expressed in the Sermon on the Mount] Jesus could only have drawn out of His own being; it could only have emanated out of that universal benevolence which was the fundamental characteristic of His own nature, and by which He felt Himself in perfect harmony with God. To be able, like God Himself, to stand firm against the irritation which is produced by wickedness, to conquer an enemy only by conferring benefits upon him, and to overcome evil only with good—these were the principles of conduct which He derived from the disposition of His own heart. . . . The dominant feature of His character was the love which embraces all creatures, and He makes of that the fundamental characteristic of the Divine Essence." [1]

(2) The goodness of Jesus is affirmed in the strongest language by those who have the best right to pronounce upon it—those, namely, who for nearly three years were brought into the closest daily contact with Him.

Thus St. Peter represents Him as absolutely sinless: "A lamb without blemish and without spot" (1 Pet. i. 19); "Who did no sin, neither

[1] *Life of Jesus* (1864), quoted by Godet, *Defence of the Christian Faith* (tr.), p. 202.

was guile found in His mouth: who, when He was reviled, reviled not again" (1 Pet. ii. 22-3); "Christ also suffered for sins once, the righteous for the unrighteous, that He might bring us to God" (1 Pet. iii. 18). In the Gospel narrative St. Peter is represented as testifying on behalf of all the Apostles: "We have believed and know that Thou art the Holy One of God" (John vi. 69, R.V.). Similarly in Acts, St. Peter, speaking of Jesus, says: "Ye denied the Holy and Righteous One" (Acts iii. 14), with which may be compared St. Stephen's description of Jesus as "the Just One" (Acts vii. 52).

St. John, the bosom friend of Jesus, who knew Him even more intimately than St. Peter, speaks of Him as sinless: "Jesus Christ the Righteous" (1 John ii. 1); "If ye know that He is righteous, ye know that every one also that doeth righteousness is begotten of Him" (1 John ii. 29); "We know that He was manifested to take away sins; and in Him is no sin" (1 John iii. 5).

Even the traitor Judas recognized the goodness of Jesus. St. Matthew records that Judas, "when he saw that Jesus was condemned, repented himself, and brought again the thirty pieces of silver to the chief priests and elders, saying, I have sinned in that I have betrayed the innocent blood" (Matt. xxvii. 3-4).[1]

[1] The evidence of the Baptist is also worthy of attention. When Jesus came to be baptized, "John forbad Him, saying, I have need to be baptized of Thee, and comest Thou to me?" (Matt. iii. 14; *cf.* iii. 11, and John i. 27, 29).

(3) The goodness of Jesus is also affirmed by those who were in no sense connected with Him: by Pilate ("I am innocent of the blood of this just person: see ye to it," Matt. xxvii. 24; "Why, what evil hath He done?" Mark xv. 14; "I find no fault in this man," Luke xxiii. 4, 14, 22; "I find in Him no fault," John xviii. 38; xix. 4, 6, 12); by Pilate's wife ("Have thou nothing to do with that just man," Matt. xxvii. 19); by one of the thieves ("This man hath done nothing amiss," Luke xxiii. 41); by the centurion ("Certainly this man was righteous," Luke xxiii. 47).

(4) The unquestionable verdict of history is that Jesus was one of the best men that ever lived. This view of Him is taken not only by Christians, but by those who regard Him as a man like other men, and not altogether faultless. Thus Dr. Martineau says: "Jesus of Nazareth, in virtue of the characteristics of His spirit, holds the place of Prince of Saints, and perfects the conditions of the pure religious life" (*Seat of Authority*, p. 652). Dr. Keim says: "The life of Jesus, both in public and private, was in an eminent degree holy and pure, and allows us as such to infer a previous unsullied youth striving towards the noble and the exalted. The small defects which have been detected are no sins; they are sometimes an extravagance of idealism and energy, and sometimes a remnant of human force in the crushing conflict of the elements, and vanish like a drop in the ocean of brilliant superhuman achievement. . . .

We are still able to retain the strong and joyful conviction that it was Virtue herself that trod the earth in Him, and that the dolorous confession made by antiquity of the impossibility of sinlessness, and of the non-existence of the ideal of virtue and wisdom, found in Him its refutation and its end. In detail, a plenitude of virtues—zeal for God and love of man, self-respect and humility, bravery and self-denial; every virtue so full, the zeal so fervent, the love so melting, the heroism so ardent, the self-denial so unbounded, that out of each atom a great man must grow" (*Jesus of Nazara*, vol. vi. pp. 416, 417).

Having now established that Jesus was one of the purest and most beautiful spirits that ever laboured for the good of mankind, we proceed to inquire what He taught about Himself, and what position in the universe He claimed to occupy. We shall use the testimony of all four Gospels; but inasmuch as it is generally supposed that there is a larger subjective element in the discourses of the fourth Gospel than in those of the Synoptics, we shall use the fourth Gospel mainly to confirm and illustrate what is independently attested by the other three. This is not, perhaps, a logical course to adopt, for the fourth Gospel, being the direct production of the most intimate friend of Jesus, ought probably to be regarded as the best guide to the interpretation of His teaching. Expediency, however, may be pleaded in favour of our procedure. The authenticity of the discourses

and sayings in Matthew and Luke is admitted by almost all,[1] but the authenticity of those in St. John is seriously disputed. Under such circumstances it is better to rest the case upon the undisputed testimony.

(1) There is good evidence that Jesus taught His own sinlessness. This in itself is a remarkable fact. The general opinion of mankind has pronounced sinlessness impossible. Thus Demosthenes assigned the attribute of acting rightly at all times to the gods alone (*De Corona*, p. 322). Cicero declared that he had never found a perfectly wise man. Xenophon said, "I see that no one

[1] For example, Renan says: "Matthew evidently merits an unlimited confidence as to the discourses; they are the *Logia*, the identical notes taken from a clear and lively remembrance of the teachings of Jesus. A kind of splendour, at once mild and terrible—a divine strength, if we may so speak—emphasizes these words, detaches them from the context, and renders them easily distinguishable" (*Life of Jesus*, Introduction).

The fourth Gospel is also regarded by Renan as to a large extent trustworthy. "Upon the whole," he says, "I admit as authentic the four Canonical Gospels. All, in my opinion, date from the first century; and the authors are, generally speaking, those to whom they are attributed. . . . Every one who sets himself to write the life of Jesus without any predetermined theory as to the relative value of the Gospels . . . will be led, in numerous instances, to prefer the narration of John to that of the Synoptics. The last months of the life of Jesus especially are explained by John alone; a number of the features of the Passion, unintelligible in the Synoptics, resume both probability and possibility in the narrative of the fourth Gospel." Even of the Johannine discourses Renan says: "There are in the discourses of John some admirable gleams, some traits which truly come from Jesus." Renan's view is endorsed (in the main) by Harnack and Matthew Arnold.

of mankind is free from failings." Epictetus raised the question, "Is it possible for a man to be faultless?" and answered, "It is impossible. What is possible is to be continually striving to be faultless." Mahomet expressly disclaimed sinlessness, and recorded in the Koran God's command to him: "Pray for the forgiveness of thy sins." Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, is not represented as having been sinless from the first, but as gradually attaining sinlessness. It is related that Socrates on one occasion, seeing his disciples deriding a physiognomist, who professed to have discovered in the philosopher's face indications of all the vices, openly declared that he had in his heart the germs of all the sins which the physiognomist professed to have detected.[1] Moses was plainly guilty of serious sin (Exod. ii. 12). Isaiah was "a man of unclean lips" (Isa. vi. 5). Elijah confessed, "I am not better than my fathers" (1 Kings xix. 4). St. Peter, conscious of his unworthiness in the presence of Christ, exclaimed, "Depart from me, for I am a sinful man, O Lord" (Luke v. 8). St. Paul confessed himself the chief of sinners, and sometimes feared, lest, when he had preached to others, he might himself be a castaway (1 Tim. i. 15; Rom. v. 8; vii. 23; 1 Cor. ix. 27). St. John, the purest and most beautiful of all New Testament

[1] Socrates himself never claimed sinlessness. Even his enthusiastic admirer and biographer, Xenophon, does not venture to claim for him more than *freedom from impiety*: "No one of mankind ever saw or heard Socrates doing or saying anything irreligious or impious" (*Memorabilia*, i. 1, 11).

characters, says decidedly: "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us. If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness. If we say that we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us" (1 John i. 8). The fact is that the more holy a man is, the more strictly he judges himself, and the less inclined he is to claim that he is free from sin. Strauss himself, in his well-known Life of Jesus, recognizes this. "In proportion," he says, "as man makes progress towards moral perfection, the instinctive sense by which he detects in himself the slightest deviations from such perfection becomes more and more acute."

Jesus, on the other hand, never recognized in Himself the least moral blemish.[1] The most *explicit* statements of His sinlessness are found in the fourth Gospel: "Which of you convinceth Me

[1] The only apparent exception is Mark x. 17 ff., where Jesus, having been accosted by a young man as "Good Master," replies, "Why callest thou Me good? there is none good but one, that is, God." That Jesus seriously meant to deny that He was good, is, in view of the other claims which He made (see below), quite impossible. Dr. Gore is clearly right when he says (*Bampton Lectures*, i.): "Christ was systematically training [the Apostles] to trust Him with that sort of trust which can legitimately be given to God only. This becomes all the more conspicuous when we find Him repudiating from one who came with the vague language of casual respect, even the familiar title, 'Good Master.' Such ordinary and casual deference, the language of mere compliment commonly addressed to contemporary Rabbis, He would not accept; but language far

of sin" (viii. 46); "The prince of this world cometh, and hath nothing in Me (xiv. 30); "I do always those things that please Him" (viii. 29); "I am the Good Shepherd" (x. 11); "I glorified Thee on the earth, by finishing the work which Thou hast given Me to do" (xvii. 4). The synoptic evidence, however, is really as strong. The claim to be the personified Moral Law of the human race, and in particular to be the Judge of the world, which He continually made, implies sinlessness. So does His claim that His death is a propitiatory sacrifice for the sins of the world (Mark x. 45). Quite decisive also is the passage (Matt. xi. 28) where, after declaring that "no man knoweth the Father, save the Son," He says, "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest. Take My yoke upon you, and learn of Me; for I am meek and lowly in heart: and ye shall find rest unto your souls. For My yoke is easy,

higher, devotion of far intenser meaning He was deliberately encouraging in the disciples who did know Him, and had reasons for what they said and felt." Another explanation of the passage, first suggested by Origen, is accepted by Ullmann, Godet, Meyer, and some other modern critics. Ullmann says (*Sinlessness of Jesus*, p. 150): "He undoubtedly did intend to reject the attribution to Himself of goodness in that absolute, that purely divine sense of which we have spoken. And not without reason. . . . His goodness [as man] was not, like the divine goodness, absolutely unexposed to temptation, and raised above all change, but a goodness capable of development, and to be perfected by temptations, conflicts, and sufferings." Meyer says: "This declaration is no evidence against the *sinlessness* of Jesus." B. Weiss, *in loc.*, takes the same view.

and My burden is light." An invitation like this could never have been addressed, without extreme arrogance and impiety, by a sinner to fellow-sinners.

Not to dwell further upon a claim which is implied in every other claim that Jesus made, we subjoin the words of the author of the most learned and critical of the rationalistic Lives of Jesus. "Any one," says Keim,[1] "who has given himself to the contemplation of the words and acts of our Lord receives from it irresistibly this impression—here we have before us a conscience which has never felt the sting of the sense of guilt. And this is not a case of a moralist of a low or easy standard of morality. Oh no! it is He who branded with the character of sin a bare look, an idle word, and, behind the veil of the outward actions, all impurity of heart and motives. He sternly rebuked His age; He made His disciples blush for their weaknesses; He made them pray for the forgiveness of their sins. But He, the man of the most absorbing vocation, of the vastest mission, . . . never prayed for pardon for Himself, not even at Gethsemane or Golgotha. He walks with perfect constancy in the sunshine of the paternal love of God; He compels other men to believe in His perfect goodness; He pronounces forgiveness upon sinners in the name of God; He dies for them, and ascends

[1] Keim rejects the fourth Gospel altogether, and uses the testimony even of the Synoptists with the utmost caution.

to heaven to take His place upon the judgment-seat of the all-holy God."[1]

[1] Of particular alleged blemishes in our Lord's character, the following are the chief:

(1) He showed wilfulness and disobedience to His parents (Luke ii. 43).

Reply.—(*a*) It is clear that He was not lodging with His parents at the time, and did not know that they had started home. (*b*) It must be remembered that the relation of Jesus to His parents was not precisely that of other children.

(2) The Baptism of Jesus involved on His part a confession of sin (*cf.* Matt. iii. 2, 6).

Reply.—Any presumption of this kind is removed: (*a*) by the voice of the Father, which declared His sinless perfection (Matt. iii. 17); (*b*) by the express words of John and of Jesus Himself (Matt. iii. 14, 15; *cf.* 11, and John i. 29).

(3) He wilfully destroyed the property of the Gadarene swine-owners (Mark v. 13).

Reply.—(*a*) Whatever may have been the case with the other actions of Jesus, His *miracles* must have been worked in full dependence upon God and in obedience to God. It is certain, therefore, that since the miracle was sanctioned by God Himself, it cannot have involved any injustice to any one. (*b*) Probably the owners of the swine were Jews, and had no right to keep swine.

(4) He called Judas a devil (John vi. 70).

Reply.—(*a*) Judas deserved the title, and Jesus, who could read the heart, had the right to apply it to Him. (*b*) The term may mean *a false accuser, a slanderer.*

(5) Jesus spoke too severely of the Scribes and Pharisees (Matt. xxiii.).

Reply.—(*a*) Religious hypocrisy is the vilest of sins, and is more culpable than open immorality. (*b*) Jesus could read the hearts of men, and knew the truth better than we do. (*c*) Jesus had in view the Church in all ages, and in the persons of the Scribes assailed religious hypocrisy in all its forms.

(6) Jesus showed undue violence in cleansing the temple (John ii. 15).

Reply.—(*a*) The scourge was used by Him to drive out the oxen, not to strike their owners. (*b*) Jesus acted in the matter

The consciousness that Jesus possessed of being sinless is not of itself evidence that His personality was more than human. Nevertheless, it is a fact that challenges attention. It marks Jesus off from all the great men who have ever lived, and demands investigation and, if possible, explanation.

(2) Jesus claimed an authority far higher than that of a prophet. The prophets spoke in the name of the Lord. Jesus did not hesitate, even upon the most solemn occasions, to speak in His own name. Thus in the Sermon on the Mount He revised on His own authority the words spoken by God Himself on Sinai: "Ye have heard that it was said to them of old time [viz. by God], Thou shalt not kill: . . . but *I* say unto you, . . . Ye have heard that it was said, Thou shalt not commit adultery: . . . but *I* say unto

as a prophet, and His zeal was not blameworthy, but altogether commendable.

(7) In cursing the fig-tree Jesus showed unreasonable anger (Matt. xxi. 19).

Reply.—The miracle was an acted parable indicating the judgment of religious hypocrites.

(8) Jesus showed want of resignation upon the Cross—"My God, My God, why hast Thou forsaken Me?" (Matt. xxvii. 46).

Reply.—(*a*) There is no complaint against God in these words. Jesus only asks the *cause* of His being thus forsaken. (*b*) The words have reference to the mystery of the Atonement, in which "He bare our sins in His own body on the tree."

(9) He spoke disrespectfully to His mother (John ii. 3).

Reply.—The words are quite respectful, *woman*, or *lady*, being a title of respectful address. Jesus does no more than warn His mother that now that His ministry has begun, not even she must presume to dictate or suggest what He is to do.

you," etc. (Matt. v. 21 ff.). We are not surprised, therefore, to find that what impressed the people about this sermon was not so much its contents as the tone of authority which pervaded it: "The people were astonished at His doctrine: for He taught them as one having authority, and not as the scribes" (Matt. vii. 28-9). Similarly He worked miracles in almost every case in His own name: "I will; be thou cleansed"; "Young man, I say unto thee, Arise"; "Lazarus, come forth." He also vindicted His power to forgive sins, braving the accusation of blasphemy to which it exposed Him (Mark ii. 5 ff.).

(3) All other great religious teachers have demanded faith in God alone, and have spoken of themselves in the spirit of St. Paul when he said: "Who then is Paul, and who is Apollos, but ministers by whom ye believed?" Jesus, however, demanded unlimited faith in His own Person —a faith so intense, and a devotion so consuming, that none but God can rightly claim it. That He did so, lies on the surface of the Gospel narratives, and is as clear in the Synoptists as in St. John, as clear in St. Mark as in St. Matthew and St. Luke: "If any man come to Me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be My disciple" (Luke xiv. 26); "Whosoever shall confess Me before men, him will I confess also before My Father which is in heaven. But whosoever shall deny Me before men, him will I also deny

before My Father which is in heaven" (Matt. x. 32-3); "He that loveth father or mother more than Me is not worthy of Me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than Me is not worthy of Me" (Matt. x. 37); "He that receiveth Me receiveth Him that sent Me" (Matt. x. 40); "Come unto Me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest" (Matt. xi. 28); "Whosoever shall not receive you, nor hear your words, when ye depart out of that house or city, shake off the dust of your feet. Verily I say unto you, It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom and Gomorrha in the day of judgment, than for that city" (Matt. x. 14-5); "[Jesus] said to another, Follow Me. But he said, Lord, suffer me first to go and bury my father. Iesus said unto him, Let the dead bury their dead: but go thou and preach the kingdom of God" (Luke ix. 59-60); "I am the Way, the Truth, and the Life: no man cometh unto the Father, but through Me" (John xiv. 6); "He that honoureth not the Son honoureth not the Father which hath sent him" (John v. 23).

Jesus continually encouraged men to put faith in Him and in His supernatural powers to an unlimited extent. He received as a matter of right, and without the least sign of displeasure, the most extreme marks of subjection and reverence. He carefully prepared the way for and led up to the great act of faith by which the disciples declared their conviction that He was the Messiah and the Son of God, and openly expressed His

joy at the result: "Blessed art thou, Simon Barjona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but My Father which is in heaven" (Matt. xvi. 17; see also Matt. viii. 2; xiv. 33; xv. 25; xx. 20; xxviii. 9, 17; John ix. 38; xx. 28; John vi. 67).

(4) Jesus taught that at the Last Judgment He would not be a subject of judgment like other men, but the Judge. All the Gospels, and apparently all the original sources of the Gospels, testify to this. This claim to be the Judge of the world appears even in the Sermon on the Mount, which is sometimes stated to be a purely ethical discourse: "Many will say to Me in that day [*i.e.* in the Judgment Day], Lord, Lord, did we not prophesy by Thy name; and by Thy name cast out devils, and by Thy name do many mighty works? And then I will profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from Me, ye that work iniquity" (Matt. vii. 22-3). The same claim is made again and again in the course of the ministry: "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of His Father with His angels; and then shall He reward every man according to his works" (Matt. xvi. 27); "Whosoever shall be ashamed of Me and of My words in this adulterous and sinful generation of him also shall the Son of Man be ashamed, when He cometh in the glory of His Father with the holy angels" (Mark viii. 38); "In an hour that ye think not the Son of Man cometh" (Luke xii. 40); "Then shall they see the Son of Man coming in

the clouds with great power and glory. And then shall He send His angels, and shall gather together His elect from the four winds, from the uttermost part of the earth to the uttermost part of heaven" (Mark xiii. 26-7); "Whosoever shall confess Me before men, him shall the Son of Man also confess before the angels of God" (Luke xii. 8); "When the Son of Man shall come in His glory, and all the angels with Him, then shall He sit upon the throne of His glory: and before Him shall be gathered all nations: and He shall separate them one from another, as a shepherd divideth his sheep from the goats: and He shall set the sheep on His right hand, but the goats on the left. Then shall the King say unto them on His right hand, Come, ye blessed of My Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world. . . . Then shalt He say also unto them on the left hand, Depart from Me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire, prepared for the devil and his angels. . . . And these shall go away into eternal punishment: but the righteous into eternal life" (Matt. xxv. 31 ff.).

The same claim to the office of Judge appears also in the parables, the most characteristic of the utterances of Jesus, and the least capable of alteration or perversion. It is found in the parable of the Tares: "Let both grow together until the harvest: and in the time of harvest *I* will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into

my barn. . . . So shall it be in the end of the world. The Son of Man shall send forth His angels, and they shall gather out of His kingdom all things that cause stumbling, and them that do iniquity, and shall cast them into the furnace of fire: there shall be the weeping and gnashing of teeth" (Matt. xiii. 30, 40-2). It is found again in the parable of the Ten Virgins, where it is undoubtedly Christ Himself who pronounces the sentence of exclusion (Matt. xxv. 12); and in the parable which follows it, where Christ is represented as going into a far country, and then returning and recompensing His servants according to their behaviour during His absence (Matt. xxv. 14 ff.; *cf.* Luke xix. 12 ff.).

The testimony of the fourth Gospel is precisely similar: "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son. . . . The Father hath given Him authority to execute judgment also because He is the Son of Man. Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear His voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of judgment" (John v. 22 ff.).

(5) Jesus taught that His death was not simply a martyrdom, but a supernatural event of momentous importance, changing for the better the relations between God and man, and initiating a new and everlasting covenant. This teaching is

less prominent than that concerning His office as Judge, but it is found in all the Gospels, and is enshrined in that sacred rite which is celebrated by Christians in remembrance of Him, and therefore it must be regarded as critically established. All the accounts of the institution of the Holy Communion show that Jesus regarded His death as an Atonement for sin: "This is My blood of the covenant, which is shed on behalf of many unto remission of sins" (Matt.); "This is My blood of the covenant, which is shed on behalf of many" (Mark); "This cup is the New Covenant in [*i.e.* by means of] My blood, even that which is poured out on your behalf" (Luke);[1] "This cup is the New Testament in My blood" (1 Cor. xi. 25).

Similar doctrine is found in the striking passage Matt. xx. 28 = Mark x. 45: "The Son of Man came not to be ministered unto, but to minister, and to give His life a ransom for [*or*, instead of] many" (λύτρον ἀντὶ πολλῶν). It also occurs several times in St. John's Gospel: "I lay down My life for the sheep" (x. 15); "The bread which I will give is My flesh, [which I will give] for the life of the world" (vi. 51); "He that eateth My flesh, and drinketh My blood hath eternal life" (vi. 54).

(6) Jesus claimed to be "the Son of God" in a sense far in advance of that in which the title is

[1] There is some doubt as to what is the true text of Luke xx. 19-20. The reader should consult the R.V. margin, Hastings's *Bible Dict.* vol. ii. p. 636, and Plummer's Commentary, *in loc.*

used in the Old Testament of the Davidic king (2 Sam. vii. 14) and of the Messiah (Psalm ii. 7). By "the Son of God" Jesus meant a supernatural being, exalted far above angels and men, and second only to God the Father in rank and dignity. Some critics deny this,[1] but the evidence is too strong to be resisted. Three passages from the Synoptic Gospels are quite conclusive. The first is Mark xiii. 32 = Matt. xxiv. 36: "But of that day or that hour knoweth no one, not even the angels in heaven, neither the Son, but the Father." The Son—notice the absolute use of the term, as in the fourth Gospel—is here certainly ranked above the angels,[2] even while it is admitted that His knowledge is limited.[3] The second passage is Matt. xi. 27 = Luke x. 22: "All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father: and no one knoweth the Son, save the Father; neither doth any know the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son willeth to reveal Him." The point of greatest significance in this passage is neither the omnipotence granted to the Son, nor the fact that He alone knows the Father, but the remarkable statement that the nature of the Son is so transcendent that it is apprehended by the

[1] Those critics who deny this meaning in the Synoptic Gospels generally admit it in the fourth Gospel.

[2] The superiority of the Son to the angels appears also in Matt. xvi. 27 ("*His* angels"), and xiii. 41 ("Shall send forth *His* angels").

[3] The limitation of the Son's knowledge is also recognized in the true text of Matt. xxiv. 36. See the R.V.

Father alone. Harnack's rationalistic exposition of the passage in his *What is Christianity?* is entirely vitiated by neglect of this important point. A really impartial criticism must candidly admit that a Being so exalted that He shares the Father's omnipotence, and is incapable of being understood by any but Him, is no creature, but is the Father's *alter ego*, His consubstantial Son, and the sharer of His throne and attributes.

This conclusion is confirmed by the third and last synoptic passage which we have to consider, Matt. xxvi. 63 = Mark xiv. 61 = Luke xxii. 66 ff., in which an account is given of the trial of Jesus before the Sanhedrim. That Jesus was not condemned merely for claiming to be the Messiah is clear both from St. Matthew and St. Mark. To lay claim to the office of Messiah was not in itself an offence. Barchochebas, in the reign of Hadrian, appeared in this character, and his claim was accepted by the Jewish population of Palestine (Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* iv. 6). Jesus, however, claimed to be more than this. He asserted that He was not only the Messiah, but also *the Son of God.* This comes out quite clearly at the trial. "I adjure Thee," said the high-priest, "by the living God, that Thou tell us whether Thou be the Christ, the Son of God" [*the Son of the Blessed*, Mark]. Now, if Jesus had regarded Himself as simply a human being, He would have at once explained that His words had been misunderstood, and that He abhorred the impiety of such a claim as much as

His accusers. Instead of this, He answered: "Thou hast said: nevertheless I say unto you, Henceforth ye shall see the Son of Man sitting at the right hand of power, and coming on the clouds of heaven." It is no wonder, therefore, that the high-priest rent his garments, and said, "He hath spoken blasphemy: what further need have we of witnesses? behold, now ye have heard the blasphemy." The synoptic account of the matter is fully confirmed by the fourth Gospel: "The Jews answered Pilate, We have a law, and by that law He ought to die, because He made Himself the Son of God" (John xix. 7).[1]

(7) Jesus claimed the essentially divine attributes of *omnipotence*: "All things have been delivered unto Me of My Father" (Matt. xi. 27); "All authority hath been given unto Me in heaven and on earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18); and *omnipresence*: "Where two or three are gathered together in My name, there am I in the midst of them" (Matt. xviii. 20); "Lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world" (Matt. xxviii. 20).

(8) Jesus claimed Divinity in precise and unambiguous language. This is evident not only from the fourth Gospel—"Before Abraham was, I AM" (viii. 58); "My Lord and my God" (xx. 28)—but also from the Synoptics: "Baptizing

[1] Other important passages bearing upon the higher sense of the title Son of God are Matt. iii. 17 (the Baptism); Matt. xvii. 5 (the Transfiguration); Matt. xxii. 45; Matt. xxi. 33 (Parable of the Vineyard); and Matt. xxviii. 19 (Baptismal formula).

them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost" (Matt. xxviii. 19). The last passage plainly teaches that the Son and the Holy Spirit are Divine Persons sharing the ineffable "name" or nature of the Supreme Father, and that therefore Jesus is, in the language of the Nicene Creed, "God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, . . . of one substance with the Father." It has been suggested by some critics that this passage is of later origin. It is maintained, not without a certain superficial appearance of plausibility, that the doctrine of the Holy Trinity was of gradual growth in the Church, and that therefore the present passage, which asserts it in precise and dogmatic language, must be far later than the apostolic age. If, however, we are willing to be guided by the evidence rather than by our preconceived notions of what is likely, we shall have to admit that the present passage is undoubtedly apostolic. There is, in fact, hardly a single text in the New Testament which is supported by evidence so ancient and so weighty Not only is it contained in every manuscript of St. Matthew's Gospel, but it is clearly presupposed in the Trinitarian expressions used by Clement of Rome, A.D. 96: "Have we not one God, and one Christ, and one Spirit of grace which was poured out on us?" (c. 46), "As God lives, and the Lord Jesus Christ lives, and the Holy Ghost, the faith and the hope of the elect" (c. 58); also by the *Didache*, A.D. 100: "Baptize ye in the name of the Father, and of the

Son, and of the Holy Ghost in living water"; and by Justin Martyr, A.D. 150: "For in the name of God the Father and Lord of the universe, and of our Saviour Jesus Christ, and of the Holy Ghost, they then receive the washing with water" (1 *Apol.* 61). The Baptismal formula is also presupposed in the Apostles' Creed, which is an expansion of it, and which, in its earliest form, dates back at least to the year 100 A.D.

Against this weighty evidence only one positive argument is produced. It is alleged that Baptism was not originally administered in the name of the Trinity, but in the name of the Lord Jesus (Acts ii. 38, x. 48, etc).[1] The obvious answer is that these passages do not specify the form used, but only indicate that the Baptism was Christian. That this is the true explanation is shown by the *Didache.* This document, like Acts, speaks of Christian Baptism as in the name of Jesus—"Let none eat or drink of your Eucharist but those who have been baptized *in the name of the Lord*"; but when it describes the manner of Baptism, it gives only the Trinitarian formula, which it mentions twice, and emphasizes by requiring triple immersion.

IV.—Difficulties

There are a few passages in the Gospels which at first sight seem inconsistent with our Lord's true Deity.

[1] This difficulty is alluded to by Cyprian, *Ep.* 73, who suggests that the Apostles baptized Jews in the name of Jesus, and Gentiles in the name of the Trinity.

(1) St. Mark vi. 5, 6, speaks of His inability to do any mighty works at Nazareth, because of their unbelief. Clearly, however, it is *moral* inability of which the Evangelist speaks. At other times Jesus, for sufficient reason, worked miracles without requiring faith as a condition (Matt. viii. 23 ff.; John v. 13).

(2) St. Luke says that the child Jesus "advanced in wisdom and stature, and in favour with God and man" (ii. 52). This, however, only proves that His humanity was real. Jesus would not have been a child at all, except in appearance, unless He had acquired knowledge and spiritual graces and virtues gradually like other children.

(3) In Mark xiii. 32 Jesus speaks of His ignorance of the time of the Day of Judgment. But He does not regard this ignorance as inconsistent with His Divinity, for even while He speaks of it, He places Himself higher in rank than the angels. The ignorance belonged to His human nature.[1] As God, He knew all things; but as man, His knowledge, though great, was limited. Its greatness is sufficiently shown by the special mention of this one limitation. If it be asked why He did not on this occasion draw upon the resources of His divine knowledge in order to answer the Apostles'

[1] This was the view of St. Irenæus, St. Athanasius, and St. Gregory of Nazianzus. The view of certain modern Kenoticists is that the *Divine Nature* of Christ was subject to ignorance during the time of His earthly humiliation. There is no real Scriptural support for this opinion, and it does not explain the difficulty better than the usual view.

question, the answer probably is that such knowledge would have been injurious to them, and to the Church (*cf.* Acts i. 7).

The reason why the time of the Day of Judgment lay beyond the sphere of Christ's human knowledge probably is that it is a *contingent event* (*cf.* 2 Pet. iii., R.V. margin). Knowledge of contingent events differs in kind as well as degree from human knowledge, and is possible only to a being who surveys time from the standpoint of absolute eternity (see p. 198).

V.—The Resulting Dilemma

Critical investigation has led us step by step to the conclusion that the Founder of Christianity, who is revered not only by Christians but by most Freethinkers as the best of men, and the greatest of religious and moral reformers, claimed to be divine. This conclusion is supported by such varied and convergent evidence, that all real doubt upon the subject is precluded. We are therefore brought face to face with a very serious dilemma: either the Author of Christianity was divine, or He was not good (*aut Deus aut homo non bonus*). Of attempts to evade this dilemma the following are the chief:

(1) Mr. G. W. Foote advocates the theory that Jesus was *insane*.

To this we reply that it is strictly impossible that a system of religion and morality which has commended itself to the intellect and conscience of

the highest races of the earth can have been originated by a madman.

(2) It is maintained that Jesus during the greater part of His life was sane, but that during the last few weeks of His ministry His mind became unhinged, and that He was in an abnormal mental state when He uttered His apocalyptic discourse (Matt. xxiv.), and claimed to be the Son of God at His trial (Matt. xxiv. 64).

It is a sufficient reply to this to point out that the same claims were made by Him throughout His ministry. They are found even in the Sermon on the Mount and in the Parables, and are by no means confined to the final episode of His career. Moreover, Jesus never appeared so truly great as at the end of His ministry. The sublime scene at Calvary is itself a sufficient proof that Jesus was not mad, or in any way deranged.

(3) It is maintained that Jesus believed Himself to be divine, not because He had any internal knowledge of the fact, but because He interpreted the Old Testament prophecies, especially *Daniel*, as indicating that the Messiah would be a Divine Person.

We reply that no mere man who interpreted the prophecies in this way, could (unless he were insane) possibly imagine himself to be the Messiah.

(4) It is maintained that the character of Jesus deteriorated towards the end of His ministry, and that He finally became a deceiver and impostor. This is, in the main, the view of Renan, who

considers that the raising of Lazarus, which immediately preceded the triumphal entry into Jerusalem, was a deliberate fraud arranged beforehand by Lazarus and his sisters, with the connivance of Jesus (*Life of Jesus*, R.P.A. ed., pp. 124, 125).

We reply that a view like this, which makes Jesus and some of His chief followers impostors, is absolutely incredible. The high moral standard set by Christ Himself in the Gospels, the unselfish heroism of the Apostles, and the austere virtues of the early Christian Church, render such a view of His character once for all inconceivable.

The dilemma, therefore, to which our inquiry has conducted us, cannot be evaded. Either Christ was divine, as He continually claimed to be, or He was an impostor of the worst type. An impostor He cannot have been, because He founded the purest system of religion and morals that has ever been presented to the world. He must, therefore, have been divine, as the Apostles themselves, and the Church ever since their day, have believed.

The matter, however, cannot be finally decided here. If Jesus was really divine, we have a right to expect:

(1) That His Divinity should be made evident by remarkable miracles; and—

(2) That His influence upon the world should be shown to be exceedingly great.

Accordingly we proceed in the three following chapters to investigate whether this has been the case.

LITERATURE

The full orthodox doctrine of Christ's Person finds expression in Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*; Gore, *Bampton Lectures* (also the same shortened for popular use, *Why we Christians Believe in Christ*); Frémont, *La Divinité du Christ et la Libre Pensée*; Knowling, *Witness of the Epistles*, and *Messianic Interpretation*, 1910; Sanday, art. "Jesus Christ" in *H.D.B.*, and *Christologies Ancient and Modern*; Godet, *Defence of the Christian Faith* (tr.); F. Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*; Luthardt, *Fundamental Truths*; Du Bose, *The Gospel in the Gospels*, and *The Gospel according to St. Paul*, and *Soteriology of the New Testament*; J. R. Illingworth, *Personality, Human and Divine*; La Touche, *The Person of Christ in Modern Thought*, 1912 (useful survey); Nolloth, *The Person of our Lord and Recent Thought*, 1908; F. Weston, *The One Christ*, 1907; A. C. Headlam, *St. Paul and Christianity*, 1913; Rostron, *The Christology of St. Paul*, 1912; H. B. Swete, *The Apostles' Creed and the Ascended Christ*; H. N. S. Eck, *The Incarnation*; J. H. B. Masterman, *Was Jesus Christ Divine?*; Westcott, *The Incarnation and Common Life*; Knox, *Some Loose Stones*, 1913; Thorburn, *Jesus the Christ*; *cf.* also H. R. Mackintosh, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ*; R. L. Ottley, *Doctrine of the Incarnation*; Dorner, *Doctrine of the Person of Christ.*

Among attempts to mediate between Unitarianism and Orthodoxy, may be mentioned R. Seeberg, *The Fundamental Truths of the Christian Religion* (tr.), 1908; F. Loofs, *What is the Truth about Jesus Christ?* 1913, and other works mentioned on pp. xxvii., xxviii.

The ordinary Liberal position finds expression in Seeley, *Ecce Homo* (a reverent treatment); Harnack, *What is Christianity?*; Martineau, *Seat of Authority* (see p. xxvii.).

For the Eschatological controversy, see p. xxviii., and add E. A. Abbott, *The Son of Man*, 1910.

For Modernism, see p. xxx. ff.

For Kenoticism and Limitarianism see Forbes Robinson, *The Self-limitation of the Son of God*; R. A. Knox, *o.c.*; C. Gore, *Dissertations*; Hall, *Kenotic Theory*; Gifford, *The Incarnation*; Mason, *Conditions of our Lord's Life on Earth*; Swayne, *Our Lord's Knowledge as Man*; Plummer, *Humanity of Christ*; Powell, *Principle of the Incarnation*; F. Weston, *o.c.*; W. Sanday, *o.c.* (*cf.* also Dorner, *o.c.*; R. L. Ottley, *o.c.*).

CHAPTER XXI

THE MIRACLES OF JESUS

SUMMARY.—It is shown that the miracles attributed to Jesus in the oldest Gospel sources cannot be explained as myths or legends, but must be accepted as authentic history.

I.—THE IMPORTANCE OF THE EVIDENCE OF MIRACLES

So far we have been presenting only the moral evidence for Christianity. But moral evidence, though indispensable, is inadequate to sustain the whole burden of proof. If faith is to be secure, the moral evidence must be supplemented by appropriate *miraculous* evidence. Even if the Christian Revelation professed to be nothing but a republication, by authority, of the truths of Natural Religion, miracles would still be necessary, or at least highly desirable, to testify to its authoritative character. But since Christianity is more than this—since, that is, it professes to reveal truths which, though not contrary to, are above reason—it is under a special obligation to produce miraculous evidence of the truth of its claims. The Founder of Christianity, wiser than some of

His modern followers,[1] clearly recognized this obligation. He did not disparage moral and spiritual evidence—He regarded it, in fact, as the most important evidence of all (*cf.* John xx. 29); nevertheless, He considered it to be part of His mission to confirm His words by "mighty works" and "signs following." Accordingly, while He refused to perform mere marvels at the demand of bigoted and prejudiced opponents (Mark viii. 12, Matt. xvi. 1), and reproved the popular appetite for "signs and wonders" (John iv. 48), He continually appealed to His miraculous "works" as signs that He was really sent from God. This is the case not only in the fourth Gospel ("The witness which I have is greater than that of John: for the works which the Father hath given Me to accomplish, the very works that I do, bear witness of Me, that the Father hath sent Me," v. 36; "The works that I do in My Father's name, these bear witness of Me," x. 25; "If I had not done among them the works which none other did, they had not had sin," xv. 24), but also in the Synoptists. Thus, when John the Baptist sent to inquire

[1] See, for instance, *Contentio Veritatis*, p. 144: "The time is past when Christianity could be presented as a revelation attested by miracles, depending on these for the main evidence of its truth"; also p. 88: "[Miracles] are unmeaning. We should not now expect, *a priori*, that the Incarnate *Logos* would be born without a human father, that He would suspend His own laws during His sojourn on earth, or that He would resuscitate His earthy body, and remove it into the sky, nor do we see that those events, however well proved, are of any value as evidence for His divinity."

whether He was really the Expected One or not, Jesus appealed to the evidence, not only of His preaching, but also of His miracles wrought upon the blind, the lame, the lepers, the deaf, and the dead (Matt. xi. 4 = Luke vii. 22). In reply to the Pharisees, who attributed His miracles to Beelzebub, He declared that they were worked by the finger (*or* Spirit) of God, and were a sign that "the kingdom of God is come upon you" (Matt. xii. 28 = Luke xi. 20). He severely reproved the inhabitants of Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum for their obstinate rejection of the testimony of the "mighty works" which He performed among them (Matt. xi. 20 ff. = Luke x. 13 ff.). In particular, He offered His Resurrection as a convincing sign of the truth of His teaching: "For as Jonas was three days and three nights in the whale's belly; so shall the Son of Man be three days and three nights in the heart of the earth" (Matt. xii. 40).[1] The Apostles also regarded it as an essential part of their office to bear witness to the miracle of the Resurrection (Acts i. 22, etc.). When it is remembered, further, that Christ regarded Himself as not only the bearer of a revelation to mankind, but also as a supernatural Person, the Son of God manifested in the flesh, the need, or at least

[1] It is possible that these words, being wanting in the parallel passage in St. Luke (xi. 30), are not in place here; but they imply, as J. Lightfoot has shown, an Aramaic original, and therefore probably formed part of the original Matthæan *Logia*. Their omission by St. Luke is probably due to the difficulty about the Son of Man remaining *three nights* in the grave.

the great propriety, of miracles to support His claims becomes still more apparent. A natural Christ may, perhaps, afford to dispense with miracles. A supernatural Christ cannot. From a supernatural Christ supernatural works are imperatively and rightly demanded, and if they are not forthcoming, sober reason will conclude that the "supernatural" Christ is not supernatural.[1]

II.—The Evidence of the Pauline Epistles

The great Pauline epistles, which even the destructive criticism of Tübingen spared, testify to two important facts: (1) that St. Paul worked numerous miracles in proof of his apostolic authority; and (2) that the other Apostles did the same. Thus in Romans xv. 19 St. Paul speaks

[1] There is much sober sense in these words of Mozley: "If, then, a person of evident integrity and loftiness of character rose into notice in a particular country, who made these communications about himself—that he had existed before his natural birth, from all eternity, and before the world was, in a state of glory with God, that the world itself had been made by him, that he had, however, come down from heaven and assumed the form and nature of man for a particular purpose, . . . and lastly, that he should descend again at the end of the world to judge the human race—if this person made these assertions about himself, and all that was done was to make the assertions, what would be the inevitable conclusion of sober reason respecting that person? The necessary conclusion of sober reason respecting that person would be that he was disordered in his understanding. . . . By no rational being could a just and benevolent life be accepted as a proof of such astonishing announcements. . . . Thus miracles and the supernatural contents of Christianity must stand or fall together" (*On Miracles*, lect. i.).

of "the signs and wonders" (*σημείων καὶ τεράτων*) wrought by him in the power of the Holy Ghost from Jerusalem to Illyricum "for the obedience of the Gentiles." Again, in 2 Corinthians xii. 11, 12, he says: "In nothing was I behind the very chiefest Apostles, though I am nothing. Truly the signs of an Apostle were wrought among you in all patience, by signs and wonders and mighty works" (*σημείοις τε καὶ τέρασι καὶ δυνάμεσι*). Similarly in the Epistle to the Galatians (iii. 5) he speaks of himself as "working miracles" (*ἐνεργῶν δυνάμεις*) among them.

That the Apostles worked miracles in confirmation of their teaching, is also asserted by the contemporary writer of Hebrews, a learned and competent witness.[1] In ii. 3 he speaks of the "great salvation, which having at the first been spoken through the Lord [Jesus], was confirmed unto us by them that heard; God also bearing witness with them, both by signs and wonders, and by manifold powers" (*σημείοις τε καὶ τέρασι, καὶ ποικίλαις δυνάμεσι*).

The statements, therefore, in Acts about the miracles wrought by St. Paul and the other Apostles, and about the evidential value which they attached to them (Acts xv. 12; iv. 10, 30; v. 12-3; viii. 6; xiv. 3; xix. 11; etc.), are entirely credible. Upon the whole, then, it seems impossible to resist the conclusion (1) that the Apostles performed "mighty works," which, whether strictly miraculous or not, were at least contrary to all ordinary

[1] Hebrews was certainly written in the Apostolic age, for it is quoted by Clement of Rome, A.D. 95.

experience, and (2) that they regarded them as important credentials of their authority.[1] If first-hand evidence to this effect were wanting, we might be inclined to hesitate; but in face of the definite and emphatic statements of St. Paul in his unquestioned epistles, doubt is impossible.

III.—The Evidence of the Oldest Gospel Sources

As it has been alleged that the existing Gospels contain late and legendary matter, and as in the case of St. Matthew, which has perhaps been subjected to a process of subsequent editing, this possibility must be seriously recognized,[2] it is desirable to go back at once to the oldest Gospel sources now recoverable.

Critics of all schools (Sanday, Salmon, Zahn, Weiss, Jülicher, Holtzmann, Reuss, Schmiedel, Wernle, Weizsäcker, Beyschlag, etc.) agree that the two oldest sources of the Synoptic Gospels are (1) the Hebrew or Aramaic *Logia* of St. Matthew, and (2) *The Reminiscences of St. Peter*, recorded by his convert and "interpreter," St. Mark. The former is the older source, having been written at a very early period for the use of the Hebrew-

[1] *Cf.* Wernle, *Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 119: "Jesus' miraculous powers likewise continued effective in the Apostles. It came to be universally accepted that an Apostle could prove himself such by signs and wonders."

[2] We by no means wish to intimate that this is the case, but it is desirable, in an inquiry of this kind, to be as cautious as possible in admitting evidence, and to exclude, in the first instance at least, everything that is doubtful.

speaking Church of Jerusalem. Zahn believes that this *Logia* was a complete Hebrew Gospel, but the majority of recent critics assume that it consisted chiefly, though not entirely, of discourses. It is possible that the whole of the discourses in St. Matthew's Gospel are taken from this source;[1] but, in order to be on the safe side, we shall regard as *Logia* sayings only those which are common to St. Matthew and St. Luke.

The Reminiscences of St. Peter were probably identical with the present canonical Mark.[2] If they were not, they resembled it so closely that the difference is unimportant.[3] All critics agree that St. Mark reproduces St. Peter's narrative with great fidelity. Dr. Swete speaks of "the peculiar freshness and realism of the second Gospel, the vividness of its descriptions, its liveliness even in dialogue, its precision and circumstantiality in its notices of time, place, custom, situation, and the like, and the simple objectivity of its narrative," and says that it is due "directly or indirectly to an eye-witness." Renan says: "The Gospel of Mark is the one of three Synoptists

[1] This is Renan's view.

[2] St. Justin (A.D. 150) clearly understood by *The Reminiscences of St. Peter* the present canonical Mark. He found in the *Reminiscences* the fact that Jesus called the sons of Zebedee *Boanerges*. This is mentioned by St. Mark only (*Dialogue with Trypho*, cvi.; *cf.* Mark iii. 17).

[3] The theory that the present Mark is based on an older *Urmarkus*, or "original Mark," advocated by Baur, is now generally abandoned. Dr. Swete says: "There is no trace in ancient literature of this supposed *Urmarkus*."

which has remained the most primitive, the most original, the one to which the fewest after-elements have been added. In Mark the facts are related with a clearness for which we seek in vain among the other evangelists. He likes to report certain words of Jesus in Syro-Chaldean. He is full of minute observations coming doubtless from an eye-witness. There is nothing to prevent our agreeing with Papias in regarding this eye-witness, who evidently had followed Jesus, who had loved Him, and observed Him very closely, and who had preserved a lively image of Him, as the Apostle Peter himself" (*Life of Jesus*, Introd.)

Now this primitive Gospel, which proceeds from St. Peter, is completely steeped in miracle, it is, in fact, in proportion to its length, more miraculous than any other Gospel. Several times it draws attention to the immense number of miracles which Jesus performed: "They brought unto Him all that were sick, and them that were possessed with devils. And all the city was gathered together at the door. And He healed many that were sick with divers diseases, and cast out many devils" (i. 32-4). "He had healed many; insomuch that as many as had plagues pressed upon Him that they might touch Him" (iii. 10). "And wheresoever He entered, into villages, or into cities, or into the country, they laid the sick in the marketplaces: . . . and as many as touched Him were made whole" (vi. 56).

Of particular miracles this primitive Gospel

records a large number, which may be classified as follows:

Visions, Voices, etc.—The Baptism and Temptation (i. 10 ff.), the Transfiguration (ix. 2).

Miracles of Healing.—Insanity and demonic possession (i. 24, v. 1, vii. 29, ix. 25), fever (i. 31), leprosy (i. 40), paralysis (ii. 11), withered hand (iii. 5), issue of blood (v. 25), deaf-mutism (vii. 35), blindness (viii. 22, x. 52).

Raising the Dead.—The daughter of Jairus (v. 22).

Physical Miracles.—Rebuking the storm (iv. 39), feeding the five thousand (vi. 35), walking on the sea (vi. 52), feeding the four thousand (viii. 1), cursing the fig-tree (xi. 14, 20).

To these may be added two *portents*—the supernatural darkness at the Crucifixion (xv. 33), and the rending of the veil of the temple (xv. 38).

It is not possible, therefore, to eliminate miracle from the life of Jesus by going back to the earliest evidence. The Gospel of St. Mark, which represents the earliest tradition, that of St. Peter himself, records over twenty particular miracles, and alludes, besides, to an immense number of others.

The Testimony of the Apostles to Christ's Miracles.—The Apostles, therefore, believed that Jesus worked miracles, and it is difficult to suppose that they were mistaken. They were with Him continually, and had ample opportunities for careful observation. It is true that they were not trained in the methods of exact science, and therefore would be liable at times to make mistakes, but the striking and

undeniable character of most of Christ's miracles and their immense number furnish a sufficient guarantee against extensive error. If the Apostles were mistaken in some, or even in many cases—and this, we admit, is possible—they were assuredly not mistaken in all. So numerous and so notorious were the miracles of Jesus, that even His enemies did not dispute them. This was not from want of will (John ix. 18, *cf.* Acts iv. 14-6), but from want of power. The Pharisees put forward the theory that He worked them by the aid of the Evil One (Mark iii. 22). Others, more favourably disposed, advocated less objectionable theories (Mark vi. 14). But all these explanations concede that our Lord's miracles were facts.

The Testimony of Jesus Himself to His Miracles.—But there is testimony to the reality of our Lord's miracles more important than that of the Apostles or of the Pharisees. There was One who must have known for certain whether His miracles were genuine or not, and to His testimony we naturally turn. The attitude of Jesus towards His miracles has already been briefly adverted to in the first section of this chapter, but its great importance necessitates a somewhat fuller treatment in this place. Jesus, then, on the testimony both of St. Mark and of the *Logia*, unquestionably believed in His power to work miracles of all kinds—not merely in His power to mitigate slight nervous disorders, as is sometimes alleged, but in His power to cure instantaneously the most obstinate

and inveterate maladies, such as leprosy, to work physical miracles, such as stilling the storm, and even to perform that miracle of miracles, the raising of the dead. The evidence for these statements is not simply one or two disputed sayings of obscure import, but our Lord's whole behaviour at almost every recorded miracle. Thus Jesus believed that he could instantaneously cure *blindness* ("What wilt thou that I should do unto thee?" Mark x. 51); a *withered hand* ("Stretch forth thy hand," Mark iii. 5); *chronic paralysis* ("Arise, take up thy bed," Mark ii. 11); *the worst form of leprosy* ("I will; be thou clean," Mark i. 41); and in every one of these cases the cure was immediate.[1] He also believed in His power to work *physical* miracles, and to control the powers of inorganic nature. Thus during a tempest on the Sea of Galilee, *He rebuked the wind, and said unto the sea, Peace, be still. And the wind ceased, and there was a great calm* (Mark iv. 39).[2] The force of this incident cannot be evaded by saying that the cessation of the storm was a fortunate coincidence, or that Jesus, being less alarmed than the Apostles, saw signs of a change of weather which were invisible to them. If this had been so, He would have said to them, "Fear not, there are signs that the storm will shortly cease." Instead of that He

[1] Nearly all our Lord's miracles were worked instantaneously. In the rare exceptions (Mark viii. 22 ff.) the process lasted only a few minutes.

[2] The peculiarity of the words used by Jesus, Σιώπα, πεφίμωσο (*literally*, Peace, be muzzled), is of itself an indication of genuineness.

said, "Peace, be still," words which show that He regarded Himself as a Being able to impose His will upon physical nature. This was the impression which the incident made upon the Apostles, and Jesus made no attempt to remove it. "Who then," said they, "is this, that even the wind and the sea obey Him?" (Mark iv. 41, Matt. viii. 27, Luke viii. 25).

The two miracles of feeding the multitudes are particularly well attested. That of feeding the five thousand is attested by all the Evangelists, and that of feeding the four thousand by St. Matthew and St. Mark. Both of them are also attested by Jesus Himself in a conversation reported by the same two Evangelists. "Why reason ye," said Jesus to the Apostles, "because ye have no bread? do ye not yet perceive, neither understand? have ye your heart hardened? Having eyes, see ye not? and having ears, hear ye not? and do ye not remember? When I brake the five loaves among the five thousand, how many baskets (κοφίνους) full of broken pieces took ye up? They say unto Him, Twelve. And when the seven among the four thousand, how many basketfuls (σπυρίδων) of broken pieces took ye up? And they say unto Him, Seven. And He said unto them, Do ye not yet understand?" (Mark viii. 14 ff. = Matt. xvi. 5 ff.).[1]

The historical truth of the miracles of feeding has

[1] This passage proves conclusively that the two miracles of feeding are distinct events, and not, as some critics contend, varying reports of the same event.

been vigorously assailed. The view of Paulus, recently revived among others by Weiss[1] and Beyschlag, is that the generosity of Jesus in sharing with others His little meal of loaves and fishes induced others to produce hidden stores of food, and to distribute them among their neighbours. Paulus's theory might be accepted if this were the only physical miracle recorded in the Gospels, and if the details about it were less precise. But under the actual circumstances, it cannot be regarded as credible. The incident is narrated in detail by two actual eye-witnesses, St. Peter and St. John, and these, since they assisted in distributing the food, must have known where it came from. It is also attested by Jesus Himself (see above), and by the multitudes fed, who clearly regarded it as a miracle, for they desired on account of it to take Jesus by force and make Him king (John vi. 14, 15).[2]

Another great physical miracle is the walking on the sea (Mark vi. 45 ff., Matt. xiv. 22, John vi. 16). It is difficult to dismiss it as a legend, for it is attested by St. Mark (that is, by St. Peter), and by another eye-witness, St. John.[3] According to

[1] It is fair to say that Weiss regards his view as highly speculative (*Life of Christ*, vol. ii. p. 385).

[2] It is clear from the Synoptists that the Apostles shared in the Messianic enthusiasm of the people. Jesus was obliged to *force* them (ἠνάγκασε) to enter the ship and depart (Mark vi. 45).

[3] Even if the attempt of St. Peter to walk on the water, a detail added, perhaps, by the editor of St. Matthew, be dismissed as a legend, the main incidents of the event stand firm on the testimony of St. Peter and St. John.

the Synoptic account, the ship which contained the Apostles was in the middle of the lake encountering bad weather, when they saw Jesus walking on the water. They were in great fear, supposing that what they saw was an apparition; but Jesus said, "Be of good cheer: it is I; be not afraid." He then entered into the ship, and the wind ceased and they were "sore amazed" (λίαν ἐν ἑαυτοῖς ἐξίσταντο).

St. John's account substantially confirms St. Peter's. He agrees with St. Peter that the incident took place about the middle of the lake,[1] and though he does not actually say that Jesus entered the ship, his account is consistent with it, and perhaps implies it.[2] All the accounts state expressly

[1] Some critics have argued from St. John's words, "And straightway the boat was at the land whither they were going," that the incident occurred close to land in shallow water, and that Jesus walked into the sea to meet them. This is negatived by the statement in John vi. 19 that the incident took place "when they had rowed about five and twenty or thirty furlongs." The lake's greatest width is fifty-six furlongs. Its average width is, as Josephus correctly states, about forty furlongs (*Wars*, bk. iii. 10). The Apostles were therefore about the middle of the lake when Jesus appeared. The sudden cessation of the storm and contrary winds caused the rest of the voyage to be *unusually and unexpectedly rapid*, so that the ship was "*straightway* at the land whither they were going."

[2] Critics have argued that because St. John says that the disciples "were willing" (ἤθελον) to take Jesus into the ship, therefore they did not do so. This is negatived by the context, and especially by the particle οὖν. The disciples were afraid to take Jesus into the ship at first, believing Him to be an apparition. Then He spoke to them and said, "It is I, be not afraid." Their fears then ceased, and *therefore* (οὖν) they were willing (ἤθελον) to take Him into the ship, and, as the Synoptic account says, did so.

that Jesus walked *upon the sea* (ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης),[1] and represent the incident as a miracle of mercy, intended to rescue the Apostles from the perils of the storm. The words placed in the mouth of Jesus—"Be of good cheer: it is I; be not afraid" (Matt., Mark); "It is I; be not afraid" (John)—are appropriate and clearly authentic. Upon the whole, it seems impossible not to conclude that this is a genuine miracle, similar in character to the stilling of the storm. The two incidents mutually confirm and support one another.

The last important physical miracle of the Petrine memoirs is the cursing of the barren fig-tree (Mark xi. 12=Matt. xxi. 18). This also brings into strong relief Christ's belief in His supernatural power over physical nature. He deliberately cursed the fig-tree ("No man eat fruit from thee henceforward for ever"); and on the next day, when the fig-tree was found withered away, acknowledged the miracle (Mark xi. 23=Matt. xxi. 21). It is objected that this was a miracle of wrath, and therefore out of harmony with Christ's other miracles. We reply that it was a miracle of *warning*, and therefore of mercy. The fig-tree represents the religious hypocrite who makes great professions of godliness without corresponding holiness of life. The cursing of the fig-tree represents God's judgment of such persons, and warns the Apostles not to imitate their works. So

[1] Recent critics have rightly abandoned the rationalizing view of Paulus that ἐπὶ τῆς θαλάσσης means on a high shore *above the sea*.

understood,[1] the miracle teaches an important and salutary lesson, and cannot be pronounced destitute of motive.[2]

Similar in character to the physical miracles are those of *resurrection*. That Jesus believed in His power to raise the dead admits of clear proof, which may be thus briefly summarized.

(1) The Petrine memoirs record an event, which *prima facie* appears to be a miracle of resurrection—the raising of Jairus's daughter (Mark v. 22 ff.). It has been maintained that this incident was not a miracle, but a fortunate coincidence. The girl was not really dead, as those at her bedside supposed, but only in a state of death-like syncope, from which the arrival of Jesus happily roused her.

Even if this explanation were correct, an important element of miracle would still remain. *How did Jesus know, before He came to the house, that the maid who was reported dead was really alive* (ver. 36)? By hypothesis, He *did* know this, and as He had not inspected the body, by which means alone He could have known it naturally, He must have known it *supernaturally*. The miracle, therefore, even on this hypothesis, remains a miracle—a miracle of knowledge.

But the whole hypothesis of seeming death is

[1] This interpretation of the miracle is not suggested by the context, but is none the less unmistakable.

[2] This miracle is excellently treated by Trench, *Notes on the Miracles*, mir. 31, who remarks, "[Christ's] miracles of mercy were numberless, and on men; his miracle of judgment was but one, and on a tree."

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untenable. The words of Jesus, *The child is not dead, but sleepeth*, do not really support it. He used precisely similar words of Lazarus, who was undoubtedly dead.[1] All the other indications of the narrative point to actual death. Christ's words, "Fear not, only believe," show that He was about to work a miracle. His urgent command that the matter should not be made known (Mark v. 43) implies that it was a miracle. It was related as a miracle by the Apostles, it was believed to be such by the parents of the child (ver. 42), and it was as a miracle that its fame "went forth into all that land" (Matt. ix. 26). If it had been a natural event, Jesus would never have allowed His Apostles to believe it a miracle.

(2) All doubt that the raising of Jairus's daughter was a real resurrection is removed by the two similar narratives of the raising of the widow's son at Nain (Luke vii. 11 ff.) and the raising of Lazarus (John xi).[2] The former of these is recorded by a

[1] "This sickness is not unto death, but for the glory of God, that the Son of God may be glorified thereby. . . . Our friend Lazarus is fallen asleep; but I go, that I may awake him out of sleep. . . . Then Jesus therefore said unto them plainly, Lazarus is dead" (John xi. 4-15).

[2] The arguments against the truth of this last miracle are not strong. It is said (1) that the raising of Lazarus implies a greater exercise of supernatural power than the raisings recorded by the Synoptists. If, however, the daughter of Jairus and the widow's son were really dead, the difference is unimportant. No one has a right to say that Jesus was able to raise a corpse on the first day of death, and not on the fourth. (2) The omission of the raising of Lazarus from the Synoptic narrative is somewhat surprising, but it must be remembered (*a*) that it

careful and conscientious historian upon the testimony of "eye-witnesses and ministers of the word" (Luke i. 2); the latter is minutely described by a friend and disciple of Jesus who witnessed it. Both these events were explained by Paulus as cases of apparent death, but few at the present day will regard this view seriously.

(3) There still remains the evidence of the *Logia*. In an undisputed *Logia* passage (Matt. xi. 5 = Luke vii. 22) our Lord refers to His mighty works as proofs of His Messiahship, and mentions among them His miracles of resurrection. "Go your way," He says to the disciples of the Baptist, "and tell John the things which ye do hear and see: the blind receive their sight, and the lame walk, and the lepers are cleansed, and the deaf hear, and *the dead are raised up*." (*Cf.* also Matt. x. 8.)

The proof, therefore, of the Resurrection miracles is complete.

We will close this section with a few other indications, taken from the Gospels, that the miracles of Christ were real. Among them are His frequent injunctions not to report His mighty works (Mark iii. 12, v. 43, vii. 36, viii. 26, etc.); His warnings against attaching undue importance

belongs to the *Judæan ministry* of Jesus, which the Synoptists, for whatever reason, do not record, and (*b*) that the Synoptists do actually record two other miracles of the same class, which confirm its credibility. (3) Lastly, it may be said that something is required to account for the extraordinary enthusiasm with which Jesus was received in Jerusalem (Mark xi. 1-10). The raising of Lazarus supplies this explanation (John xii. 9, 17).

to them (John iv. 48; xiv. 11; Luke x. 20); and a number of striking and obviously genuine utterances in which He alludes to them: "Woe unto thee, Chorazin! woe unto thee, Bethsaida! for if the mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon which were done in you, they would have repented long ago in sackcloth and ashes. . . . And thou, Capernaum, shalt thou be exalted unto heaven? thou shalt go down unto Hades: for if the mighty works had been done in Sodom which were done in thee, it would have remained until this day. Howbeit I say unto you, that it shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee (Matt. xi. 21-4 = Luke x. 13-5; *cf.* Luke xiii. 32, and Luke xi. 20 = Matt. xii. 28).

But perhaps the most convincing proof of the reality of Christ's miraculous power is the fact that He delegated them. "He appointed twelve," says St. Mark, "that they might be with Him, and that He might send them forth to preach, and to have authority to cast out devils. . . . And He began to send them forth by two and two; and He gave them authority over the unclean spirits. . . . And they cast out many devils, and anointed with oil many that were sick, and healed them (Mark iii. 14; vi. 7, 13). "He called unto Him His twelve disciples," says St. Matthew, "and gave them authority over unclean spirits, to cast them out, and to heal all manner of disease and all manner of sickness. . . . And Jesus charged them, saying, Heal

the sick, raise the dead, cleanse the lepers, cast out devils: freely ye have received, freely give." Matt. x. 1, 8; *cf.* Luke x. 17; Mark xvi. 17-20; John xiv. 12).

Seeing, then, that this delegation of miraculous powers by Christ is attested by all the Evangelists, and that the actual exercise of these powers by the Apostles can be independently verified,[1] the conclusion that Christ really possessed the power of working miracles can hardly be resisted.

IV.—The Testimony of the Other Gospel Sources

The miracles recorded in the other Gospel sources are, upon the whole, similar in character to those found in the Petrine memoirs and in the *Logia*, as the following table will show.

Visions, Voices, etc.—A voice from heaven (John xii. 28).

Miracles of Healing.—The centurion's servant (Matt. viii. 5-13; Luke vii. 1-10); two blind men (Matt. ix. 27-31); the dumb demoniac (Matt. ix. 32-3; Luke xi. 14); one possessed with a devil, blind, and dumb (Matt. xii. 22); a woman which had a spirit of infirmity eighteen years and was bowed together (Luke xiii. 10-17); a dropsical man (Luke xiv. 1-6); ten lepers (Luke xvii. 12-9); the healing of Malchus's ear (Luke xxii. 49-51); the nobleman's son (John iv. 46-54); the impotent

[1] See sect. ii.

man at Bethesda, who had been afflicted thirty-eight years (John v. 1-16); the man born blind (John ix.)

Raising the Dead.—The widow's son at Nain (Luke vii. 11-7); Lazarus (John xi.); possibly also the resurrection of the saints (Matt. xxvii. 52-3), which, however, seems more of the nature of a *vision.*

Other Physical Miracles.—The miraculous conception of Jesus (Matt. i. 18-25; Luke i. 26-38, iii. 23); the guiding star of the Magi (Matt. ii. 9); the finding of the coin in the fish's mouth (Matt. xvii. 24-7); the earthquake (Matt. xxvii. 51); the first miraculous draught of fishes (Luke v. 7-10); changing the water into wine (John ii. 1-11); the second miraculous draught of fishes (John xxi. 1-23).

These miracles do not form an entirely homogeneous series. Those relating to our Lord's infancy, not being supported by Apostolic testimony, fall into a group by themselves, and require to be considered separately (see c. xxii. app. 2). Certain miracles related by St. Matthew alone, or by his editor, and differing somewhat in character from the others (the star of the Magi, the coin in the fish's mouth, the earthquake at the tomb, and the resurrection of the saints),[1] form another

[1] There are two miracles, however, recorded by St. Matthew alone (the two blind men, Matt. ix. 27-31, and the demoniac who was blind and dumb, xii. 22), which conform to the Synoptic type so closely, that they may safely be regarded as belonging to the original *Logia.*

distinct group.[1] Excluding these two groups, there remains an important series of seventeen miracles precisely resembling,[2] and therefore strongly confirming, the series vouched for by St. Mark and St. Peter. With this independent corroboration, the evidence for the Marcan miracles must be pronounced, even from the purely historical point of view, extremely strong.

V.—Objections to the Christian Miracles

Objection I.—Miracles are contrary to the uniformity of nature, and are therefore impossible and incredible.[3]

[1] In separating the peculiarly Matthæan miracles from the rest, we by no means wish to intimate that they are spurious, but only that their attestation is comparatively weak, and that controversial stress cannot be laid upon them.

[2] The changing of the water into wine at Cana, which is not a miracle of mercy, and appears to lack adequate motive, may be thought to be an exception, but if it be regarded as a symbolical miracle or acted parable, it is the same in character as the cursing of the fig-tree.

[3] This position is taken up not only by such writers as Strauss and Renan, but even by the more conciliatory school of rationalism represented by Harnack and Wernle. Harnack says: "We are firmly convinced that what happens in space and time is subject to the general laws of motion, and that in this sense, as an interruption of the order of Nature, there can be no such thing as 'miracles.'" Wernle says: "If faith in the enchanted world [of miracles] constitutes the substance of Christianity, then, of course, the doom of our religion would be sealed." Even Dr. J. Drummond, who maintains the genuineness of the fourth Gospel, says: "I must frankly add that, on general grounds affecting the whole question of the miraculous, I am unable to believe that such miracles as the turning of water into wine and the

Reply.—This objection has already been dealt with in c. xvi. We will only here add that to start the investigation with a strong prejudice in one direction is unworthy of criticism. The existence of a God being admitted, miracles are certainly possible, and their actual occurrence is a matter of evidence. There is a certain presumption against miracles arising from the general uniformity of Nature, and a certain presumption in their favour arising from the known character of God, and the need of a revelation. These opposite presumptions balance one another, and there the matter is left to be determined by the evidence.

Objection II.—The miracles of Jesus were worked in a pre-scientific age, and therefore the evidence in favour of them cannot be trusted.

Reply.—It is necessary to distinguish between (1) the testimony of the Apostles to the actual facts; and (2) their testimony to the supernatural character of the facts.

(1) The testimony of the Apostles to the actual facts is, after making due allowance for a reasonable margin of error, to be received. The miracles of Jesus were not abstruse scientific experiments, requiring special training to appreciate them, but miracles of healing. Persons of ordinary common sense know perfectly well, without scientific training, the difference between health and

raising of Lazarus were really performed" (*Character and Authorship of the Fourth Gospel*, p. 426). This initial prejudice vitiates the whole treatment of the evidence for miracles by these writers.

disease. The sick, therefore, who were healed, and their friends, and the Apostles, were perfectly able to form a sound judgment as to whether the cures which Christ professed to perform were genuine or not.[1] They decided that they *were* genuine, and against their decision there is no valid objection.

(2) On the other hand, the testimony of the Apostles to the miraculous nature of the facts which they witnessed is by no means equally trustworthy. They knew far less about the laws of nature than we do, and therefore it is perfectly legitimate to attempt to explain any or all of the apostolic "miracles" by natural causes. What, however, is *not* legitimate is to manipulate the facts in order to accommodate them to the theory advocated. The business of the critic is to accommodate his theory to the facts, not the facts to his theory.

Objection III.—The presence of miracles in the Gospels proves that they are late and legendary compositions.

Reply.—Many undoubtedly contemporary narratives record miracles. The Life of St. Martin of

[1] Prof. Wernle says: "In the Gospels Jesus appears before us first of all as a physician of men's bodies, as the redeemer of the sick and suffering. However great the number of miraculous narratives that we set on one side as exaggerations or inventions of a later age, a nucleus of solid fact remains with which we have to deal. Jesus possessed an healing power, strictly limited, it is true, by unbelief, but capable of producing the very greatest physical and psychical changes whenever He encountered faith. This power operated especially in the case of mental diseases, but was by no means confined to them" (*Beginnings of Christianity*, vol. i. p. 97).

Tours, by his friend Sulpitius Severus, is full of them.[1] Many are contained in the Lives of St. Francis of Assisi by the *Tres Socii*, and by Thomas of Celano.[2] Prof. Harnack, in his brilliant lectures, *What is Christianity?* very properly lays stress on this point: "But the miraculous element, all these reports of miracles! Not Strauss only, but many others also have allowed themselves to be frightened by them into roundly denying the credibility of the Gospels. . . . We now know that it is not after they have been long dead, nor even after the lapse of many years, that miracles have been reported of eminent persons, but at once, often the very next day. The habit of condemning a narrative, or of ascribing it to a later age, only because it includes stories of miracles, is a piece of prejudice" (pp. 24, 26).

We may add that the *character* of the Gospel miracles proves that they are not legends. If they had been legends, they would have been of the same unworthy and frivolous character which marks the miracles attributed to Christ in the Apocryphal Gospels.[3]

[1] It would appear, however, from c. xxv., that Severus was not an actual eye-witness of the bulk of the miracles which he records.

[2] The text of Thomas of Celano's Life is now conveniently accessible in Dr. Rosedale's edition (1904).

[3] We append a few specimens of miracles, which are really legendary, and which fairly represent the tone of the Apocryphal Gospels. When the Holy Family fled to Egypt, and approached a city of idols, it was changed into sandhills (*Arabic Gospel of the Infancy*, 23). The water in which the infant Jesus was washed healed leprosy and other diseases (18). The infant caused a fountain to spring forth in the desert for His mother

Objection IV.—The evidence for the Gospel miracles is no stronger than that for the ecclesiastical miracles. But the ecclesiastical miracles are admitted to be spurious by almost all; therefore the presumption is that the Gospel miracles are spurious also.

Reply.—It is not true that the evidence for the ecclesiastical miracles is as strong as that for the Gospel miracles. In the immense majority of cases the evidence for ecclesiastical miracles melts away upon close examination. In the few exceptional cases in which ecclesiastical miracles are as well authenticated as those in the Gospels (*e.g.* the vision of Constantine,[1] the miraculous prevention of the rebuilding of the Jewish temple under Julian,[2] the instantaneous healing of a blind man at

to wash His clothes in. His sweat produced balsam (24). He changed a mule (which was really a man bewitched) into a man again (21). He healed a demoniac, and the demons issued from the man's mouth in the shapes of ravens and serpents (11). He struck three of His playmates dead (*Pseudo-Matthew*, 26 ff.), and on another occasion changed some of them into kids. He made twelve clay sparrows, clapped His hands, and bade them fly away (27). He drew out a plank, which was too short, to the required length (37). He carried water in His cloak (33). He was adored by lions (35). This is the kind of puerilities which the Gospels would have contained, had they really been, as Strauss alleges, legendary.

[1] For this miracle we have the authority of Constantine himself, confirmed by an oath to Eusebius (Eusebius, *Life of Constantine*, i. 27 ff.).

[2] The evidence for this event, though not that of eye-witnesses, is strong. It is attested by St. Ambrose, St. Chrysostom, St. Gregory of Nyssa, and by the pagan historian Ammianus Marcellinus, all contemporaries. Ammianus relates that explosive balls of fire issued from the foundations and drove back the workmen, whenever they attempted to approach.

Milan in the time of St. Ambrose,[1] and the remarkable "stigmata" found on the hands and feet of St. Francis of Assisi after his death), the best critics believe that, whether the events in question were miracles or not, *they really happened.*[2]

Objection V.—Jesus disbelieved the miracles attributed to Him, or at least regarded them as of insignificant importance (John iv. 48, xx. 29; Luke x. 20; Matt. xii. 39; John xiv. 11).

Reply.—The passages alluded to prove no more than that Jesus regarded moral evidence as higher in character than miraculous. That Jesus believed in His own miracles has already been proved (see sect. iii.).

Objection VI.—Miracles are not necessary to prove the truth of a revelation. The religions of Mahomet and Buddha have been widely accepted, notwithstanding the fact that their founders did not appeal to the evidence of miracles.

Reply.—It is not denied that moral evidence alone may commend a religion to the consciences of

[1] Gibbon says: "The truth of [this miracle] is attested by Ambrose himself, by his secretary Paulinus, and by his proselyte the celebrated Augustin, who, at this time, professed the art of rhetoric in Milan. The blind man's name was Severus; he touched the holy garment, recovered his sight, and devoted the rest of his life (at least twenty-five years) to the service of the Church" (*Decline and Fall,* xxvii.). A full account of this miracle is given by St. Augustine in his *Confessions* (bk. ix. c. 7).

[2] The examples given represent the best type of ecclesiastical miracle. They are dignified and not without adequate motive. On the other hand, a large number of ecclesiastical miracles are undignified and trivial.

great multitudes of men. This has been the case with Buddhism, and to a less extent with Mahometanism.[1]

But while admitting this, we still maintain that a revelation which is attested by moral evidence *and miracles*, stands upon a firmer foundation altogether, than one which is attested by moral evidence alone. As Prof. Mozley well says: "The triumph of Mahometanism over human belief, striking as it has been, cannot blind us to the fact that the belief of the Mahometan is in its very principle irrational, because he accepts Mahomet's supernatural account of himself, as the conductor of a new dispensation, upon Mahomet's own assertion simply, joined to his success. . . . Christianity is the only religion in the world which professes to possess a body of direct external evidence to its having come from God. Mahometanism avows the want of this; and the pretensions of other religions to it are mockery. One religion alone produces a body of testimony—testimony doubtless open to criticism, but still solid, authentic, contemporaneous testimony—to miracles, a body of evidence which makes a stand, and upholds with a natural and genuine strength certain facts" (*On Miracles*, i.).

Again, even if it be admitted that miracles would be unnecessary to prove the truth of a revelation which was simply a republication of the truths of Natural Religion (and we do not admit this), they

[1] Mahometanism has been chiefly propagated by the sword.

would still be necessary to establish the truth of such a religion as Christianity,[1] the cardinal doctrine of which is the *Incarnation.* The Incarnation is a *miracle*, and being a *secret* miracle, requires, as Butler correctly says, *open* miracles to prove its truth.

Objection VII.—Miraculous evidence becomes weaker by lapse of time, and therefore, however useful it may be to contemporaries, it is of little or no use to subsequent generations.

Reply.—(1) The miracles of Jesus performed the important function of recommending the new religion to the first generation of believers. By starting Christianity upon its victorious career in the world, they have proved themselves useful to all future generations.

(2) The miracles of Jesus, having been recorded by credible witnesses, are a standing confirmation of the truth of Christianity. Reported testimony is not equal in value to the testimony of the senses, but it is of great value, and its value does not diminish with lapse of time. It is as strong now as it was in the second century, and will be as strong twenty centuries hence.

Objection VIII.—Miracles are as much needed now to convince objectors as they were in the Apostolic age. Why, then, are they not worked?

Reply.—Objectors have before them now the

[1] And, we may add, of Buddhism and Mahometanism, both of which teach numerous truths over and above those of Natural Religion.

evidence of the beneficent influence exercised by Christianity upon the civilized world for nearly two thousand years. This evidence, which some consider the strongest proof of the truth of Christianity, was not available in the Apostolic age. It is not correct, therefore, to say that miracles are as necessary now to convince objectors as they were then. In the apostolic age miracles were necessary to overcome the difficulties of founding a new religion. They have been less necessary since, and have, in consequence, been much more sparingly performed.[1]

Objection IX.—The miracles of Jesus are capable of natural explanation.

Reply.—It will be convenient to consider the chief natural explanations in order.

(1) Reimarus, Woolston, and partly also Renan, regarded the miracles as fraudulent tricks on the part of Jesus and His disciples. As this theory is now generally abandoned, it is hardly necessary to refute it at length. A few remarks upon it, as applied to the Resurrection, will be found in the next chapter.

(2) Strauss maintained that the miracles of Jesus are legends or myths, not history. The Messiah was expected to work miracles. Isaiah had prophesied

[1] Some would say that the miraculous powers of the Church ceased altogether at the close of the Apostolic age. The safer opinion is that vestiges of these miraculous powers still remain, ready to be exercised upon proper occasions. Some remarkable recent cases of miracles are reported from various parts of the mission-field.

that in the Messiah's days "the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing" (Isa. xxxv. 5, 6). Hence the early Christians, believing Jesus to be the Messiah, invented miraculous stories about Him.

This view requires us to suppose that the Gospels are late and unauthentic productions, a supposition which has been already disproved.[1] (See, further, Objection III.).

(3) Paulus, whose methods still find occasional representatives,[2] maintained that all the so-called miracles of Jesus are authentic, but that they are not miracles. Thus Jesus walked not *on* the sea, but on the high shore *above* the sea. The changing of the water into wine was an innocent wedding joke. The healing of the blind was effected by "an efficacious eye-salve." The stilling of the storm was a "happy coincidence." Further happy coincidences were the raisings of Jairus's daughter, of Lazarus, and of the widow's son, who were not really dead, but only in a death-like stupor. The Transfiguration was a mistake of Peter, James, and John, who saw Jesus through the uncertain light of a morning mist talking to two men, and thought that they were Moses and Elijah. Upon the cross

[1] Baur, like Strauss, regarded the miracles as legendary, and the Gospels as unauthentic, but he gave a different account of the origin of the legends.

[2] See, for instance, Dr. E. A. Abbott's *Kernel and the Husk*.

Jesus did not die, but only fainted. The so-called Resurrection, therefore, was quite a natural event. The Ascension was the disappearance of Jesus in a mountain cloud which came between Him and His disciples; etc.

To most persons the mere statement of Paulus's theory is its sufficient refutation. Applied to one or two miracles, it might be credible: applied to over thirty, it becomes ridiculous.

(4) The general attitude of present-day rationalism is represented by Keim. He regards physical miracles as altogether incredible, and healing miracles as only credible in so far as they can be shown to be due to natural causes—that is, not to be miracles.[1] Thus he is willing to credit the healing of Peter's wife's mother, because she was perhaps not very ill, and perhaps her fever was *intermittent*. The healing of the palsied man he also accepts, but finds fault with St. Luke, and especially St. Mark, for grossly exaggerating the symptoms of the case. The cleansing of the leper causes Him

[1] He explains the miracles which he accepts as due to the joint action of faith on the part of the person healed, and of unique sympathy on the part of Jesus: "Under His tender and compassionate glance, under His elevating word, and in the believing touch of His garment, the sick grew well, and felt themselves relieved." He admits, however, that the series of miracles ascribed to Jesus is unique and unparalleled. "It may be that such healings occurred at other times also, yet they occurred in His time in a special degree only in connection with and through Him; and other times have been unequal to His, in the extent and attestation of the cures, and chiefly in the depth of the moral-religious basis, even though it is too much to talk—with Ewald or Holtzmann—of thousands of cases of healing."

serious difficulty. It is too well attested to be rejected outright; on the other hand, it cannot be naturally explained. Keim suggests, therefore, that there was no miracle. The man had already spontaneously recovered of his leprosy before he came to Jesus, and Jesus simply pronounced him clean. The healing of the withered hand Keim accepts, with the proviso that the hand was not withered, but only subject to slight paralysis. He also accepts the healing of the woman with the issue of blood, and a few other miracles which seem to him capable of natural explanation. But all the greater miracles, such as the healing of the Gadarene demoniac, the stilling of the storm, the walking on the sea, the raising of Jairus's daughter, and the feeding of the five thousand, he first pronounces impossible, and then by various "critical" artifices dissolves into myths.

Keim's theory must be pronounced arbitrary for several reasons.

(*a*) He decides beforehand that miracles are impossible, and consequently does not even profess to judge miraculous narratives by the ordinary laws of evidence. If a narrative is miraculous, it is a myth, and the only task that remains for "criticism" is to invent an ingenious theory of the origin of the myth.[1]

[1] What is said of Keim applies with equal force to Dr. Schmiedel. He treats miracles in precisely the manner of Keim, with only this difference, that he does not commit himself verbally to the principle that miracles are impossible.

(*b*) The *Memoirs of St. Peter* and the *Logia* of St. Matthew, the oldest Gospel sources, attest with equal distinctness the greater miracles which Keim rejects, and the lesser ones which He accepts. They also report words of Jesus, of undoubted genuineness, in which He attests even such miracles as the cure of leprosy and the raising of the dead. Criticism, therefore, can draw no real distinction between the attestation of the greater and of the lesser miracles of Jesus.

(*c*) Keim does not really explain even those miracles which he accepts as authentic. In every case of healing he reduces materially the gravity of the symptoms; in other words, instead of explaining the facts recorded by the Evangelists, he substitutes other facts, and explains *them*. Consequently, his whole procedure amounts to a confession that the miracles of Jesus, which he professes to explain, are not capable of explanation.

Objection X.—The healing miracles of Jesus are credible, but not His physical miracles.

Reply.—All miracles, considered simply as miracles, are equally difficult to believe. Every philosophical objection which can be brought against a physical miracle, applies with equal force to a healing miracle. If to some persons the healing miracles of Jesus seem more credible, it is because they think them more capable of a natural explanation.

Objection XI.—The contemporaries of Jesus attributed miracles at random to all great men, and

therefore the statements in the Gospels that Jesus worked miracles are of no historical value.

Reply.—None of the great contemporaries of Jesus are represented as working miracles. Even John the Baptist, who was regarded as a prophet, worked no miracles, nor were miracles ascribed to him (John x. 41). The reason why miracles were ascribed to Jesus and not to John, clearly is that Jesus professed to work them, and John did not.

Objection XII.—Miracles, so far from being the main support of Christianity, are the chief hindrance to its universal acceptance.

Reply.—If by Christianity is meant the historical belief of the Church that Jesus Christ is the Son of God made man, then miracles are not a hindrance, but an aid to faith, for it is to be expected that a superhuman Person would perform superhuman works.

If, on the other hand, by Christianity is meant Unitarianism, or Natural Religion, even so, miracles are an aid to faith, for the truths of Natural Religion are almost as much questioned, and therefore almost as much in need of miraculous corroboration, as those of historic Christianity. No reflecting person can deny that the healing miracles of Jesus, supposed true or probable, render the Divine Benevolence more easy to believe, and that His Resurrection, supposed an actual fact, lends additional credibility to the doctrine of a future life. Whichever way, therefore, we regard Christianity, whether as a revelation of new truths inaccessible

to reason, or as a republication of Natural Religion, its well-attested miracles render it more credible.

Objection XIII.—Miracles, however authentically proved, can confer no additional credibility upon an alleged revelation. "Suppose," says Matthew Arnold, "that I could change the pen with which I write into a pen-wiper, I should not make what I write any the truer or the more convincing."[1]

Reply.—The miracle supposed by Matthew Arnold would confer no credibility upon a revelation, because its frivolous and unethical character would prove clearly that it did not proceed from God.

It is otherwise with the miracles of Christ. Supposing them to be authentic, their lofty and sublime character, their redemptive purpose, and the depth of Divine compassion which they reveal, stamp them as works of God.

VI.—Provisional Conclusions

It is premature to come to a final decision with regard to the miracles of Jesus until the evidence for the greatest of them all, His Resurrection, has been considered. But it will be convenient at this point to sum up the results which have already been attained. It has been shown—

[1] It is satisfactory to notice that Matthew Arnold erased this unfortunate and offensive illustration from the last edition of his *Literature and Dogma*.

(1) That St. Paul and the Twelve believed firmly that they possessed miraculous powers.

(2) That these miraculous powers were delegated to them by Jesus.

(3) That Jesus Himself professed to work miracles, and frequently alluded to them as facts in His discourses.

(4) That the Apostles witnessed and reported many striking miracles of Jesus.

(5) That the enemies of Jesus were unable to deny His miracles.

(6) That the oldest narrative Gospel source is, in proportion to its length, even richer in striking miracles than the later sources.[1]

(7) That the physical miracles, including those of raising the dead, are as well attested as the miracles of healing.

(8) That the miracles of the oldest sources cannot be explained as legends or myths.

(9) That the Gospel miracles are unique in respect of their number, character, magnitude, and varied attestation.

(10) That the numerous attempts to explain the Gospel miracles as a whole by natural causes are not even plausible.

(11) That though plausible efforts have been made to explain certain of the *healing* miracles of Jesus

[1] So uncompromisingly miraculous is the narrative of St. Mark that Keim finds himself obliged (contrary to the weight of the evidence) to date it later than St. Matthew and St. Luke.

as acts of ordinary faith-healing, yet when we consider (*a*) the immense number of persons healed, (*b*) the absence of failures, (*c*) the incurable character of many of the diseases, and (*d*) the completeness and instantaneousness of the cures, which were sometimes performed at a distance, and without the instrumentality of faith in the persons healed, it is impossible to resist the conviction that even the healing miracles, taken as a whole, are incapable of natural explanation.[1]

We think, therefore, that whoever examines the evidence fairly, and without an overwhelming prepossession against the possibility of miracles, will come to the conclusion (1) that the miracles ascribed to Jesus by the oldest authorities are facts, and (2) that they are miracles.

[1] In ordinary faith-healing the failures are much more numerous than the successes, the successes are often only partial, and it is seldom that serious diseases are cured. This was the case even with the famous Jansenist miracles, which Hume compares with the miracles of the Gospels. Paley justly remarks that the Jansenist miracles (1) were *tentative*. Out of many thousand sick, infirm, and diseased persons who resorted to the tomb, the professed history of the miracles contains only *nine* cures. (2) The convulsions at the tomb are admitted. (3) The diseases were, for the most part, of the sort which depends upon inaction and obstruction. (4) The cures were gradual; some patients attending many days, some several weeks, and some several months. (5) The cures were many of them incomplete. (6) Others were temporary (*Evidences of Christianity*, prop. ii. c. 2). The same remarks apply to the more recent healings at Lourdes, where often, out of many thousands of patients, there are no cures at all, and to the attempted healings of the "Christian Scientists"

APPENDIX I

JESUS AND DEMONIACAL POSSESSION

The Synoptic Gospels, as is well known, always represent insanity and epilepsy, and sometimes diseases in general, as due to demonic possession. Jesus also, in numerous Synoptic passages, seems to countenance this belief. Several different views are held as to the real attitude of Jesus towards this question.

(1) According to some, Jesus rejected the belief in demonic possession altogether. They allege that the Synoptists have allowed their own beliefs to colour the language which they place in the mouth of Jesus, and that His real sentiments must be sought in the fourth Gospel, which records no cures of demoniacs.

This theory must be rejected as inconsistent with the attribution of any degree of credibility, however slight, to the Synoptic Evangelists.

(2) According to another view, Jesus accommodated His language to the delusions of the persons whom He desired to heal, humouring them for their own good.

But He used exactly similar language in speaking to the disciples (Matt. xii. 43, etc.).

(3) According to others, Jesus knew that the current views about demonic possession were erroneous, but did not regard it as part of His mission to correct them. On the contrary, He preferred to "accommodate" His language to the popular theology or demonology.

"Accommodation" of this kind, unless the popular belief is, in its main features, true, must be pronounced immoral, and therefore not credible of Jesus.

(4) According to the traditional view, demonic possession, exactly as it was conceived of in the Apostolic age, is a fact. Instances of it are rarer now than they used to be, but still

they occur, and, when they do, must be regarded as, in the strictest sense, supernatural phenomena.

There is more to be said for this view than is sometimes imagined;[1] but it seems better, especially considering that some of the cases of possession in the New Testament present the features of well-known diseases, to set it aside, and to seek for some other explanation.

Probable Conclusion.—The following theory seems fairly well to harmonize the facts. Jesus accepted the current belief of the Jews, which has since been adopted by the Christian Church, that God governs the world to a very considerable extent through the instrumentality of created spirits, some of which are good, and others (through a fall from innocence) evil. He regarded the good spirits (or *angels*) as ministering good things to man, and the evil angels (or *devils*) as ministering evil things. Being thus fully convinced that malignant diseases, and especially mental diseases, are due to diabolical agency, He was able to use the popular language about possession as approximating sufficiently to the truth for the ordinary purposes of religion.[2]

The advantage of this view is, that it does not conflict, as the traditional view does, with the natural causation of disease.

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[1] It is defended in so recent a book as *Demonic Possession in the New Testament: its Relations, Historical, Medical, and Theological*, by W. M. Alexander, M.D. Dr. Alexander rightly lays stress on the confession of the demons that Jesus was the Son of God (Mark iii. 11, 12, etc.), and this is undoubtedly difficult to explain on any but the traditional view.

[2] It should be noticed that Jesus does not appropriate *all* the popular language upon the subject. The crudities and extravagances which are found in Josephus, in Rabbinical literature, and in the Apocryphal Gospels are absent from the New Testament. In the one passage in which Jesus uses language approaching that of the popular demonology (Matt. xii. 43 ff. = Luke xi. 24 ff.), He is speaking figuratively, or parabolically.

It regards the Satanic power as operating, not miraculously, but as part of the order of nature.

It may be objected that this view assumes the existence of a personal devil or devils. It does so, but the assumption is reasonable, and will continue reasonable, as long as the universe continues to present the appearance of a conflict between good and evil. The assumption of a *non-personal* devil, or mere influence for evil, is attended with far greater philosophical difficulties (see further pp. 220-4).

APPENDIX II

THE MIRACLES OF THE OLD TESTAMENT

The Old Testament miracles, owing to the uncertain character of their attestation, cannot be regarded as possessing apologetic value. They are, moreover, in the opinion of the best recent authorities, much less numerous and important than those of the New Testament. With the exception of the Mosaic miracles which inaugurated the Old Dispensation, and a few isolated "signs" to individuals (1 Kings xiii. 1 ff.; 2 Kings xx. 1 ff.; etc.), it is difficult to point to any well-attested Old Testament miracles. Those of Elijah and Elisha cannot be used controversially, because, in the opinion of not a few authorities, they are Rabbinical *haggadoth*, rather than sober history. Again, the miracles of the Captivity lose their contemporary attestation, and therefore their apologetic importance, if the book which records them (*Daniel*) be regarded as an Apocalypse of a far later date. Philosophically, the Old Testament miracles must be pronounced credible, owing to the organic connection between the New Testament and the Old; but from the strictly evidential standpoint the verdict must be *not proven*.

APPENDIX III

THE ARGUMENT FROM PROPHECY

Some of the detailed correspondences between the life of Jesus and the predictions of the prophets, upon which the older apologists laid stress, are certainly impressive, but it is not wise, in the present state of criticism, to lay much controversial stress upon them.[1] More important in every way, from the apologetic point of view, is the fact that the life of Jesus, taken as a whole, realizes and even surpasses the highest expectations of the Old Testament prophets, and that the religion which He founded fulfilled, and more than fulfilled, the high hopes which they confidently cherished even in the darkest days of the nation. Only a summary of the leading correspondences can here be given.

(1) The prophets believed that the Old Covenant, under which they lived, would be superseded by a new and more spiritual covenant, which they describe in language which exactly suits the religion founded by Christ. "Behold, the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel. . . . I will put My law in their inward parts, and in their heart I will write it" (Jer. xxxi. 31 ff.). "I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh" (Ezek. xi. 19).

(2) The prophets declared that the Gentiles would be

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[1] Among the most impressive of these are Christ's birth at Bethlehem (*cf.* Mic. v. 2) and His Davidic descent. Some critics maintain that His birth at Bethlehem is a mere legend suggested by the prophecy of Micah, but this is unlikely. The Davidic descent of Jesus, legally through Joseph, and perhaps also naturally through Mary, may be regarded as certain (see Mark x. 47; Acts ii. 30; Rom. i. 3; etc.).

admitted into this New Covenant, and that the religion of Israel would thus become the religion of the whole earth. "The earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord, as the waters cover the sea" (Isa. xi. 9). "And nations shall come to thy light, and kings to the brightness of thy rising (Isa. lx. 3). "And of them [the Gentiles] also will I take for priests and for Levites, saith the Lord" (Isa. lxvi. 21). "I will pour out My Spirit upon all flesh" (Joel ii. 28). "Glorious things are spoken of thee, O city of God. I will make mention of Rahab [Egypt] and Babylon as among them that know me: behold Philistia, and Tyre, with Ethiopia; this one was born there [in Zion]. Yea, of Zion it shall be said, This one and that one was born in her; and the Most High shall establish her. And the Lord shall count, when He writeth up the peoples, This one was born there" (Ps. lxxxvii. 3-6).[1]

(3) The prophets prophesied that this new covenant would be established by a Davidic king, whose rule would extend over all the earth, and last for evermore. "And there shall come forth a shoot out of the stock of Jesse, and a branch out of his roots shall bear fruit. . . . Unto Him shall the nations seek, and His resting-place shall be glorious" (Isa. xi. 1, 10). "Of the increase of His government and of peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon His kingdom, to establish it, and to uphold it with judgment and with righteousness from henceforth even for ever" (Isa. ix. 7). "I will raise unto David a righteous Branch, and He shall reign as king and deal wisely" (Jer. xxiii. 5). "The Lord said unto my Lord [the Messiah], Sit Thou at My right hand, until I make Thine enemies Thy footstool" (Ps. cx. 1).

(4) The prophets often speak of the gentleness and humanity of the Messiah's rule, of His kindness to the poor

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[1] This psalm describes the enrolment of all the nations of the earth as citizens of Zion, and the conferring upon them of the same privileges as if they had been Israelites by birth.

and afflicted, and of the universal peace which the world will then enjoy. "A bruised reed shall He not break, and the smoking flax shall He not quench" (Isa. xlii. 3). "Then the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped. Then shall the lame man leap as an hart, and the tongue of the dumb shall sing" (Isa. xxxv. 5, 6). "With righteousness shall He judge the poor, and reprove with equity for the meek of the earth. . . . And righteousness shall be the girdle of His loins, and faithfulness the girdle of His reins. And the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, and the leopard shall lie down with the kid; and the calf and the young lion and the fatling together; and a little child shall lead them" (Isa. xi. 4 ff.). "And they shall beat their swords into ploughshares, and their spears into pruning-hooks: nation shall not lift up sword against nation, neither shall they learn war any more" (Isa. ii. 4 = Mic. iv. 3).

(5) The prophets represent the spiritual blessings of the Messianic age as absolutely unique. "And the Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live" (Deut. xxx. 6). "In that day shall there be upon the bells of the horses, HOLY UNTO THE LORD; and the pots in the Lord's house shall be like the bowls before the altar" (Zech. xiv. 20). "They shall teach no more every man his neighbour, and every man his brother, saying, Know the Lord: for they shall all know Me, from the least of them unto the greatest of them" (Jer. xxxi. 34).

(6) Although the prophets do not represent the Messiah as actually a Divine person, yet Divine titles are applied to Him, and He is invested with superhuman powers. "His name shall be called Wonderful, Counsellor, Mighty God, Everlasting Father, Prince of Peace" (Isa. ix. 6).

(7) He is priest as well as king, and His priesthood excels that of Aaron, and is eternal. "Thou art a priest for ever after the order of Melchizedek" (Ps. cx. 4).

(8) The great prophet of the Captivity enriches the Messianic picture with a delineation of the Messiah's sufferings. Only through persecution, rejection, and death, will the Messiah attain to His glory. His death, however, will be an atoning sacrifice for the sins of the people, and the Messiah, triumphing over death, will witness the fruit of His labours. "He was despised, and rejected of men; a man of sorrows, and acquainted with grief. . . . He was wounded for our transgressions, He was bruised for our iniquities: the chastisement of our peace was upon Him; and with His stripes we are healed. . . . Yet it pleased the Lord to bruise Him; He hath put Him to grief: when thou shalt make His soul an offering for sin, He shall see His seed, He shall prolong His days, and the pleasure of the Lord shall prosper in His hand. He shall see of the travail of His soul, and shall be satisfied" (Isa. liii.).

The extraordinary manner in which these anticipations of the prophets, even those which at first sight appear contradictory, were fulfilled in Jesus Christ, is a strong confirmation, on the one hand, of the reality of prophecy, and on the other hand of the truth of Christianity.

LITERATURE

(*a*) Christ's Miracles

From the literature given with some fulness under ch. xvi. we may select the following: J. Wendland, *Miracles and Christianity* (tr.), 1911; A. B. Bruce, *The Miraculous Element in the Gospels*; Trench *On the Miracles* (mainly expository); Paley, *Evidences of Christianity* (still useful); K. Beth, *Die Wunder Jesu*, 1911; Mozley, *Bampton Lectures*; W. Sanday, art. "Jesus Christ" in *H.D.B.*; add Salmon, *Non-miraculous Christianity*; A. C. Headlam, *Miracles of the N. T.*

On the rationalistic side Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, vol. iii., pp. 152-249, is especially thorough and illuminating.

(*b*) Demonic Possession

Nevius, *Demon Possession in China* and *Demon Possession and Allied Themes*; W. M. Alexander, *Demonic Possession in the New Testament*; A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*[3], ch. vii.

(*c*) The Argument from Prophecy

The subject is well treated from a modern standpoint in Riehm, *Messianic Prophecy*; Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief* (revised ed.), p. 447 ff.; Bruce, *Apologetics*, p. 245 ff.; R. L. Ottley, *Incarnation*, part ii. sect. 4; A. B. Davidson, "Prophecy," in *Hastings' Bible Dict.*; *Lux Mundi* (art. "Preparation in History for Christ"); Stanton, *The Jewish and the Christian Messiah*; the *Old Testament Theologies* of Schultz and Oehler; *cf.* also W. R. Smith, *The Prophets of Israel*; Kirkpatrick, *Doctrine of the Prophets*; and C. A. Briggs, *Messianic Prophecy*; W. Sanday, *Inspiration*; G. A. Smith, *Modern Criticism and the Preaching of the Old Testament*; E. A. Edghill, *Enquiry into the Evidential Value of Prophecy*, 1906 (useful work on modern lines). For other, and mainly older points of view, see J. Davison, *Discourses on Prophecy*; Hengstenberg, *Christology of the Old Testament*; Payne Smith, *Prophecy a Preparation for Christ*; Delitzsch, *Messianic Prophecies*; Alexander, *Witness of the Psalms to Christ*; B. Maitland, *The Argument from Prophecy* (S.P.C.K.); Goode, *Fulfilled Prophecy* (conservative).

CHAPTER XXII

THE RESURRECTION OF JESUS

SUMMARY.—It is shown that a concurrence of strong historical with exceptionally strong moral evidence justifies faith in the Resurrection of Jesus Christ. The Resurrection authenticates the teaching of Jesus, and therefore His Divinity.

THE unique importance of the miracle of the Resurrection, and the prominent place which it fills in the earliest preaching of the Apostles, entitle it to special treatment. Yet its evidential importance should not be exaggerated. It is a mistake to place it in a special class by itself, as the only miracle capable of historical verification, and the sole authentication of all other miracles. Those who speak of it in this way, place upon the evidence for the Resurrection a greater weight than it will bear. They do not reflect how difficult it is to prove an isolated fact of an abnormal character. If the Resurrection, or any other miracle of Jesus, stood alone, the evidence for it, though it were far stronger than it is, would fail to convince. What makes the case for the Resurrection exceptionally strong is that it forms part of a series of extraordinary events, all worked by the same person,

all remarkably well attested, and all, or nearly all, stamped with a lofty ethical character, which renders them not unworthy of being ascribed to God Himself. The Resurrection, therefore, is not an isolated event. It belongs to a *class*, and the class contains hundreds certainly—thousands probably—of closely similar events. Thus the evidence for the Resurrection is cumulative. It consists of the evidence for that special event, together with the evidence for all the other miracles that Jesus worked. To say, therefore, that the Resurrection proves the other miracles is only half the truth. To be accurate, it is necessary to add that the other miracles prove the Resurrection.

I.—The Evidence of St. Paul

It is well to begin with the evidence of St. Paul, because this is perhaps the oldest,[1] and is certainly the least disputed.

The Resurrection is the corner-stone of St. Paul's system. It is the convincing proof that the Man Jesus, born of the seed of David according to the flesh, is also the eternal Son of God (Rom. i. 4). It demonstrates that the ignominious death of Jesus was really a victory over the powers of darkness (Col. ii. 12-5). It is a pledge that those who are members of Christ are raised to newness of life, and have in prospect a blessed immortality

[1] The only evangelical source which is probably older is the Hebrew *Logia* of St. Matthew.

(Rom. vi. 4-11). In short, to use St. Paul's own forcible words, Jesus Christ "hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel" of the Resurrection.

Unfortunately, St. Paul nowhere describes in detail the evidence upon which the Resurrection of Jesus was believed by the first disciples. He has left us, however, an important passage (1 Cor. xv. 3-11), written just twenty-five years after the Resurrection, in which he mentions six appearances of the risen Lord (five to the original disciples, and one to himself), but without any indication of place, time, or circumstances. St. Paul's words are: "For I delivered unto you first of all that which also I received, how that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures; and that He was buried; and that He hath been raised on the third day according to the Scriptures; and that He appeared to Cephas [Peter]; then to the Twelve; then He appeared to above five hundred brethren at once, of whom the greater part remain until now, but some are fallen asleep; then He appeared to James; then to all the Apostles; and last of all, as unto one born out of due time, He appeared to me also. . . . Whether then it be I or they, so we preach, and so ye believed."

This passage was written in or about the year 55, but it is based on considerably earlier testimony. St. Paul was converted, according to most recent critics, soon after the Ascension, probably within

a year of it.[1] Three years later he went up to Jerusalem to visit St. Peter, and saw also St. James.[2] From them, therefore, it cannot be doubted, he received particulars of the five appearances which he records in 1 Corinthians xv. This is the verdict not only of Orthodoxy, but also of Rationalism. Strauss, for example, says: "The fact that the Apostle Paul heard from the mouth of Peter, of James, and of others besides, that Jesus had appeared to them, and that they all, with the five hundred brethren also, were absolutely convinced that they had seen Jesus living after He had died, is one which we will not call in question."[3]

[1] Harnack makes the date A.D. 30.

[2] Gal. i. 18.

[3] Similarly Dr. Schmiedel says (*Encyclop. Biblica*, vol. ii. col. 1,879): "This passage must be regarded as the earliest account of the appearances of the risen Jesus; unquestionably it goes back to the communications made by Peter during the fifteen days' visit of Paul, three years after the conversion of the latter (Gal. i. 18)." Prof. Weizsäcker says: "Paul's knowledge of these things must have come from the heads of the primitive Church" (*Apostolic Age*, i. p. 5). Prof. Wernle says: "In the very earliest time St. Paul obtained this information from St. Peter" (*Beginnings of Christianity*, i. p. 115). Dr. Keim also says: "In this epistle [1 Corinthians] Paul states what he had received from tradition from the earliest Apostles and first Christians, that is at and after his two weeks' visit to Peter in Jerusalem in the year 39. What he then heard he found to be established or elucidated in his intercourse with the Apostles and earliest brethren. Paul wishes in pious earnestness to give the truth. . . . It is beyond doubt that the facts were really experienced and believed as they were faithfully related to him, and as he has again faithfully reported them. . . . Paul's help supplies the whole question with its fixed point, its Archimedean fulcrum" (*Jesus of Nazara*, vol. vi. pp. 279-81).

II.—The Testimony of St. Peter and St. John

This conclusion is corroborated by the undisputed Epistle of St. Peter, who regards the Resurrection as the firm basis of a Christian's life and hope. "Blessed," says St. Peter, "be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who according to His great mercy begat us again unto a living hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead, unto an inheritance incorruptible, and undefiled, and that fadeth not away, reserved in heaven for you" (1 Peter i. 3, 4; *cf.* i. 21, iii. 21).

St. John also in his undisputed epistle alludes indirectly, but unmistakably, to the post-resurrection appearances of Jesus ("That which . . . our hands *handled* [ἐψηλάφησαν] concerning the Word of life" (1 John i. 1).[1] That the handling spoken of is the handling of the risen body of Christ is made clear by a comparison with the Gospel (John xx. 27; *cf.* Luke xxiv. 39).[2]

It is absolutely certain, therefore, and may be taken as the starting-point of the inquiry, that shortly after the death of Jesus the Apostles and other brethren saw visions of Him, which

[1] The disputed Apocalypse also testifies to the Resurrection, both implicitly, by its mention of the Lord's Day (i. 10), and explicitly: "I was dead, and behold, I am alive for evermore, and I have the keys of death and of Hades" (i. 18); "These things saith the First and the Last, which was [became] dead, and lived again" (ii. 8).

[2] See Westcott's Commentary *in loc.*

completely convinced them that He had risen from the dead.[1]

III.—Examination of St. Paul's Testimony

St. Paul's evidence, quoted above, is possibly—we do not say probably—consistent with the view that the manifestations of the risen Christ were purely spiritual. St. Paul speaks of "appearances" only (ὤφθη), and says nothing of the empty tomb, of the handling of the risen body, or of words spoken by the risen Lord. Hence many critics[2] suppose that the idea of a bodily resurrection is a later legendary growth, and that the original view was, that the *spirit* of Jesus returned and manifested itself in a purely spiritual manner.[3]

This minimizing interpretation of St. Paul's language is, we believe, incorrect; but since it is accepted by numerous Rationalists, and even by

[1] Baur says: "For the disciples the Resurrection was as real as any historical fact—whatever may have been the medium of this persuasion. . . . History must hold to the assertion that to the faith of the disciples the Resurrection of Jesus Christ was a fact, certain and indisputable. It is in this faith only that Christianity found a ground solid enough to erect upon it the superstructure of its whole historic development." So also Mr. Macan, writing from the standpoint of pure Rationalism, says: "Two broad facts may be taken as certain—that Paul and the other Apostles had certain visions, and that in consequence of these visions they believed that Jesus had risen from the dead" (*The Resurrection*, p. 68).

[2] Schenkel, Baur, Keim, Weizsäcker, Harnack, Wernle, etc.

[3] Some of these critics admit that Christ appeared in a "spiritual body," but they regard this spiritual body as completely different from His earthly body. The latter, they believe, remained in the tomb.

some who claim to be Christian believers,[1] we will adopt it provisionally, and proceed to inquire whether, even on this minimizing hypothesis, the Resurrection appearances can be naturally explained.

St. Paul's Conversion.—The conversion of St. Paul, regarded as an isolated event, is perhaps capable of a natural explanation.[2] St. Paul *possibly* was, as Holsten suggests, a weak epileptic with shattered nerves, which were to him a permanent "thorn in the flesh" (2 Cor. xii. 7). He was certainly prone to visions and ecstasies, at least after His conversion (2 Cor. xii. 1 ff.; Acts xxii. 17). Although a Pharisee and a strict observer of the Law, he was already, before his conversion, dissatisfied with his religion, and desirous of something better (Rom. vii. 7—viii. 11). He had heard arguments in favour of Christianity, having been present almost certainly when St. Stephen delivered his famous apology (Acts vii. 1-53). As a Pharisee, the doctrine of the Resurrection would be likely to appeal to him (Acts xxiii. 6 ff.). The spectacle of the constancy of St. Stephen and of the other Christian martyrs would also be likely to produce an impression upon his mind. In his heart he was already inclining towards Christianity, and his feverish zeal against the Church was only

[1] By Canon Wilberforce, for example.

[2] It may perhaps be naturally explained, if we confine ourselves to St. Paul's own account of the matter. If, however, St. Luke's account in the Acts is authentic, natural explanation is impossible.

a futile attempt to stifle his conscience, and to blind himself to the fact that the Christians, after all, were in the right. At last, at the close of his journey to Damascus, the crisis, so long prepared, arrived. He broke violently with his former faith, and, in the intense spiritual exaltation of the moment, saw a vision of the risen Christ, just as the dying Stephen shortly before had seen "the heavens opened, and the Son of Man standing on the right hand of God."[1]

[1] Visions, though unusual, are not unprecedented during religious revivals. Two or three have already occurred in the course of the present Welsh revival (Nov.—Dec. 1904).

There are also parallels to the overpowering light which St. Paul saw at his conversion. Charles Finney, the American revivalist (1792—1875), writes in his *Autobiography* (c. iii.): "Mr. Gale was standing at the door [of the meeting-house], and as I came up, all at once the glory of the Lord shone around and about me, in a manner most marvellous. The day was just beginning to dawn; but all at once a light perfectly ineffable shone in my soul, and almost prostrated me to the ground. In this light it seemed as if I could see that all nature praised and worshipped God, except man. It was too intense for the eyes. I recollect breaking into a flood of tears, in view of the fact that mankind did not praise God. I think I knew something then, by actual experience, of that light that prostrated Paul on his way to Damascus. It was surely a light such as I could not have endured long."

There is an extraordinary modern parallel to St. Paul's conversion in the instantaneous conversion of Alphonse Ratisbonne. Ratisbonne was a free-thinking Jew, who, happening to enter the Church of San Andrea della Fratte in Rome, in the year 1843, saw an overpowering celestial vision of the Mother of Jesus, and was instantly converted to Christianity. Ratisbonne was hostile to Christianity, and indeed to all religion, and the influences which had prepared the way for his conversion had been slight (W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*, pp. 223-6).

The abstract possibility of this explanation is not, in face of the modern parallels (see p. 470, note), to be denied. At the same time it involves many improbabilities, and a very free handling (to use no stronger term) of St. Paul's statements. Holsten's theory of epileptic seizures cannot be taken very seriously. The Apostle's unexampled and protracted labours for a period of at least thirty years (2 Cor. xi. 23 ff.), which were terminated not by disease, but by the sword of the executioner (Clement of Rome, c. v.),[1] prove him to have possessed a thoroughly sound constitution. There is more plausibility about the theory that a long and severe struggle took place in St. Paul's mind, and ended, at Damascus, in the victory of the new faith; but this, at best, is only a guess, and is contradicted by all the evidence that we possess.[2] "Such a picture," says Dr. Knowling, "of the Apostle's mental state is drawn in direct opposition to his own statements. Paul knows nothing of a gradual conversion to the Gospel. In Galatians i. 12-6, if his language has any meaning, it certainly shows that he was inaccessible to human influences in this matter; all through his life his conversion is regarded as an event which surprised him in the midst of his fanatical zeal;

[1] St. Paul probably perished at the beginning of Nero's persecution, A. D. 64; but some authorities place his martyrdom as late as 67 or 68.

[2] The expression, "It is hard for thee to kick against the pricks" (Acts xxvi. 14), does not prove the existence of an inward struggle in St. Paul's mind (see the commentators).

he represents it as *being apprehended by Christ* (Phil. iii. 12); he has been conquered by main force; if he preaches the Gospel, he does so *of necessity*; he describes himself by a term which pointedly indicates the sudden change wrought in him (1 Cor. xv. 8). . . . There is no acknowledgment that in his zeal against the Christians he was violating his conscience, or acting wilfully against his better judgment, and if we accept 1 Timothy i. 13, he has himself anticipated and refuted all such imputations" (*Witness of the Epistles*, p. 390).[1] Even Strauss admits that if St. Paul's account of his mental condition at the time of his conversion is strictly true, the vision cannot be naturally explained.[2]

The difficulties, therefore, of a purely natural explanation of St. Paul's conversion are extremely great, and they are not sensibly relieved by the supposition of Holsten and others that St. Paul

[1] *Cf.* also H. A. W. Meyer on Acts ix. 3-9: "The conversion of Saul does *not* appear, on an accurate consideration of the three narratives (ix., xxii., xxvi.), which agree in the main points, *to have had the way psychologically prepared for it by scruples of conscience as to his persecuting proceedings.* On the contrary, Luke represents it in the history at our passage, and Paul himself in his speeches (xxii. and xxvi.; *cf.* also Gal. i. 14, 15; Phil. iii. 12), as in direct and immediate *contrast* to his vehement persecuting zeal, amidst which he was *all of a sudden* internally arrested by the miraculous fact from without."

[2] Strauss says: "From . . . the excitement into which the fanatical upholder of Jewish traditions had been brought by the threatening advances of Christianity, . . . a vision of Moses or Elias would have been far more likely to result than an image of Christ."

was in a *trance* when he saw Christ. Even visions seen in trance are subject to the laws of psychology, and therefore, unless the mind of St. Paul was already far on the way to conviction—which he denies—he would not have been likely to see a vision of Christ, but rather (as Strauss admits) one of Moses or of some other zealous upholder of the Law. Even Baur, in one of his latest works, gave up the attempt to explain the conversion of St. Paul naturally, and said: "We cannot call his conversion, his sudden transformation from the most vehement opponent of Christianity into its boldest preacher, anything but a miracle; and the miracle appears all the greater when we remember that in this revulsion of his consciousness he broke through the barriers of Judaism, and rose out of the particularism of Judaism into the universal idea of Christianity. . . . No analysis, either psychological or dialectic, can detect the inner secret of the act in which God revealed His Son in him" (*Church History*, p. 47).[1]

[1] This was written in 1853, seven years before his death. Even in his earlier work, *Paul the Apostle* (1845), he had admitted that a miraculous explanation of the event was at any rate admissible: "Although the historical and critical treatment of the narrative of the conversion of Paul . . . does not allow us to consider it as simply miraculous, yet if we look at it from a psychological point of view, the supposition of a miracle, if not necessary, may yet be allowable" (pt. ii. c. 3). Holsten also says (on Galatians i. 13-6): "The sudden change from being a passionate zealot for the traditions of the fathers, and persecutor of the community of Jesus, to being as passionate a preacher of His Gospel . . . is only to be explained as a direct interposition of God in Paul's spiritual life."

The Other Appearances mentioned by St. Paul.—Many other difficulties in the way of a purely natural explanation of St. Paul's conversion might be mentioned,[1] but it is better to pass at once to the consideration of the other appearances to which he alludes. The real question which we have to decide is not whether St. Paul's conversion, taken alone, can be naturally explained, but whether the whole group of six appearances, of which it forms a part, can be so explained. This question must, we think, be answered in the negative, for the following reasons :

(1) The psychology of visions is now fairly well understood. For the production of a definite visual hallucination in a sane and healthy person, there is normally required (*a*) intense emotional excitement and nervous exaltation, and (*b*) intense pre-occupation of the mind with an idea.

Neither of these conditions seems to have been present in the case of the Apostles. Let us briefly review the historical circumstances of the appearances.

(*a*) The appearances of the risen Christ began as early as the third day, and at that time the

[1] According to St. Paul, Christ not only *appeared* to him at Damascus, but also conferred upon him a special commission to preach the Gospel to the *Gentiles*. This, be it remembered, was at a time when Christianity was still a Jewish sect, and when none of the original Apostles had realised their responsibilities towards the Gentiles. How St. Paul, the bigoted Pharisee, became in a moment, not only a Christian, but a Christian more liberal than St. Peter, is a psychological problem which no rationalistic critic has yet satisfactorily solved.

Apostles were not in a state of exaltation, but in one of profound depression. The arrest of Jesus on Thursday night had been a terrible blow to their hopes; so much so, that they all "forsook Him and fled" (Mark xiv. 50). Subsequently St. Peter thrice denied Him (Mark xiv. 66 ff.). The Crucifixion and Death of Jesus on the next day must have reduced the Apostles to despair. To Jewish minds the fatal end of Jesus could only bear one meaning—that God had pronounced Him a false Messiah, and, by inflicting upon Him the shameful punishment of crucifixion, had placed Him under a curse (Deut. xxi. 23; Gal. iii. 13). "A death like His," says Baur, "made it impossible for the Jew, as long as he remained a Jew, to believe in [Jesus] as his Messiah." The anonymous author of Mark xvi. 10 is therefore perfectly justified in representing the Apostles as mourning and weeping on the morning of the third day.[1]

(*b*) The Apostles had not expected the Death of Jesus, and *a fortiori* did not expect His Resurrection. Both these events had, it is true, been several times foretold (Matt. xvi. 21; xx. 18; etc.), according to St. Mark, even *openly* (παρρησίᾳ, viii. 32);[2]

[1] *Cf. The Gospel of Peter*, 14: "But we the twelve disciples of the Lord were weeping and mourning. And each one, mourning at what had happened, departed to his house."

[2] It should be remembered that Rationalists, as a rule, reject our Lord's prophecies of His Death and Resurrection, and therefore are unable to use them as proofs that the Apostles expected His Resurrection.

but the predictions had failed to make any impression upon the Apostles (Mark ix. 10), not so much on account of their obscurity, as because the Apostles' minds were filled with expectations of an entirely different kind (Matt. xvi. 22-3; Mark x. 37).

Psychologically, therefore, it is scarcely possible to account for the appearances to the disciples in a purely natural way. The manifestations were not expected, and they began within forty-eight hours of the Death of Jesus, when the disciples were still prostrated with shame and grief. So serious, on this view of the facts, do the difficulties of a natural explanation appear to Strauss, that he denies altogether that the appearances began on the third day, transports the disciples to Galilee, gives them ample time to recover their lost faith, and then makes them see, after a considerable interval, the visions enumerated by St. Paul. This desperate expedient only serves to show the desperate character of Strauss's hypothesis. The third day stands firm, not only on the testimony of all the Gospels, but also on that of St. Paul.[1] It is, moreover, confirmed by the institution of the Lord's Day, which dates from the apostolic period (Rev. i. 10; Acts xx. 7). If a fact so well attested as the Resurrection on the

[1] St. Paul does not expressly say that Jesus was *seen* on the third day, but only that He *rose* then. It is clear, however, that it was because Jesus appeared on the third day, that He was believed to have risen on that day.

third day be doubted, historical criticism becomes impossible.

(2) The appearance to James[1] was an appearance to *an unbeliever* (John vii. 5; *cf.* Mark iii. 21), whose unbelief had, moreover, been apparently justified by the recent catastrophe. His mind therefore was not in a condition to generate spontaneously an hallucination of the risen Saviour.

(3) The older apologists denied altogether the possibility of collective hallucinations, and pointed triumphantly to the appearances to the Twelve, to the five hundred, and to "all the Apostles,"[2] as demonstrative proof that what was seen was real. Recent investigations, however, have shown that "collective hallucinations"—*i.e.* hallucinations affecting simultaneously more than one person—do occasionally occur. They are, however, rare, and when they happen, seldom affect more than two persons. The great Census of Hallucinations, conducted between the years 1889 and 1892 by the Psychical Research Society, yielded ninety-five apparent cases, but upon close investigation most of them were found to be indecisive, and the final decision of the committee was expressed in very

[1] An obviously fictitious account of the manifestation to James is given in the Gospel according to the Hebrews. No authentic details about it are known.

[2] That is, the Twelve, together with such leading Christians as James and Jude. For this wider use of the term *Apostle*, see Acts xiii. 2, 3; xiv. 4, 14; Rom. xvi. 7; 1 Thess. ii. 6; and consult Lightfoot, *Galatians*, pp. 92-101.

cautious language.[1] In none of the ninety-five alleged cases was the apparition seen by more than two persons, and there was "no case in which two percipients both saw an apparition, and at the same time heard a voice."[2] No cases were discovered parallel to the series of appearances mentioned by St. Paul.

It is urged, however, that in times of religious excitement visions become infectious, and that the result is an epidemic of hallucinations. It is suggested, therefore, that St. Peter first saw a vision of Jesus, and then worked upon the imaginations of the other Apostles and brethren, until they began to see visions of Him also.[3]

It is not to be denied that under the influence of religious excitement an epidemic of hallucinations may arise. Thus in the summer of 1889 a large number of peasants in the Department of the Dordogne saw visions of the Virgin Mary. It appears, however, from the careful investi-

[1] "If the case for collective hallucinations rested on the Census alone, it would perhaps be rash to regard it as conclusively proved that hallucinations may be shared." Then, after quoting other evidence, they conclude: "We do not think it can be reasonably doubted that collective hallucinations occur, though unmistakable ones are somewhat rare" (*Proceedings*, vol. x. pp. 319, 320).

[2] The best-attested cases of collective hallucinations are those which coincide with the death of the persons seen; but since such appearances (if authentic) are probably caused telepathically by the dying man himself, they cannot be regarded as *mere* hallucinations.

[3] Renan assigns this *rôle* to Mary Magdalene.

gations of M. Léon Marillier,[1] that all who saw the Virgin were in a state of intense religious faith and expectancy. The original percipient, a little girl of eleven, placed her head in a dark hole in a ruined wall, and imagined that she saw the Virgin at the end of it. She then made a number of other persons do the same, telling them what they were expected to see. The result was that in many cases the force of imagination was sufficient to produce a vision. It was not till considerably later, when the excitement became intense, that the Virgin was seen walking in the fields or along the roads by several people at once. But even when all saw her, "she did not appear to all of them under the same aspect. Some saw her in white, and others in black. For some she was wrapped in veils; for others her face was bare. . . . A sort of education or gathered enthusiasm was necessary in order that they might see the apparition with full clearness. . . . The principal elements of the visions were furnished by the mind of each person. . . . The apparitions on the heath, in the fields, or on the roads are exceptional. They were hardly ever experienced but by those who had already seen the Virgin in the wall." It will be seen that the conditions at Dordogne were entirely different from those at Jerusalem on the third day from the Crucifixion,

[1] A translation of his report, revised by himself, is printed in the *Transactions of the Society for Psychical Research*, vol. vii. pp. 100-10.

and that the character of the manifestations was different also.

Upon the whole, then, while admitting that collective hallucinations do sometimes occur, especially under the influence of religious excitement,[1] we are unable to admit that any real parallel to the Pauline appearances, considered in all their circumstances, has yet been produced. Until, then, such a parallel is forthcoming, it will be more reasonable to regard the appearances in question as real manifestations of the spirit of Jesus[2] than as hallucinations. In this judgment a great number of Rationalists (Baur, Schenkel, Holtzmann, Weisse, Keim, Weizsäcker, Harnack, and Wernle) concur with more conservative theologians.

IV.—The Evidence of the Gospels and of the Acts

This doctrine of a purely "spiritual" resurrection, which many Rationalists are willing to accept, is, in a sense, sufficient for faith. If the soul of Jesus really manifested itself to the disciples after death, or if, as Keim suggests, God sent a "telegram from heaven" to assure the disciples that all was well with Jesus, then human immortality is a fact, and Jesus is really the Son of God.

But this view, though held by so many Rational-

[1] Hallucinations are rare even at revivals. The present Welsh revival has produced only a few, and none of these were collective.

[2] This view is generally referred to as the theory of "a spiritual resurrection," or of "objective visions."

ists, is not really consistent with Rationalism. It makes the Resurrection of Jesus a *miracle.* It is as much a breach of the order of nature, and therefore as much a miracle, for a disembodied spirit to return, or for God to send a "telegram from heaven," as for a corpse to rise. It is a mistake to think that the philosophic objections to miracles apply exclusively, or even with especial force, to *physical* miracles. They apply equally to *all* miracles. It is more difficult, of course, to determine the limits of natural possibility in the case of mind than in the case of matter; but when those limits are plainly transcended, as they are when the facts require the hypotheses of spirit-return and of telegrams from heaven to be entertained,[1] the philosophic objections against alleged psychical miracles are as strong as those against alleged physical miracles.[2] The half-hearted Rationalism, therefore, which accepts a spiritual, while denying a corporeal, resurrection, is as incapable as orthodoxy of removing the great stumbling-block of miracle, and is under the additional disadvantage of being forced to deal with the evidence in a thoroughly arbitrary way. It is obliged to interpret St. Paul as negativing a physical resurrection, which is difficult, and to reject summarily all the evidence but his.

Now, it is not maintained by candid apologists

[1] We assume, with the best authorities, that the theory of spirit-return, advocated by modern Spiritualists, is not proved.

[2] On this point we are in complete agreement with Schmiedel, *Encyclop. Biblica,* vol. iv. col. 4,077.

that all the Gospel evidence for the Resurrection is as weighty or as credible as that of St. Paul. The conclusion of St. Matthew, for example, has probably been retouched by the editor, and the appearance to the women (xxviii. 9), peculiar to the first Gospel, is perhaps entirely due to him. The conclusion of St. Mark also (xvi. 9-20), though canonical, is plainly of secondary authority.[1] St. Luke, however, and St. John are witnesses of the first importance,[2] and can be used with confidence.

St. Luke on St. Paul's Conversion.—The admission of the evidence of St. Luke at once throws fresh light upon the conversion of St. Paul. It appears from the Acts (1) that the risen Lord spoke at considerable length to St. Paul, and commanded him to preach to the Gentiles (see especially xxvi. 12 ff.); (2) that St. Paul became blind for three days; and (3) that Ananias received a revelation, informing him of St. Paul's conversion, and commissioning him to go and heal him. If these details are to be accepted—and coming, as they do, from an actual companion of the Apostle, it is impossible to doubt them—a natural explanation of the conversion becomes impossible. The conversion alone might be naturally explained, but the vision

[1] It seems in part dependent on canonical sources, which it epitomizes.

[2] The internal evidence that the "we-sections" of Acts were written by a companion of St. Paul has convinced even van Manen; and since the rest of the Acts and the Gospel of St. Luke are written in precisely the same style, the Lucan authorship of these books must be pronounced *certain*. See c. xviii.

of Ananias, which coincided with it, can only be regarded as a miracle.

St. Luke and St. John on the Resurrection Appearances.—St. Paul simply *mentions* the appearances of Jesus to the original disciples. St. Luke and St. John describe them in detail. Their evidence may be thus summarised:

(1) Jesus *spoke* at every manifestation, sometimes at considerable length. Numerous critics deny the credibility of this, on the ground that it contradicts St. Paul.[1] But Jesus spoke when He appeared to St. Paul, and this furnishes a presumption that He spoke when He appeared to others.[2]

(2) The grave was found empty[3] on the third day. This fact, which even Schenkel regarded

[1] Schmiedel says: "There is to be drawn from the various accounts one deduction which goes very deep: no words were heard from the risen Jesus" (*Encycl. Biblica*, iv. 4,063). So also Keim: "Paul, in mentioning the Resurrection appearances of Jesus, has determinedly excluded the speaking of Jesus" (*Jesus of Nazara*, vi. p. 290).

Considering that St. Paul *gives no details of any of the appearances*, the statements of Schmiedel and Keim must be pronounced misleading in the highest degree.

[2] It has now been proved by an induction extending over thousands of instances, that apparitions hardly ever speak, and, when they do, never more than two or three words. The conversations of the risen Jesus are therefore proof positive that He was not an apparition.

[3] The empty grave testifies to a real corporeal resurrection. That the disciples did not remove the body, is evident. If they had done so, they would not have believed the Resurrection. It is equally evident that the Jewish authorities did not do so; for in that case they would have testified to the fact, and perhaps have produced the body, when the Apostles began to preach the Resurrection.

as incontrovertible, has been denied by Strauss, Keim, Weizsäcker, and Schmiedel. But it is attested not only by Luke, but also by Mark (that is, by Peter), by Matthew, by John, by the Jews (Matt. xviii. 13), and apparently by Paul also, for that is the most natural conclusion to draw from the fact that he mentions the burial in close connection with the Resurrection (1 Cor. xv. 4). To deny a fact so amply attested is mere prejudice.

(3) The risen Jesus sought to dispel the idea which the Apostles at first entertained, that He was a disembodied spirit:

(*a*) By offering Himself to be handled, and by showing the wounds in His hands, feet, and side: "They were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they beheld a spirit. And He said unto them, . . . See My hands and My feet, that it is I myself: handle Me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye behold Me having" (Luke xxiv. 37 ff.)[1]; "He shewed unto them His hands and His side" (John xx. 20); "Reach hither thy finger, and see My hands; and reach hither thy hand, and put it into My side: and be not faithless, but believing" (John xx. 27).

(*b*) By eating before or with the Apostles: "They gave Him a piece of a broiled fish. And He took it, and did eat before them" (Luke xxiv. 42); "We

[1] *Cf.* the testimony of St. Ignatius, a disciple of St. John: "When He came to those who were with Peter, He said to them, 'Lay hold, handle Me, and see that I am not an incorporeal demon'" (*To the Smyrænans*, iii.).

did eat and drink with Him after He rose from the dead" (Acts x. 41, *cf.* i. 4, R.V. marg.; Mark xvi. 14).[1]

These statements have been questioned by critics on two grounds: (1) that they contradict St. Paul, and (2) that they imply the return of Jesus to a purely natural life. But they neither contradict St. Paul, who says nothing whatever about the character of the appearances, nor do they imply that Jesus returned to a purely natural life, for He ate, not as needing food, but to prove that His body was real.

Seeing, then, that these statements are made by one who himself handled the risen Lord, and saw Him handed (1 John i. 1, *cf.* Westcott's note), and by a conscientious historian whose information was derived from eye-witnesses (Luke i. 1-4), the handling and eating must be regarded as critically established.

(4) The body of the risen Lord was a spiritual body, no longer subject to the limitations of ordinary matter.[2] This was shown:

(*a*) By its suddenly appearing, suddenly vanishing, manifesting itself within a closed space, and ascending into heaven.[3]

[1] *Cf.* Ignatius: "And after His Resurrection He did eat and drink with them, as being possessed of flesh, although spiritually He was united to the Father" (*o.c.* iii.).

[2] If the Gospel narratives had been fictitious, they would have represented Jesus as rising with a purely natural body, for that was the Jewish expectation (Mark vi. 14; xii. 23).

[3] Ἄφαντος ἐγένετο, Luke xxiv. 31; ἔστη ἐν μέσῳ, Luke xxiv. 36, *cf.* John xx. 19, 26, where it is added that the doors were closed; διέστη ἀπ' αὐτῶν, Luke xxiv. 51; ἐπήρθη, Acts i. 9, *cf.* ἀνεφέρετο εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν, Luke xxiv. 51, R.V. text, not margin.

(*b*) By express statements that Jesus was glorified at His Resurrection: "All authority *was given Me* [ἐδόθη] in heaven and on earth" (Matt. xxviii. 18), the reference being to the Resurrection; "Ought not the Christ to have suffered these things, and *to have entered* into His glory?" (*οὐχὶ ἔδει παθεῖν καὶ εἰσελθεῖν*,[1] Luke xxiv. 26).

(*c*) Moreover, Jesus conferred the Holy Spirit on Easter evening (John xx. 23), which was not possible before He had been glorified (John vii. 39).

(5) Nevertheless the risen body was the *same body* which was crucified, as was shown by the empty tomb, and by the wound-prints which it still exhibited.

(6) It is evident, therefore, that the Evangelists believed that, at the Resurrection, the body of Jesus was transformed into a spiritual body, that the post-resurrection manifestations were made out of a state of heavenly glory already attained, and that their visible and tangible character was an *accommodation* to the needs of the disciples.

(7) It is implied by St. Luke and St. John that the Resurrection appearances were (*a*) numerous and (*b*) convincing. St. Luke speaks of "many proofs" (Acts i. 3), and St. John knows of "many other signs" which the risen Lord did in the presence of the disciples (John xx. 30).[2]

[1] The *παθεῖν* being past, the *εἰσελθεῖν εἰς τὴν δοξαν αὐτοῦ* is presumably past also.

[2] Baur is undoubtedly right in understanding these signs as signs worked *by the risen Lord* The context plainly requires this meaning.

Some critics object that the appearances cannot have been more than five, because only five are mentioned in 1 Cor. xv. 3 ff.[1] But this objection is capricious in the highest degree. All that can fairly be gathered from 1 Cor. xv. 3 ff. is that the five appearances there mentioned are typical ones about which St. Paul and the Twelve were in the habit of giving information to their converts. There is not a word to indicate that they were the only manifestations. St. Paul's list is clearly an *official* one. There is an appearance to Peter, the leading Apostle; then an official appearance to the Twelve; then an appearance to the five hundred—that is, to the Church at large; then an appearance to James, the Bishop of Jerusalem and leader of the Jewish Christians; then an appearance to "all the Apostles" —that is, to the chief officers of the Church; and lastly an appearance to St. Paul, the Apostle of the Gentiles. Clearly St. Paul is giving a carefully selected, not an exhaustive, list.

(8) The Gospels represent the appearances as taking place first at Jerusalem, then in Galilee, and then again at Jerusalem. There is nothing incredible in this representation. The fact that the first appearances were seen on the third day

[1] So Schmiedel, *Encycl. Biblica*, iv. 4,057. Similarly Keim: "The appearances were five, neither more nor less. It is above all evident that Paul supplies the complete list" (*Jesus of Nazara*, vi. p. 292). Weizsäcker also speaks of "the various Christophanies, arranged by Paul in so definite an order, and with such an evident intention of securing absolute completeness" (*Apostolic Age*, vol. i. p. 12).

almost necessitates the location of them in Jerusalem.[1] The subsequent transference of the manifestations to Galilee was appropriate, in view of the fact that most of our Lord's followers lived there. The return of the Apostles to Jerusalem for the final appearances was also suitable, seeing that they were to begin their work at Jerusalem. Notwithstanding this, numerous critics state dogmatically that St. Paul locates all the appearances in Galilee, and that therefore the Judæan appearances recorded in the Gospels are fictitious.[2] They argue that because the appearance to the five hundred, which St. Paul records, must presumably have taken place in Galilee, therefore *all* the appearances must have taken place in Galilee. It is not easy to conceive a more illogical argument.

Internal Evidence of Trustworthiness.—There are numerous features in the Gospel accounts of the post-resurrection period which bear the stamp of authenticity. Thus:

(1) The disciples were afraid when they first saw

[1] Galilee was a three days' journey from Jerusalem.

[2] So Strauss, Schenkel, Zeller, Keim, Weisse, Weizsäcker, Wernle, Schmiedel. Schmiedel says: "Galilee and Jerusalem were at first mutually exclusive." Keim says: "These appearances of Jesus took place, according to the plainest evidences, in Galilee, and not in Jerusalem." Wernle says: "The first [appearances] must have taken place, according to the oldest accounts, in Galilee." Weizsäcker says: "Now these two representations [of appearances in Jerusalem and appearances in Galilee] are irreconcilable." On the other hand, Renan, Holsten, and Hilgenfeld, among Rationalists, support the Judæan appearances.

Jesus, and thought that He was an apparition (Luke xxiv. 37).[1]

(2) Jesus was not always recognized at once (Luke xxiv. 16, 31; John xx. 14-6; xxi. 4-7; *cf.* Mark xvi. 12).[2]

(3) Again, the great depression of the disciples (Mark xvi. 10, *cf.* Luke xxiv. 21), the difficulty with which they were induced to believe (Luke xxiv. 11; Mark xvi. 11, 13, 14), and the obstinate doubts of some of them (Matt. xxviii. 17; John xx. 25, 27), being facts which a later generation would have regarded as discreditable, and therefore would not have invented, are decided indications of truthfulness.

(4) The fourth Gospel is particularly full of unobtrusive, but unmistakable, autoptic touches. How true to life, for instance, is the visit of the two Apostles to the tomb (John xx. 3-10), when John, the younger man, outruns Peter, but the latter, true to his energetic and impetuous nature, is the first to enter in! How well, too, the reflective character of John is brought out by making him the first to recognize the meaning of the empty grave-clothes; and what intimate knowledge of the state of belief among the Apostles is shown by the

[1] Their fear was natural under the circumstances, and harmonizes well with the similar fear expressed, Matthew xiv. 26.

[2] This fact, which is most unlikely to have been invented, shows that the disciples *were not expecting to see Jesus* when He appeared. The appearances, therefore, were not the effects of "expectant attention," as the apparitions in the Dordogne were

ninth verse: "For as yet they knew not the Scripture, that He must rise again from the dead"!

The Discrepancies.—It is true that some of the Gospel statements are difficult to harmonize, and that there are several apparent, and perhaps one or two real, discrepancies. St. Luke and St. John, for example, mention two angels: St. Matthew and St. Mark only one. According to the Synoptic Evangelists, the angels were seen by the women: according to St. John, by Mary Magdalene only. According to St. Luke and St. Matthew, news was brought by the women that the tomb was empty, and that Jesus had risen: according to St. Mark, "they said nothing to any one; for they were afraid":[1] according to St. John, news of the empty tomb (but not of the Resurrection) was brought by Mary Magdalene only.[2] The words of the angel announcing a Galilean appearance are given with substantial agreement by St. Matthew and St. Mark; but in St. Luke an important change is made. The word Galilee is retained, but the reference to a Galilean appearance is obliterated.[3]

[1] The conclusion of St. Mark being lost, we are unable to be sure that this is a real discrepancy. It is possible that after a time the women (or one of them) summoned sufficient courage to go and tell the disciples what they had seen and heard.

[2] There is, however, a hint contained in the use of the plural (οἴδαμεν, John xx. 2) that other women had been with Mary to the tomb.

[3] The explanation of this change probably is that St. Luke (for whatever reason) does not intend to narrate any Galilean appearances.

There is a further difficulty as to whether Jesus appeared first to Mary Magdalene alone (John xx. 11-7, *cf.* Mark xvi. 9), or to Mary Magdalene in company with "the other Mary" (Matt. xxviii. 9).[1]

These are all the discrepancies of any moment which can be plausibly alleged against the Gospel narratives.[2] They relate almost entirely to the proceedings of the women on the morning of the Resurrection, and are easily explained by the fact that the women were so much startled by the appearance of the angel (Matt. xxviii. 8; Mark xvi. 8; Luke xxiv. 5), that they were unable to give an entirely consistent account of their experiences (*cf.* Luke xxiv. 11).[3]

[1] This appearance to the two women (Matt. xxviii. 9) is, critically speaking, by far the most doubtful of the appearances. It is extremely difficult to harmonize with the representation in St. John xx. 11 ff., where Mary Magdalene, at her second visit to the tomb, has not yet seen Jesus (ver. 13). It is also most difficult to harmonize with the other Gospels, which speak of angelic appearances only as having been seen by the women. We are not prepared, therefore, to affirm positively that this appearance is authentic, and we are disposed to assign it, not to the original Matthew, but to the later editor.

[2] A much more formidable list of discrepancies is given by Mr. Macan, *The Resurrection*, p. 38 ff., and by Dr. Schmiedel, *Encyclop. Biblica*, iv. 4,041, who enumerates no less than twenty. If the harmonists have erred in finding too few discrepancies, Mr. Macan and Dr. Schmiedel have certainly erred in finding too many.

[3] Confused as the history undoubtedly is at this point, there is complete agreement as to the two important facts that the tomb was empty, and that an angel (or angels) appeared, announcing the Resurrection.

We claim, therefore, that since the discrepancies between the Gospels are not fundamental, and are less important than the points of agreement, they are insufficient to discredit the Gospel narratives taken as a whole.[1]

V.—Difficulties and Objections

Many objections to the Resurrection narratives have already been discussed, but a few still remain for consideration.

Objection I.—Christ's Resurrection is a type of ours (1 Cor. xv. 12-23, etc.), but since our resurrection is not the raising of the old body, but the clothing of the soul with a new and spiritual one (1 Cor. xv. 35-58), we are forbidden to think of Christ's Resurrection as an actual resuscitation of His natural body.

Reply.—The Resurrection of Christ was intended to serve *two* purposes:

(1) To furnish a type of the future resurrection of the righteous; (2) to furnish an unmistakable miraculous proof of the truth of Christianity.

The first purpose might have been fully attained by a purely spiritual Resurrection, the second not so fully. What was urgently needed to restore confidence in Christ and His teaching after His

[1] Dr. G. P. Fisher, in his *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*, gives some interesting illustrations of the extraordinary contradictions which are found in independent accounts of the same event by different persons, and even by the same person at different times (Revised Edition, pp. 413-20).

ignominious death, was a palpable and undeniable miracle. Such a miracle was the physical Resurrection.[1]

Objection II.—St. Paul says (1 Cor. xv. 50) that "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." He cannot therefore have believed in the corporeal Resurrection and Ascension of Jesus.

Reply.—St. Paul means that flesh and blood *in their natural and unglorified condition* cannot inherit the kingdom of God (see verses 51-4). But the body of Jesus was changed at the moment of resurrection into *a spiritual and glorious body* (see sect. iv. 4-6),[2] so that no contradiction arises.

VI.—Summary of the Historical Evidence

It has now been shown—

(1) That the death of Jesus was followed, on the third and subsequent days, by striking appearances, which convinced the Apostles that He had risen from the dead.

[1] A "spiritual resurrection," or mere manifestation of Christ's spirit to the disciples, would not have had the same evidential value as have the empty tomb, the handling, and the eating, which cannot possibly be explained except as miracles.

[2] That the body of Jesus was glorified at the Resurrection and not at the Ascension is the ancient traditional view (St. Augustine, St. Leo, St. Gregory, Albertus Magnus, St. Thomas Aquinas), as well as that of modern criticism. There is no scriptural or patristic authority for the view common in the Presbyterian Churches that Jesus rose for forty days to a purely natural life, or for the popular Anglican theory that the forty days were a period of progressive glorification.

(2) That the Apostles were not asleep, or in trance, but awake, when they saw Jesus.[1]

(3) That the visions cannot be satisfactorily explained as generated by ideas or expectations present in the minds of the Apostles.

(4) That on this account, and also on account of their numerous, persistent, and collective character, they cannot be regarded as mere subjective visions or hallucinations.

(5) That the lowest view that can plausibly be taken of them is that they were real manifestations of the glorified spirit of Jesus to the disciples.

(6) That the facts, taken as a whole, point to more than this. The empty tomb, the handling of the risen body, and the eating with the disciples—all facts well attested—cannot possibly be explained on any other theory than the traditional one of a physical resurrection. This theory, therefore, which explains the whole of the facts, must be preferred to the other, which does not.

[1] St. Paul draws a clear line (2 Cor. xii. 1-10) between ecstasy or trance, and the waking state. That the vision at Damascus was seen in the waking state is shown by the fact that he continually described it (Acts xxii. 5, xxvi. 12; Gal. i. 11 ff.); whereas he never described the "visions and revelations" vouchsafed to him in trance (2 Cor. xii. 4); also by his use of the unambiguous word ἑώρακα (1 Cor. ix. 1) in addition to ὤφθη (1 Cor. xv. 8), and οὐράνιος ὀπτασία (Acts xxvi. 19), which, taken alone, might be consistent with a trance vision.

The waking character of the visions seen by the other Apostles is, of course, beyond question.

VII.—The Moral Evidence

The historical evidence for the Resurrection is strong, but the moral evidence is still stronger. The Resurrection, if it is true, solves the question which affects the whole human race more than any other. The problem of immortality is one which in our day clamours for solution. It was shown in cc. xiv. and xv. that unless there is a future life, there is no rational basis for any morality higher than pure Hedonism, or for any religion which regards the Deity as morally perfect. And yet this very question of a future life is encompassed with difficulties which modern philosophy and science have done nothing to remove, and have, perhaps, even increased. If, therefore, the miraculous intervention of God in the affairs of the world is credible at all—and we have shown that it is—His miraculous intervention to solve this particular problem is more credible than His intervention for any other purpose. The moral evidence, therefore, for the Resurrection is not only stronger than that for any other miracle,[1] but is the strongest that we can conceive. Upon this combination, therefore, of strong historical and strong moral evidence, we accept the Resurrection as a fact.

[1] It is stronger than the moral evidence for the raising of Lazarus, of the widow's son, and of Jairus's daughter, because these were raised to a purely natural life, and died again, whereas Jesus was raised to an *immortal* life—"Christ being raised from the dead dieth no more; death hath no more dominion over Him" (Rom. vi. 9).

VIII.—The Resurrection and the Person of Christ

The Resurrection does not *directly* prove that Jesus is the Son of God, for He might, though a mere man, have been raised to life again; but it proves it *indirectly*, because it sets the stamp of Divine approval upon His teaching, part of which was His own Divine Sonship. St. Paul, therefore, is perfectly justified in saying that Jesus was "declared to be the Son of God with power, according to the spirit of holiness, by the resurrection of the dead" (Rom. i. 4).[1]

APPENDIX I

LIST OF THE RESURRECTION APPEARANCES

(*a*) *In Judæa.*

(1) To St. Mary Magdalene alone (Mark xvi. 9; John xx. 16).

(2) To St. Mary Magdalene and the other Mary (Matt. xxviii. 9).

(3) To Cleopas and another, journeying to Emmaus (Luke xxiv. 13).

(4) To St. Peter (Luke xxiv. 34; 1 Cor. xv. 5).

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[1] Mr. Macan admits the cogency of this reasoning. "If the Resurrection," he says, "be an historical event, it must apparently affect essentially our conception of the historical person of Christ. 'In His death He assured us of His humanity, by His Resurrection He demonstrated His divinity.' None of the other events or miracles of His life raised Him so conspicuously above the level of mortality, and the analogy of what had been granted to men before" (*The Resurrection*, p. 7).

(5) To the Apostles without St. Thomas (John xx. 19; Luke xxiv. 36; probably also 1 Cor. xv. 5).

(6) To the Apostles with St. Thomas (John xx. 26).

(*b*) *In Galilee.*

(7) To SS. Peter, Thomas, Bartholomew (Nathanael), James, John, and two others, at the Lake of Galilee (John xxi.).

(8) On a mountain in Galilee to the eleven disciples (Matt. xxviii. 16); with which is possibly to be identified.

(9) The appearance to above five hundred brethren at once (1 Cor. xv. 6).

(10) The appearance to St. James (1 Cor. xv. 7).

(*c*) *In Judæa again.*

(11) The appearance to the Apostles on the occasion of the Ascension (Acts i. 4-12; Mark xvi. 19; probably also Luke xxiv. 50;[1] and 1 Cor. xv. 7).

(*d*) *Near Damascus.*

(12) The appearance to St. Paul (Acts ix. 3; xxii. 6; xxvi. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 8; Gal. i. 15).

APPENDIX II

RATIONALISTIC THEORIES OF THE RESURRECTION

The most important of these theories have been already discussed. We add here a complete list.

(1) *The Theory of Fraud.*—The disciples stole the body, and pretended that Jesus had risen (Matt. xxviii. 13-5; St. Justin, *Apology*, cviii.; Tertullian, *Apologeticus*, xxi., *cf.* Origen, *Against Celsus*, ii. 56; the heathen *Acts of Pilate*; the mediæval Jewish *Toledoth Jeshua*; Reimarus, 1694-1767).

In our day even Rationalists reject this theory as "repellent and disgraceful" (Keim). It is acknowledged on all hands

[1] It is not *certain* that this passage describes the Ascension. See ver. 51, R.V. marg.

that so pure an ethical movement as Christianity cannot have originated in fraud.

(2) *The Theory of the Natural Disappearance of the Body.*—The body is supposed to have been removed by some person or persons unknown (*e.g.* the gardener, unknown Galilean disciples, Mary Magdalene, the Sanhedrim, Pilate, etc.). But these unknown persons would either have produced the body, or at least have explained that they had removed it, as soon as the Apostles began to proclaim the Resurrection (see above, sect iv.).

(3) *The Theory of Apparent Death.*—Jesus did not die upon the cross, but fainted, and afterwards revived (Bahrdt, Paulus, Venturini, Schleiermacher, Bunsen, Hase, and many others). This theory is nearly, if not quite, obsolete. Strauss (1864) said of it: "A man half-dead, dragging Himself in languor and exhaustion out of His tomb, with wounds requiring careful and continuous medical treatment—could He, in such a state, have produced upon the minds of the disciples the impression that He was victor over death and the grave, the Prince of Life—an impression which nevertheless was the source and spring of all their subsequent activity?"

(4) *The Reflection Hypothesis.*—After the death of Jesus, His disciples studied the Scriptures, and becoming convinced that His resurrection was foretold by the prophets, began to see visions of Him. This view, originally suggested by Strauss, was afterwards abandoned by him, and is now recognized on all hands as inadequate. "Visions," says Dr. Schmiedel, "do not arise by processes so gradual or so placid."

(5) *The Hypothesis of Subjective Visions or Hallucinations.*—(First in Celsus [A.D. 170]: "Who beheld the risen Jesus? A half-frantic woman, as you state, and some other person, perhaps, of those who were engaged in the same system of delusion, who had either dreamed so, owing to a peculiar state of mind, or, under the influence of a wandering imagination, had formed to himself an appearance according to his

own wishes, which has been the case with numberless individuals," Origen, *Against Celsus*, ii. 55. *Cf.* Renan, *Life of Jesus*, xxvi.: "The strong imagination of Mary Magdalene played an important part in this circumstance. Divine power of love! Sacred moments in which the passion of one possessed gave to the world a resuscitated God!")

This theory has already been sufficiently discussed.

(6) *The Theory of Objective Visions, or of a Spiritual Resurrection.*—After death, the immortal and glorified spirit of Jesus was allowed to manifest itself to the disciples.

This theory has already been considered at length, and shewn to be inadequate.

(7) *The Mythical Theory.*—The Resurrection appearances recorded by the Evangelists and by St. Paul are all fictitious, and therefore there are no facts to explain (Martineau, *Seat of Authority*, p. 363 ff.). This view can only be consistently adopted by those who reject not merely the Gospels, but even the Pauline Epistles. It is altogether preposterous.

APPENDIX III

THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY[1]

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body, upon which the historical Church has always laid much stress, encountered in early times great opposition[2] from those Greek philosophers

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[1] The reader is reminded that "matter" is probably not a distinct substance, but a thought or idea in the Divine Mind (see c. vi.).

[2] The opposition of the philosophers was partly due to the unphilosophical form in which the doctrine of the resurrection of the body was sometimes presented. It was not infrequently asserted that the very particles of matter which were laid in the grave would rise again. This, of course, is contrary to the New Testament. St. Paul teaches that at the Resurrection the soul will be clothed with a new and glorious body, suited to its new environment.

who adopted from Plato the Oriental belief (or prejudice) that matter is essentially evil, and that the body is the prison-house of the soul. The Platonic view is not entirely obsolete even now, and therefore it may be advisable to state briefly some of the philosophical reasons for preferring the Christian doctrine of the resurrection of the body to the Platonic one of the immortality of the soul alone.

(1) Matter is not evil, as Plato asserted, but destitute of moral character. It is an *instrument*, and, as such, can be used for good or evil ends, with equal facility. The same knife which a physician uses to excise a tumour may be used by an assassin to commit a murder.

(2) Matter possesses an intrinsic excellence of its own. It has reached its present perfection as the result of many ages of cosmical development, and therefore it is probable, on the hypothesis that there is a final goal to which the whole creation moves, that matter as well as spirit will be ultimately perfected and glorified (*cf.* Rom. viii. 18-25; 2 Pet. iii. 13; Rev. xxi. 1).

(3) Matter (in the form of a brain and nervous system) is necessary to the soul for the exercise of its powers. Without the brain, not a single function of the soul can be performed. But if a body is thus indispensably necessary to the soul in this present life, there is an obvious presumption—not, of course, a strong one, but still a presumption—that a body of some kind will also be necessary in the world to come.[1]

(4) In other respects, also, matter ministers to the needs of the soul. Thinking, for example, is carried on entirely by means of material symbols. Language, the most important of these, consists of material vibrations. Writing, another important aid to thought, consists of particles of matter arranged in particular ways. Even the most abstract branches

[1] The kind of body that will be required is, as St. Paul says, a *spiritual* one—*i.e.* a perfect organ and visible expression of a glorified and perfected spirit.

of mathematics require the use of written formulæ. Again, the arts of painting, sculpture, architecture, and music, which aim at satisfying the soul's aspirations for the beautiful and the true, are forced to embody their ideals in material forms. So completely "material" are all our categories of thought, that we cannot even think of *God*, whom we know to be immaterial, except as a majestic human figure seated on a throne. This, then, being the constitution of the human mind, it is more natural to suppose that in the future life we shall possess bodies, and be surrounded by a "material" environment of some kind, than that we shall not. Unless hereafter we possess bodies, it is difficult to understand how we shall even recognize one another; and unless there are beautiful objects, it is difficult to understand how the soul will enjoy, as Plato says it will, the contemplation of perfect beauty for ever.

APPENDIX IV

THE ASCENSION

Doubts have been expressed as to the historic truth of the Ascension, owing to the fact that there is no certain allusion to it in the Synoptic Gospels,[1] and that the Epistles nowhere speak of it as an event distinct from the Resurrection.

The scantiness of allusions to the Ascension as a distinct event is admitted, but a satisfactory explanation can be offered. *The Ascension brought about no change in the condition of Jesus.* Jesus was glorified at the Resurrection, not at the Ascension, and the event on the fortieth day, which we call the Ascension, was His final farewell to the Apostles, not His entry for the first time into glory. The Apostles seldom separated in thought our Lord's Ascension from His Resurrection. They believed

[1] The allusion in St. Mark is no part of the original Gospel, and the apparent allusion in Luke xxiv. 51 is absent from the Western text, and is regarded by Westcott and Hort as untrustworthy.

that immediately after His Resurrection He ascended into heaven, and there remained during the whole of the forty days, descending to earth for occasional interviews with the Apostles, and ascending to heaven immediately afterwards. On the fortieth day He bade the Apostles farewell, and on this occasion ascended visibly, that He might give them a sensible proof of His exaltation to the right hand of God.[1]

APPENDIX V

OUR LORD'S BIRTH OF A VIRGIN

To those who disbelieve the other Gospel miracles, the miracle of Christ's conception (Matt. i.; Luke i., ii.) is of course incredible. To those, however, who believe them, it presents, or ought to present, no special difficulty. We will consider first of all *the appropriateness* of the miracle, and secondly *the evidence* for it.

The Appropriateness of the Miracle

(1) Natural conception produces natural personality. But the personality of Jesus was not natural. Jesus was, on the assumption that Christianity is true, both God and man. Since, then, His incarnate personality was supernatural, it was

[1] This view of the Ascension, which fully explains the paucity of references to it in the New Testament, was advocated, among older writers, by Whitby and Whiston, and has been defended in more recent times by Baur, Kinkel, Rothe, Milligan, Westcott, Harnack, and Schmiedel. Milligan says: "The glorification of Jesus began at His Resurrection, not at His Ascension. . . . He revealed Himself out of a hidden glory into which He had passed; and this glory could only be the glory of His eternal state, not waiting to be begun, but begun already." For the other view, see Denney, "Ascension" (in Hastings' *Bible Dictionary*).

fitting that it should be brought into existence by a supernatural act. So closely does the idea of His supernatural conception cohere with that of His supernatural Personality, that few in our day who abandon belief in the former are able to retain faith in the latter.

(2) Natural conception produces in all cases a nature which is sinful and imperfect. It was appropriate, therefore, that a sinless and perfect nature should be originated by a *supernatural* conception.

(3) According to the sentiment of most nations, conception by a virgin mother is altogether a more *reverent* manner of effecting the Incarnation than the intercourse of husband and wife.[1]

The Evidence for the Miracle

(1) The most important evidence for the Virgin Birth is the Gospel according to St. Luke. St. Luke had visited Palestine at a time when authentic details were still procurable (Acts xxiii. 33, xxiv. 27); and, being a historian in the full sense of the term, made full use of his opportunities (Luke i. 3).

(2) St. Luke's narrative contains every indication that it proceeds—perhaps directly—from the Virgin herself. This is evident, not only from the intimate and private nature of the details described, but also from the words of the Evangelist in ii. 19, 51: "Mary kept all these sayings [*or* things], pondering them in her heart. . . . His mother kept all these sayings [*or* things] in her heart."

(3) St. Luke's narrative makes a decidedly favourable impression upon the reader, partly on account of its commendable delicacy and reticence, and still more on account of the absence from it of tasteless and unnecessary miracles. The inquirer who doubts its truth should read the birth-stories in

[1] See a striking passage in Lecky's *History of European Morals*, vol. i. pp. 103-9.

the apocryphal Gospels. These are *really* legendary, and, being so, are full of coarse details and senseless marvels.[1]

(4) Since we do not know the exact origin of St. Matthew's account, we cannot regard it as equal in authority to that of St. Luke, nevertheless it is an important secondary authority. It is ancient, clearly Jewish in origin, and comparatively free from features which can be reasonably regarded as legendary embellishments.

(5) St. Matthew's account, since it regards the Nativity exclusively from Joseph's point of view, must (if authentic) be ultimately based on Joseph's testimony, but it is probable that Joseph's narrative had passed through several hands before it reached the Evangelist.

(6) The two narratives are quite independent, and contain several apparent discrepancies; but they entirely confirm one another upon the two most important facts—viz. (1) that Jesus was born at Bethlehem, and (2) that He was supernaturally conceived.

Objections to the Miracle

Objection I.—The miracle of the Virgin Birth was not

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[1] For example, in the *Protevangelium of James*, one of the most respectable of the apocryphal Gospels, Joseph is selected as the husband of Mary by the miracle of a dove flying out of his rod, and alighting upon his head (9). Mary proves her chastity publicly by undergoing "the trial of jealousy" (Num. v. 11) unharmed. When Jesus is born, a luminous cloud overshadows the cave of the Nativity, the heavens cease to revolve, flying birds remain suspended in the air, and the motion of every living creature is arrested (18). The child is born *clauso utero, salvâ integritate corporis virginalis. Obstetrix, quæ supervenit post partum, non prius credit virginem peperisse, quam virginitatis indicia integra tactu probaverit.* The hand of the unbelieving midwife falls off, but is restored as she touches the Holy Child (19, 20). According to *Pseudo-Matthew*, 23, the ox and the ass incessantly adored the new-born Saviour, etc.

contained in the original preaching of the Apostles. Two of the Gospels, and all the Epistles, are silent about it.

Reply.—It is probable that, out of regard to the reputation of the mother of Jesus, the facts about His birth were not made public until some time after her death. It is also possible that for a considerable period after the Ascension the true origin of Jesus was unknown even to the Apostles. Joseph being dead, Mary was the only living witness to the facts, and she would naturally be loth to disclose them, until there was a real necessity to do so. This necessity would only arise when theological speculation about the Person of Jesus had become active, and when Christians began to inquire how He who had left this world in so wonderful a way had originally entered it. Silence could then no longer be kept without imperilling the Christian faith.[1]

The absence of the miracle from the earliest apostolic preaching—and therefore from St. Mark's Gospel—is easily explained. The Apostles preached mainly what they had themselves heard and seen—that is, the events from Christ's Baptism to His Ascension. Its absence from St. Paul's epistles needs no explanation,[2] as the Apostle mentions very few of the events of our Lord's life.

Objection II.—The supernatural conception is plainly a legend of Pagan origin, and may be compared with the alleged intercourse of the Greek and Roman gods with mortal women.

Reply.—Both forms of the birth story originated in Jewish circles, and therefore this explanation is impossible.

Objection III.—There are still closer heathen analogies in the supernatural birth of Perseus, and of Buddha.

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[1] It is important to observe that as soon as the fact of the Virgin Birth became known, it was regarded as of fundamental importance. It was contained in the oldest form of the Apostles' Creed, which cannot be dated later than about A.D. 100. This is clear from Ignatius, *To the Smyrnæans*, i., ii. (A.D. 110); and also from Aristides, *Apology* (A.D. 131).

[2] Possibly he alludes to it in Galatians iv. 4.

Reply.—It is uncritical to compare a mere legend like that of Perseus with a well-attested narrative like that of St. Luke. As to the birth of Buddha, the analogy is not close, for though his conception is said to have been miraculous, his mother was not a virgin.

Objection IV.—The story of the Virgin Birth was invented as a fulfilment of Isaiah vii. 14 (LXX.), where *'almah*, young woman, is wrongly translated παρθένος, virgin.

Reply.—(1) The story originated in Jewish circles, where such a misinterpretation would have been unlikely.

(2) In St. Luke there is no allusion to the fulfilment of prophecy, and even in St. Matthew, where the prophecy is quoted, the stress is laid not on the word παρθένος, virgin, but on the word *Emmanuel*, God with us, which is regarded as a prophetic anticipation of the Holy Name of Jesus.

Objection V.—The genealogies, which are traced through Joseph both in St. Matthew and in St. Luke, show that Joseph was originally regarded as the true father of Jesus.

Reply.—It is possible that this is the case, and that these genealogies were compiled before the Virgin Birth became known, but it is not necessary to suppose this, for—

(1) Joseph was at any rate the *legal* father of Jesus, and an official genealogy would necessarily trace the ancestry of Jesus through him.[1]

(2) Owing to the fact that the Jews paid no regard to descent through the female line, it was only through *Joseph* that the claim of Jesus to the throne of David could be made out.

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[1] Belief in the inspiration of the Gospels does not necessitate belief in the trustworthiness of the genealogies. These are *bonâ fide* attempts by Jewish genealogists to trace the acknowledged Davidic ancestry of Jesus; but to claim more for them than this, is not wise. The apologist, as such, is not interested in the various attempts that have been made to harmonize the two genealogies.

(3) The Jews regarded marriage exclusively from the *husband's* point of view, and therefore it is probable that Joseph was considered by them (even when the truth about the Virgin Birth was known) as the *real* as well as the legal father of Jesus. He was considered the real father, because it was *for his sake*, and as a *special mark of divine favour to him*, that his wife bore him a son in this remarkable way.

Objection VI.—It is stated in the *Sinai-Syriac* text of Matt. i. 16 (published in 1894) that *Joseph begat Jesus*, and this reading is confirmed by the *Dialogue of Timothy and Aquila* (published by Mr. F. C. Conybeare in 1898). Joseph, therefore, was the true father of Jesus.[1]

Reply.—Even if the Sinai-Syriac reading were correct, it would only prove that *the genealogy quoted by St. Matthew* regarded Joseph as the true father of Jesus. This would simply shew that the genealogy was compiled before the fact of the Virgin Birth was generally known.[2]

But the Sinai-Syriac reading is certainly *not* correct. The ordinary reading, supported, as it is, by every known manuscript, and by practically every known version, must be pronounced, if the matter is to be decided by evidence, unquestionably original. The only problem is, how the peculiar Sinai-Syriac reading is to be accounted for.

Probably it is a case of heretical corruption of the text. The Ebionites and certain other early heretics (Cerinthus, Carpocrates, Symmachus, etc.) believed that Jesus was a mere man, and in consequence denied His miraculous conception (see Justin, *Dialogue*, xlviii. ; Epiphanius, *Panarion*, xxx. 14 ;

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[1] The Sinai-Syriac reads: "Jacob begat Joseph. Joseph, to whom was espoused the Virgin Mary, begat Jesus who is called Christ."

The Dialogue reads: "Jacob begat Joseph the husband of Mary, of whom was born (ἐξ ἧς ἐγεννήθη) Jesus who is called Christ. And Joseph begat Jesus who is called Christ."

[2] It is clear from vv. 18, 25, that the evangelist did not regard Joseph as the father of Jesus.

Eusebius, *Eccl. Hist.* vi. 17). They, therefore, after the usual manner of heretics (Marcion, for example), tampered with the text of the Gospels, to bring it into accordance with their views.

Others suppose that some careless scribe, who had already written the formula "A begat B" thirty-nine times, wrote mechanically "Joseph begat Jesus," without observing his mistake. Such mechanical errors are common in manuscripts.

Objection VII.—Joseph's suspicion of his wife's chastity (Matt. i. 19) was fully justified. Jesus was the natural son of Mary and some other man.[1]

Reply.—This theory is a baseless Jewish slander (see below), the credulous acceptance of which by Professor Haeckel (*Riddle of the Universe*, c. xvii.) and other modern Rationalists evinces a complete absence of the critical faculty. The best rationalist opinion (Keim, Schmiedel, Usener, etc.) decidedly rejects it. Keim says: "No moral taint can have attached to the house. No calumny was ever forged against Jesus from this side. . . . There is not the shade of a suspicion that the house came short in any way in respect of civil virtues, or an Israelite's religious reputation" (*Jesus of Nazara*, ii. 31).

Dr. Rendel Harris has recently shown that the name of the Virgin's supposed paramour (variously written Panthera,

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[1] This calumny is first found in Celsus (A.D. 170), who places it in the mouth of a Jew. "When Mary was pregnant, she was turned out of doors by the carpenter to whom she had been betrothed, as having been guilty of adultery, and she bore a child to a certain soldier named Panthera" (Origen, *Against Celsus*, i. 32). The Talmud represents Mary, the curler of women's hair, as unfaithful to her husband Stadas. She has an intrigue with Panderas Pappus, the son of Judas: their offspring is Jesus. A similar story is found in the mediæval Jewish book *Toledoth Jeshua* (see Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*, ii. 77). Among modern supporters of this view are Venturini, Tolstoi, and Haeckel.

Pantheras, Pandera, Panderas, Pappos, etc.) is simply an anagram of the Greek word *parthenos*, virgin.

LITERATURE

(*a*) A Corporeal Resurrection

See the discussion above, p. xliv. ff.; W. J. S. Simpson, *The Resurrection and Modern Thought*, and *Our Lord's Resurrection*; T. J. Thorburn, *Resurrection Narratives and Modern Criticism* (reply to Schmiedel); Mangenot, *La Résurrection de Jésus* (reply to Loisy); Le Breton, *La Résurrection de Jésus*; J. Orr, *Resurrection of Jesus*; G. Milligan, *The Resurrection*, and *The Ascension*; Westcott, *Gospel of the Resurrection*; H. B. Swete, *The Appearances of our Lord after the Passion*; Knowling, *Witness of the Epistles*; Bruce, *Apologetics*; Godet, *Defence of the Christian Faith*; J. Kennedy, *The Resurrection of Jesus Christ*; F. Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*; C. H. Robinson, *Studies in the Resurrection*; Hyslop, *Psychical Research and the Resurrection* (*cf.* also J. H. Skrine, *Miracle and History*).

(*b*) A Spiritual Resurrection

K. Lake, *The Historical Evidence for the Resurrection of Jesus*; B. H. Streeter in *Foundations*; F. Loofs, *Die Auferstehungsberichte*; Keim, *Jesus of Nazara*; Weizsäcker, *Apostolic Age*; E. A. Abbott, *The Kernel and the Husk*.

(*c*) Purely Negative

Arnold Meyer, *The Resurrection* (tr.); P. W. Schmiedel, "Resurrection and Ascension Narratives" in *Encycl. Bibl.*; R. W. Macan, *The Resurrection*; A Loisy, *L'Évangile et l'Église* and *Les Évangiles Synoptiques*; Martineau, *Seat of Authority*.

(*d*) The Virgin Birth

T. J. Thorburn, *A Critical Examination of the Evidence for the Virgin Birth*; J. Orr, *The Virgin Birth*; B. W. Randolph, *The Virgin Birth of our Lord*; R. J. Knowling, *Our Lord's Virgin Birth*; C. Gore, *Dissertations*; Ramsay, *Was Christ Born in Bethlehem?*; Sanday, art. "Jesus Christ" in *H.D.B.*; R. H. Grutzmächer, *Die Jungfrauengebürt* (regards it as possibly true); W. Soltau, *Birth of Jesus*; P. Lobstein, *The Virgin Birth* (negative); P. W. Schmiedel, arts. "Nativity" and "Mary" in *E.B.* (do.). (For the present state of the question, see particularly p. xxxv. ff. above.)

CHAPTER XXIII

THE INFLUENCE OF JESUS UPON THE WORLD

SUMMARY.—The unparalleled influence Jesus upon men of all races for the last two thousand years constitutes a strong evidence of the truth of His teaching, and of the Divinity of His Person.

THE last question that we have to consider is whether the influence of Jesus upon the history of the world, and especially upon its moral development, has been such as to countenance the idea that He was a supernatural Person, and the author of a genuinely supernatural Religion.

I.—MORAL PROGRESS UNDER CHRISTIANITY

Abolition of Slavery.—When Christianity first appeared in the world, the majority of the population of Europe were slaves. Not only domestic and agricultural work, but trade and commerce, manufactures, and even the learned professions, were mainly carried on by slaves for the benefit of their masters. "The youths of a promising genius," says Gibbon, "were instructed in the arts and sciences, and their price was ascertained by the degree of their skill and talents. Almost every profession, either liberal or mechanical, might be

found in the household of an opulent senator. A learned slave sold for many hundred pounds sterling. Atticus always bred and taught them himself. Many of the Roman physicians were slaves."

A few persons, such as the kind-hearted Plutarch, and some Stoic philosophers, extended to slaves a certain degree of humane consideration, but the prevailing sentiment was widely different. Juvenal speaks of Roman matrons crucifying their slaves out of pure caprice, and causing them to be flogged almost to death in their very presence (*Sat.* vi. 218 ff., 479 ff.). Suetonius alludes to the practice of exposing sick or useless slaves on an island in the Tiber to perish (*Claudius*, xv.). A young slave of Vedius Pollio accidentally broke a crystal vase at a banquet, and his master "commanded him to be carried away and punished with no common death; for he ordered him to be thrown to his lampreys, which he kept, of great size, in a fishpond." Augustus, however, who was present, interceded successfully for the slave (Seneca, *De Ira*, iii. 40). When Pedanius Secundus, prefect of Rome, was killed by a slave, the senate commanded the whole of the household slaves, six hundred in number, to be promiscuously slaughtered, without distinction of age, sex, or innocence (Tacitus, *Annals*, xiv. 42-5). Slave door-porters were chained to the door (Suetonius, *Rhet.* iii.). Slaves were frequently branded upon the face and otherwise brutally maltreated (Plutarch, *Nicias, ad fin.*, etc.). So

universally did the institution of slavery prevail that it was regarded as part of the law of nature. The humane and enlightened Aristotle said: "It is clear, then, that some men are free by nature, and that others are slaves, and that in the case of the latter the condition of slavery is both advantageous and just" (*Politics*, i. 5). Similarly Gaius, the Roman jurist, says: "Slaves are in the power of their masters, a power recognized by the law of nations, for all nations present the spectacle of masters invested with the power of life and death over slaves; and by the Roman law the owner is entitled to everything acquired by the slave" (*Institutes*, i. 52).

Almost the whole credit of undermining and of finally overthrowing this inhuman institution belongs to Christianity.[1] Three stages of the process may be distinguished. In the first the Church contented itself with enforcing the duty of mutual love between masters and slaves. "Let the master love his servant, though he be his superior: let him consider wherein they are equal, even as he is a man. . . . Let a master who has a believing servant love him as a son or a brother" (*Apostolic Constitutions*, bk. iv. 12).[2] "The Bishop ought to

[1] The Stoic emperors introduced a few reforms, but they were not enforced, and produced little effect. As a matter of fact, many leading Stoics (Cato the elder, Cassius who advocated the execution of the slaves of Pedanius Secundus, and Vedius Pollio) were exceptionally inhuman to slaves. The Stoic Ulpian speaks of "a slave, or any other animal."

[2] The bulk of the *Apostolic Constitutions* dates from the third century.

know whose oblations he ought to receive, and whose he ought not. He is to avoid . . . those that oppress the widow and overreach the orphan, and fill prisons with the innocent, and abuse their own servants wickedly, I mean with stripes, and hunger, and hard service. Do thou, O Bishop avoid such as these, and their *odious oblations*" (iv. 6). "Let the faithful person, whether man or woman, treat servants kindly" (viii. 32). "Let the slaves work five days; but on the Sabbath day [Saturday], and the Lord's day, let them have leisure to go to Church for instruction in piety. Let slaves rest from their work all Holy week and Easter week," and at the other holy seasons (viii. 33).[1]

The second stage, that of emancipation, began with the conversion and triumph of Constantine (A.D. 312). "In A.D. 312 a law was passed declaring the poisoning of a slave, or the tearing his body with the nails of a wild beast, or branding him,

[1] As early as the time of Ignatius (A.D. 110), slaves were ransomed with the alms of the Church, though this could not be demanded as a right (Ignatius, *To Polycarp*, iv.). Aristides (*c.* A.D. 131) says: "Slaves, male and female, are instructed so that they become Christians, on account of the love felt for them by their masters, and when this takes place, they call them brethren without any distinction" (*Apology*, xv.). Lactantius (*c.* A.D. 310) says: "Slaves are not slaves to us. We deem and term them brothers after the spirit" (*Institutes*, v. 16). Several saints and martyrs (Felicitas, Blandina, etc.) were slaves. Pius I. (A.D. 143—157), and Calixtus I. (A.D. 219—223), bishops of Rome, were either slaves or freedmen. According to de Rossi, the title "slave" never occurs on a Christian monument. (See further, Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*, i. 207 ff.).

to be homicide. In 314 liberty was declared a right which could not be taken away: sixty years of captivity could not take from the free-born the right of demanding liberty. In 316 Constantine writes to an archbishop: 'It has pleased me for a long time to establish that in the Christian Church masters can give liberty to their slaves, provided that they do it in presence of all the assembled people, and with the assistance of the Christian priests.'"[1] Subsequent Christian emperors followed Constantine's noble example. Theodosius (379—395) forbade the division of families. "Who can bear," said he, "to see children separated from their parents, brothers from sisters, wives from husbands?" Justinian (527-565) declared that it was his will "to have our republic frequented by freemen rather than liberated slaves."

The third stage, that of regarding slavery as absolutely unlawful, began to be reached in the ninth century. The first to affirm the new principle in express language was St. Theodore of Stude: "Thou shalt possess no slave, neither for domestic service, nor for the work of the fields; for man is made in the image of God." From the ninth century the opinion that slavery is contrary to the divine law gradually won acceptance, and slavery in consequence became extinct in most Christian countries.

Abolition of Cruel Customs.—It was the custom of all classes in the ancient world to kill or expose

[1] Brace, *Gesta Christi*, pp. 53, 54.

their newborn children,[1] especially girls, and the custom was seldom reprobated. Quintilian said bitterly that "to kill a man is often held to be a crime, but to kill one's own children is sometimes considered a beautiful action among the Romans."

The Church consistently opposed the practice, which it regarded with unmitigated horror. St. Justin says: "But as for us, we have been taught that to expose newborn children is the part of wicked men; first, because we see that almost all so exposed (not only the girls, but also the boys) are brought up to prostitution; and also lest some of them be not picked up, but die, and we become murderers" (1 *Apol.* c. xxvii., xxix.). Many of the exposed infants were rescued and brought up by the Christians, and from the fourth century there were foundling hospitals in most dioceses. Constantine, in A.D. 315 and 321, attempted to put an end to all forms of infanticide by enacting that parents who were too poor to support their children might apply for assistance to the treasury. This plan was found after a time to be unworkable; but Constantine and his Christian successors did not on that account remit their exertions to save from death as many children as possible.

Another barbarous institution was that of gladiatorial games. Combats of gladiators, first intro-

[1] The practice of procuring abortion was also prevalent. It is condemned in the earliest Christian manual for catechumens, *The Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* (A.D. 100): "Thou shalt not kill a child by abortion, neither shalt thou slay it when born" (ii.).

duced at Rome in the year 262 B.C., soon became popular, and created an almost insane thirst for blood. Julius Cæsar, in his ædileship, exhibited 320 couples of gladiators.[1] Titus opened the Colosseum[2] with a gladiatorial exhibition of a hundred days. The humane and virtuous Trajan forced ten thousand prisoners and gladiators to fight at one time in the arena. At the triumph of Aurelian eight hundred pairs of gladiators contended. Even Constantine, as late as the year 313, cast an immense multitude of captives into the arena to be devoured by wild beasts. These bloody spectacles were not confined to Rome, but took place in every important town in the provinces. Women and children were present at them, and women were sometimes trained as gladiators.

The Christian Church never wavered in its opposition to these enormities. It pronounced the profession of a gladiator infamous, and forbade Christians to attend the amphitheatre under penalty of excommunication. The conversion of Constantine opened an era of anti-gladiatorial legislation. The first edict against gladiatorial combats was issued in 325, but for a long period the imperial legislation remained ineffective. It was not till the reign of Theodosius (379—395) that these spectacles ceased in the East, and in

[1] Cæsar designed to exhibit more, but the Senate restrained him.

[2] At Rome the gladiatorial shows and wild beast fights were held at the Colosseum and sometimes at the Circus Maximus. The former held 80,000 spectators; the latter, according to Pliny, 260,000.

the West they continued till the reign of his son Honorius. "In the West," says Dr. Lecky, "the last gladiatorial show was celebrated at Rome, under Honorius, in A.D. 404, in honour of the triumph of Stilicho, when an Asiatic monk, named Telemachus, animated by the noblest heroism of philanthropy, rushed into the amphitheatre, and attempted to part the combatants. He perished beneath a shower of stones flung by the angry spectators; but his death led to the final abolition of the games" (*History of European Morals*, c. iv.).

Discouragement of Suicide.—On this point Dr. Lecky remarks: "Direct and deliberate suicide, which occupies so prominent a place in the moral history of antiquity, almost absolutely disappeared within the Church."

The Promotion of Humane Legislation.—Christianity modified the rigorous harshness of the *patria potestas* of the Romans;[1] removed the chief civil disabilities of women;[2] secured equal justice for the widow, the orphan, and the poor;[3] introduced a more

[1] A Roman father possessed the power of life and death over his children, and had a right to the whole of their property, however old they might be. These despotic powers were curtailed by a long series of enactments of the Christian emperors from Constantine to Justinian.

[2] The legislation of Justinian abolished the "tutelage" of women, and placed the wife, in almost every respect, on an equality with her husband. "It is worthy of the chastity of our times," he says, "to give this new position to women; tutelage of women must be done away with."

[3] Constantine made the bishops the legal protectors of all oppressed persons, reformed the legal tribunals, and promulgated special legislation in favour of widows and orphans

humane treatment of criminals and accused persons;[1] discouraged war;[2] and relieved the hard lot of the labouring classes by securing them rest on Sundays and holy days.[3]

Promotion of Philanthropy.—The active philanthropy of the Christians, which was freely extended to the pagans, contributed greatly to the propagation of the Christian faith. The emperor Julian confessed with shame that the despised Galileans were the main benefactors of the poor of the empire. During the frequent pestilences, the Christians were unremitting in their attendance upon the sick, and tenderly nursed those who were abandoned by their pagan nurses and physicians.[4] At

[1] Constantine abolished crucifixion and branding on the face. The sexes were to be confined in different cells. The cells were to have air and light. Accused persons under arrest were to be humanely treated, and their trial was not to be delayed. It was forbidden to allow legal technicalities to stand in the way of justice. Prisoners were to be acquainted with the charges made against them, that they might be able to prepare their defence.

[2] *Cf.* St. Athanasius, *On the Incarnation*, lii.: "When the barbarians become disciples of Christ, immediately, instead of wars, they turn to husbandry; and instead of arming their hands with swords, they stretch them forth in prayer." Some of the ancient Christians regarded war as altogether unlawful.

[3] The observance of Sunday was ordered by Constantine in A.D. 321.

[4] Eusebius, speaking of the plague at Alexandria (A.D. 259), says: "Most of our brethren . . . visited the sick without fear, ministered to them assiduously, and served them for the sake of Christ. Right gladly did they perish with them. . . . Quite the reverse was it with the heathen. They abandoned those who began to sicken, fled from their dearest friends, threw out the sick when half-dead into the streets, and let the dead lie

Alexandria, in the fifth century, the *parabolani*, or sick-visitors, numbered between five and six hundred.[1] The stranger, the widow, the orphan, the foundling, and the poor, were regarded as under the special protection of the Church. St. Basil founded at Cæsarea, in Cappadocia, about the year A.D. 370, a great hospital, which formed the model for similar institutions all over the world. In almost every diocese there arose guest-houses for the entertainment of strangers (*xenodocheia*), alms-houses for the impotent and aged poor (*ptocheia*), orphanages for orphans and wards (*orphanotropheia*), foundling-hospitals for exposed children (*brephotropheia*), and hospitals for the sick. The cities were divided into districts for charitable relief. In Rome there were seven regions, each under the charge of a deacon, and each with a special building (*diaconia*) at which the relief was distributed. When St. Chrysostom was at Antioch, the alms of the Church were daily distributed to three thousand poor, and when he was made

unburied" (*Ecclesiastical Hist.* vii. 22). The same historian, speaking of a later plague, says: "The Christians were the only people who, amid such terrible ills, showed their fellow-feeling and humanity by their actions. Day by day some would busy themselves with attending to the dead and burying them (for there were numbers to whom no one else paid any heed); others gathered in one spot all who were afflicted by hunger throughout the whole city, and gave bread to them all. When this became known, people glorified the Christians' God, and, convinced by the very facts, confessed that the Christians alone were truly pious and religious" (*o.c.* ix. 8).

[1] Bingham, *Antiquities*, iii. 9.

Archbishop of Constantinople, he maintained no less than seven thousand.

The practice of charity was not entirely unknown among the pagans. The great Stoic emperors, Nerva, Trajan, Hadrian, Pius Antoninus, and Marcus Aurelius, are mentioned as having founded and endowed orphanages and similar charities; but the sum of pagan charity was infinitesimal compared with the Christian, and it is not unfair to claim that charity is a distinctively Christian virtue.[1]

Encouragement of Chastity.—Chastity among men was scarcely regarded as a virtue, certainly not as a duty, by average pagan opinion in the time of Christ. The most austere moralists did not go

[1] It is not claimed that Christian charity, in the days before the rise of the science of Political Economy, was always wisely administered. It is a mistake, however, to think that the charity of the early Church was usually indiscriminate. "Let the bishop," say the *Apostolic Constitutions*, "know who is the most worthy of his assistance. For if there be a widow who is able to support herself, and another woman who is not a widow, but is needy by reason of sickness, or the bringing up of many children, or infirmity of her hands, let him stretch out his hand in charity rather to this latter. But if any one be in want by gluttony, drunkenness, or idleness, he does not deserve any assistance" (bk. ii. 3, 4). The *Didache* says: "If a wayfarer wishes to settle among you, having a trade, let him work and eat. If he has no trade, exercise your discretion in arranging for him to live among you as a Christian, but not in idleness. If he will not do this, he is trafficking with Christ. Beware of men like that" (xii.). The pseudo-Clement writes: "Provide for those who are without a trade the means of necessary support through employment, giving work to the artificer, and alms to those incapable of work" (*Ep. to James*, viii., in the *Clementine Homilies*).

further than to recommend it as a counsel of perfection. Cicero, a remarkably good man for his age, said: "If there be any one who thinks that young men should be altogether restrained from the love of courtesans, he is indeed very severe. I am not prepared to deny his position; but he differs not only from the licence of our age, but also from the customs and allowances of our ancestors. When, indeed, was this not done? When was it blamed? When was it not allowed? When was that which is now lawful not lawful?"[1] A certain number of writers (Seneca, Plutarch, Ulpian, etc.), chiefly Stoics, teach that chastity is a duty of *married men*; but this was a purely speculative opinion, repudiated by almost the whole ancient world.[2]

The importance attached to female chastity was greater. In the earliest and purest ages of Rome, marriage was held in the highest honour, divorce was unknown, and, if the historians can be believed, the Roman matrons were models of chastity and virtue. But the domestic virtues of the Romans did not long survive the extension of their dominions and the increase of their wealth. The last age of the Republic and the first age of the Empire were marked by a declension of female virtue which shocked even the laxest pagan

[1] Quoted by Lecky, *History of European Morals*, c. v., who gives other interesting illustrations of pagan sentiment.

[2] The small regard which was paid to the marriage-tie may be gathered from the fact that friends sometimes exchanged wives.

sentiment. Divorces became frightfully common. Martial wrote an epigram upon a woman who married ten husbands within a month.[1] Juvenal mentions a woman who married eight husbands in five years (*Sat.* vi. 227 ff.). The shamelessness of women was the continual theme of the moralist and of the satirist. "Does any woman," says Seneca, "now blush on account of a divorce, since the time when certain distinguished women of noble families reckon their years not by the number of the consuls, but of their husbands? . . . Where can you find any woman so miserable, so squalid, that one pair of adulterers is enough for her?" (*De Benef.* iii. 16). Some women of noble birth were not satisfied even with unlimited freedom of divorce, and Tacitus informs us that their incredible licence "was restrained by severe decrees of the Senate, and it was provided that no woman should make merchandise of her body, whose grandfather, father, or husband had been a Roman knight" (*Annals*, ii. 85).

Unnatural vice prevailed extensively, and was practised without shame. Originally condemned by Roman law and sentiment, this peculiarly Greek vice[2] was transported to Rome in the later years of the Republic, and under the Empire was indulged in not only by sensualists like Tiberius,

[1] Bk. vi. 7. The poet justly remarks: "Quæ nubit toties, non nubit: adultera lege est. Offendor mœcha simpliciore minus."

[2] It was the vice of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, and of Sophocles. Cicero says: "Apud Græcos, opprobrium fuit adolescentibus, si amatores non haberent."

but even by philosophers like Hadrian. Pagan writers allude to it frequently, either without disapproval, or with disapproval so slight as to amount almost to encouragement.[1]

Not only unchastity, but every other sensual vice prevailed to an unparalleled degree in the early Empire,[2] and the poet Juvenal declared, "Nothing will remain for after-times to add to our corruption; posterity will but ape our acts and our desires; all vice has settled at its zenith: poet, hoist sail, shake out every stitch of canvas" (*Satires*, i. 147-50, tr. Mayor).

The change of sentiment with regard to the duty of chastity,[3] which Christianity introduced, is very distinctly marked in the enactments of the Christian emperors. Constantine greatly curtailed the liberty

[1] Plutarch praises the *heroic virtue* of Agesilaus, who refrained from it.

[2] Sallust, writing of the close of the Republic, says: "But the lust of licentiousness, of low debauchery, and of every sort of luxury, did not the less spread abroad: men let themselves be used as women, women publicly offered their chastity for sale; for the sake of filling themselves with food they sought all things, by land and sea; they slept before any desire of sleep had come; they waited neither for hunger, thirst, desire of coolness, nor for weariness, but anticipated all in their luxurious indulgence" (*Catiline*, xiii.). The incredible gluttony of Vitellius is described by Suetonius, who remarks that it was only rendered possible *vomitandi consuetudine* (*Vitellius*, xiii.).

[3] Those who would appreciate the immense difference between the Christian and even the best pagan sentiment on this subject, should compare the account of the visit of Socrates and his disciples to the courtesan Theodota, given in Xenophon, *Memorabilia*, iii. 11, with the Gospel account of our Lord's relations with fallen women (Luke vii. 37).

of divorce. A wife might divorce her husband only for three causes—murder, sorcery, and the violation of tombs. A husband might divorce his wife only for adultery, and certain other serious sins. Adultery was made a criminal—even a capital—offence. The same connubial fidelity was required from husbands as from wives. Married men were forbidden to keep a concubine. Breaches of chastity were punished with great—even with inhuman—severity. Unnatural vice, which is stigmatized with startling energy of language, is ordered to be suppressed *summo supplicio, et exquisitis pœnis.* Licentious theatrical exhibitions were forbidden, as also was the practice of the promiscuous bathing of the sexes, which had been ineffectively reprobated by Hadrian and Alexander Severus. The profession of a procurer was pronounced unlawful. The violation even of a slave was punished with death. Every effort was made to reclaim fallen women. The virtue of chastity was declared, in the codes of Theodosius and of Justinian, pleasing to God and beneficial to the state. "Nothing in human affairs," said Justinian, "is so deserving of reverence as marriage. . . . We enact that all persons, to the best of their power, should preserve chastity, which alone is able to present the souls of men with confidence before God."

The Church did not, of course, succeed in suppressing sexual vice completely, but it certainly succeeded in making it rarer and more disreputable

The Mediæval and Modern Period.—Among the

triumphs of Christianity in more modern times must be reckoned the abolition of private war,[1] and of duels;[2] the abolition of serfdom, and of African slavery;[3] the fostering of chivalrous ideas towards women; the mitigation of the horrors of war;[4] the encouragement of arbitration;[5] prison reform;[6] the abolition of torture;[7] organized charity; the temperance movement; constitutional government;[8] the encouragement of education;[9] factory and other labour legislation; and "Christian social" work, such as that of the Christian Social Union, of the Church Army, of the Salvation Army,

[1] The Church struggled earnestly from the tenth to the fifteenth century to put an end to this abuse. It is said to have been condemned by thirty Councils.

[2] From the fifteenth century the Church refused Christian burial to duellists. Duels were forbidden in the British Army in 1844.

[3] The slave-trade is now piracy by the consent of all Christian nations. The Congress of Vienna in 1815 called it "a traffic reproved by the laws of religion and nature." In 1833 the British Parliament abolished slavery in the Plantations, and voted £20,000,000 compensation to the planters.

[4] The Geneva *Cross* indicates the origin of this humane movement.

[5] The recent establishment of The Hague tribunal illustrates this tendency.

[6] John Howard, the father of modern prison reform, was an earnest Christian.

[7] The French freethinkers of the eighteenth century assisted to bring about this reform. Torture has lately been abolished in Japan.

[8] The Councils (diocesan and provincial) of the Church formed the model for parliaments.

[9] All the older universities and schools are religious foundations. The education of the poor was the work mainly of the Church in most countries until quite recently.

and of the various University and Public School missions.

The Sins of the Church.—There is, of course, another side to the picture, which it ill becomes a lover of truth to conceal. The enthusiasm for monastic celibacy, which prevailed from the close of the fourth century, though admirable in many ways, led too often to a depreciation of marriage, and a disparagement of the domestic virtues.[1]

The laudable zeal of the early Christians for the salvation of souls led them, when they became possessed of power, to abandon gradually those enlightened principles of toleration which they had formerly professed,[2] and to adopt the persecuting principles of their pagan adversaries. The change did not take place at once, or without energetic protests from some of the greatest saints;[3] but gradually the persecuting spirit mastered the

[1] The fanatical aim of St. Jerome was "to cut down by the axe of Virginity the wood of Marriage." On this subject, see Lecky, *European Morals*, c. v.

[2] "The theory of persecution was established by Theodosius, whose justice and piety have been applauded by the saints, but the practice of it, in the fullest extent, was (A.D. 385) reserved for his rival and colleague Maximus, the first, among the Christian princes, who shed the blood of his Christian subjects on account of their religious opinions" (Gibbon, c. xxvii.).

[3] The persecution of the Priscillianists by Maximus was reprobated by St. Martin of Tours and St. Ambrose of Milan, "who," says Gibbon, "on this occasion, asserted the cause of toleration. They pitied the unhappy men who had been executed at Treves; they refused to hold communion with their episcopal murderers; and if Martin deviated from that generous resolution, his motives were laudable, and his repentance was exemplary."

Church, and the final result was the Spanish Inquisition, which perpetrated, in the name of Christ, atrocities worthy of a Nero or a Domitian.[1]

Facts like these constitute—who can deny it?—a serious blot upon the record of the historical Church, but they cannot fairly be alleged as an argument against Christianity itself, to the spirit of which they are entirely opposed. They only prove how unfaithful Christians can be, in ignorant and barbarous ages, to the spirit and teaching of their Master.

The scandal of these un-Christian abuses has now to a large extent ceased. The Reformation has redressed the balance in favour of marriage—somewhat, perhaps, except in the Anglican Church, to the undue depreciation of religious celibacy—and has gradually introduced, first the practice, and afterwards the theory of toleration. The principle of toleration is now fully accepted by all the Reformed Churches, and is not without influential advocates even in the Roman Communion.

II.—The Spread of Christianity

(1) In mere number of adherents, Christianity with its five hundred millions of believers[2] does

[1] The Spanish Inquisition was founded in 1480, and was suppressed by Napoleon in 1808. In Spain alone it burnt 31,912 heretics, and imprisoned 291,450. The Count of Alva boasted, in 1573, that during the previous six years he had executed 18,000 persons in the Netherlands, chiefly for heresy.

[2] The Christian population of the globe was estimated in 1896 at five hundred millions. It now considerably exceeds this figure (Art. "Christian Church," *Encycl. Brit.*, vol. xxvii).

not so greatly exceed Buddhism with its (*alleged*) four hundred millions, and Mahometanism with its one hundred and seventy-five millions. It is, however, spreading so much more rapidly than any other religion, that it is not too much to anticipate that within the present century it will become the religion of the great majority of the human race.[1]

(2) The converts to Christianity belong chiefly to the most cultivated races. All those nations which excel in literature, art, science, philosophy, invention, industry, and political and social organization, are Christian.

(3) The Christian races are the dominant races of the earth. They govern directly two-thirds of the world's population, and four-fifths of its area; they also control financially, through their great preponderance in wealth, a considerable part of the remainder.

(4) Christianity, though historically the religion of civilization, is equally adapted to the lower races. Some of its greatest triumphs have been won among the barbarous tribes of Central Africa.[2] It has completely transformed whole tribes of the degraded inhabitants of Australia and New Guinea.

[1] The total population of the world is about fifteen hundred millions, so that the Christian Church claims already more than a third.

[2] In Uganda, in 1884, there was only a handful of converts. The Anglican Church of Uganda now numbers 30,000 baptized Christians, 2,000 native teachers, 27 native clergymen, 800 churches, all supported by the converts themselves. The Roman Church in the same district reckons 8,000 baptized Christians, and 16,000 catechumens.

The extraordinary moral and material changes brought about by Christian missions are attested not only by missionaries, but also by independent, and sometimes by hostile, observers. Charles Darwin, for instance, writing of the South Seas, says: "[The opponents of missions] forget, or will not remember, that human sacrifices and the power of an idolatrous priesthood—a system of profligacy unparalleled in any other part of the world—infanticide a consequence of that system—bloody wars where the conquerors spared neither women nor children—that all these have been abolished, and that dishonesty, intemperance, and licentiousness have been greatly reduced by the introduction of Christianity. In a voyager to forget these things is base ingratitude; for should he chance to be at the point of shipwreck on some unknown coast, he will most devoutly pray that the lesson of the missionary may have reached thus far. . . . The lesson of the missionary is the enchanter's wand. The house has been built, the windows framed, the fields and even the trees grafted by the New Zealander. When I looked at the whole scene I thought it admirable. The march of improvement consequent on the introduction of Christianity throughout the South Sea probably stands by itself in the records of history." [1]

(5) The kind of Christianity which is spreading is "orthodox," or Trinitarian Christianity.

[1] *Journal*, quoted by Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, p. 205, who gives other interesting testimonies.

Unitarianism is singularly lacking in missionary zeal, and can hardly be said to be in evidence in the mission field.

III.—The Personal Influence of Jesus

Jesus has been dead nearly two millenniums, and yet He inspires, in hundreds of millions of human hearts, the same intense love and devotion which was felt for Him by His first disciples. His empire over the human race grows stronger, not weaker, with time. For such a phenomenon there is no parallel in history. "It is needless," says Dr. Row, "to attempt to prove that the supreme attractiveness of the person of the Founder of Christianity has imparted to the Church the whole of its vitality. To this fact all history bears witness. Nor is its testimony less certain that of all the influences that have been exerted in this earth, that of Jesus has been the most potent. Enumerate all the great men who have ever existed, whether kings, conquerors, statesmen, patriots, poets, philosophers, or men of science, and their influence for good will be found to have been as nothing compared with that which has been exerted by Jesus Christ. . . . He who was in outward form a Galilean peasant, who died a malefactor's death, has founded a spiritual empire which has endured for eighteen centuries of time, and which, despite the vaticinations of unbelievers, shows no signs of decrepitude. Commencing with the smallest beginnings, His empire now embraces all the progressive races

of men. Those by whom it has not been accepted are in a state of stagnation and decay. It is the only one which is adapted to every state of civilization. It differs from all other states and communities in that it is founded neither on force nor on self-interest, but on persuasion and the supreme attractiveness of the character of its Founder. . . . History affirms that Jesus has not only been a great man among great men, or even the greatest of them, but that He stands at an immeasurable height above them. He is the one only catholic man, the one ideal of humanity, for whose presence in and action on history none of the known forces that energize in the moral and spiritual worlds can account. What is the necessary inference from this? I answer, that as those forces which have energized in man from the day of his appearance on this earth have failed to produce His fellow, we must be in the presence of a moral miracle" (*Bampton Lectures*, pp. 94, 95).

Similar homage is rendered to Jesus by not a few modern Rationalists—by Renan, for instance, who speaks of "the incomparable man, to whom the universal conscience has decreed the title of Son of God, and that with justice, since He has advanced religion as no other has done, or probably ever will be able to do";[1] and by Dr. Lecky, who says that "He has not only been the highest pattern of virtue, but the highest incentive to its practice, and has exerted so deep an influence that

[1] *Life of Jesus*, c. i.

it may be truly said that the simple record of three short years of active life has done more to regenerate and to soften mankind than all the disquisitions of philosophers, and than all the exhortations of moralists":[1] but since many testimonies of this kind have already been given (see c. xix. appendix 1), we will here produce the testimony of a man of an entirely different type. It is stated on good authority that one day at St. Helena, the exiled Emperor Napoleon, in the course of a conversation with Count Montholon, asked him, "Can you tell me who Jesus Christ was?" The Count declined to answer, and Napoleon proceeded: "Well, then, I will tell you. Alexander, Cæsar, Charlemagne, and I myself have founded great empires; but upon what did these creations of our genius depend? Upon force. Jesus alone founded His empire upon love, and to this very day millions would die for Him. . . . I think I understand something of human nature; and I tell you, all these were men, and I am a man: none else is like Him; Jesus Christ was more than man. . . . I have inspired multitudes with such an enthusiastic devotion that they would have died for me; . . . but to do this it was necessary that I should be *visibly* present with the electric influence of my looks, of my words, of my voice. When I saw men and spoke to them, I lighted up the flame of self-devotion in their hearts. . . . Christ alone has succeeded in so raising the mind of man towards

[1] This fine passage is given in full in c. xix. appendix 1.

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the Unseen, that it becomes insensible to the barriers of time and space. Across a chasm of eighteen hundred years Jesus Christ makes a demand which is beyond all others difficult to satisfy; He asks for that which a philosopher may often seek in vain at the hands of his friends, or a father of his children, or a bride of her spouse, or a man of his brother. He asks for the human heart; He will have it entirely to Himself. He demands it unconditionally; and forthwith His demand is granted. Wonderful! In defiance of time and space, the soul of man, with all its powers and faculties, becomes an annexation to the empire of Christ. All who sincerely believe in Him experience that remarkable supernatural love towards Him. This phenomenon is unaccountable; it is altogether beyond the scope of man's creative powers. Time, the great destroyer, is powerless to extinguish this sacred flame; time can neither exhaust its strength, nor put a limit to its range. This it is which strikes me most; I have often thought of it. This it is which proves to me quite convincingly the Divinity of Jesus Christ."[1]

IV.—Conclusion

We will conclude by summarizing and bringing to a focus our long argument for the truth of Christianity.

[1] Quoted by Liddon, *Bampton Lectures*, iii. The genuineness of this conversation has been contested.

(1) After discussing Natural Religion, we shewed that the urgent need of some new spiritual force to regenerate the world, the weakness of Natural Religion, and the difficulties connected with the proof of even such fundamental articles of religious faith as the moral perfection of the Deity, and the immortality of man, pointed to the possibility—even to the probability—of some further revelation than that of Nature (c. xvii.).

(2) We proceeded, therefore, to examine the credentials of the Christian religion, and were favourably impressed to find (*a*) that it offered itself to the world as a regenerative and redemptive power; (*b*) that it endorsed every truth of Natural Religion; and (*c*) that it offered strong miraculous confirmation of the two most doubtful articles of Natural Theology—the moral perfection of the Deity, and human immortality (p. 278-81).

(3) We discovered, however, that Christianity was something more than a mere republication of Natural Religion, for the Founder claimed the position not merely of a prophet, but of a *Divine Redeemer.* The doctrine of Christ's Deity, or of the Incarnation, having no basis in Natural Religion, seemed at first difficult to credit, but upon mature consideration it appeared—

(*a*) That the Incarnation, if true, is an act of redemptive love, worthy of God, and suitable to man's needs (c. xvii.).

(*b*) That the Person who claimed to be the Son

of God was a man of unparalleled virtue and holiness of life (c. xx. sect. 3).

(*c*) That if we disbelieve His claim, we are reduced to the absurdity of supposing that the Founder of the religion of all civilized men was either an impostor or a madman (c. xx. sect. 8).

(*d*) That the claim of Jesus was supported by numerous well-attested miracles, and in particular by His resurrection from the dead (c. xxi., xxii.).

(*e*) That belief in Christ's Divinity is the motive power of Christianity, and that, when it is absent, Christianity ceases to inspire enthusiasm, or to produce its characteristic fruits (c. xx. sect. 1).

(*f*) That the beneficent influence of Jesus upon the world for the last two thousand years, and His present dominion over human hearts, which have no parallels in history, strongly confirm the other indications that He was more than man (c. xxiii. sects. 1-3).

On these grounds, therefore, we believe that Jesus was not merely a human teacher, or even an inspired prophet, but the *Son of God.* It appears to us that, given the premisses of Theism or Natural Religion, faith in the Christ of the Catholic Church naturally follows, and that the Theistic and Christian positions are inseparable. We admit that the difficulties of Theism and Christianity are real; but they are a mere trifle compared with the difficulties of *non*-Theism. The non-Theist *outrages*

reason—no weaker term is adequate—when he affirms—

(1) That the Cause which produces *the mind of man* is impersonal and unintelligent; and

(2) That the Cause which produces *the idea of moral perfection* in the human soul is non-moral.

To affirm these propositions—and every non-Theist affirms them—is to affirm that the creature is greater than its Creator, and the effect than its cause.

Since then Theism, with all its difficulties, offers a rational, and the only rational, view of the world; and since non-Theism offers one which is fundamentally irrational; and since, moreover, suspension of judgment upon a question of such vital importance is impossible (see c. x.); we claim the verdict for Theism, and therewith for Christianity.

APPENDIX I

REASON AND RELIGIOUS AUTHORITY

Throughout this book we have appealed continually to reason as the sole religious guide of mankind, and we are liable to be met with the obvious retort that, as a matter of fact, Christianity appeals to authority more than to reason, and prefers blind faith to candid inquiry. It is pointed out—and with justice—that the principle of ecclesiastical authority is admitted by all Christians, as much by Protestants, who

nominally reject it,[1] as by Catholics, who more consistently affirm it.[2]

Now, it is perfectly true that certain views of ecclesiastical authority—the extreme Ultramontane, for example, which affirms the personal infallibility of the Pope, and the extreme Protestant, which affirms the mechanical infallibility of the letter of Scripture—do in fact sacrifice reason to blind, irrational faith. But this is not the case with every theory of ecclesiastical authority, least of all with the Anglican theory, which, while insisting that the Church possesses real authority in matters of faith, affirms no less decidedly the supremacy of reason. The following brief and imperfect summary of the Anglican view of authority may be useful.

(1) *The Authority of Revelation.*—The Christian revelation, coming from God, is authoritative, but its authoritative character does not interfere with the supremacy of reason, because it is reason which determines whether the revelation

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[1] Nonconformists accept the same Canon of Scripture as the Church. The Wesleyan Catechism contains the Nicene Creed. The appeal to the Primitive Church, as well as to Scripture, was allowed by Luther, and even by Calvin, and is admitted by the modern Presbyterians. The standard of Trinitarian orthodoxy fixed by the Ecumenical Councils is generally recognized by Protestant Christendom. Even the Unitarians believe in a *revelation*, and therefore in religious authority of some kind.

[2] For Anglo-Catholic statements, see Article xx.: "The Church hath . . . authority in Controversies of Faith. . . . The Church [is] a witness and keeper of holy Writ"; and compare the Canon of 1571 enjoining preachers to "teach nothing in their sermons which they should require to be devoutly held or believed by the people, except what is agreeable to the doctrine of the Old and New Testaments, and what the ancient Fathers and Catholic bishops have collected out of the said doctrine." For the modern Roman Catholic view, see *Concil. Vat.*, sess. iv. cap. 4. For the Eastern Catholic view, see the longer Russian Catechism: "[The Church] shall never apostatize from the faith, nor sin against the truth of the faith, or fall into error."

is true or not. As Bishop Butler says, "Reason is the only faculty we have wherewith to judge concerning anything, even revelation itself" (*Analogy*, part ii. 3).

(2) *Human Authority in General.*—Reason teaches us to have regard to the opinions of others as well as to our own, or, in other words, teaches a rational submission to authority. Authority is not, as some imagine, a principle distinct from Reason. Authority is *collective reason.* Just as we believe, upon the authority of mankind, that it is advantageous to live under some form of government, so we believe, on the same authority, that religion, in some form or other, is true.

(3) *The Special Authority for the Truth of Christianity.*—We believe in the truth of Christianity largely upon the authority of the civilized races of mankind, which for more than fifteen centuries have constantly professed it, and, in spite of continual attacks upon it, still do so.[1]

(4) *The Natural Authority of the Christian Church.*—Christianity being the religion of the civilized races, the consensus of Christendom represents the consensus of civilized man on the subject of religion. This is the whole basis of the authority of the Christian Church, considered as *natural.*[2]

(5) *The Supernatural Authority of the Church.*—The supernatural authority of the Christian Church is grounded upon the fact that Jesus Christ, who (if the Christian revelation is true) is God and man, declared that the gates of Hades should not prevail against it (Matt. xvi. 18), promised to be with it always, even unto the end of the world (Matt. xxviii. 20), and to guide it, through His Spirit, into all the truth

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[1] It is as reasonable to prefer the religion of the civilized races to the religions of other races, as it is to prefer their literature and their science.

[2] Some civilized men reject Christianity, but inasmuch as they are few in number, and not superior in intellect or virtue to those who accept it, their authority is of less weight than that of the Christian majority.

(John xvi. 13). These statements do not amount to a promise of unconditional infallibility, but they undoubtedly confer a supernatural authority of some kind.

(6) *Reason and the Church's Supernatural Authority.*—At first sight we seem at this point to be recognizing the existence of some other guide than reason—viz. the Church's supernatural authority, and in the Roman system of religion this is, no doubt, the case. According to Ultramontane teaching, the Church is *unconditionally infallible.* It is not by the use of reason, but in some quite different way, that the Church attains to truth. However ignorant a Pope may be, and however fallacious the arguments by which he supports his opinions, those opinions, if once formally promulgated, are infallibly true, and for ever unalterable. The Anglican view is widely different. According to Anglican teaching, religious truth is attained and preserved *by the due use of reason.* It is essential to the proper exercise of the Church's authority that investigation should be free,[1] and that all questions should be fully discussed by competent authorities, before a decision is reached. The current teaching of the Church is not, according to the Anglican view, irreformable, but is subject to continual revision, in order to secure its complete conformity with Scripture, Antiquity, and Reason. Anglicans do not regard Church Authority as a principle distinct from Reason, but as Reason assisted by Grace. Just as Divine Grace augments, and does not supersede, the spiritual powers of the soul, so Grace assists Reason, and does not supersede it.

(7) *The Religious Authority of Particular Churches.*—All Christian bodies, in which any real fruits of the Spirit are found, possess some degree of religious authority; but it

[1] In individual cases the result of free investigation may be to destroy faith in the Christian Revelation altogether. Under such circumstances the investigators are under an obligation to leave the Church, which is an association of believers in the Christian Revelation.

is not unreasonable, in the present divided state of Christendom, to attribute a special degree of religious authority to the primitive undivided Church, which fixed the Canon of Scripture, and defined in its General Councils the Catholic Faith. The appeal to antiquity—that is, to the authority of this undivided Church—is recognized not only by the three great communions which are historically continuous with it—the Anglican, the Eastern, and the Roman—but also in a quite real, though less formal, way by the Churches of the Reformation. The best hope of Christian reunion is a fuller return on the part of all Christian bodies to the principles of this undivided Church, upon which Christendom was once *visibly*, and is still, to a large extent, *spiritually* united. At the same time Antiquity is not to be blindly followed. The Spirit of God still works in the Church, and in many important matters the modern Church is more enlightened than the ancient.

APPENDIX II

HELL

There is much misapprehension as to what the teaching of the Church really is upon the important subject of future retribution. This arises partly from a false identification of the doctrine of the Church with that of Calvinism,[1] from which

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[1] James Mill, the father of John Stuart Mill, was driven into infidelity by the Calvinistic doctrine of Hell, and his son regarded it as the accepted Christian view. It is clearly Calvinism which he criticises in his *Three Essays*. "The recognition," he says, "of the object of highest worship in a Being who could make a Hell, and who could create countless generations of human beings with the certain foreknowledge that He was creating them for this fate, . . . is a moral difficulty that almost outweighs all the beauty and benignity and moral greatness which so eminently distinguish the sayings and character of Christ. Is there any moral enormity which might

it is radically different; partly also from the fact that preachers, having mainly in view the awakening of sinners to a due sense of their peril, dwell by preference upon the more austere and terrifying aspects of the doctrine. It is desirable, therefore, in this place to show that the familiar picture has another side. The following brief statement of the doctrine of future punishment, as held by strict orthodox Anglicans, will show how baseless the usual objections to the Divine Justice based on this doctrine really are.

(1) It is of faith that *there is a Hell*; *i.e.* that souls which, in spite of all warnings and pleadings, remain finally and obstinately impenitent, will at the last be rejected from God's presence, and eternally punished with such penalties as justice requires. This truth of Revelation is confirmed also by Natural Religion, for if the soul is immortal and free, as Natural Religion assumes it to be, it must be possible for it to reject God finally, and so consign itself to some kind of a hell. Thus Plato, in the *Gorgias*, says: "They who have been guilty of the worst crimes, and are incurable by reason of their crimes, are made examples; for as they are incurable, the time has passed at which they can receive any benefit themselves. But others get good, when they behold them for ever enduring the most terrible and painful and fearful sufferings as the penalty of their sins." Even such Agnostics as Diderot and Voltaire believed in a hell. Diderot, for example, thus addressed his soul: "If you abuse your reason, you will be unhappy not only in this life, but after death, in hell"; and Voltaire, writing to a correspondent who had arrived at a conviction that there is no hell, said: "Most

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not be justified by imitation of such a Deity? And is it possible to adore such a one without a frightful distortion of the standard of right and wrong? Any other of the outrages to the most ordinary justice and humanity involved in the common Christian conception of God, shrinks into insignificance beside this dreadful idealization of wickedness" (p. 113).

happy are you! I am far from having arrived at it."[1] In fact, if God is really just, there must be a hell of some kind, for natural justice is revolted at the idea of selfish sensual criminals sharing equally with the just the rewards of Heaven.

(2) It is not of faith that any creatures whatever, except perhaps Judas and Satan, will be finally lost. Even in these cases it may be held that the Divine Mercy will intervene to make their punishment tolerable.

(3) It is a false and monstrous belief that God has predestined any souls to perdition, or that the majority of the human race will be lost. On the contrary, God desires, and labours to achieve, the salvation of *every man.*

(4) Good Christians outside the Church, and even good heathens, may be saved. Dr. Pusey says (representing in this matter all Anglican theologians): "God the Holy Ghost (it is a matter of faith) visits and has visited every soul of man whom God has made, and those who heard His voice and obeyed it as far as they knew, belonged to Christ and were saved for His merits, whom, had they known, they would have obeyed and loved." Even those Roman theologians, who take the sternest view of hell which s compatible with orthodoxy, admit this. For example, Dr. Wilhelm and Dr. Scannell, following Suarez, teach that in the case of the heathen "the implicit desire to believe in Christ and the Trinity must be deemed sufficient. By 'implicit desire' we mean the desire to receive, to believe, and to do, whatever is needful for salvation, although what is to be received, believed, and done, is not explicitly known" (*Manual of Catholic Theology*, vol. i. p. 137).

(5) Unbaptized infants are certainly saved, for it is contrary to natural justice to believe that the fault of others will be allowed to affect their eternal welfare. The Prayer

[1] Quoted by Pusey in *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?*

Book rubric does not state this in express words; but the object of this reticence is mainly to avoid encouraging the negligence of parents in bringing their children to Baptism. Even those austere Roman theologians who exclude unbaptized infants from Heaven, assign to them a degree of natural happiness which far exceeds anything that is possible on this earth.

(6) There is no need on grounds of equity to assume a second probation, as some do, after death. All who in this life have shown faith and love, however rudimentary—all who, in short, are in any sense capable of salvation, are accepted by God here and now, and at death pass immediately into such a state of existence as is fitted to prepare them for Heaven. Good Christians pass at once into a state of joy and felicity, called in Scripture Paradise, or Abraham's bosom, hardly inferior in beatitude to Heaven itself. Those persons whose faith and love are seriously imperfect, pass into a state of temporal punishment, the degree and quality of which are precisely adapted to each individual case. This punishment is not only expiatory, but *remedial*, and is intended to lead the soul by the easiest road to perfect sanctification.[1] Then at the last judgment all who are capable of salvation will receive their final reward, and the finally impenitent will be lost.

(7) Nothing is of faith as to the *nature* of eternal punishment. All that is certain is that it will be both just and merciful, and in proportion to the degree of delinquency. If we may be allowed to speculate on so mysterious a subject, we think it not improbable that an essential part of it will be *the loss of free-will*. Sin came into the world by

[1] Anglicans and Eastern Christians reject the Roman doctrine that the souls of *good* Christians suffer purgatorial punishment after death. The practical difference between the two doctrines is great. For the Eastern doctrine see the *Larger Catechism* of the Russian Church. For the Anglican doctrine consult the commentaries on Article xxii.

the abuse of free-will, and therefore it seems equitable that the abuse of the faculty should be punished by its loss. On this theory, after the last judgment evil will cease to exist. The lost, if any, will become intelligent automata, and will do God's will, since they refuse to do it *voluntarily*, by natural necessity. Creatures in this condition would probably be capable of a considerable degree of natural happiness, but their joy would be tempered with regretful thoughts of the blessedness which might have been theirs, and which they wilfully forfeited.

APPENDIX III

THE ATONEMENT

There is no need, in a work like this, to discuss fully the doctrine of the Atonement. It is necessary, however, to notice the chief popular objections to it, which turn mainly on its morality.

Objection I.—The doctrine of the Atonement represents God the Father as angry with God the Son, and punishing Him for sins which He had never committed. Such a doctrine is unjust and immoral.

Reply.—Doubtless it is, but it is not the doctrine of the Bible or of the Church. It first originated in the sixteenth century, being taught by Luther (1483—1546) and Calvin (1509—1564) and their followers.[1] It was regarded by the

[1] The Augsburg Confession, 1530 (Lutheran), represented Christ as suffering the penalty of human sin vicariously (*subiit pœnam peccati*). Gerhard, 1582—1637 (Lutheran), said: "Christ truly experienced the anger of God annexed to each variety of sin. How could He have redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us, unless He had experienced to the full the judgment of an incensed God [*nisi judicium Dei irati persensisset*]?" Calvin interpreted Christ's descent into hell as meaning that He suffered the torments of the damned. "If Christ," he says, "is affirmed to have descended into hell [*ad inferos*], it is not to be wondered at, considering that He

best-informed opinion of the time as a novel and dangerous doctrine,[1] and is now abandoned by most of those who have a right to speak for Lutheranism[2] and Calvinism.[3]

Objection II.—The idea of *imputation*, upon which the doctrine of the Atonement rests, is immoral. It implies a fictitious transfer of our sins to Christ, and an equally fictitious transfer of Christ's righteousness to us.

Reply.—This idea of "imputation" also arose in Lutheran and Calvinistic circles, and is irreconcilable with Holy Scripture and the traditional theology of the Church. According to this theology, there is a real, spiritual, vital, and moral union of the closest kind between the Incarnate Christ and the whole human race; and in consequence of this union it is possible, not only in figure, but in fact, for Christ to bear the burden of our sins, and for us to share the righteousness of Christ. As a loving parent mourns for the sin of a beloved child, so, but in a deeper and still more effectual way, does Christ identify Himself with the sins of men, sorrow for them as if they were His own, and

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suffered that death which is inflicted on the wicked by an angry God. . . . He suffered in His soul the awful tortures of condemned and lost mankind" (*Institutes*, ii. 16, 10). Calvin's school for the most part held that Christ suffered in man's stead the penal torments of Gehenna (*pœna gehennalis*), both in His soul and in His body (*animâ principaliter, corpore secundario*). The Heidelberg Catechism (1563), which combines the views of Luther and Calvin, declares (q. 37) that "Christ bore the divine wrath during *the whole period of His earthly life*."

[1] Bellarmine (1542—1621) called it "a new, unheard-of heresy." Pearson, speaking for Anglicanism, says, "It must not; it cannot be admitted."

[2] There is no mention of it in Martensen's *Christian Dogmatics*, the work most representative of modern orthodox Lutheranism.

[3] Dr. McLeod Campbell's *The Nature of the Atonement* (Presbyterian), which has run through many editions, expressly repudiates it.

by thus showing His sympathizing love, invite sinners to repentance. In virtue of this mystical but real union, Christ is also enabled to impart His righteousness to mankind, potentially to all men, for salvation is offered to all, but actually to believers. Those who are united to Him by faith and love receive from Him power to repent truly, to overcome temptation, and to advance in holiness. Ultimately all true believers will attain to perfect sanctification, and therefore God, knowing this, grants them pardon, and accounts them righteous, *by anticipation.*

Objection III.—Repentance is of itself a sufficient atonement for sin.

Reply.—A *perfect* repentance would be a sufficient atonement for sin, but without supernatural aid fallen man cannot offer to God a perfect repentance (see pp. 285, 286).

Objection IV.—God might have granted the necessary aid to repent and to live a holy life *directly*, without employing any mediator.

Reply.—He might have done so; but seeing that it is His will in the common course of nature to confer His gifts through the instrumentality of others, it is not incredible that He should confer His *supernatural* gifts in an analogous way. As Butler well says, "The whole analogy of nature removes all imagined presumption against the general notion of *a Mediator between God and man.* For we find that all living creatures are brought into the world, and their life in infancy is preserved, by the instrumentality of others: and every satisfaction of it, some way or other, is bestowed by the like means" (*Analogy*, pt. ii. 5).

APPENDIX IV

THE HOLY TRINITY

The doctrine of the Holy Trinity is a truth of Revelation rather than of Natural Religion; nevertheless it can be shown by purely philosophical arguments that the Trinitarian

view of the Godhead is more satisfying from the ethical standpoint than the Unitarian.

(1) Since Christ taught the supremacy of love and the duty of universal benevolence, it has gradually become the accepted doctrine of all civilized men, that *love* is the most beautiful of human virtues and the most adorable of the Divine perfections. But perfect love is only possible between equals. Just as man cannot satisfy or realize his powers of love by loving the lower animals, so God cannot satisfy or realize His love by loving man, or any creature. If God is truly love, in the full sense of that term, He must have always possessed some equal object of His love, some *alter ego*, or, to use the language of Christian theology, a consubstantial, co-eternal, and co-equal Son.

(2) An ideally perfect life is a social life. A life lived in the exercise of friendship, social intercourse, and benevolence is a far higher life than that of a recluse, who seeks to attain perfection in solitude. If, therefore, the life of the Godhead is as perfect as can be conceived, it must be *a social life*—that is to say, there must exist within the Divine Unity a plurality of Persons, between whom the most perfect fellowship exists. This conception of the Godhead as a Perfect Society, characteristic of Trinitarianism, is ethically more fruitful and practically more stimulating than that of Unitarianism, which regards God as an isolated Person, incapable of social life, or of any real love but *self-love*. The Trinitarian, and the Trinitarian alone, is able to discern perfect love realized in his object of worship, and to recognize, in the essential Nature of the Godhead, the perfect pattern of the Family and of the State.

(3) It is sometimes alleged that the Trinitarian view of the Godhead is inconsistent with the acknowledged truth of the Divine Unity. This, however, does not appear, upon an accurate consideration of the facts, to be the case. Trinitarian theology guards the doctrine of the Divine Unity in several distinct ways.

(*a*) According to the Catholic doctrine of the Trinity, there is only one substance, essence, and nature in the Godhead, and this is shared by all the Persons equally and wholly.

(*b*) The Divine Persons are not mutually exclusive, as human persons are, but mutually inclusive. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost mutually contain, include, and interpenetrate one another.

(*c*) The Three Persons are not three First Principles or Causes. The Father alone is the First Cause. It is He who begets the Son; and from Him, as from a First Cause,[1] the Holy Ghost proceeds.

(*d*) There is an absolute unity of will, and an absolute concurrence in all Divine operations, among the Divine Persons.

APPENDIX V

HISTORY OF APOLOGETICS

Period I.—To the Suppression of Paganism

The first and most important period of the history of Apologetics extends from the first century to the suppression of Paganism, which took place early in the fifth century. Christian apologists during this period had to contend with two main adversaries—the Jews, and the Pagans.

(1) *The Conflict with Judaism.*—The controversy with the Jews began at the very beginning of the apostolic period (Acts viii., etc.), and was still active in the second century, and indeed much later. It gave rise to a considerable literature—viz. *The Epistle of Barnabas* (A.D. 75 ?); St. Justin's important *Dialogue with Trypho the Jew* (155); Tertullian's *Answer to the Jews* (200); St. Hippolytus's *Expository Treatise against the Jews* (220); Origen's argument against the Jew in his

[1] According to Western theologians, the Holy Ghost proceeds also from the Son, *but not from the Son as from a First Cause.* There is only one Fountain of Godhead, and that is the Father.

Against Celsus (240); St. Cyprian's *Three Books of Testimonies against the Jews* (250); Eusebius's *Demonstration of the Gospel*, bks. i. ii. (315); St. Gregory of Nyssa's *Testimonies against the Jews* (390); St. Chrysostom's *Demonstration against the Jews and the Heathen*, and *Homilies against the Jews* (400).

In arguing against the Jews the apologists laid great stress upon the Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament, which, they insisted, were perfectly fulfilled in Christ. They repelled the charge of Tritheism, by showing that even in the Old Testament there are intimations of a plurality of Persons within the Divine Unity. They proved the divinity of Jesus by identifying Him with the mysterious "Angel of Jehovah" who appeared to Abraham (Gen. xviii.), Moses (Exod. iii.), Joshua (Josh. v. 13), and others; and who, being called Jehovah, and receiving divine worship, could only be regarded as a Divine Being.

(2) *The Conflict with Paganism.*—Much more important was the conflict with Paganism. The following list contains the leading contributions to this controversy: *The Apologies* of the philosophers Quadratus and Aristides,[1] presented to the Emperor Hadrian during his visit to Greece, A.D. 131; Ambrosius (?), *To the Greeks*, and *Epistle to Diognetus* (140?); St. Justin, *First* and *Second Apologies*, and other works of doubtful authenticity (150); Tatian, *Oration to the Greeks* (165); Melito, *Apology* addressed to Marcus Aurelius (177); Athenagoras, *Embassy for the Christians*, presented to Marcus Aurelius and Commodus (177); Theophilus of Antioch, *To Autolycus* (181); St. Clement of Alexandria, *Exhortation to the Heathen* (190); Tertullian, *Apology* (200); St. Hippolytus, *Refutation of all Heresies*, bks. i. and iv. (220); Minucius Felix, *Octavius* (230?); Origen, *Against Celsus* (240); Cyprian, *On the Vanity*

[1] Aristides' *Apology* has lately been recovered. That of Quadratus is lost.

of Idols (250); Arnobius, *Against the Heathen* (300); Eusebius, *Preparation for the Gospel*, and *Demonstration of the Gospel* (315); St. Athanasius, *Oration against the Heathen* and *On the Incarnation of the Word* (319); Lactantius, *Divine Institutes* (320); Hermias, *Mockery of the Pagan Philosophers* (362); Diodorus of Tarsus, *Against Fate* (380), a summary of which has been preserved by Photius; St. Augustine, *City of God* (413—426); Theodoret, *A Remedy for Greek Affections*, and *On Divine Providence* (435).

The main purpose of the earlier apologists was to refute the calumnious charges of impurity, barbarity, and impiety, under which the Christian body laboured, and to show that it was possible to be at once a Christian and a good citizen. The later apologists wrote with a more exclusively polemical purpose against Paganism. All the apologies, however, even the earliest, contain severe strictures on Polytheism. As against Polytheism, the apologists demonstrate the unity of the Godhead, partly from the unity and harmony of Nature (Origen, Athanasius, Lactantius), and partly from the impossibility of there being more than one perfect and absolute First Cause (Athenagoras, Cyprian, Gregory of Nyssa). They are, in fact, uncompromising Monotheists, and for this reason lay greater stress on the Divine Unity than on the Divine Trinity, greater stress on the supremacy (*monarchia*) of the Father than on the co-equality of the Divine Persons. They seek to commend the doctrine of the Incarnation to the Pagan world by identifying Jesus with the *Divine Reason* or *Logos*, which is immanent in the world, and is the cause of its rational order. This *Logos*, they teach, enlightens every man that is born into the world. It inspires all genuine prophets, not only those of Judaism, but also those of heathenism.[1] The philosophers also, they hold, especially Socrates and Plato, spoke under the guidance of the *Logos*, and were thus

[1] *E.g.* the Cumæan Sibyl.

enabled to anticipate to some extent the doctrines of the Gospel. At last the *Logos*, who had partially manifested Himself at sundry times and in divers manners throughout human history, became incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth, and through His life and teaching gave to mankind a full and final revelation, which approves itself to the conscience as absolutely perfect. This identification of Jesus with *the Divine Logos*, the real existence of which almost every philosopher and educated Pagan of the second century believed, was a master-stroke of apologetic ingenuity. The *Logos* Christology formed a golden bridge by which a constant stream of cultured and philosophic Pagans passed over into the Catholic Church. The attitude of the Christian apologists towards Pagan philosophy was, generally speaking, friendly.[1] Several of the Christian apologists (Quadratus, Aristides, Justin, Athenagoras) had been Pagan philosophers, and after their conversion naturally represented Christianity as a more perfect philosophy. A high esteem for Philosophy is especially characteristic of the Alexandrian Fathers (Clement and Origen), but is not confined to them. Even for educated Christians generally, Christianity was "our philosophy." All the apologists were Platonists. They looked with little approval on the cold intellectualism of Aristotelianism, and the moral arrogance of Stoicism, and they severely condemned —as indeed did most earnest Pagans—the levity and impiety of the school of Epicurus. The exclusive devotion of the primitive Christians to Plato was fortunate for the Church. Platonism prevailed almost exclusively from the end of the second century to the closing of the philosophic schools by Justinian I. (A.D. 529), and inasmuch as Platonism, in its

[1] The Greek Christians were more friendly than the Latins, who were inclined to regard Philosophy as secular and dangerous. Tatian, Tertullian, and Hermias may be mentioned as (upon the whole) hostile to Philosophy. Tertullian, nevertheless, makes large use of it.

Neo-Platonic form, taught the unity of God, the existence of inferior "dæmons," the immortality of the soul, future rewards and punishments, the reality of inspiration and prophecy, and even a kind of Trinity, it is not surprising that many philosophic Pagans were led through Neo-Platonism to Christ.

The firm belief of the ancient apologists in magic, and therefore in Pagan miracles, prevented them from laying any great stress upon the miraculous evidence for Christianity. When they allude to the miracles of Christ, it is generally to call attention to their ethical and redemptive character. Arnobius, however, employs the argument from miracles almost in the manner of the eighteenth-century apologists.

The strongest and most convincing argument employed by the apologists was the moral contrast between Christianity and Paganism. The rites of Paganism were, as they often pointed out, idolatrous, superstitious, and impure; its moral standard was low, and it lacked the power to generate enthusiasm for righteousness. Christianity, on the other hand, as the apologists rightly insisted, upheld a most exalted standard of virtue and piety, and, what is more, gave the power to realize it.

The leading Pagan writers against the Church were Celsus (A.D. 170?); Porphyry (270); Hierocles (305); and Julian the Apostate (362). Lucian satirized Christianity in his *Death of Peregrinus*; and Philostratus, senior, in his *Life of Apollonius of Tyana*, attempted to depict a more perfect life than that of Christ.

Period II.—From the Middle of the Fifth to the Middle of the Fifteenth Century

From the downfall of Paganism to the dawn of the Reformation the history of Apologetics is almost a blank. Christianity found only one real opponent, Mahomet; and the contest between the two adversaries was fought with

sharper weapons than the pen. The following works, however, may be described as apologetic: *On the Insolence of the Jews*, by Agobard of Lyons (A.D. 822); *A Dialogue between a Philosopher, a Jew, and a Christian*, by Abelard (1120); *The Dagger of the Faith against Moors and Jews*, by Raymundus Martini, a Dominican friar (1278); and *A Summary of the Catholic Faith against the Heathen*, by St. Thomas Aquinas (1225—1274).

Period III.—From the Middle of the Fifteenth Century to the Present Time

(1) *The Renaissance and the Reformation.*—The intellectual tendency of the Renaissance, which preceded the Reformation, is generally described as Humanism. The Humanists actively promoted the revival of classical learning, and fell in violent love with classical ideals. They did not actually repudiate Christianity, but were often accused (not altogether without reason) of preferring Cicero to the New Testament, and the teaching of the Pagan poets to that of Christ. In Philosophy they followed Plato, and rejected, perhaps with undue contempt, the scholastic Aristotelianism, which, since the time of Aquinas, had dominated the schools. The chief works in criticism of Humanism were those of Marsilius Ficinus, *De religione Christiana et fidei pietate* (A.D. 1497); Savonarola, *Triumphus crucis* (1497); Steuco, *De perenni philosophia* (1540); and Vives, *De veritate fidei Christianæ* (1543).

The Reformation, being a domestic dispute among Christians, which did not call fundamental doctrine in question, naturally gave rise to few apologetic works. The sub-reformation period, however, produced one work of considerable importance, the *De veritate religionis Christianæ* of Hugo Grotius (1627), which was written to serve as an undenominational manual of Christian evidences. It achieved an immense popularity, and was translated into the chief European

languages, and even into Arabic, Persian, and Chinese. Fifty years ago it was still extensively read.

(2) *The Close of the Seventeenth and the Eighteenth Century.* —From about the middle of the seventeenth century a type of unbelief began to prevail, which was called in England Deism, in France Scepticism, and in Germany Rationalism.[1] The English movement is the most important. The English school of Deists embraced Lord Herbert of Cherbury,[2] the founder (1582—1648); Tindal (1657—1733); Woolston (1669—1733); Toland (1670—1722); Shaftesbury (1671—1713); Bolingbroke (1678—1751); Collins (1676—1729); Chubb (1679—1746); and, greatest of all, Hume (1711—1776). Some class Locke (1632—1704) as a Deist, but wrongly. His Philosophy is undoubtedly rationalistic in tendency, but in actual belief he was a liberal Anglican. The most notable writings against Deism were Locke's *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1695); Leslie's *Short and Easy Method with the Deists* (1697); Berkeley's *Three Dialogues* (1713) and *Alciphron* (1733); Butler's *Analogy* (1736); Lardner's *Credibility of the Gospel History* (1727—1755); Paley's *Evidences of Christianity* (1794) and *Natural Theology* (1802).

French Scepticism was an offshoot of English Deism. Its chief representatives were Bayle (1647—1706), Rousseau (1670—1741), Voltaire (1694—1778), and Diderot (1713—1784). The apologetic literature to which it gave rise is unimportant.

The founder of German Rationalism was Christian Wolff, the philosopher (1679—1754), who was followed by Reimarus (1694—1767). The most characteristic work of Reimarus, the *Apologie*, was published after his death, as the notorious *Wolfenbüttel Fragments* (1774), by Lessing (1729—1781), the

[1] To the beginning of this period belongs also the somewhat isolated figure of Spinoza (1632—1677), the greatest advocate of pure and consistent Pantheism.

[2] Herbert's famous "five articles" were: (1) There is a God, (2) who is to be worshipped, (3) mainly by virtue and piety. (4) Men should repent. (5) There is a future retribution.

greatest of the German Rationalists of the eighteenth century with the exception of Kant (1724—1804), who, perhaps, is not fairly classed as a Rationalist. Representative of the Biblical criticism of the period is J. G. Eichhorn (1752—1827), whose rationalizing methods of dealing with the Gospel miracles are similar to those of his younger and better-known contemporary Paulus (1761—1851). The main solvent of the rather shallow Rationalism of this period was not so much the strictly orthodox polemic, as the deeper and more philosophical Theology of Semler (1725—1791), Schleiermacher (1768—1834), and Neander (1789—1850).

(3) *The Nineteenth Century.*—The ample space already accorded to the controversies of the nineteenth century renders lengthy treatment of them in this place unnecessary. The Rationalism of this period may be classed as (*a*) philosophic, (*b*) scientific, (*c*) critical. Philosophic Rationalism in Germany has been inspired mainly by the sceptical or semi-sceptical Philosophy of Kant (died 1804), and by the Pantheism or semi-Pantheism of Schelling (1775—1854) and Hegel (1770—1831). Hegelianism was popularized to some extent in England and Scotland by T. H. Green (1836—1882), but most British philosophers of rationalistic tendencies have preferred to develop the empirical Scepticism of Hume (*e.g.* James Mill (1773—1836), John Mill (1806—1873), and Prof. Bain). Much less important has been the naked Materialism of Vogt, Moleschott, Büchner, and Häckel. Sir W. Hamilton, in his *Philosophy of the Unconditioned* (1829), and Mansel, in his *Limits of Religious Thought* (1858), made interesting apologetic efforts to press the Agnosticism of Kant into the service of Theism and Christianity. In France philosophic Rationalism has been ably represented by the *Positive Philosophy* of Comte (1798—1857). Rationalism has been popularized among the masses in Germany by Schenkel's *Charakterbild Jesu*, Strauss's *Life of Jesus for the German People* (1864), and *The Old Faith and the New* (1872); in France by Renan's *Life of Jesus* (1863); and in England by

Robert Owen (1771—1858), G. J. Holyoake, and C. Bradlaugh, and still more recently by the cheap publications of the Rationalist Press Association.

Modern scientific Rationalism dates from 1859, the year of the publication of Darwin's *Origin of Species*. Darwinism has been developed into complete philosophy of Evolution by H. Spencer in his *Synthetic Philosophy* (1860—1896), and by Fiske in his *Outlines of Cosmic Philosophy* (1874).

Critical Rationalism, based on the "higher criticism" of the Bible, dates (in its modern form) from Baur's appointment as Professor of Historical Theology in the University of Tübingen (1826). Of late years Baur's followers have split into two groups—an unimportant one (Pierson, Loman, Naber, Völter, Steck, van Manen) which rejects every New Testament book, and a large and influential one (Harnack, Jülicher, etc.) which leans strongly towards conservative views.[1]

Among the leading apologists of the century may be mentioned, in Germany, Ullmann, Tholuck, Luthardt, Auberlen, Christlieb, Zöckler, Ebrard, Ritschl, Kaftan, Delitzsch, Zahn, Hettinger (R.C.), and Schanz (R.C.); in England, Mansel, Liddon, Lightfoot, Salmon, Westcott, Farrar; in France, Guizot, Lacordaire; in Switzerland, Naville, Godet. English apologists were dominated down to 1869 (Mozley's *Bampton Lectures on Miracles*) by the traditions of Paley, who relied mainly on the evidence of miracles. Since that date apologists have relied chiefly on the moral and spiritual evidence for Christianity (Row, Storrs, Brace, Kidd, etc.).

APPENDIX VI

USEFUL BOOKS

The literature of special subjects has been very fully given; but the following short list of general books will be found useful.

[1] Among rationalistic "higher critics" of the Old Testament may be mentioned de Wette (1780—1849), and, in more modern times, Graf, Kuenen, and Wellhausen.

(*a*) TREATISES.—* Berkeley, *Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous*; * Butler, *Analogy*, and *Sermons*; Paley, *Natural Theology*, and *Evidences of Christianity*, and *Horæ Paulinæ*; Row, *Bampton Lectures*; Flint, *Theism*, and *Anti-theistic Theories*, and *Agnosticism*; J. Ward, *Naturalism and Agnosticism* (best criticism of Materialism and Spencer's Philosophy); G. P. Fisher, *Grounds of Theistic and Christian Belief*; R. Otto, *Naturalism and Religion* (good criticism of Materialism); A. J. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*; E. De La Touche, *Christian Certitude*; G. K. Chesterton, *Orthodoxy*; *J. N. Figgis, *The Gospel and Human Needs*, and *Civilization at the Cross Roads*; *Liddon, *Divinity of our Lord*; C. Gore, *Bampton Lectures*, and (ed.) *Lux Mundi*; J. R. Illingworth, **Divine Immanence*, and **Divine Transcendence*, and **Reason and Revelation*, and * *Personality Human and Divine*; A. Godard, *Christian Positivism* (tr.) (French R. C. apologetic work); Gutberlet, *Apologetik* (R. C.); Margaret Benson, *The Venture of a Rational Faith*; H. B. Swete, *Faith in its Relation to Creed, Thought, and Life*; W. P. Du Bose, *The Reason of Life*; T. G. Bonney, *The Present Relations of Science and Religion*; * G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*; A. H. Tabrum, *Religious Beliefs of Scientists* (contains 100 letters); Henslow, *Present-day Rationalism critically examined*; A. L. Moore, *Science and the Faith*; J. Orr, *The Christian View of God and the World*; A. B. Bruce, *Miraculous Element in the Gospels*; J. Wendland, *Miracles and Christianity* (tr.); W. Sanday, *Inspiration*; G. Salmon, *Introduction to the New Testament*[9], 1899 (still the best apologetic treatise); P. Batiffol, *The Credibility of the Gospel* (very valuable); A. Lang, *The Making of Religion*; W. James, *Varieties of Religious Experience*; F. von Hügel, *The Mystical Element of Religion*; R. Hoffmann, *La Notion de l'Être Suprême chez les Peuples non-civilisés* (Geneva, 1907).

The best recent defence of the Catholic conception of Christianity is the thoroughly scientific work of P. Batiffol, translated as *Primitive Catholicism*, 1912. There is very little

* These are also published in cheap editions.

in it with which Anglicans are not in agreement. The Anglican standpoint is well defended in the numerous publications of the Church Historical Society (issued by the S.P.C.K.); in C. Gore's *The Church and the Ministry*, and *Orders and Unity*, and * *Roman Catholic Claims*; Puller's *The Primitive Saints and the See of Rome*; also in *The Answer of the Archbishops of England to the Apostolic Letter of Pope Leo XIII.*

The best recent rationalistic manual is P. Vivian, *The Churches and Modern Thought.* (See also the publications of the Rationalist Press Association.)

(*b*) POPULAR, SEMI-POPULAR, AND CHEAP BOOKS.—Westcott, *The Historic Faith*, 6*d.*; C. Gore, *The Creed of the Christian*, 6*d.*; W. H. Turton, *The Truth of Christianity*, 2*s.* 6*d.* (the most complete small work, orthodox and conservative); V. Staley, *The Natural Religion and The Practical Religion*, and *The Catholic Religion* (1*s.* each); A. F. W. Ingram, *Reasons for Faith*, 2*s.* 6*d.*; Liddon, *Some Elements of Religion*, 6*d.*; A. W. Momerie, *Belief in God*, and *Inspiration*, and *Origin of Evil*, and *Immortality*, 6*d.* each; G. J. Romanes, *Thoughts on Religion*, 6*d.*; C. L. Drawbridge, *Is Religion Undermined?*, 1*s.*; P. N. Waggett, *Science and Faith*, 6*d.*; J. H. Skrine, *Miracle and History*, 1*s.*; H. Drummond, *Natural Law in the Spiritual World*, 6*d.* (Calvinistic); L. Ragg, *Evidences of Christianity*, 1*s.*; B. Lucas, *Faith of a Disciple*, 6*d.*; C. Bickersteth, *Letters to a Godson* (2 series, 1*s.* each); A. C. Row, *Reasons for Believing in Christianity*, 6*d.*; C. Gore, *Why We Christians Believe in Christ*, 1*s.*; P. C. Simpson, *The Fact of Christ*, 1*s.*; R. E. Welsh, *In Relief of Doubt*, 6*d.*; G. Haw (ed.), *Religious Doubts of Democracy* (exposes *Clarion* fallacies), 6*d.*; J. Warschauer, *Anti-Nunquam*, 6*d.*; F. Loofs, *Anti-Haeckel*; Paterson-Smith, *The Old Documents and the New Bible*, 1*s.*, and *How We Got Our Bible*, 6*d.*; M. Dods, *The Bible, its Origin and Nature*, 2*s.*; F. Watson, *Inspiration*, 4*s.*; G. H. Box, *Short Introduction to the Literature of the Old Testament*, 1*s.*; J. A. Robinson, *Thoughts on Inspiration*, 6*d.*; C. H. Robinson,

* This is also published in a cheap edition.

Human Nature a Revelation of the Divine (defends inspiration of O. T.), 6*d.*; Driver and Kirkpatrick, *The Higher Criticism*, 1*s.*; R. M. Wenley, *Preparation for Christianity in the Ancient World*, 1*s.* 6*d.*; C. C. Martindale, *The New Testament* (R. C.), 6*d.*; J. A. Robinson, *Historical Character of St. John's Gospel*, 6*d.*; Wace, *On Agnosticism*, 6*d.*; M. Benson, *Review of Christian Science*, 2*d.*; C. C. Martindale, *Theosophy*, 1*s.*; J. L. Johnston, *Some Alternatives to Jesus Christ*, 2*s.* 6*d.*; W. St. C. Tisdall, *Comparative Religion*, 1*s.*; C. C. Martindale, *Lectures on the History of Religions*, vol. i., 1*s.* 6*d.*; F. B. Jevons, *The Idea of God*, 1*s.*, and *Comparative Religion*, 1*s.*; E. McClure, *Modern Substitutes for Traditional Christianity*; H. Lewis, *Modern Rationalism as seen at Work in its Biographies*, 4*s.*; J. M. Wilson, *Evolution and the Holy Scriptures*, and *Problems of Religion and Science*, and *Four Lectures on the Old Testament*, and *The Atonement*, 6*d.* each; O. Lodge, *Man and the Universe*, 1*s.*; H. Drummond, *The Ascent of Man*, 6*d.*; F. Ballard, *Popular Determinism*, 6*d.*; and *God Prayer and the Mysteries of Pain*, 6*d.*; J. Hinton, *The Mystery of Pain*, 6*d.*; Hirst, *Is Nature Cruel?*, 1*s.*; *Oxford House Papers*, 3 vols., 1*s.* 6*d.* each; Liddon, *The Divinity of Our Lord*, 2*s.* 6*d.*; J. A. Robinson, *Some Thoughts on the Incarnation*, 6*d.*; H. R. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ*, 9*d.*; J. N. Figgis, *The Gospel and Human Needs*, 6*d.*; J. H. B. Masterman, *Was Jesus Christ Divine?*, 1*s.* 3*d.*; Westcott, *Is Christianity True?* and *Characteristics of the Gospel Miracles*, 6*d.* each; J. Young, *The Christ of History*, 6*d.*; T. P. Ring, *The Most Certain Fact in History* (on the Resurrection), 2*s.* 6*d.*; W. H. Turton, *The Resurrection of Christ*, 6*d.*; Westcott, *The Gospel of the Resurrection*, 6*d.*; P. Bull, *The Evidences of the Resurrection*, 1*d.*, and *Through Doubt to Faith*, 1*d.*; F. Ballard, *Miracles of Unbelief*, 6*s.*, and *The People's Religious Difficulties*, 3*s.* 6*d.*; P. Dearmer, *Everyman's History of the English Church*, 1*s.*; Newbolt, *The Athanasian Creed*, 1*d.*; F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*, 6*d.*; W. E. Chadwick, *The Social Principles of the Gospel*, 1*s.* 6*d.*; J. L. Barton, *Human Progress Through*

Missions, 1*s.* 6*d.* (See also lists of books issued by the Christian Evidence Society, and the pamphlet *Books to Read*, Longmans, 1914, 6*d.*)

LITERATURE

(*a*) The Influence of Jesus

Storrs, *Divine Origin of Christianity*; Brace, *Gesta Christi*; Row, *Bampton Lectures*; Phillips Brooks, *The Influence of Jesus*; B. Kidd, *Social Evolution*; Croslegh, *Christianity Judged by its Fruits*; Dennis, *Missions and Social Progress*; Uhlhorn, *Christian Charity in the Ancient Church*: Harnack, *Expansion of Christianity*; T. E. Slater, *The Influence of the Christian Religion in History*; J. L. Barton, *Human Progress Through Missions*; N. Talbot, *The Mind of the Disciples*; F. G. Peabody, *Jesus Christ and the Social Question*; S. A. Barnett, *Religion and Progress*; W. Cunningham, *Christianity and Modern Social Questions*; Hobhouse, *The Church and the World*; Cairns, *Christianity and the Modern World.*

The subject is treated from a moderate rationalistic standpoint by Lecky, *History of European Morals from Augustus to Charlemagne.*

(*b*) The Authority of the Church

T. B. Strong, *Authority in the Church*; Stanton, *The Place of Authority in Religious Belief*; A. J. Balfour, *Foundations of Belief*; C. Gore, *Roman Catholic Claims*; H. Cecil, *Liberty and Authority*; P. T. Forsyth, *Principle of Authority and Positive Preaching*; Forrest, *Authority of Christ*; A. C. Headlam, *History, Authority, and Theology*; G. E. Newsom, *Principles of Churchmanship*; Lecky, *Authority in Religion.*

(*c*) Eternal Punishment

Pusey, *What is of Faith as to Everlasting Punishment?*; Farrar, *Eternal Hope*; Plumptre, *Spirits in Prison*; Mason, *Purgatory*; Luckock, *After Death*; (Symposium) *Is there a Hell?*

(*d*) The Atonement

Butler, *Analogy*; Moberly, *Atonement and Personality*; E. H. Askwith in *Cambridge Theological Essays* (ed. Swete);

Rivière, *Le Dogme de la Rédemption*, 1905; S. A. McDowall, *Evolution and the Need of Atonement*, 1912; F. R. M. Hitchcock, *The Atonement and Modern Thought*; J. Denny, *The Atonement and the Modern Mind*; J. M. Wilson, *Gospel of the Atonement*; H. A. Lyttleton in *Lux Mundi*; J. M. Campbell, *Nature of the Atonement*; Oxenham, *Catholic Doctrine of the Atonement*; Ritschl, *Justification and Reconciliation*; A. Sabatier, *Doctrine of the Atonement* (see also ch. xiv.).

(*e*) The Holy Trinity

J. Lebreton, *Les Origines du Dogme de la Trinité*, 1910; J. R. Illingworth, *The Doctrine of the Trinity apologetically considered*; F. J. Hall, *The Trinity*, 1910; W. O. Brown, *The Trinity and Modern Thought*; Billot, *De Deo Uno et Trino*; A. L. Moore in *Lux Mundi*.

(*f*) History of Apologetics

Article, "Apologetik, Apologie," in the Hauck-Herzog *Realencyklopädie*; art. "Apologists," in Smith's *Dict. Chr. Biog.*; A. S. Farrar, *History of Free Thought*; Lecky, *A History of the Rise and Influence of Rationalism in Europe*; L. Stephen, *History of English Thought in the Eighteenth Century*; Draper, *History of the Conflict between Religion and Science*; A. D. White, *Warfare of Science with Theology*; Allen, *Continuity of Christian Thought*; the relevant sections in the various histories of Philosophy and Theology.

SUPPLEMENT

THE ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

The ontological argument is an attempt to prove the existence of God from the mere idea of God. As stated by St. Anselm, it is as follows: We have in our minds the idea of a perfect being; but an actually existing being is more perfect than a being that exists in the mind alone: therefore a perfect being really exists.

Gaunilo, a contemporary of St. Anselm, retorted with the following parallel argument: It is possible to conceive of a perfect island, far superior to any existing island; but a really existing island is more perfect than an island that exists in the mind alone: therefore the perfect island that we imagined really exists.

The saint replied that the perfection of an island is only relative and partial, whereas the perfection of God is absolute, so that the arguments are not really parallel. In this he was right; but it cannot be denied that the argument, as originally stated, was open to Gaunilo's criticism.

Anselm's argument, rejected by the schoolmen, was revived in a modified form by Descartes and Leibnitz.

A more satisfactory way of stating the argument is as follows: There exist in the human mind *ideals*, *e.g.* the ideal of absolute perfection; but such an ideal cannot be derived from the mind itself, for the mind is imperfect; nor can it be derived from external nature, for nothing perfect exists

in nature. It remains that it must be derived from some Being superior to nature, who is absolutely perfect.

It should be noticed that this form of the argument does not, like Anselm's, infer the existence of God from the mere idea of perfection, but from the need of assigning a cause to this idea.

(See W. Knight, *Aspects of Theism*, c. iv.; R. Flint, *Theism*, p. 278 ff.; C. C. J. Webb, *Problems in the Relations of God and Man*; B. Boedder, *Natural Theology*, pp. 24–29. A translation of St. Anselm's *Proslogium* and *Monologium*, with Gaunilo's objection and St. Anselm's reply, is issued by the Open Court Publishing Company, Chicago.)

SUPPLEMENTARY CHAPTER TO THIRD EDITION

RECENT CRITICAL TENDENCIES

The main theological and philosophical movements of interest to the Christian apologist, which have gained prominence since the last edition of this book (1914), are the following :—

(1) The rise of a type of Christology, which, while attempting to preserve the traditional Christian attitude of devotion towards the Person of Christ as the God-man, yet rejects with decision the doctrine defined by the Fourth Ecumenical Council (Chalcedon, A.D. 451), that within the unity of the Redeemer's Person are to be distinguished two " natures " and " substances " (the Divine and the human), each equally complete and perfect, and each (in spite of its eternal distinctness) co-operating with the other in absolute and indissoluble harmony.

(2) The development of an advanced type of Modernism within the Anglican communion.

(3) The growth of a tendency to base theology upon psychology, instead of, as heretofore, upon logic and metaphysics.

(4) A tendency among certain theologians to adopt agnostic theories of knowledge, which deny

or doubt the power of the human mind to attain real objective knowledge of ultimate reality.

Of considerable apologetic interest also is—

(5) The adoption by the younger English Evangelicals of the generally accepted principles and methods of modern criticism as applied to the Bible.[1]

Upon the whole, we welcome this change of attitude, because it makes it evident that, so far as the Anglican communion is concerned, the Christian faith will henceforth be defended (at least in all responsible quarters) by arguments likely to appeal to modern minds.[2]

The Doctrine of "the Two Natures"

In Germany the doctrine of "the Two Natures" in the one Person of Christ has been rejected for more than two generations by all Liberal—indeed by practically all Protestant—theologians; and this rejection has usually been accompanied by a steady drift towards Humanitarianism or Unitarianism. Among continental Liberals, Jesus is usually regarded as a man of unique holiness (not, however, by any means always of actual sinless-

[1] See especially the volume of essays *Liberal Evangelicalism* (1923), the Christology of which is more open to objection than its attitude towards modern criticism. Its authors lean decidedly towards the Christological theories of Prof. H. R. Mackintosh, which are criticized below.

[2] The same cannot unfortunately be said of America, where the defence of Christianity is left largely to "the Fundamentalists," a numerous and well-organized body, who adhere to the doctrine of Verbal Inspiration (or something like it), and are frankly hostile to the application of modern methods to the study of the Bible and theology.

ness), in whom the Spirit of God dwelt in larger measure than in other men, and who uniquely realized in faith and devotion that attitude of "Sonship" towards God, which is the religious ideal set before every man. Jesus is the Religious Pioneer of our race—our great Initiator into that supreme type of religion which is based on the recognition of man's filial relation to God as Father. Jesus is not a Divine Redeemer in the sense of traditional Christianity. His "Sonship" is not metaphysical or "consubstantial" in the orthodox sense, but ethical. He is literally "the first-born among many brethren"—the first human being actually to realize "Sonship" in its full perfection, not, however, the only person who will ever do so. On the contrary, every true follower of Jesus may confidently hope and indeed expect to become a "Son of God" hereafter in precisely the same sense in which Jesus now is.

In England, on the other hand, the rejection of the doctrine of the Two Natures is often accompanied by a strong antagonism to Unitarianism, and a sincere desire to keep within the limits of what is sometimes spoken of as "substantial orthodoxy," *i.e.* the recognition of Christ as no mere man, but man's divine and adorable Redeemer.[1] This is notably the case with Prof. H. R. Mackintosh, whose able, sincere, and (at least in spirit and

[1] Canon Storr, for instance, who rejects the Two Natures, says: "I do not think the line taken [by me] is really heretical. I have merely tried to insist that we must at all costs preserve the unity of Christ's Person, and give full value to His real humanity."

intention) most Christian book, *The Doctrine of Person of Jesus Christ* (1912), has exercised a powerful influence, not only in Scotland, but also in England, and that, not only among Nonconformists,[1] but even among Anglicans.[2] Dr. Mackintosh's devotional attitude towards the Person of Christ is all that orthodox Christians could desire ; he writes, moreover, with the definitely apologetic aim of removing difficulties felt by certain types of modern minds in accepting the historic belief of Christendom, that Jesus, the Redeemer, is both God and man. He and his followers are sincerely persuaded that, in rejecting the decrees of Chalcedon, they are strengthening rather than weakening the essential faith for which the Chalcedonian Fathers contended ; yet since they have taken so serious a step as to reject a doctrine which all Christendom received continuously and almost unanimously from A.D. 451 to the Reformation—a doctrine which was not challenged by a single Reformation leader except Socinus, and to which the vast majority of professing Christians are still passionately attached, as enshrining in their view

[1] Dr. Mackintosh's influence on English Nonconformists has been largely exercised through the Christian Student Movement (a predominantly Free Church organization), for which he has written two books, *The Divine Initiative*, and *The Person of Jesus Christ*.

[2] Canon Storr, both in *Fundamentals of the Faith* (1922) and in *Liberal Evangelicalism* (1923) quotes Dr. Mackintosh with enthusiastic approval. Dean Burroughs (in the latter work) also says : "The rapid advance of the science of psychology . . . has made many feel that the definition of Christ's Person framed in A.D. 451 by the Council of Chalcedon requires revision."

the very essence of the Gospel message, it is necessary to weigh with all possible care the reasons offered for rejection. This seems to be all the more necessary, because Dr. Mackintosh's book has been received with marked favour in advanced Modernist and Unitarian circles, where there is a disposition to maintain, that though the writer is personally orthodox or nearly so, his principles, when carried to their logical conclusions, result not in " the essential orthodoxy " which he advocates, but in a Christology of an advanced liberal and most unorthodox character.

Dr. Mackintosh's three fundamental positions may be summed up as follows :—

(1) That the category of " substance " has been abandoned by modern thinkers, and is moreover " materialistic " and inapplicable to spirit. Accordingly the Church should abandon its official theology (which is expressed in terms of " substance "), and give it new expression in terms of " personality " or " will."

(2) That the doctrine of " Two Natures " in Christ must be discarded, because it postulates two centres of consciousness, two activities, and two wills in His single Personalty, thus destroying the unity of His mental life as depicted in the Gospels.

(3) That the Incarnation may be correctly described in terms of " Immanence," or the Divine Indwelling.

I propose to discuss each of these positions in turn.

The Category of "Substance"

In reply to Dr. Mackintosh's contention that the category of substance is materialistic and antiquated,[1] and that accordingly it is the duty of modern theologians to cease to employ it, and to "construe the facts freshly in terms of personality," I venture to suggest that, so far from "substance" being a materialistic category, it is impossible to understand or to define personality without introducing the idea of it. That this is so, is recognized, and indeed insisted on, by so modern-minded a philosopher as Prof. Clement Webb, who in his recent Gifford Lectures affirms decidedly that the ancient and medieval definition of a person ("a person is an individual *substance* of a rational nature") is still the best that we have.[2]

In spite of Dr. Mackintosh's and Dr. Temple's plea to the contrary,[3] a "person" cannot be de-

[1] *Cf.* Dr. Temple's trenchant assertion in *Foundations* (Essay V): "The spiritual cannot be represented in terms of 'substance' at all. The whole of Greek theology, noble as it is, suffers from a latent materialism; its doctrine of substance is in essence materialistic. . . . The 'substance' of the Greek Fathers, whether divine or human, has the material, not the spiritual, characteristics; it is in fact an intangible matter." It is satisfactory to notice that Dr. Temple's thought has moved steadily in the direction of tradition since these words were written.

[2] See *God and Personality*, p. 47. The definition is usually (and probably correctly) ascribed to Boetius (*c.* A.D. 480–524).

[3] "If we are inspired by the Christian Faith," says Dr. Mackintosh, "to affirm that Jesus Christ is *identical with God in will*—a will manifested in His achievement, we have reached a point beyond which no advance is possible. . . . Intelligent will is the organic centre of personality; and the will of Jesus fixes His absolute status in the world of being." Similarly Dr. Temple writes: "We easily fall into the notion

fined in terms of any of the activities or contents of his mind (such as will, thought, emotion, desire). A " person " is not a mere flux of ever-changing volitions, thoughts, emotions, desires, etc., but *a permanent, self-conscious, self-identical subject,* who exercises or experiences all these and other mental activities. Every act of will is *someone's* act of will, every thought is *someone's* thought, every desire is *someone's* desire. Moreover the consciousness of " personal identity " (*i.e.* of the identity of the " self ") is not interrupted or destroyed by growth or development, or by any change of opinion or character, however extreme, not even by a sudden conversion as dramatic and complete as that of St. Paul.

Now, it is this direct consciousness of the " self " —the " self " as distinguished from its changing activities and thoughts, which yields the concept of " substance." Dr. Mackintosh and Dr. Temple often speak of the " substance " of the soul, as if it were something inscrutable and unknowable, as indeed it is in the philosophy of Kant. But in the philosophy of the Fathers (and of orthodox Christians generally), " substance," however mysterious it may be admitted to be in its ultimate nature, is always something familiar and comprehensible, something which is known to us *in its*

of a self which ' has ' various thoughts and purposes ; but in truth the self exists in thinking its thoughts and purposes, and *apart from its thoughts and purposes is just nothing at all. . . . Will is the only substance there is in a man ; it is not a part of him, it is just himself* as a moral (or indeed ' active ') being " (italics mine).

true reality by direct experience. The traditional theology maintains (it seems to me with unanswerable force) that we are conscious not only of our mental activities (*e.g.* our thoughts, desires, volitions), but also of our permanent *self*, which exercises (or experiences) these activities. If it be objected that we cannot frame any clear idea of what the *self* is apart from its activities, it may be replied that neither can we frame any idea whatever of a feeling, or thought, or volition, without referring it to some *self*. Self and self's activities are apprehended by a single intuition of the mind, which assures us that both are equally real.

Now the *self*, as apprehended in direct experience, is precisely what is meant by a *substance*. A " substance," according to the traditional definition of it, is not something unknowable, but " something which exists *per se* "—exists, that is, in its own right, and not as a mere attribute or activity of some other thing. To take a simple illustration, " Socrates " is a " substance," [1] and " wisdom " an attribute. We can predicate wisdom of Socrates, affirming that " Socrates is wise," but we cannot reverse the process, and affirm that " Wisdom is Socrates." Wisdom is a quality of Socrates, but Socrates is not and cannot be a quality of wisdom.

In a similar way " volition " (will) is an activity of the " self," but the " self " is not an activity of

[1] Properly a *composite* substance, for he consists of " soul " (*i.e.* spiritual substance) and " body " (*i.e.* material substance ").

volition. We can say (with full understanding of what we mean) that the " self " possesses or exercises " will " ; but we cannot say without absurdity that the will possesses or exercises " self." The " self " is the permanent central reality or subject to which all mental activity is referred [1] ; hence the " self " is a " substance " ; and since the " self " is the most fundamental ingredient (technically the " ground ") of personality, it follows that personality must be defined in terms of substance capable of spiritual activities, not in terms of activities alone.

Applying this result to theology, we conclude (as against Dr. Mackintosh), that a " theology expressed in terms of personality " must of necessity be " a theology expressed in terms of substance " and not in terms of mere " will."

With regard to Dr. Mackintosh's further contention that " substance " is " a physical and all but mechanical " category, the only actual reason which he alleges for it (so far as I can discover) is that substantiality can be predicated *in an identical sense* both of matter and of spirit.

This sounds plausible, but the fallacy is immediately apparent, if we reflect that the same thing is true of the similar category of " being " or " existence," which no one on that account regards as a " material " category. We can say *in an identical sense*, " God exists," " the soul of Socrates exists," " this stone exists," without either

[1] *E.g.* it is the " self " which wills, reasons, perceives, knows, desires, hates, hopes, is happy, and is miserable.

materializing God, or spiritualizing matter. Dr. Mackintosh, who frequently asserts God's existence, never imagines that he is thereby materializing God. Why, therefore, should he imagine that orthodox theologians do so, when they assert that He is " substance " ? [1]

Should any further proof be needed that " substance " is not a " material " category, it may be added that not a few eminent philosophers (including Berkeley) who deny the existence of " material substance " altogether, yet affirm (quite as positively as the most convinced believers in " matter ") that both the human soul, and God Himself, are " substances." [2]

Dr. Mackintosh endeavours to strengthen his general position by appealing to a supposed general abandonment by modern thinkers of the category of " substance." His assertions in this direction seem to me far more sweeping than the

[1] It is only in colloquial, not philosophical English, that " substance " denotes " matter."

[2] Dr. Mackintosh seems to me less than just to orthodox theologians in ignoring the sharp distinction which they draw between (1) " spiritual [*i.e.* rational and moral] substances," and (2) " material substances." He nowhere informs the reader that they attribute to the former entirely spiritual qualities, and deny to them altogether the attributes of matter.

He seems to me equally in error in affirming that " substance " is a " static " category, excluding growth or development. No orthodox Christian would admit this for a moment. The idea of " substance " is (as I have shown) derived from our internal experience of the nature of our own souls or selves. That the human soul (which is the best known kind of " substance ") develops continually from infancy to old age without loss of personal (*i.e.* " substantial ") identity, is a fact of familiar experience.

facts warrant. It is, of course, true that there are eminent modern thinkers who have entirely discarded this category. On the other hand, there are other modern thinkers, equally eminent, and probably more numerous, who consider that " substance " is a thought-form, the use of which is as indispensable to coherent thinking in this age as in any other. They contend, with great plausibility, that many of those modern philosophers and psychologists who profess to discard it, discard only the name, but retain the idea, which they disguise from themselves and others by the use of various periphrases.

As an example, let me quote one of the greatest of contemporary psychologists and metaphysicians, Prof. James Ward[1]: " However much assailed or disowned," he writes, " the concept of a ' mind ' or conscious subject is to be found implicitly or explicitly in all psychological writers whatsoever —not more in Berkeley, who accepts it as a fact, than in Hume, who treats it as a fiction. This being so, we are far more likely to reach the truth eventually, if we openly acknowledge this inexpugnable assumption, if such it prove, instead of resorting to all sorts of devious periphrases to hide it. Now wherever the word *Subject*, or its derivatives, occurs in psychology, we might substitute the word Ego and analogous derivatives, did such exist. . . . As to the [proposal to resolve the Ego or Self into a mere succession of its own conscious states], paradox is too mild a term; even contra-

[1] See art. " Psychology," *E.B.* 11th edit.

diction will hardly suffice. . . . *What knows* can no more be identical with *what is known*, than a weight with what it weighs. . . . Knowledge or consciousness is unmeaning, except as it implies *something knowing or conscious of something*" (italics mine).

One of the most influential books on psychology which has appeared in recent years, Prof. Wm. McDougall's *Body and Mind* (1911, and many later editions) is from cover to cover a protest against that "psychology without a soul," which commends itself to the school of Dr. Mackintosh. Prof. McDougall defends at length the traditional position that the soul is a permanent self-identical "substance," distinct both from the body and from its own changing thoughts. He ridicules those who, denying that the soul is a "substance," are driven to the absurdity maintaining that "all that exists is 'knowing,' though there is no one who knows, and nothing but knowing to be known"; or that "all that exists is 'willing,' though there is no one who wills, and nothing to be willed but willing." [1]

One of the most competent of present-day metaphysicians, Mr. Thomas Case, contends that our knowledge of "substance" comes to us, not only through our inward contemplation of the mind's nature and activities, but also (and hardly less) through sensation and external perception. He considers that we never perceive qualities or activities as existing in isolation, but always as inhering

[1] *Op. cit.*, pp. 161-62.

in some substance. For instance, we never see mere colour, but always something (*i.e.* some "substance") coloured; never mere motion, but always something (*i.e.* some "substance") moving.[1] In a similar spirit Lotze writes: "A mere sensation without a subject is nowhere to be met with as a fact. It is impossible to think of a bare movement, without thinking of the mass whose movement it is; and it is just as impossible to conceive of a sensation existing without a corresponding idea of that which has it, or rather of *that which feels it*, for this also is included in the given fact of experience" (italics mine).[2]

T. H. Green also in his *Prolegomena to Ethics* defines "substance" as "that which is persistent throughout certain appearances"; and those extremely agnostic philosophers, Mr. Bertrand Russell[3] and Mr. McTaggart,[4] both affirm the former as a probable, the latter as a certain fact, that we are conscious, not only of our mental activities, but also of our "selves" as "substances."

Before closing the discussion it will be well to point out that the attempt to define a "person" in terms of "will" or even of the totality of the person's mental activities, results in the following (among other) absurdities:—

(1) If a "person" is nothing but his mental activities, it follows that in proportion as those

[1] See his *Physical Realism*, passim.
[2] *Metaphysics*, bk. iii, ch. 1.
[3] *The Problems of Philosophy*, pp. 78 ff.
[4] "The self is a substance with attributes" (*Some Dogmas of Religion*, p. 129).

activities gradually change, he gradually changes into *another person*, which is a contradiction of experience.

(2) For the same reason, if his mental activities entirely cease (as they do in deep coma, or under the influence of chloroform, or even in profound sleep), we must conclude that *he is annihilated as a person*, and that when consciousness awakes, *a new person comes into being*—a supposition equally contradicted by experience.

We may sum up the matter in the weighty words of Prof. James Lindsay : " There have been many attempts in modern philosophy to interpret experience intelligibly without the aid of the category of substance ; but even when it has been denied in words, it has not been possible to deny it in thought. . . . Substance must be sought . . . *in the self*, which attests itself as a substantial being behind all its activities. [The] knowing subject is itself substance. In other words, what we are yields the fullest consciousness of substance that we have, in virtue of its self-identical ego amid changing states or manifestations. . . . The notion of substance . . . is one from which we simply cannot get away."[1]

The Two Natures of Christ

Dr. Mackintosh has so strong a conviction of the dangerous consequences of the doctrine of the Two

[1] *Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics* (1920), article " Substance."

Natures of Christ, as defined at Chalcedon, that he considers that those Christians who in this enlightened age still adhere to it are guilty, not merely of intellectual, but even of moral delinquency. "To return thus," he says, "to a theoretic duality of mental life in our Lord, against which all modern Christology has been a protest, is surely *to sin against light*."[1] Seeing, however, that the immense majority of Christians still adhere firmly to the formula of Chalcedon, and that the reasons alleged against it by Dr. Mackintosh seem to me insufficient, I venture, even at the risk of "sinning against light," to say something in its defence.

Prof. Mackintosh's objections to the doctrine of the Two Natures are mainly: (1) that it "imports into the life of Christ an incredible and thoroughgoing dualism," and (2) that it contradicts the evidence of the Gospels.

"In place of that perfect unity which is felt in every impression of Him, the whole is bisected sharply by the fissure of distinction. No longer one, He is divided against Himself. . . . A dualism of this kind annuls the very thought of redemption by means of God's self-manifestation in flesh. . . . God is not after all living a human life. . . . There has been no saving descent, since in the last resort deity is impossible." "The self-consciousness of Jesus," continues Dr. Mackintosh, "as depicted by the evangelists, we may call it divine or human as we please; to express the whole truth we must call it both at once. But it

[1] *Doctrine of the Person of Jesus Christ*, p. 482 (italics mine).

is a single consciousness after all ; it moves always as a spiritual unity ; and separative or divisive theories do a grave disservice, not merely to clear thinking, but to religious truth and power." [1]

Before coming to close quarters with the main question at issue, it will be well to remove certain serious misunderstandings, to which the above unsympathetic description of orthodox belief is likely to give rise. It is, then, simply a *parody* of the Chalcedonian theology to assert that it denies the reality of God's " self-manifestation in the flesh," or of His assumption of a genuine human experience, or that it interprets the Divine impassibility in such an extreme sense as to deny that the Eternal Son tasted to the full the bitterness of death for our redemption.

It is of the very essence of the formulated faith of Christendom that the Son of God, by virtue of His Incarnation, humbled Himself to *become* man. His Divine Personality itself became, by a process of limitation, depotentiation, or " self-emptying," the personal centre of the manhood of Jesus. It is precisely this actual descent of divinity into human conditions—this actual acquiring by God *as His own* of a personal human experience, which the doctrine of Christ's " impersonal " [2] manhood was framed to safeguard. This doctrine does not mean

[1] Pp. 294-5, abridged. *Cp.* the words of Canon Storr : " We must, then, if we are to do justice to the records, start from the fact that our Lord was a man, with a single will and consciousness. . . . He did not have two wills, or two centres of consciousness " (*Fundamentals of the Faith*, pp. 37, 40).

[2] *ἀνυπόστατος.*

—it never has meant—that the manhood of Jesus was really impersonal, but only that *it had no personality of its own*,[1] as distinct from the personality of Him, who created it by assuming it. As Leontius of Byzantium and his successors rightly explained the formula, Christ's manhood was not personal *in its own right* (for had it been so, Christ would have been two persons,[2] not one), but it was " personal in the Word,"[3] whose humanity it was. Explained in this way (and no other explanation is orthodox) the doctrine of the "impersonal" manhood ought to find a ready acceptance with Dr. Mackintosh, for it has been found by experience to be the only effective safeguard of the truth so precious to him of " the infinite self-surrender of God in becoming man for our redemption " (*op. cit.*, p. 281).

With much of Dr. Mackintosh's criticism of the exaggerated emphasis laid by certain medieval theologians (including some of the greatest) upon the doctrine of the divine impassibility, most orthodox Christians will find themselves in agreement. What, however, he fails to recognize is that this defect is entirely absent from the definitions of

[1] ἦν οὐκ ἰδιοϋπόστατος.

[2] Nestorius was supposed to teach that there are two persons in Christ, and it was largely against his heresy that the doctrine of the " impersonal " manhood was formulated.

[3] ὑπόστατος ἐν τῷ Λόγῳ, or in one word, ἐνυπόστατος. Euthymius expresses the truth with great accuracy. " Christ's divine nature is personal in its own right; but His human nature is neither impersonal, nor personal in its own right, but it is personal in something else (ἐνυπόστατος), for it achieves personality in the divine nature."

the Ecumenical Councils, which alone are authoritative for Christians. Authoritative Christology has never accepted the ancient philosophic doctrine of " the impassibility of God," [1] except in the very limited sense that *He cannot be made to suffer by any being lower than Himself.* It has never at any time denied His capacity for redemptive suffering, voluntarily undertaken for the salvation of His creatures. On the contrary, it is part of the formulated faith of Christendom that Almighty God, *in the Person of His Incarnate Son,* has stooped, not merely to become man, but also to suffer on the cross. The Church, while avoiding such unqualified expressions as " God suffered," lest it should be imagined that all three Persons of the Trinity became incarnate and died, has admitted into the language of orthodoxy the expression, " One of the Trinity was crucified," and the Fifth Ecumenical Council (Constantinople II, A.D. 553) has anathematized all who deny it.[2]

The tendency of recent theology towards a fuller appreciation of God's capacity for redemptive suffering is a thoroughly wholesome one, and, so far from being unorthodox, arises naturally out of the view of the Incarnation officially defined by the ancient general councils.

[1] The absolute " impassibility " of God was a doctrine upon which all the heathen philosophers of antiquity (including Epicurus) were completely agreed.

[2] See the 6th Capitulum of the proceedings of this Council: " If any one does not confess that our Lord Jesus Christ, who was crucified in the flesh, is true God, and the Lord of glory, and *one of the Holy Trinity,* let him be anathema."

In our discussion of the difficult problem of the Two Natures, it will be well to start from the position (admitted by Dr. Mackintosh to be the correct one) that Incarnation means *God becoming man*. And inasmuch as many of the more advanced members of his school reject the doctrine of the "personal" Trinity altogether, preferring to regard God as one Person with three distinct operations, and Dr. Mackintosh himself, though a Trinitarian, lays little stress upon the distinction of Persons in God, and refuses to draw important inferences from it, it will be convenient in the first instance to consider only the broad principle of the Incarnation, without definite allusion to that Trinitarian background, which is implied even in the New Testament, and which becomes fully explicit in later theology.

If, then, God becomes man, *He must limit Himself*. His infinite consciousness must become in some real way *finite*: and, when we come carefully to consider what is implied in the difference between an *infinite consciousness*, which embraces in one view all time and all existence, which knows all things possible as well as all things actual, which views *sub specie æternitatis* both its own intrinsic life and the life of the universe as it unfolds itself gradually through the long æons of its history, and which also sustains all things in being and guides them towards their final end by the operation of an all-embracing and all-powerful will—between this, I say, and a mere *finite consciousness* which looks at the world through the eyes and

mind of Jesus of Nazareth, then I think we can hardly deny that a difference so vast and overwhelming amounts in practice to a difference of *kind*, and that God, in becoming incarnate, acquired *a new nature*. The difference of which I am speaking is not confined to the realms of knowledge and power; it extends to the moral and emotional life also. The Incarnate One acquires new feelings (*e.g.* fear, and emotions arising out of the sense of weakness and dependence). He becomes liable to temptation. He is also capable of new virtues (*e.g.* courage, and creaturely obedience), impossible to a Being purely divine. Further, He ceases to be immutable, develops or evolves through every stage of human growth, increases in wisdom and knowledge, and (though sinless from the first) advances with painful effort towards the goal of complete human virtue. The significance of all this can only be adequately expressed in terms of the traditional doctrine that God by incarnation took upon Him *a new nature*, *i.e.* human nature. Human nature, though made in the image of God and akin to Him, is nevertheless, as being finite and dependent, qualitatively and ontologically distinct. Finitude involves a mode of being, not merely quantitatively, but also *qualitatively* different from that of infinitude. Consequently, when God became man, He adopted what can only fairly be called *a second nature*. No language less emphatic can do justice to the facts.

It is not less evident that God, by becoming incarnate, did not absolutely denude Himself of

His unlimited divine attributes ; for had He done so, He would, by becoming man, have practically ceased to be God, a supposition which reason refuses to entertain. Indeed, had this happened, the whole universe would have fallen into confusion, or rather, would have been entirely annihilated, for clearly the limited human intelligence and power of Jesus of Nazareth were inadequate to guide and sustain it.

We are driven, therefore, by the logic of the facts to conclude that when God became incarnate for man's salvation, *two distinct modes of consciousness* became established, viz. an *infinite mode*, in which He knew all things and exercised all power, and a *finite mode*, in which His knowledge and power and other perfections were limited to human measure. Doubtless, since God is essentially indivisible, He was manifested " totally " in both modes (to speak technically, He was *totus in carne*, and *totus extra carnem*) ; nevertheless, these two modes, however close their union and intimate their interpenetration, as being modes of a single personality, must have remained *distinct*. For had the infinite mode at any time been merged in the finite, God would have been practically annihilated ; and if, on the other hand, the finite mode had ever been merged in the infinite, the manhood of Jesus would have entirely ceased to exist, and the Incarnation would have been reduced to a Theophany —the appearance of the Almighty and Infinite in a soulless human body, which was not organically His own. Two unacceptable consequences, there-

fore, flow logically from the denial of the Two Natures ; either (1) the reduction of the Incarnation to a mere Theophany, or else (2) the virtual annihilation of God.

If we now look at the matter from the Trinitarian standpoint, our general line of argument still holds. For if the eternal Son of God, who became man, is completely God—if the whole "substance" of Godhead (as orthodoxy teaches) is "totally" in Him, then it is almost as hard to think of Him as virtually ceasing to be God at the Incarnation, as to think of God in general, or the whole Trinity, doing so. All Christians regard God as immutable in His fundamental nature and attributes, and though we can think of Him as limiting the exercise of certain of them in a particular sphere, we cannot think of Him as resigning them altogether. It follows, therefore, from the Christian view of the fundamental character of Godhead, that the Son of God must have possessed, after His Incarnation, as well an *infinite* as a *finite* mode of consciousness—in other words, He must, although only a single Person, have possessed Two Natures, the one finite and human, the other infinite and divine.

We have further to remember, that according to the scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, God's supreme moral perfection, His *love*, is primarily constituted, not by His love of creatures, but by the mutual love of Father, Son and Spirit. In this connection, Holy Scripture lays especially stress upon the mutual love of the Father and His

co-equal Son—that "Son of His love" who was in "the bosom of the Father" before His Incarnation, and indeed from eternity.[1] If, now, we suppose that the Son of God at His Incarnation reduced Himself entirely to manhood (*i.e.* virtually ceased to be God), it follows that the Father lost for a time an Infinite Object of His love—in other words that the Trinity was morally mutilated, and God ceased to be perfect love.

Finally, it is the doctrine of Holy Scripture, that the Son (or Word, or Logos) of God exercises cosmic functions. It is through Him that the world is created; it is He who rules and upholds it; He is also its inner principle of order and coherence (John i. 3; 1 Cor. viii. 6; Eph. iii. 9; Col. i. 16; Heb. i. 2).

Now although it is not quite *unthinkable* that the Logos at his Incarnation abandoned His cosmic functions, yet a theory which implies that He did so, labours under the gravest difficulties. Surely we are not warranted in accepting belief in what amounts to *a revolution* in the internal life of the Godhead, and in the order of the universe, unless the arguments produced in its favour are *coercive*, which they are far from being.[2]

[1] John i. 1-2, 18; xvii. 5.

[2] All that Dr. Mackintosh has to say in reply to this very strong objection to the Kenotic theory is as follows: "After all, it is a fundamental truth that the world is upheld by God, not by a constituent or part of God. There are spheres in which division of labour is unmeaning. We must simply confess that we know nothing of an existence of the Logos apart from but synchronous with His reality in Jesus, and that statements of a dogmatic character on the subject have no apprehensible reality for our minds" (*op. cit.*, p. 485).

In reply to the oft-urged charge, that " the fearful riddle of Two Natures in One Person " with which the Fathers of Chalcedon " vexed themselves and their descendants " has introduced a fundamental discord and contradiction into the harmonious life of Christ as depicted by the evangelists, I would submit the following considerations :—

(1) That inasmuch as the two " natures," " activities," and " wills " are those of a single Person, and Him divine, it is hardly possible to suppose that any such " discord " as that imagined would ever occur. Surely it is much more natural to assume with the Sixth Ecumenical Council [1] which defined the doctrine of the two " operations " [2] and two " wills," [3] that " the two natural wills of Christ are not opposed," but that on the contrary " His human will, so far from opposing or resisting, rather subjects itself to His divine and almighty will."

(2) There is scriptural evidence (and that not only in the Fourth Gospel, but also in the Synoptics) that Christ possessed a limited human will, distinct from the divine will, which, though always conforming itself in the end to the divine will, yet did so at times at the cost of an inward struggle.[4]

[1] Constantinople III, A.D. 680.
[2] *ἐνέργειαι.* [3] *θελήματα.*
[4] Thus in the agony in the garden, Jesus prays (Luke xxii. 42), " Father, if Thou be willing, remove this cup from Me ; nevertheless, not *My* will (*θέλημα*), but *Thine* be done." The distinction of wills is also evident in John v. 30 (*cp.* vi. 38), " I seek not Mine own will, but the will of Him that sent Me." The " obedience " of Christ, so often alluded to (Phil. ii. 8,

(3) Christ's humanity would have been imperfect (and indeed unreal), unless it had possessed a finite " operation " and finite " will," distinct from the infinite operation and will of unlimited Godhead, which also was His in another " sphere " or " mode " of His consciousness.

Two final difficulties remain :—(1) Do not two " modes " or " spheres " of consciousness imply two persons? and (2) Can such opposites as knowledge and ignorance, power and impotence, coexist in one person without contradiction?

Reverence, which is also true wisdom, requires us here to speak with caution, remembering that though the divine and human natures are sufficiently akin to make the argument from analogy valid, yet there are mysteries in God which no human intellect can fathom.

Making use, then, of human experience for what it is worth, we can venture to affirm with some confidence that there are numerous reasons for supposing that two (relatively distinct) modes of consciousness may coexist in a single personality, and further that the same person may both know and also be (relatively) ignorant of the same thing, even at the same time.

(1) A person possessing the not very unusual gift of automatic writing places his hand upon a planchette-table furnished with a pencil, and occupies his entire attention with reading a book.

[a] etc.) also implies a distinct human will. All these and other passages are quoted by the Sixth Council in support of its decree.

The pencil then automatically traces intelligible sentences, the meaning of which is unknown to the writer until he actually reads them. This familiar experiment affords clear proof of the co-existence of two streams of thought and two modes of consciousness within a single personality.

(2) A thinker attempts to solve a difficult problem, and fails. Disgusted with his failure, he puts the problem aside, and employs himself with some other work which entirely occupies him. When he returns to his mental task, *the solution of the problem instantly appears*, which indicates that, while he was otherwise engaged, his mind (without his knowledge) has thought the problem out.

(3) A person is hypnotized, and undergoes in that condition various experiences, and gains various items of knowledge. When he wakes, everything is forgotten, and he may accordingly be said to be " ignorant " of everything which he experienced or learned while in the hypnotic state. *Nevertheless the knowledge is truly in his mind,* and shows itself in unmistakable ways, especially by causing him to perform or to refrain from performing actions, which, but for the possession of this knowledge, he would not have performed or refrained from performing. What is still more extraordinary, a sensitive hypnotic subject may be made both to see and not to see the same object at the same moment. For example, he may be told not to see a lamp-post, whereupon he becomes (in the ordinary sense) quite *unable* to see it. *Nevertheless he does see it,* because he avoids it, and

cannot be induced by any possible device to precipitate himself against it.

(4) Recent psychology has made us familiar with various " censors," which guard the threshold of consciousness, and prevent ideas, feelings, and items of knowledge which are really in the mind (as is shown by their influence on conduct and character) from crossing this threshold and becoming perceptible, except in disguised and symbolic forms.

(5) Again, the actual contents of a man's consciousness at any one moment are probably not more than a millionth part of his *potential* consciousness. Most of our knowledge is potential only. Some of it can be revived in memory easily, some with great difficulty, some only under very peculiar circumstances (not likely to occur) which may give a " cue " to it : we recognize, therefore, that our actual consciousness is surrounded by a vast area of potential consciousness, which, however, influences our actions in many subtle and imperceptible ways, protecting us from mistakes, and guiding us to form true judgments, without actually coming before the mind in any recognizable form.

Of course, none of these illustrations are more than distant analogies. They are quite insufficient to afford us any adequate view of the actual relations obtaining between the human consciousness and the divine consciousness of our Lord Jesus Christ. Nevertheless, they are sufficient to show that *there is no contradiction*, either logical or practical, in supposing (as orthodoxy does) that the

finite or human consciousness of the Redeemer was compassed about by an infinite ocean of divine consciousness belonging to the same personality, into which it could only partly penetrate, but by which it was nevertheless so completely guided and illuminated that the result was, for the Incarnate Life, not indeed omniscience (a thing impossible for a finite nature), but certainly real infallibility in matters of faith and morals.[1]

Immanence and the Incarnation

A leading feature of Prof. Mackintosh's Chris-

[1] The self-consciousness of Jesus, as depicted in the Gospels, though truly human, is by no means *purely* human. As being the consciousness of the Word-made-flesh it was a divine-human consciousness. Both the divine and the human elements were always present, but sometimes the one, sometimes the other, emerged into special prominence. According to the Synoptic record, Jesus was aware, at least from the date of His baptism, not only that He was actually the unique Son of God, but also that He had been so even before that event. This is sufficiently indicated by the past tense of εὐδόκησα ("in Thee I *was* well pleased," Mark i. 11). According to St. Luke, He was aware, even as a child of twelve, of a special filial relation to His heavenly Father (see Plummer's note on Luke ii. 48-9). At the Transfiguration, and at the utterance of such words as are recorded in Matt. xi. 25-30, His Divine Sonship was plainly in the focus of His consciousness. Nor is it true (as is often hastily assumed because the technical term is absent) that the idea of Christ as the Divine "Logos," ruling and sustaining all creation, is absent from the Synoptic Gospels. The words Christ used in rebuking the winds and waves, "Peace, *be muzzled*," can only be explained on the supposition that He knew Himself to be the absolute Lord, not only of human souls, but also of physical nature—in other words, the "Logos."

Undoubtedly the divine and the human elements in our Lord's personal life operated *inseparably*, and in *perfect harmony*; nevertheless (for the reasons stated above) it is necessary to regard them as *distinct*.

tology is his attempt to come to terms with modern thought [1] by defining the Incarnation in terms of "Immanence." He does so with some hesitation —indeed in one passage he warns his readers that "it is necessary that we should avoid confusing immanence with identity." [2] Yet his desire to conciliate "the modern mind" is so strong, that he forgets his warning, and finally commits himself to the position that "One true mode of describing Christ . . . is to speak of His Person as representing *the absolute immanence of God.*" [3]

He considers that creation "in a perfectly real sense is incarnation; nature is the body of the infinite Spirit, the organism which the divine thought has articulated and filled with the breath of life." He teaches further that "divine immanence is essentially a matter of *degree*, and that the degrees of it are morally conditioned," from which he draws the conclusion that God is especially immanent in *good* men, and in them in proportion to their goodness. He then states that "in Christ immanence reaches its climax," and that "the self-giving God is wholly present in Jesus."

"The divine indwelling," says Prof. Mackintosh, "must vary in quality and intensity with the receptiveness of man." "Now of this divine inhabitation we are entitled to regard Christ as the transcendent climax . . . all that can be named divine immanence comes to itself in Him, and is

[1] "No conception has seized the modern mind more powerfully than that of divine immanence" (*op. cit.* p. 431).
[2] P. 432. [3] P. 434.

consummated, for in Him alone there exist ethical conditions which make form and content equal to one another." [1]

That God was really " in " Christ in a perfect and consummating manner, every orthodox Christian believes ; but there is a world of difference between God being " in " Christ by way of " Immanence " and being " in " Him by way of " Incarnation." Immanence means " God dwelling in man "; Incarnation means " God *becoming* man," an idea entirely distinct and indeed contradictory. " Immanence " (or indwelling) can only exist, when that which indwells and that which is indwelt, are *distinct* from one another. If they are not distinct from one another, there is no longer " immanence," but " identity." Thus it is quite correct to speak of the soul as " immanent " in the body, because body and soul, though so closely related, are distinct. But it would be nonsense to speak of the soul as " immanent " in *itself*, or of the body as " immanent " in *itself*, because the relation of a thing to itself is " identity," not " immanence."

To quote what I have said elsewhere : " It must be obvious to every logical mind upon careful reflection, that the idea of God *dwelling in* man (which is what is meant by Immanence) and that of God *becoming* man (which is what is meant by Incarnation) are radically distinct, and indeed contradictory. Indwelling, however ideally perfect, can never (if logically interpreted) yield any

[1] See pp. 431-40.

other idea than that of *a man in whom God dwells*, a God-possessed, God-inspired, and God-sanctified man (ἄνθρωπος ἔνθεος, οὐ θεός). Never by any possibility can it yield the idea of a man who is actually God (θεάνθρωπος, θέανδρος). Both theologically and devotionally the difference between Immanence and Incarnation is enormous. If God is not man, but only dwells in man, then He can only know human experience *from outside*; He cannot know it *as His own*. He necessarily knows *all about it*, because He is omniscient, but He cannot possibly know it with the 'knowledge of direct acquaintance.' . . . The only possible way in which even God, omnipotent and omniscient as He is, could actually gain a real human experience, is *by actually becoming man*." [1]

Dr. Mackintosh's treatment of "immanence" is not only unsatisfactory in itself, but it contradicts the general line of argument in the rest of his book, which is to the effect, not that Jesus was a man in whom God *specially dwelt*, but that He *was actually* God Incarnate.

I greatly hope that, in a later edition, Prof. Mackintosh will see his way to reconsider and modify some of the positions here criticized. His statements that "Jesus is identical with God in will," and that the Incarnation may be rightly regarded as "the absolute immanence of God," entirely fail to safeguard the faith which he holds dear, for there is hardly a Unitarian who would not accept them. If Jesus was really sinless, as

[1] *Creeds or no Creeds?* pp. 145-7.

most Unitarians admit, then, even if He was not more than man, He was "identical with God in will,"[1] and in Him God was "supremely immanent."

At the beginning of his enquiry, Dr. Mackintosh laid down the principle that "it is unnecessary to clothe [the doctrine of the Incarnation] in the formulas of conciliar theology." Without disputing the abstract truth of this proposition, the student of Dr. Mackintosh's treatise may still be permitted to doubt whether the author, in spite of all his diligence and learning, has succeeded in finding formulas that are really better.

Modernism

It is impossible in the space available to deal adequately with so large and complex a subject as Modernism, and it is the less necessary to do so, as the present writer has dealt fully with the movement in a recent book (*Creeds or no Creeds? A*

[1] Two persons do not become the same person, because, or in proportion as, they will the same things. In the abstract, we might imagine two persons so united in thought, that the whole content of their wills was *identical*. But they would not therefore be or become the same person. They would remain *numerically distinct*. Of course, if we could prove that the will of Jesus and the will of God were in all respects *identical psychical acts*, we might infer from this identity of Person. But this is not alleged by Dr. Mackintosh, and Dr. Temple definitely contradicts it ("Christ's will, as a subjective function, is of course not the Father's will; but the contents of the Wills—the Purpose—is the same."—*Foundations*, p. 248). The mere fact that God's will is infinite and Christ's human will finite, is a clear indication that they are psychically distinct acts.

Critical Examination of the Basis of Modernism, 1922).

The term "Modernism" is somewhat ambiguous. Sometimes it is used to denote the attitude of those numerous Christians who maintain that the outlook of the modern Church should be modern (not medieval, or ancient), that modern methods of criticism should be employed in the study of the Bible and theology, that a sympathetic attitude should be adopted towards modern philosophy and science, and, above all, that the doctrines of the Church should be restated in modern language, and explained by the help of those categories and forms of thought which are familiar to modern thinkers.

In this sense Bishop Gore, and practically all apologists of the Anglican Communion, might fairly be called "Modernists."

More usually, however, the term "Modernism" is used to describe the views of a much more advanced school of liberal theologians, who, while accepting the doctrines of the Incarnation and of the Trinity (usually in a much "reduced" or minimizing sense) have yet so far diverged from orthodoxy as to have accepted the two following theological positions:

(1) "That all the doctrines of the Church, even those formulated in the Apostles' and Nicene Creeds, so far from being absolutely true and immutable (as has hitherto been assumed) are subject to correction and even rejection, as human knowledge advances, and need not be accepted by

modern Christians in their usual or traditional sense.

(2) That miracles, if not absolutely impossible, are at least in practice incredible, and that therefore even the great miracles connected with the Person of Christ, and defined as vital in the Creeds —viz. the Virgin Birth, the Bodily Resurrection, and the Bodily Ascension of Jesus Christ—are not historic facts.

The English Modernists, though small in numbers, are a well-led, well-organized, and decidedly enterprising group,[1] and as several of their more prominent adherents are distinguished writers and thinkers, they are able to exercise considerable influence on public opinion.

Modernists are not homogeneous in doctrine: their views vary from approximate orthodoxy [2] to something hardly to be distinguished from Unitarianism.[3] The more extreme of them adopt a pantheistic or semi-pantheistic theory of the Incarnation. In their view, human nature, if not actually divine at present, is at least capable of deification. They regard Jesus as a man, naturally conceived and born, who, as a reward for His

[1] Their official organization is "The Churchman's Union," and their organ *The Modern Churchman.*

[2] The Christology of Dr. Henson, who till recently ranked as a typical Modernist, is approximately (perhaps entirely) orthodox.

[3] According to Mr. H. D. A. Major (a good authority), the charge of Unitarianism "is a serious one, and deserves serious attention. A well-known Unitarian layman recently wrote of the principal speakers at the Cambridge Conference, that he could not see where their position differed from his own" (*Hibbert Journal,* January 1922).

unequalled virtue, and unexampled services to mankind, was exalted after death to divine rank, and became "consubstantial with God." Jesus however, it is held, is only "the first-born of many brethren." All His faithful followers may hope hereafter to become consubstantial sons of God in precisely the same sense. The worship of Jesus is defended on the ground that He has now become the "consubstantial Son of God." It is not perceived that, since deification is the destiny of all faithful Christians, all these also will one day *become equally adorable*, and, accordingly, the eternal employment of saints in heaven will consist, not merely in the worship of the Eternal and of the Lord Jesus, but also, and not less, in *the worship of one another and themselves.*

Hardly anyone outside the Modernist movement supposes that so extravagant a type of belief as this has any considerable future before it in the modern world. It is criticized with almost equal severity by orthodox Christians and Liberal Protestants, who are agreed in maintaining that, so far from being typically "modern," it is a mere recrudescence of certain half-forgotten Pagan superstitions, which the world has long outgrown, viz. (1) the apotheosis and worship of heroes, and (2) unlimited polytheism.

"Adoptionism [or Apotheosis]," writes Prof. Lake, who has recently abandoned Modernism for Liberal Protestantism, "seems to me to have no part or lot in any intelligent modern theology, though it is unfortunately often promulgated,

especially in pulpits which are regarded as liberal. We cannot believe that at any time a human being, in consequence of his virtue, became God, which he was not before, or that any human being will ever do so. No doctrine of Christology, and no doctrine of salvation, which is Adoptionist in essence, can come to terms with modern thought." [1]

[1] *Landmarks in Early Christianity*, p. 131.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

SINCE the last edition of this work was issued the production of theological books has not been very large, and the revised bibliographies then appended to each chapter will still be found serviceable. They may be supplemented by the following short list, which, though far from complete, will probably suffice for most ordinary purposes.

The new periodical *Theology* (published monthly at 1s.) devotes great attention to apologetics, and is indispensable to those who wish to study present-day difficulties from the modern (but orthodox) standpoint.

Of books with a definitely apologetic aim, the most comprehensive and important are Bishop Gore's *Belief in God* (7s. 6d.) and *Belief in Christ* (7s. 6d.), which together cover nearly the whole field. The following works deal for the most part with special aspects of apologetics: J. H. Beibitz, *Belief, Faith, and Proof* (on Theism, 6s.); *The Return of Christendom*, by a Group of Churchmen (on social questions, 7s. 6d.); H. M. Relton, *A Study in Christology* (7s. 6d.); R. H. Mackintosh, *The Person of Jesus Christ* (S.C.M., 2s.) and *The Divine Initiative* (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.); J. E. Davey, *Our Faith in God through Jesus Christ* (S.C.M., 3s. 6d.); W. Spens, *Belief and Practice*; T. K. Mozley, *Christ and the Nicene Creed* (1s.); O. C. Quick, *Liberalism, Modernism, and Tradition* (7s. 6d.); A. C. Headlam, *The Doctrine of the Church and Christian*

Reunion (defends the Nicene Creed, 12*s.*) ; C. P. Nolloth (ed.), *The Christian Faith* (mainly liberal, 7*s.* 6*d.*) ; W. Temple, *The Faith and Modern Thought* (3*s.*) ; Lily Dougall and others, *God and the Struggle for Existence* (S.C.M., 4*s.* 6*d.*) ; the Archbishop of York (ed.), *Fundamentals of the Faith* (1*s.*) ; C. Anderson Scott, *Dominus Noster* (6*s.*) ; T. J. Thorburn, *The Historical Jesus* (1*s.* 6*d.*) ; A. Nairne, *The Faith of the N.T.* (6*s.*) ; J. M. Shaw, *The Resurrection of Christ* (9*s.*) ; N. P. Williams, *The First Easter Morning* ; W. R. Matthews (ed.), *King's College Lectures on Immortality* (mainly liberal) ; W. O. E. Oesterley, *Immortality and the Unseen World* ; H. E. Fosdick, *The Assurance of Immortality* (S.C.M., 3*s.*) ; A. E. J. Rawlinson, *Studies in Historical Christianity* (4*s.*) ; Bishop Gore, *Christian Moral Principles* (4*s.*) ; Archbishop D'Arcy, *Christian Ethics and Modern Thought* (2*s.* 6*d.*) ; L. S. Thornton, *Conduct and the Supernatural* (8*s.*) ; T. A. Lacey, *Shaken Beliefs* (1*s.* 6*d.*).

On the Atonement may be mentioned, W. J. S. Simpson, *Reconciliation between God and Man* (3*s.* 6*d.*) ; S. A. McDowall, *Evolution and the Need of Atonement* (7*s.* 6*d.*) ; V. F. Storr, *The Problem of the Cross* (5*s.*).

The most important recent contribution to Christian philosophy are the Gifford Lectures of Prof. C. C. J. Webb, published in two volumes, *God and Personality* (12*s.* 6*d.*), and *Divine Personality and Human Life* (12*s.* 6*d.*). We may mention also W. R. Matthews, *Studies in Christian Philosophy* (12*s.*) ; O. C. Quick, *Modern Philosophy and the Incarnation* (1*s.* 6*d.*) ; Canon Peter Green, *The Problem of Evil* (5*s.*) ; G. Galloway, *Religion and Modern Thought* (8*s.*) ; Baron F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion* (representative of apologetic R.C. Modernism, 15*s.*) ; C. J. Shebbeare, *The Challenge of the Universe.* For some time to come the apologist will have to reckon seriously with Prof. A. Seth Pringle-Pattison's much-discussed book, *The Idea of God in the Light of Recent Philosophy* (16*s.*, 1920). The writer's exposition of Theism upon a semi-pantheistic basis forms the metaphysical background of most of the recent Modernist Christology of an advanced type.

Books upon psychology and religion have been numerous, but for the most part of very moderate quality.

The only one that can be confidently recommended is R. H. Thouless's *Introduction to the Psychology of Religion* (*7s. 6d.*, 1923). Of the rest the least unsatisfactory seem to be F. R. Barry's *Christianity and Psychology* (S.C.M., *5s.*), and T. W. Pym's *Psychology and the Christian Life* (S.C.M.), and E. A. Micklem's *Miracles and the New Psychology* (*7s. 6d.*).

The present tendency to base theology and ethics upon psychology seems to the present writer radically unsound. Many of its advocates have little idea of the profound revolution which it involves. *It really implies a change from objective truth to subjective opinion.* Psychology studies human thought *as subjective*, and does not concern itself with the external objects about which thought thinks. It follows that psychological theology is knowledge, not of God, but of man's religious ideas and feelings, and that "psychological" ethics is knowledge, not of the objective and eternal Moral Law, which (according to the older philosophic tradition and orthodox Christianity) binds all rational natures, including God's, with an absolute obligation, but merely of man's subjective moral tendencies, sentiments, and beliefs. Undoubtedly, upon the basis of mere psychological facts, religious and ethical, it is possible to construct a valid argument for the objective existence both of God and of an authoritative moral law; *but such an argument is in essence metaphysical, not psychological.* As soon as we quit the merely subjective standpoint, we leave psychology behind, and enter the realm of metaphysics and theology. Religion and morality, if based solely upon psychology, instead of upon metaphysics and logic, become simply matters of taste, convenience, and utility, and may be expected to vary indefinitely, not merely according to race and individual idiosyncrasy, but even to no inconsiderable extent according to latitude and longitude, for undoubtedly climate affects human psychology.

Psychology, if duly controlled and supplemented by the superior sciences of metaphysics, theology, and ethics, is able to make valuable contributions to the study of religious and moral questions, but if its strictly limited point of view is allowed to predominate in spheres which do not belong to it, nothing but mischief can result.

The literature of *Modernism* is international and voluminous. A full bibliography is given in *Creeds or no Creeds?*, pp. 369-76. For a preliminary study the following works are sufficient: A. Loisy, *L'évangile et l'église*, 1902 (E.T. by C. Home, 1903); E. Le Roy, *Dogme et critique*, 1907; Anon., *Il Programma dei Modernisti*, 1908 (E.T. by A. L. Lilley); A Fogazzaro, *Il Santo*, 1905 (E.T. by M. Prichard-Agnetti). The more moderate school is worthily represented by *Le réalisme chrétien* and other works of L. Laberthonnière. The most representative works of the English movement are P. Gardner, *Exploratio Evangelica* (2nd edition, 1907); C. H. S. Matthews (ed.), *Faith or Fear*, 1916, and *Faith and Freedom*, 1918; G. Tyrrell, *Christianity at the Cross Roads*, 1909; B. H. Streeter (ed.), *Foundations*, 1912 (semi-Modernist); and the reports of recent Modernist Conferences. Moderate R.C. Modernism is well represented by F. von Hügel, *Essays and Addresses on the Philosophy of Religion*, 1921. The history has been exhaustively and admirably treated in A. Houtin's *Histoire du modernisme catholique*, 1912. The recent works of Bishop Gore are the best orthodox reply in English to the Modernist position as a whole.

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